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USSR Report

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 1, Jan-Mar 1984

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5 September 1984

USSR REPORT

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 1, Jan-Mar 1984

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EDITORIAL CONTRASTS U.S., SOVIET POLICY IN ASIA

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 84 pp 19-29

[Editorial: "The Soviet Union Favors Peace and Security on the Asian Continent"]

Meeting the vital interests and most cherished desires of the Soviet people, the USSR directs its policy at safeguarding and consolidating peace, curbing the arms race, and expanding cooperation among all countries. "We do not separate the well-being of our people and the security of the Soviet state from that of other nations, other countries, much less counterweigh them", said Yuri Andropov on September 29, 1983.

The Soviet foreign policy of peace differs from and opposes the policy of the present US administration—a militarist policy aimed at securing predominant positions in the world for US imperialism regardless of the interests of other states and peoples.

The antithesis between Soviet foreign policy, which is based on socialist principles and genuine humaneness, and the foreign policy of the United States, which expresses imperialism's aggressive substance, is easily seen in various spheres.

US imperialism is out to achieve nuclear supremacy, to intimidate the world with the possible use of weapons of mass annihilation, to build up their stockpiles on an unprecedented scale, and to establish its military presence far away from the United States. The US interferes in the affairs of other countries, not short of direct armed aggression, and has made arbitrary behaviour a norm in its international relations. The Reagan Administration, obsessed with the idea of a "crusade" against communism and other progressive forces, has stoked up tensions in all parts of the world—Europe, the Middle East, Central America, Asia and Africa.

Soviet foreign policy, on the other hand, as shaped by the resolutions of the 24th, 25th and 26th Congresses of the CPSU, has been and is steadily directed at safeguarding peace and at protecting the right of nations to independence and social progress. The Soviet policy is consistent, considered, and true to principle.

One of the main goals of the Soviet foreign policy is to promote peace and security in Asia.

Since the Great October Socialist Revolution which awakened Asia, the peoples of that continent, numbering more than half the world population, have achieved no few changes in the fight for their national and social emancipation. The disgraceful colonial system has collapsed. The oppressed peoples of Asia have achieved political independence or have safeguarded themselves against imperialist enslavement, thereby gaining the opportunity to build their life as they think best. Mongolia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, China, and the countries of Indochina opted for socialism. The changes did not come about by themselves. They were the result of an arduous, consuming anti-imperialist struggle during which the Soviet Union stood by their side and helped them consolidate their political and economic independence.

The positive changes witnessed all over Asia go against imperialism's grain. The imperialists would be more than glad to turn back the pro-

gressive course of history, to hamper social progress, to prevent the Asian nations from consolidating their independence, and are breeding fear and suspicion among them. They prod them towards confrontation, and thereby obstruct the final elimination of the still remaining seats of tension. They need this climate of confrontation to be able to replace former colonial methods of oppression with more refined methods of neocolonialism disguised as hypocritical concern for the maintenance of Asia's ties with the "free world".

The following main points are distinctly seen now in the US administration's activity on the international scene, aimed at directing developments in Asia along a tack that suits the interests of US imperialism.

First, the US administration is out to maintain, even escalate, the presence of US armed forces, especially those with nuclear weapons, in Asian countries and the adjoining seas and oceans.

Second, it seeks closer political and military cooperation with imperialist Japan, the latter's tacit commitment to the global designs of US imperialism, to its confrontation with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community.

Third, it is bent on forming a political and military alliance of the NATO model in Asia and the region of the Pacific Ocean, which would unprotestingly serve the far-reaching expansionist plans of US monopolies.

Fourth, it is taking all possible steps to prevent China from reverting to goodneighbourly relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

Fifth, it is backing reactionary regimes in Asian countries; its all-round aid, however, is anything but altruistic and is accompanied by all-out penetration of US capital in the economy of the countries concerned; the other side of the picture is a policy of isolation, discrimination, of all kinds of "sanctions" towards countries that are carrying out progressive social and economic changes against the wishes of the USA.

Sixth, it is seeing to it that seats of tension remain in the relations between Asian countries, and does not shrink from direct interference in their internal affairs through military support of various counter-revolutionary riffraff that has taken asylum in neighbouring states.

Lastly, it has perfected the machinery of lies and slanders about the socialist countries, notably the Soviet Union, of frightening Asian peoples with talk of a "threat" to them from their socialist neighbours, and shrinks from nothing to further its aims.

The United States, Japan, and countries in Asia and the Pacific Ocean tied to Washington's apron strings have created an enormous war machine which is directed against the Soviet Union and other progressive forces in the region. The Western press reports that the overseas grouping of US armed forces in the Far East is second in terms of military might and accounts for over 300 military installations, including 32 bases in Japan, 40 in South Korea, and 11 in the Philippines.

One thousand US aircraft of the forward-based nuclear force are stationed in the Far East and in the Indian Ocean. The US nuclear force in this region also includes nuclear-carrying submarines.

That US policy in the Far East flouts the security interests of the Asian nations is made clear by many recent facts, and notably by President Reagan's November 1983 visit to Japan and South Korea with the prime purpose of expediting the two countries' war preparations and speeding up the foundation of a Washington-Tokyo-Seoul triple alliance as the core of a new multilateral reactionary political and military alliance in Asia and the Pacific.

It is not incidentally that Reagan had had to confine his visit to only the closest US allies, and called off the planned tour of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, where the hegemonic imperialist policy of the United States is running into mounting public resistance. In Japan, too, the progressive public met the US President with sharp disapproval and protest. Reagan's visit raised apprehensions in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and other Asian countries. The World Peace Council and the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation branded the US President's visit to Japan and South Korea as an act furthering America's militaristic strategic plans, and called on the public at large to denounce the dangerous US arms buildup in the Far East and the Pacific Ocean.

In contrast to the US administration, the Soviet government wants confrontation in Asia to give way to dialogue and rapprochement. It wants tension and suspicion to give way to confidence, and isolation and estrangement to be substituted by broad political, economic and cultural cooperation among all countries of the region irrespective of their social system.

Soviet foreign policy in Asia proceeds from Lenin's principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. Nor has the Soviet Union forgotten the socialist political and diplomatic objectives which Lenin formulated in relation to countries subjected to imperialist exploitation, namely, support of their efforts to buttress national independence, aid to all progressive undertakings, help in overcoming economic and cultural backwardness, strict equality and noninterference in internal affairs, understanding and respect for national and historical traditions, promotion of their equal participation in settling international problems, and solidarity with their fight against imperialism.

People in the Soviet Union follow the postwar development of new mutual relations among Asian countries with deep attention. The USSR commends the resolutions of the 1955 Bandung Conference. It regards the nonaligned movement, which derives its strength from its orientation against imperialism, colonialism, war and aggression, as an important force in contemporary international relations. The message of greeting sent by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers to the Seventh Conference of Nonaligned Countries in Delhi (March 1983) noted that "the efforts of the nonaligned movement in the fight for peace and international security, for halting the arms race and furthering disarmament, for restructuring international economic relations along just democratic lines, and for complete and allround decolonisation, have always found, and now find, wholehearted support in the Soviet Union."

The Soviet Union takes an active part in the search for ways to consolidate peace and security and to promote equal cooperation on the Asian continent. In 1976 the 25th Congress of the CPSU declared the Soviet Union's readiness to treat "with the utmost attention any proposals prompted by a concern for lasting peace and security in Asia, and for assuring them by collective effort".¹ Among the urgent tasks furthering peace and the freedom and independence of nations, the Congress of the Soviet Communist Party pointed to the need for promoting security in Asia through the joint efforts of the Asian countries.²

Regarding the struggle for lessening the threat of war and curbing the arms race as the key stone of Soviet foreign policy, the 26th Congress of the CPSU proposed to adopt a set of new constructive political

¹ XXVth Congress of the CPSU. *Documents and Resolutions*. Moscow, 1976, p. 19.
See *Ibid.*, p. 31.

and military measures. Many of them relate directly to various parts of Asia—from the Middle East to the Far East.

Concern for preventing the emergence of seats of military conflict prompted the Soviet Union to express its readiness to conduct confidence-building negotiations with all interested countries in the Far East. Moreover, it was made clear from the outset that in the process of elaborating and applying confidence-building measures the USSR would fully consider the specificity of the region where such powers as the USSR, China and Japan neighbour upon each other, and where the USA has military bases. Among other things, the Soviet Union acted on the idea that confidence-building measures, if put into effect, would facilitate progress in the field of disarmament.

In March 1982, the Soviet Union came forward with one more important proposal which, if effected, could substantially lessen the tensions in the world as a whole and also around countries of Asia: it declared its readiness to negotiate mutual limitation of naval activity by the opposing blocs and, in particular, withdrawal of nuclear-capable submarines of both sides from the present vast areas of combat patrol, restricting them to mutually agreed-upon areas. The Soviet Union also expressed its readiness to discuss the extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans, especially in areas where ship traffic is heavy. In practical terms, this amounted to making the greatest possible part of the World Ocean a zone of peace in the immediate future.

In its address to the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in June 1982, the Soviet Union solemnly pledged no-first-use of nuclear weapons. If the other nuclear powers assumed a similarly unequivocal pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, this would, in effect, be tantamount to a general renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons.

At the Prague conference of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation's Political Consultative Committee in early 1983, its member-countries made the proposal for concluding a treaty on the mutual renunciation of armed force and the maintenance of peaceful relations among member-states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO, and for abstaining from extending the zone of operation of the two blocs to other regions of the world, including Asia.

The close attention that the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community devote to the objectives of peace and security in Asia is illustrated by the consultative meeting of the deputy foreign ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the People's Republic of Kampuchea, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Soviet Union, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which gathered in Ulan Bator on October 26-27, 1983. Its participants expressed readiness to examine all positive initiatives and to discuss them in a constructive light in order to work up measures to prevent the further deterioration of the situation in Asia, and to build mutual confidence and security. They reaffirmed their determination to persevere in the struggle for lasting peace in Asia, and agreed on concrete steps expanding cooperation and coordination in this most important issue.

When negotiating with the USA on a reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, the Soviet Union sought an agreement that would not merely ensure equal security for the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries, but would also relieve the tense situation in the rest of the world. The USSR took note of the apprehension expressed by China and Japan over the possible transfer of Soviet medium-range SS-20 missiles from Europe to the East, and made it quite clear that if a mutually accep-

table agreement were reached with the United States, the missiles subject to reduction would be destroyed and not deployed anywhere else.

On October 27, 1983, explaining the Soviet position at the negotiations with the United States, Yuri Andropov said: "In the event of an agreement limiting nuclear arms in Europe, the deployment of SS-20 missiles in the eastern regions of the Soviet Union would also be halted from the moment that agreement entered into force. And we shall abide by this commitment as long as no substantial changes occur in the strategic situation in the Asiatic region. This means, above all, that the United States should not deploy new medium-range nuclear weapons in areas where they would be capable of reaching the eastern part of Soviet territory."

In its efforts to eliminate the war threat and halt the arms race, the Soviet Union is working to create conditions for lasting peace in all regions of the world, Asia included. The United States, on the other hand, has begun stationing Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe and has thereby torpedoed the medium-range arms limitation negotiations. At the same time, it is building up nuclear missiles and other armaments in practically all the strategically important regions of the world, Asia included, and wants its allies to escalate their war preparations as well.

Having made clear that it favours buttressing Asian security by collective effort, the Soviet Union welcomes all constructive initiatives to that effect by other countries. Mention should be made, above all, of the proposal made by the Mongolian People's Republic at the 18th Congress of the MPRP in May 1981 on concluding a convention for mutual nonaggression and renunciation of force in relations between countries of Asia and of the Pacific Ocean. By the end of 1982, Mongolia had dispatched special messages spelling out its peace initiative to heads of state and government of sixty countries. The Mongolian proposal was actively backed by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union is a staunch supporter of the idea advanced by the nonaligned countries to make the Indian Ocean a peace zone, and favours withdrawal of all naval forces not belonging to the littoral states from that region. It holds that a pertinent international conference should be held, and is ready to resume negotiations with the United States on limiting and subsequently reducing military activity in the Indian Ocean. The idea is being blocked by the United States, which has amassed a large fleet of nuclear-carrying ships there and built a ramified network of military bases with the central strategic base located on Diego Garcia. Not only does this create a threat to Soviet security from the south, but also threatens the security and independence of Asian and African countries lying on the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Union's bilateral relations with Asian countries, be they socialist, developing or capitalist, are totally free of any elements of hegemonism. Soviet foreign policy never fails to acknowledge the equal rights of all countries, all races, all nationalities.

The Soviet Union maintains truly just, equal and fraternal relations with Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea. These countries hold the same views on all major problems and international issues of our day and age. The Soviet Union is doing its utmost to expand and enrich its ties with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In view of the present deterioration of the international situation, improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China is especially important and topical. The state of Soviet-Chinese relations of the past 20-odd years is seen by the Soviet Union as an anomaly. Sustaining the line set by the 24th, 25th and 26th Congresses of the CPSU, the Soviet Union has consistently worked for good-neighbourly ties with the People's Republic of China. The Soviet people have an ingrained feeling of respect and friendship for the people of China.

The Soviet side promotes the idea of normalising and gradually improving relations between the USSR and PRC on a basis of common sense, mutual respect, and mutual advantage.

"The CPSU and the Soviet state," Yuri Andropov said at the November 1982 Plenary Meeting of the CC CPSU, "sincerely want broader and better relations with all socialist countries. Mutual goodwill, respect for each other's legitimate interests, and common concern for the interests of socialism and peace must prompt correct solutions even where, for various reasons, the necessary confidence and mutual understanding are still lacking."

"This also applies to our great neighbour, the People's Republic of China."

The first round of Soviet-Chinese political consultations by special representatives of the two countries' governments took place in Peking in October 1982. Later, in the course of 1983, the consultations were resumed in Moscow, and then again in Peking. The third round of the Soviet-Chinese consultations, held on October 6-20, 1983, were held like the previous ones in a calm and outspoken atmosphere. The two sides saw the consultations as useful and agreed to hold the next round in Moscow in March 1984.

Soviet-Chinese trade has increased visibly in the past two years, and contacts in a number of other fields are also expanding gradually.

In all fields—political, economic, scientific and cultural—the Soviet Union is prepared to come to terms without preliminary conditions on measures acceptable to both sides and aimed at improving Soviet Chinese relations on a basis of respect for each other's interests, noninterference in each other's affairs, and mutual advantage without prejudice, of course, to third countries.

The present level of bilateral relations between the USSR and PRC is far too low. The Soviet Union feels that there are considerable opportunities for a further expansion of trade, and for economic, scientific and technical cooperation, for ties in such fields as culture and sports, and so on. Joint elaboration and realisation of confidence building measures in the proximity of the Soviet-Chinese border would be a good thing and would considerably help to improve relations between the two countries.

In June 1983, the Soviet government handed a memorandum to the PRC government suggesting that all nuclear powers should freeze their nuclear stockpiles quantitatively and qualitatively. The Soviet Union is ready for a political dialogue with China on the basic issues of world development, notably the buttressing of peace and international security.

"Certainly," Yuri Andropov observed on August 27, 1983, "we and China differ considerably in approach to some important international problems, and to relations with particular countries. But we firmly believe that Soviet-Chinese relations must not inflict damage on third countries and expect the same from the Chinese side."

Soviet ties with many of the Asian developing countries are becoming steadily wider and deeper. It is commonly recognised that this is helping to consolidate their political and economic independence, and has become an effective factor consolidating peace in Asia.

The traditionally friendly relations between the USSR and India are marked by respect and confidence between the leaders and peoples of the two countries, by the diversity of fields and forms of cooperation. Based on strict observance of the principles of sovereignty, equality, independence, mutual respect and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, Soviet-Indian relations are a striking example of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social and economic systems. The Soviet Union welcomes the greater role India is playing in international

affairs, which is also furthered by the fact that India is at present chairman of the nonaligned movement.

The Soviet Union sees no obstacles to beneficial cooperation with Indonesia and the other ASEAN countries.

The USSR has worked consistently for enduring and truly goodneighbourly relations with Japan. The Soviet Union's Far Eastern neighbour, ranking second in the capitalist world in economic power, could play a prominent part in fortifying peace in the Far East, if only by dint of its constitution which forbids it to have armed forces and renounces war.

But the foreign policy of Japan, which in contravention of its peaceful constitution has now built up a well equipped and trained armed force and entered a political and military alliance with the United States is showing evidence of increasingly negative trends—towards militarisation and towards commitment to Washington's dangerous global plans. As was recently pointed out by Nikolai Tikhonov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, the Japanese government has deliberately, not without obeisance to US wishes, begun dismantling the system of Soviet-Japanese relations created with so much effort on both sides since the war.

Japan is responding to Washington's calls for various sanctions against the USSR and other socialist countries. Moreover, Japanese leaders are endeavouring to play an active role in "rallying" the West to the side of the USA and demanding, as Premier Nakasone has done at the Williamsburg summit meeting, that the European capitalist powers should unreservedly support Reagan's adventurist policy.

Japan is far ahead of the European NATO countries in the annual rate of its military expenditures increase (6.8 per cent). The ruling element is intensively belabouring the minds of the people, scaring them with lies of a "Soviet threat", fanning revenge-seeking sentiment with ceaseless claims to Soviet territory, and demanding revision of the "peace article" of the constitution so as to open the doors to remilitarisation and Japan's expansion into a strong military power.

The sphere of operation of the Japanese-American "security treaty" is being widened. Japan has assumed "responsibility" for military action along sea and oceanic communication lines up to 1,000 miles from its shores. It is coordinating military activity with the US armed forces, including plans for blockading straits in the Far East against the Soviet ships. It is making its naval bases available to US aircraft carriers and other American surface ships and nuclear-armed submarines, and is adapting Misawa Air Base for new nuclear-capable US air force combat planes. The US military expects to deploy Tomahawk cruise missiles in Japan at some later date, and has admitted breaching Japan's "three non-nuclear principles" by carrying nuclear weapons to or via Japan.

Prime Minister Nakasone's intention of making Japan an "unsinkable aircraft carrier", which he expressed in January 1983 during his Washington visit, is seen as a symbol of Japan's current foreign policy. During Reagan's visit to Tokyo in November 1983, the Japanese Premier again voiced solidarity with the US policy of fanning international tensions, and of forming a triple USA-Japan-South Korea military alliance.

There are influential, sober-minded politicians in Japan who are conscious of the possible consequences of this course. Nakasone's diplomacy which stresses Japan's role as "a member of the Western world," writes the *Mainichi shimbun*, "is designed to turn Japan into a great power with influence on world politics, and will directly involve Tokyo in the sharpening East-West tensions and in destabilising the situation in Asia."³

As the Soviet Union sees it, it is in the interests of the Japanese nation and the cause of Asian peace, as well as those of the Soviet people, to have dependable goodneighbourly relations, mutually beneficial cooperation and mutual confidence between the USSR and Japan instead of confrontation. The Soviet attitude towards Japan is constructive and peaceful.

In the past few years the Soviet Union has approached Japan with a large number of constructive proposals:

Ever since 1973, the Soviet Union has been proposing an agreement on the principles of economic cooperation between the two countries on the model of similar highly profitable agreements that the USSR has signed with Great Britain, France, Canada, and a few other countries.

—In 1976 the Soviet Union suggested joint elaboration of a long-term (10 or 15 years) Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation programme with the emphasis on more intensive use of the resources of Siberia and the Soviet Far East.

—In 1975 the Soviet Union came forward with a proposal for a Soviet-Japanese treaty on goodneighbourly relations and cooperation covering fields ripe enough to be put on a reliable contractual basis. In January 1978 a concrete draft of such a treaty was put before the Japanese side. The Soviet Union also expressed its readiness to examine possible Japanese initiatives in this field, seeing that Japan is not yet ready to conclude a peace treaty.

In pursuance of the 26th CPSU Congress' decisions, the Soviet Union addressed a proposal to Japan in 1981 for concrete negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East. In 1982 it informed Japan that this proposal need not necessarily involve all countries of the region and that its implementation could be started on a bilateral basis, say, with Soviet-Japanese talks.

—It will be recalled that the Soviet Union has expressed readiness to guarantee on a contractual basis nonuse of nuclear weapons against countries that neither own, produce or have any on their territory. In 1982 the Soviet Union declared that it sees no obstacle to exchanging opinions on this topic with Japan—either in the framework of the proposal for negotiating on confidence-building measures in the Far East or in any other form acceptable to both sides.

All these proposals are still in force. "We in the Soviet Union," Nikolai Tikhonov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, has reiterated, "have all respect and sympathy for the people of Japan and sincerely wish that confidence and goodneighbourliness should win out in our relations. The Soviet people have never harboured any other sentiments, nor do they now."⁴

The Soviet Union has never failed to show interest in eliminating all seats of tension in Asia. The Korean peninsula has been such a seat for a long time. The United States wants a staging area in the southern part of the peninsula for its Asia-based armed forces and is therefore bent on perpetuating Korea's division into two states that face each other in constant confrontation. To back these designs it keeps a force of more than 40,000 men and maintains major air, missile and other bases in South Korea with mass destruction weapons and admitted nearly 1,000 nuclear warheads. Poised to deploy first-strike nuclear weapons (Pershing II and cruise missiles) in the Far East, the US military establishment regards South Korea as one of the most suitable launching pads for them.

The South Korean regime has built up an army of 21 divisions num-

bearing 600,000 servicemen. Up to 6 per cent of its yearly gross national product is spent to maintain it. Washington encourages its militarist ambitions, and also wants Japan to bolster its aid and augment the South Korean military-economic potential. During Nakasone's visit to Seoul in January 1983, the Japanese Premier went more than half-way to meet the wishes of the US administration and granted Chun Doo Hwan a loan of \$4 billion on easy terms.

The military hysteria in and around the Korean peninsula is being sustained by regularly held large-scale military exercises involving South Korean and US ground, air and naval forces. The Team Spirit-83 games extended over several months in early 1983, for example, involved close to 200,000 US and South Korean servicemen; air and sea lifts of US troops to Korea directly from the United States and US bases in the Pacific were practised. These were followed in autumn of 1983 by the Two Dragons-83 exercises, accompanied by threats and a vociferous propaganda campaign against the North. On a still wider scale the Team Spirit-84 exercises are held.

During his visit to Seoul in November 1983, US President Reagan promised the South Korean regime sustained support of its continuing militarisation policy, and reinforcements of US troops in the southern part of the peninsula "if necessary".

The path which the US administration has imposed on the leaders of the South Korean regime is a confrontation fraught with dangers not only for the two Koreas but also for their neighbours, Soviet Union, China, and Japan.

The Korean problem, as the Soviet Union sees it, can and must be settled by peaceful means without outside interference. That is why it considers the proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the withdrawal of US troops, which would pave the way for unifying the country by peaceful means, a suitable basis for settling the problem.

Tension is also running high in Southeast Asia. The peoples of Indochina, who defended their freedom and independence against Japanese, French, and then also US imperialists over more than 30 years of war, want nothing more dearly today than peace. But as before, the policy of outside forces aimed at disrupting the independence of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea and impeding construction of a new, peaceful life, is brewing tensions in Southeast Asia.

Imperialist and hegemonic quarters are trying to isolate Vietnam on the political and economic planes, and are waging a "psychological war" against it. They ceaselessly intimidate the ASEAN countries with a "Vietnamese threat", prodding them towards military confrontation with the states of Indochina.

Kampuchea, it will be remembered, has only recently shaken off the nightmare of Pol Pot's rule, when something like 2,750,000 Kampucheans were butchered and more than 568,000 were declared missing. But even now that the Kampuchean people have overthrown the barbarian Pol Pot regime and are engrossed in rehabilitating the country economically, socially and culturally, certain foreign quarters refuse to leave them in peace. These quarters are backing the remnants of Pol Pot gangs sheltered in Thailand, giving them arms and supplies, and encouraging their armed raids into the People's Republic of Kampuchea. Reactionary bourgeois groups under Norodom Sihanouk and Son Sann are accorded friendly treatment in certain foreign capitals, and in June 1982 the enemies of the People's Republic of Kampuchea managed to form what they called a "coalition government" out of these bankrupt groups that had been kicked out by the people of Kampuchea. The purpose here is to camouflage the aid given to the Pol Pot people, the villains of the Kampuchean tragedy, and impart an appearance of "legality" to outside in-

terference in Kampuchean affairs by creating the impression that there is a front opposing the PRK government inside the country.

An important part in these plans of a terrorist campaign (as the encouragement of Pol Pot people and other adepts in mass terrorism may rightly be called) is played by Thailand, where Pol Pot and other gangs have their camps, their supply base, and their jumping-off places for forays into Kampuchea to obstruct its national revival.

In contrast to forces that want the seat of tension in Southeast Asia to survive, the Soviet Union backs the idea of making the region a zone of peace, goodneighbourliness and cooperation. The USSR welcomes the moves of the three Indochinese states to initiate political dialogue among the Southeast Asian countries.

The Soviet Union invariably rejects outside interference in the internal affairs of states, as it rejects use or threat of armed force. As Yuri Andropov stressed in a conversation with a group of US Senators on August 18, 1983 the existing seats of tension and conflict, including the one in Southeast Asia, should be eliminated by peaceful means through search for mutually acceptable solutions.

In February 1983 at the conference in Vientiane the top leaders of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Kampuchea issued a joint statement reaffirming the intention to work for peace and against the arms race, for disarmament and detente. This was met with deep satisfaction in the Soviet Union.

The leaders of the three Indochinese states stress their readiness to maintain good relations with their neighbours, and with all other countries irrespective of their political and social systems on the principles of peaceful coexistence. They would spare no effort, they said, to restore normal relations with the People's Republic of China on a basis of peaceful coexistence, and reiterated their wish to have normal relations with the United States. They stated their opinion that friendly relations and cooperation between the Indochinese states and the ASEAN countries would work effectively for peace and stability in Southeast Asia. "All controversial issues between the two groups of countries," said the joint statement of the leaders of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, "must be settled by negotiations in a spirit of goodneighbourliness, peaceful coexistence, cooperation and friendship, without outside interference and outside attempts at dividing them, without allowing their territory to be used for actions against other countries, and with the intention of making Southeast Asia a zone of peace, stability and cooperation."²

The Soviet Union showed deep interest in the decisions of the three leaders concerning the situation around Kampuchea, and particularly the understanding that the Vietnamese volunteers helping the Kampucheans and their armed forces in rebuilding and defending Kampuchea at the request of the PRK government would be withdrawn the moment the outside threat to Kampuchean security ended and Thailand no longer used as a bridgehead against the People's Republic of Kampuchea. The governments of Vietnam and Kampuchea announced further that annual withdrawals of Vietnamese volunteers would be made depending on Kampuchea's concrete state of security. The government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea reaffirmed its determination to build up the country as a peaceful, independent, and nonaligned state. The three Indochinese countries reminded the world of their proposal to conclude nonaggression treaties with China and the ASEAN countries directed to normalising relations between them. They suggested holding an

² Quoted from *Pravda*, Feb. 24, 1983

ternational conference on Southeast Asia to settle the problems of regional peace and stability.

In short, the three Indochinese countries have clearly declared their wish that by the efforts of all interested parties Southeast Asia be made a zone of peace, stability, friendship and cooperation free from foreign military bases and outside interference.

The peace policy of the three Indochinese states, with the stress on fruitful cooperation and goodneighbourly relations between all Southeast Asian countries, is particularly relevant now when outside forces are provoking friction between them. In a telegram to the leaders of the three Indochinese states, the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers, pointed out that the Soviet Union's solidarity with them "reflects the community of the lofty socialist ideals and the common determination to fight jointly against imperialism, and for peace, security and social progress".

On July 29, 1983, meeting Le Duan, General Secretary of the CC CPV, in Moscow, Yuri Andropov said that the USSR would continue backing the constructive efforts of socialist Vietnam, launched jointly with Laos and Kampuchea to make Southeast Asia a zone of peace, co-operation and stability.

During the Soviet-Kampuchean negotiations in Moscow in September 1983, the foreign ministers of the two countries expressed the belief that it would be in the interests of the peoples and states of Southeast Asia, as well as in the general interests of security in the rest of Asia and the world as a whole, to eliminate tensions and establish an atmosphere of confidence and goodneighbourliness in Southeast Asia. The Soviet side condemned the attempts at using the UN to disguise interference in internal Kampuchean affairs, and declared that it would persevere in its efforts for the PRK to be reinstated in that international organisation.

In October-November 1983, during the friendly visit to Vietnam of a party and government delegation of the USSR headed by G. A. Aliyev, there was an exchange of opinion on topical aspects of the current international situation. Much attention was devoted to problems related to Southeast Asia. The joint Soviet-Vietnamese statement published after the talks declared the Soviet Union's complete support of the struggle fought by the three Indochinese countries against the intrigues of hegemonic and imperialist forces threatening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the SRV, the LPDR, and the PRK. The two sides were convinced that foreign interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the region must be stopped if the situation in Southeast Asia is to return to normal. The visit of the Soviet Party and government delegation to Vietnam serves to further the international fraternity and multilateral cooperation between the USSR and SRV.

The diverse Soviet foreign-policy efforts in Asia are helping to create favourable conditions for the peaceful constructive labour of the Soviet people. The Soviet efforts are also designed to remove the threat of war and to safeguard peace for present and future generations not only in the USSR, but for all mankind. The Soviet Union's struggle for the peace and security of the Asian peoples has helped the latter to concentrate their efforts on the intricate social and economic problems facing them today. And in this respect the Soviet Union is prepared for the broadest possible cooperation with all peaceloving forces. The road to strengthening peace in Asia is that of uniting the efforts of the peoples of that continent.

Pravda, Feb. 21, 1983

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DIFFICULTIES IN INDOCHINA'S TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM VIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 84 pp 30-41

[Article by M. P. Isayev: "Indochina: Tracing the Evolution of National Liberation Revolutions into Socialist Ones"]

The national liberation movement, being an integral part of the world revolutionary process, a revolutionary force undermining imperialism and spearheaded against feudal and prefeudal relations in colonial and dependent countries, has a tendency today to become a factor of the anti-capitalist struggle for a socialist transformation of society. The downfall of the colonial system of imperialism and the winning of independence by a number of countries in Asia and Africa marked a new stage in the progress of national liberation revolutions, with the struggle for national liberation turning in practice into a struggle against all forms of exploitation, both feudal and capitalist. The thesis of the development of the national liberation struggle of the working people of colonial and semi-colonial countries into a struggle for socialism was propounded by V. I. Lenin in his report at the 3rd Comintern Congress: "In the impending decisive battles in the world revolution, the movement of the majority of the population of the globe, initially directed towards national liberation, will turn against capitalism and imperialism and will, perhaps, play a much more revolutionary role than we expect."¹

The recent growth in the number of liberated countries that have rejected the capitalist way of development and have chosen socialist orientation is evidence that such a choice is not simply a result of the subjective wishes of some social forces and groups. It is also proof that today V. I. Lenin's idea of the feasibility of transition of the peoples of economically backward countries, relying on the help of the victorious proletariat of more advanced states, to socialism, bypassing the capitalist stage of development, is ever more graphically manifest. The experience of Indochinese countries that under the leadership of Marxist-Leninist parties have embarked on the path of socialist transformations shows that it is this way that brings real results in the struggle for national liberation and social progress.

The type of a national liberation revolution, as of any social revolution, is determined first of all by the relations of production introduced by the classes and social groups that have come to power. National liberation revolutions are not known to exist in a pure form; they embrace mainly two processes: that of winning political independence, on the one hand, and, on a wider plane, that of liquidating old relations of production and gradually introducing new ones, on the other.

The experience of the Indochinese countries is instructive in the sense that the present-day national liberation revolution, led by the communist party, is not limited by the takeover of political power. The winning of power by the forces of revolution in the countries of Indochina started

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 182.

an even more complicated and decisive process of step-by-step transition to building a new, socialist socio-economic formation. Special importance in this process is acquired by the international factor: further strengthening of world socialism contributes to the growing force and revolutionary potential of the national liberation revolutions. The general tendency which can be characterised by Lenin's words that for revolutionary forces "it is impossible to go forward without advancing towards socialism" is graphically manifest in our epoch, and the experience of Indochina is evidence of it.²

National liberation revolutions constitute the highest stage in the development of the national liberation movement, a stage that solves the contradiction between the subjugated peoples and imperialism. Such was the case of the 1975 national popular-democratic revolutions in South Vietnam and Laos where power was seized by the working people headed by Marxist-Leninist parties — the Communist Party of Vietnam and the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. These revolutions resulted in the unification of Vietnam and formation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976, and the proclamation of the Lao People's Democratic Republic in 1975.

The Kampuchean people's national liberation struggle under the leadership of the communists of that country resulted in the April 1975 overthrow of the renegade pro-imperialist regime. However, the fruits of that victory were reaped by extremist elements who usurped power in the country. Their anti-democratic reactionary policy put the Kampuchean revolution on the verge of defeat. It took tremendous efforts by real patriots of that country with the assistance of the revolutionary forces of Vietnam under the conditions of a maturing revolutionary situation in Kampuchea to bring down the Pol Pot regime in January 1979 and put the revolutionary process in Kampuchea on the correct road of development.

The national democratic revolutions in South Vietnam and Laos in 1975 became possible in the present epoch, at the third stage of the world revolutionary process, as a result of fundamental changes in these countries and on the international arena. These revolutions graphically illustrate the stage-by-stage development of national liberation revolutions into socialist revolutions. The experience of not only Vietnam and Laos but also of Cuba reveals that there is no insurmountable barrier between the democratic, anti-imperialist stage of revolution and its socialist stage, that they are both part and parcel of one revolutionary process in which democratic measures often pave the way for purely socialist ones. Of decisive importance in this process, along with the international factor, is leadership by Marxist-Leninist parties and the holding of state power by the working class in close alliance with the peasantry.

At the same time it should not be overlooked that the development of a national people's democratic revolution into a socialist revolution in economically underdeveloped countries which either did not pass through the capitalist stage of development at all or in which capitalism had not become dominant at the outset of revolutionary transformations, is a rather complicated, protracted process demanding considerable efforts from Marxist-Leninist parties, all the working people. As Yuri Andropov pointed out at the June 1983 Plenum of the CPSU CC, "it is one thing to proclaim socialism as a goal, and quite another to build it. The latter takes a definite level of productive forces, culture and social consciousness".³

National liberation revolutions in Indochina have underscored the

V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 362
Peking, June 16, 1983

importance of a subjective factor. V. I. Lenin emphasised that a revolution's objective preconditions must always be augmented by the "ability of the revolutionary class to take revolutionary mass actions strong enough to break (or dislocate) the old government, which never, not even in a period of crisis, 'falls' if it is not toppled over.⁴ Marxist-Leninist parties of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea which branched off in the early 1950s from the Communist Party of Indochina have become recognised leaders of the revolutionary struggle in their countries. The communists can be credited for not missing their historic chance. They selflessly worked for the national liberation movement in Indochina, ascended to the leading positions in the revolution and steered it to victory.

The experience of Indochina has shown the importance of revolutionary-socialist bases for the success of national liberation revolutions, especially in divided countries, such as Vietnam and Laos were after the Geneva agreement of 1954. Without a revolutionary-socialist base that found embodiment in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, relying on the alliance with world socialism, the victory of the national liberation struggle in Indochina would not have had the effect that it did.

A decisive factor for the liberation struggle in South Vietnam was provided by the DRV's achievements in socialist construction that went on even during the most severe years of US aggression. During the whole period of anti-imperialist national liberation war in South Vietnam the socialist North was a reliable rear base of revolutionary struggle in the South and rendered every form of assistance possible to patriots in Laos and Kampuchea. Events in Indochina have shown that favourable international conditions and direct assistance in diverse forms to the forces of liberation serve the cause of revolution but this important external factor of success by no means negates the thesis that a revolutionary situation is necessary.

The national liberation forces, especially in South Vietnam and Laos, have acquired valuable experience in effectively and flexibly combining different forms of struggle—armed and peaceful, legal and illegal, for the attainment of their goals. The policy of combining military and political forms of struggle practiced by the Vietnamese and Lao communists can be considered as the main method of revolutionary coercion used by liberation forces in South Vietnam and Laos. The use of revolutionary coercion there was always in reply to counterrevolutionary violence by imperialism and reaction.

The experience of revolutionary forces in Indochina has shown that armed struggle is by no means the only and necessary way of carrying out social revolution. The choice of the form of struggle (military or peaceful) depends on the correlation of forces in the international arena and in separate countries, on the acuteness of class and other contradictions and the strength of the exploiter's opposition. To raise the effectiveness of the national liberation movement, its vanguard—the communist parties — must master all forms of struggle and be able to use the most effective form in good time and with a view to changing conditions. V. I. Lenin pointed out that Marxism, first, is not "binding the movement to any one particular form of struggle", and, second, "demands an absolutely historical examination of the question of forms of struggle. To treat this question apart from the concrete historical situation betrays a failure to understand the rudiments of dialectical materialism".⁵ It is noteworthy that unlike in South Vietnam, where revolution attained victory in April 1975 after the liberation forces conducted a powerful

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 211.

⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, pp. 213, 214.

military offensive (combined with political demonstrations by the popular masses) which defeated the puppet Saigon regime, the people's democratic revolution in Laos in December 1975 was realised by peaceful means. This is evidence of the variety of means of achieving the aims of a national liberation revolution in the present epoch.

The triumph of revolutions in Indochina resulted from a mature revolutionary situation there and its development into national people's democratic revolutions in South Vietnam and Laos and national democratic revolution in Kampuchea. Allegations by bourgeois ideologists that the revolutionary process in Indochina was caused from the outside, that it was a result of the so-called export of revolution hold no water. As Yuri Andropov pointed out, "Export of revolution" is not possible at all. Socialism only grows on the ground of objective needs of social development of each given country".⁶

The experience of Vietnam and Laos shows that national people's democratic revolutions are possible in those countries where Marxist-Leninist parties effectively guide the struggle of wide popular masses against imperialists, feudal lords, reactionary local bourgeois circles, for the attainment of national independence, social liberation and progress on the road to socialism. At the same time, the low level of these countries' economic development presupposes quite a few general democratic tasks to be solved by these revolutions. It is necessary that reforms be effected step by step while maintaining a wide democratic basis of people's democratic power.

With the victory of the liberation forces in South Vietnam and Laos, the national liberation revolutions there acquired a clear-cut socialist orientation, the credit for which should be given to the vanguard role of Marxist-Leninist parties and the strength of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry.

The 1979 national democratic revolution in Kampuchea had features that were unique to the history of contemporary revolutionary process. Having an anti-Maoist, truly popular nature, the Kampuchean revolution was specific in the sense that, while maintaining democratic tasks, it was directed not against imperialism (the anti-imperialist aims of the revolution were achieved in the main back in 1975 when the Lon Nol regime was overthrown), but against the puppet Pol Pot regime that constituted a form of direct control by the forces of international reaction that entered a counterrevolutionary alliance with imperialism against the revolutionary liberation forces of Indochina. That revolution was aimed not at liquidating pre-capitalist relations of production in the village but at doing away with the cruel exploitation of the population by the extremist regime. Despite Pol Pot's claims that under his regime Kampuchea would make "a quick, truly socialist revolution", "a big leap revolution", the puppet regime, having completely destroyed the country's economic and social life, caused the extreme poverty and pauperisation of the population. The Pol Pot regime only replaced the previous feudal form of exploitation of peasants by a new totalitarian form of exploitation and ruthless suppression of the population.

The speedy character of the Kampuchean revolution during its final stage (1978-1979) was due both to external and internal factors. A revolutionary situation set in when growing contradictions between the Kampuchean people and the puppet regime had created prerequisites for a mighty revolutionary action of the population. The Pol Pot regime was in the grip of a deep political and economic crisis, while its pillar—the army—was being routed in the battles with the Vietnam's People's Army which decisively rebuffed the

* *Pravda*, June 16, 1983

Pol Pot regime's aggression against the southwestern regions of Vietnam
Under these conditions Vietnam's rebuff to Pol Pot aggression and the upsurge of the national liberation struggle of Kampuchea's patriotic forces under the banner of the United Front for National Salvation, led by true communists, merged to form a single whole. With the support of Vietnamese patriots the revolutionary armed forces of Kampuchea started an all-out offensive in December 1978 and early January 1979 that led to the downfall of the criminal regime, its replacement by the power of revolutionary forces and to the formation of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

The revolutionary developments in Kampuchea in early 1979 are known to have caused an extremely hostile reaction in the camp of the enemies of the Kampuchean revolution. They refuse to recognise the PRK, accuse the SRV of "aggression" against Kampuchea, pin their hopes on the left-overs of Khmer reaction, make attempts to revive on the ruins of the Pol Pot regime the coalition government of "democratic Kampuchea" that represents no one, etc. It is appropriate to stress here that communists' denial of interference in the internal affairs of other countries does not mean a denial of international assistance, of help to revolutionary forces, of support for national liberation movements. This support, expressing the international solidarity of the working people and based on the principles of proletarian internationalism, i. e., on one of the most important features of revolution, has nothing to do with "prodding" a revolution or with "exporting" it. It was socialist Vietnam's international support of Kampuchea's revolutionary forces that saved the people of the country from physical and spiritual extermination.

After the winning of genuine independence the forces of revolution, which brought to power people's democracy in the PRK, had to solve the socio-economic problems practically from scratch. The general democratic tasks of the revolution had to be tied up with the problems of rehabilitation.

The experience of Indochina shows that the underdeveloped countries' road to socialism is a rather complicated revolutionary process. V. I. Lenin emphasised that for the solution of this problem in economically underdeveloped countries, where "... relying upon the general theory and practice of communism" it is necessary, "to adapt ... to specific conditions such as do not exist in the European countries", one "must be able to apply that theory and practice to conditions in which the bulk of the population are peasants, and in which the task is to wage a struggle against medieval survivals and not against capitalism".⁷

The experience of building the foundations of socialism in the SRV and the LPDR in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the present-day experience of the PRK in preparing conditions for undertaking socialist reforms show that only a correct approach to the general problems and national specific problems, the ability to apply creatively general rules of building a new life to conditions of one or another country can ensure the scientific consistency of the ruling Marxist-Leninist parties' policy and bring about effective results in their activity.

Thus the development of national liberation revolutions into socialist revolutions demands maximum efforts by Marxist-Leninist parties and the popular masses. In Lenin's words, the task of the day is to focus "all efforts and all attention on ... the search after forms of the *transition* or the *approach* to the proletarian revolution".⁸

The Vietnamese communists emphasise that the liberation of South Vietnam in April 1975 meant the victory of the national people's democratic revolution on a countrywide scale and thus paved the way for

⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 161

⁸ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 92

building socialism throughout Vietnam. The 24th Plenary Meeting of the CPV CC in October 1975 pointed out that North Vietnam had "to continue socialist construction and strengthen socialist relations of production", while South Vietnam would "simultaneously make socialist transformations and build socialism". The party's efforts in the South were aimed at the tasks of the national people's democratic revolution, first of all the agrarian question, and making preparations for socialist transformations. Relying on the alliance of the working class and the toiling peasantry, the party guided the masses in frustrating the plans of counterrevolutionaries who tried to undermine the people's power and sabotage measures directed at normalising the political and economic situation in South Vietnam.

The main lines of progress of united Vietnam on the path of socialism were mapped out by the 4th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in December 1976. It noted that the Vietnamese revolution had entered a new stage — the stage of independence of the entire country and of its unity, the stage of a single strategic goal: carrying out the tasks of socialist revolution, building socialism. One of the main features of the new stage of revolution was direct transition from predominantly small-scale production to large-scale socialist production. Vietnam's transition to socialism, bypassing the stage of capitalism, demanded from the working people initiative, creativity, and a high level of social consciousness in carrying out socialist revolution.⁹

The people's democratic revolution in Laos and the proclamation of the Lao People's Democratic Republic paved the way for radical transformations of Laotian society. The efforts of the LPRP and of the whole nation were aimed first of all at rebuilding the country after the war and preparing conditions for laying down the foundations of socialism. Proceeding from the decisions of the Second LPRP Congress, the 4th Plenary Meeting of the Party's CC, held in February 1977, set the tasks of a new stage—the stage of transition to socialist revolution. Discussing the theoretical aspect of the question whether transition to socialism was possible in such an underdeveloped country as Laos, Kaysone Phomvihane, General Secretary of the LPRP Central Committee and Prime Minister of the LPDR pointed out that "our experience, and earlier experience of Mongolia and Vietnam, provide a positive answer: yes, it is possible, if the struggle for the new social order is guided by the party standing on the positions of the working class and equipped with Marxist-Leninist ideology". The determining factor of the victory of the Laotian revolution was the strong alliance built by the LPRP between the working class and peasantry. This factor remains to be decisive also during Laos's transition to socialism.¹⁰

During its second five-year-plan period (1976-1980) the SRV succeeded in strengthening the material-technical foundation of its economy. The fixed assets of industry rose by 91 per cent, which ensured a certain increase of output in a number of industries and strengthened the state and cooperative sectors. By the end of 1980, the socialist sector accounted for about 60 per cent of the GSP. The volume of industrial output increased by 17.3 per cent as compared with 1975. The yield of food crops reached 14.4 million tons, almost 3 million tons more than in 1975.¹¹

Despite difficulties at home and complicated external conditions, the SRV during the second five-year-plan period overcame many grievous

⁹ *The 4th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam*, Moscow, 1977, p. 35
National Liberation Movement on the Eve of the 1980s Who Is It With?, Prague, 1982, p. 230

¹⁰ *Nhan Dan*, Dec. 21, 1982.

consequences of the protracted war. The main results of socialist transformations in the South were virtual liquidation of class exploitation and the remnants of neocolonialism, strengthening of the state sector in industry and the initial formation of new, socialist relations of production. Out of the 3,500 industrial and handicraft enterprises owned by the comprador and national bourgeoisie, 34 per cent were nationalised and 14.5 per cent were changed over to mixed (state-private) ownership. Socialist transformations began to be implemented in handicraft and agricultural production. By the end of the five-year period there were in the South 1,300 agricultural cooperatives, 165 state farms and over 9,000 teams of mutual work assistance. Noticeable gains were scored in the social sphere: in culture, science, public education and health care.

On the whole, over the five-year-plan period, the SRV managed to solve quite a number of urgent social and economic problems. Nevertheless, Vietnam's economic situation remained strained. Despite great efforts in the second half of the 1970s, the republic did not succeed in substantially lessening disproportions in the national economy; internal sources of accumulation had not been created, the situation in industry and transport remained tense; food and some consumer goods were in short supply; living standards of the working people, in particular workers and employees of the state sector remained generally low.

Preparing for the 5th Congress of the CPV, Vietnamese communists critically analysed the shortcomings in carrying out the second five-year plan. It was pointed out that while implementing on the whole correct policy mapped out by the 4th CPV Congress, aimed at building a new society in Vietnam, there had been frequent cases of ignoring the objective laws of social and economic development during the transition to socialism and cases of voluntarism, and premature actions. The decisions of the 6th (1979) and subsequent plenary meetings of the CPV CC envisaged taking certain corrective actions and working out in more detail the CPV's social and economic policy. Their purport is to deny the practice of administrative commands that lingered on since wartime, to resort to methods of material incentives for the working people, support economic initiative and self-reliance in the localities. In 1981, a new system of economic management was introduced, providing for fixed quotas of production for each work team and worker, as well as a new system of purchasing prices for agricultural production.

Assessing the country's economic situation, Vietnamese communists singled out objective causes of difficulties (above all the consequences of US aggression and the invasion of Chinese troops in 1979, the consequences of neocolonialist rule in the South, of natural calamities) and subjective factors, connected with shortcomings "in managing the economy and society". Much damage to the fulfilment of the second five-year plan was done by the PRC's annulment of its technical and economic assistance to Vietnam and by its cutting off of trade with the SRV. At the same time, the party documents noted that in solving economic problems "subjectivism and haste were present", the plans were drawn "with too high figures, running beyond real possibilities".¹² A kind of blunder occurred in the South, the scene of often mechanical use of the experience of socialist construction in the North in the 1950s, alignment though the of class forces and positions of classes in the South did not match the conditions under which socialist transformations were carried out in the DRV.

In the LPDR a breakthrough in laying the groundwork for socialism took place during the three-year-plan period of 1978-1980. Standing out was a complex of measures implemented in agriculture — the mainstay

¹² *Nhan Dan*, March 28, 1982

of the country's economy, accounting for some 80 per cent of the GNP. The Laotian communists were guided by Lenin's thesis that cooperation in agrarian countries plays a decisive role in "transition to the new system by means that are the *simplest, easiest and most acceptable to the peasant!*".¹³

In 1978 the LPRP CC Politburo adopted a decision on the tasks of cooperation and provisional Rules of the agricultural cooperative, which stressed the strictly voluntary and gradual character of the cooperative movement. By late 1980 Laos had over 2,800 cooperative farms, embracing some 25 per cent of the country's peasant families. The yield of rice in 1980 was to the tune of one million tons, which made it possible to solve the food problem.

The development of the LPDR's industry proceeded in 1978-1980 primarily through the expansion of the state and mixed sectors, while keeping some enterprises in private hands, if put under state control and working in accordance with state plans.

In the course of fulfilling the three-year plan the LPDR began the process of shaping and strengthening new socialist relations of production. The LPRP's policy aimed at creating the necessary preconditions for that.

The LPRP paid considerable attention to correcting mistakes in the course of socialist construction. Thus, the 7th Plenary Meeting of the LPRP CC (1979) demanded that mistakes be corrected that were connected both with attempts to "run too far ahead", and with "the striving to bring down the party's strategy to the level of a spontaneous course of events". The Plenary Meeting pointed out that social changes in Laos must be scientifically substantiated and must take into account objective needs. Phomvihane said that "pre-socialist and precapitalist modes are not to be artificially destroyed; in the course of socialist construction they will wither away by themselves".¹⁴

The course of socialist reforms in the South of Vietnam and in Laos has shown that the transition of the SRV and the LPDR to socialism will probably take longer period than was expected on account of these countries' weak material and technical foundation, the heterogeneous nature of their economies, in particular, the presence in the North and South of Vietnam of different social and economic structures.

The experience of building a new life in the SRV and the LPDR in the second half of the 1970s has confirmed the need to single out in the period of underdeveloped countries' transition to socialism stages and substages, which are not present in the countries that passed through the stage of capitalist development. This is first of all the initial stage, which witnesses the solution of predominantly general democratic, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal tasks and at the same time sees the creation of preconditions for building socialism, the appearance of elements of socialist production relations. A decision adopted by the Comintern back in 1930 noted the need "to proceed from the fact that socialism is not introduced immediately and directly. Transition to socialism implies a number of intermediary stages. Transition to socialism is a long process, embracing a number of concrete and consecutive measures. Separate steps leading to socialism must proceed from the needs of the masses, and the necessity of these steps must be understood by the majority of the population. These steps must come from economic reality and must be totally feasible economically".¹⁵

¹³ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 468.

¹⁴ *The National Liberation Movement on the Eve of the 1980s*, p. 229.

¹⁵ *The Comintern's Strategy and Tactic in National-Colonial Revolution as Exemplified by China*, Moscow, 1934, p. 280.

The experience of the SRV and the LPDR shows that transition to socialism by way of bypassing capitalism in economically underdeveloped countries differs greatly from transition from capitalism to socialism because in the former case one actually starts from pre-capitalist forms of production. Such a transition means a fundamental socio-economic transformation, the creation of a qualitatively new material-technical foundation of the economy, a radical cultural and ideological revolution and essential changes in the social psychology of the working masses.

The practice of socialist transformations in the late 1970s in South Vietnam and Laos, which faced quite a few anti-imperialist and anti-feudal tasks, has shown how difficult it is simultaneously and, especially at accelerated rates to rebuild an underdeveloped multistructural and war-devastated economy, implement general democratic measures and create new relations of production and a socialist foundation.

Social and economic problems of the SRV and the LPDR were subjected to profound critical analysis in 1982 at the 5th Congress of the CPV and the 3rd Congress of the LPRP. The Congress of Vietnam's communists mobilised the people to tackle two strategic tasks—build the material-technical foundation of socialism and strengthen the country's defence. The Congress mapped out the main directions of development of the national economy in the third five-year-plan period (1981-1985) and for the rest of the decade. Le Duan, General Secretary of the CPV CC, said at the Congress that "from the viewpoint of implementing the socio-economic strategy at the present stage, the 1981-1985 period will become one more step on the way of developing and remodeling the economic structure, of reforming it rapidly in a socialist manner".¹⁶

Taking into account the experience of the second half of the 1970s, the 5th Congress came up with a concrete strategy to be used by the CPV at the initial stage of transition to socialism. It was pointed out that the building of the material-technical foundation of socialism in the SRV would be carried out in several stages, with the first stage, up to 1990, becoming the initial stage of creating the necessary prerequisites for subsequent socialist industrialisation. The Congress realistically determined the rates of development of Vietnam's economy in the third five-year-plan period. The average annual growth of the national income is envisaged at 4.5-5 per cent, that of agricultural production 6-7 per cent and industrial 4-5 per cent.

The Congress posed the question of structuring the economy on a rational agrarian-industrial basis with the emphasis on solving the food problem. In 1981-1985 a large amount of capital is to be invested in industries serving the needs of agriculture.

Learning from experience, the Congress tackled the problem of socialist reforms in South Vietnam, most of which are to be completed by the end of the 1980s. The 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CPV CC in late 1982 made a point of focusing attention on a number of reforms in the South, particularly on the most knotty problem in the village. In early 1983 South Vietnam had 185 agricultural cooperatives of the highest type and over 8,000 production teams. Collective forms of labour embraced 17 per cent of peasant families owning 15 per cent of the land.

The 3rd Congress of the LPRP formulated two strategic goals of the Laotian people: construction of socialism and defence of the country. The construction of socialism is the main and decisive goal because it creates conditions for achieving the aims of the revolution, meets the desires of all of Laos's nationalities and provides a foundation for the defence of the new social order.¹⁷ The Congress noted that after the vic-

¹⁶ *Nhan Dan*, March 28, 1982

¹⁷ *Siang Pasason*, April 28, 1982

tory of the people's democratic revolution the country's GNP in 1981 had increased by 43 per cent against 1976, the national per capita income by 40 per cent, the gross volume of production of agriculture and forestry had risen almost one and a half times. The yield of rice in 1981 reached 1,154,000 tons against 700,000 tons in 1976, which made it possible to solve the food problem. In early 1982, 188 industrial enterprises with 15,000 workers were under state control, over 30 state farms and foresteries had been created and the trade turnover of state and cooperative shops had increased five-fold against 1976.

It was pointed out at the 3rd LPRP Congress that along with the great achievements in the economic and cultural work, mistakes had been made in implementing certain measures of cooperation, in public education, health care, etc.

The Congress approved the main directions and tasks of the first five-year plan of the LPDR's social and economic development for 1981-1985 and to the end of the 1980s. The main goals of the plan are to expand the state and cooperative sectors of the economy, to speed up progress in science, technology and culture and to strengthen the country's defence.

As emphasised by Vietnamese and Laotian communists, their parties' social and economic policy at the present stage is a policy of transition to socialism by way of bypassing the stage of capitalist development, with the SRV and the LPDR finding themselves at the very beginning of transition. That policy has the general characteristics of the policy of countries that have embarked on the road of socialist transformations, such as remodeling a heterogeneous multistructural economy and the whole system of social relations, creating a new political setup for society on a socialist basis and building the material-technical foundation of socialism. As economically underdeveloped countries, Vietnam and Laos must solve a number of problems which do not face the countries that have passed the capitalist stage of development. The economic policy of the CPV and the LPRP also reflects the specific features of these countries which are a result of the historic conditions of their development, mainly the necessity to divert at all stages considerable means and efforts to repel the aggression of imperialist and hegemonic forces. Yet on the whole, the policy worked out by the CPV and the LPRP and aimed at the interaction of different economic modes, while giving constant priority to the strengthening of the state sector, is in full accord with the Leninist assessment of the initial stage of transition to socialism in underdeveloped countries.

Having seized power in the aftermath of the 1979 national-democratic revolution, the Kampuchean people under the leadership of the PRPK, relying on internationalist assistance, primarily from SRV and the Soviet Union, began to tackle the complex political, economic, social and other problems, left over from the Pol Pot regime, which had thrown the country a long way back as for its economy and culture. Most pressing was the problem of staving off famine, since agriculture had been wrecked by the Pol Pot "communes", the abolition of commodity-money relations and of the peasants' right to use the fruits of their work.

Revolutionary government of Kampuchea exerted great efforts to rehabilitate the country, concentrating first of all on the creation and strengthening of organs of people's revolutionary power at all levels. Much was done to revive agricultural production. "Groups of production solidarity" became an effective way of getting peasants to work in collectives and to increase output.

In 1980-1981 decisive steps were made in the consolidation of people's revolutionary power in Kampuchea and in its economic and cultural rehabilitation. In 1980 a harvest was brought in from an area of 1.5 mil-

lion hectares, which put an end to the threat of famine in the country. Over 80 per cent of industrial enterprises and handicraft workshops had been restored and put into operation. The stabilisation of the situation in the PRK was attested to by the May 1981 general elections to the local bodies of people's power and the National Assembly.

The tasks of strengthening Kampuchea's independence, speeding up her rehabilitation and gradually coming over to socialism were formulated by the 4th Congress of the PRPK (May 1981). It was pointed out that, relying on internationalist aid, it was necessary to start preparing preconditions in Kampuchea for a stage-by-stage transition to building the foundation of socialism.

At the people's democratic stage of the revolution, the PRPK, having suffered great losses in the years of Pol Pot dictatorship, is guiding the revolutionary process in the country, relying on the help of the USSR, the SRV and other socialist countries. It is a matter of realising under new historic conditions the theses of the 2nd Comintern Congress, worked out on the basis of V. I. Lenin's proposals, on the possibility of bringing a politically weak working class to socialism under the guidance of the proletariat of other countries.¹⁸

Today in People's Kampuchea a socialist mode of production is being formed, represented by the state and cooperative sectors, and new relations of production are emerging. Taking into consideration the present low level of the country's socio-economic development and the need for greater efforts to restore fully the economy after the damage inflicted by the long war and Pol Pot "experiments", the PRPK holds that the PRK's advance to socialism will be a rather long process and that at the present stage it is necessary to prepare corresponding material and social preconditions for transition to the building of the foundation of socialism.

Kampuchea's experience shows very convincingly the extreme importance in the present situation of the international factor both for the solution of socio-economic problems in countries that have taken the socialist path of development and for the defence of the revolutionary achievements of their people.

The practice of the countries of Indochina is proof that the development of national liberation revolutions into socialist revolutions in underdeveloped countries is a peculiar revolutionary process which can proceed successfully only under the essential external and internal conditions. The nature of internationalist ties of the SRV, the LPDR and the PRK with the countries of the socialist community gives ground to say that the essential international conditions exist for these countries to advance gradually towards socialism. The peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have left the world economic system of capitalism and entered the world economic system of socialism. At all stages of the liberation struggle and at the present stage of peaceful construction, the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have constantly had the internationalist support of the Soviet Union. "Solidarity with the newly-free states, with the peoples fighting for independence," emphasised Yuri Andropov, "was and remains a basic principle of Soviet foreign policy."¹⁹

There are also solid internal prerequisites, including political conditions, for a successful transition of the Indochina states to socialism. The most significant of these is that the SRV, the LPDR and the PRK are independent states ruled by the working people under the leadership of Marxist-Leninist parties. From a political point of view, since the SRV and the LPDR have emerged as states of the dictatorship of the proletariat, based on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry,

¹⁸ *Communist International in Documents. 1919-1932*. Moscow, 1983. p. 131
¹⁹ *Pravda*, Nov. 23, 1982.

since the ruling parties rely on people's power from top to bottom, on mass public organisations, on the armed forces loyal to the cause of revolution, national liberation revolutions in these countries have already developed into socialist ones.

At the same time, on the economic front in Indochina an acute struggle is still being waged between the two ways—capitalist and socialist, and the solution of this contradiction is bound to take some time. Under favourable international conditions, relying on the strength of the dictatorship of the proletariat—let us note that the vantage points in the economies of the SRV, the LPDR and the PRK are held by the state—Marxist-Leninist parties of these countries will undoubtedly ensure victory for socialism in this struggle.

It is worthwhile to remember that in these countries, particularly in Vietnam, in the years of people's rule, a tremendous amount of creative work has been done to build the foundation of socialism and form new relations of production. An essential source of strength for the three countries is their relations of unity and cooperation. The strengthening of the alliance of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea has become the law of the revolutionary process in Indochina. An important factor for the advance of the countries of Indochina on the road to socialism is the strengthening of the alliance of these countries, the developing process of multi-faceted integration between them, their turning into a solid community of fraternal states, which is an advanced post of the forces of peace and socialism in Southeast Asia.

The experience of the Indochina states provides evidence that in the process of realising the general laws of socialist transformation of society, each country contributes to this process a great many of its own specifics which cannot but transpire in the variety of forms of socialist transformation, as regards, first of all, length of time, speed, methods, etc. And it is underdeveloped countries that display much originality in the forms of manifestation of the general laws, which comes both from the variety of problems they face and from the longer time it takes to solve them, as compared to economically developed countries.

The versatile experience of the countries of Indochina is convincing evidence of the relevancy of V. I. Lenin's thesis that "all nations will arrive at socialism—this is inevitable, but all will do so in not exactly the same way, each will contribute something of its own to some form of democracy, to some variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the varying rate of socialist transformations in the different aspects of social life".²⁰

²⁰ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, pp. 69-70

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FRUITFUL COOPERATION BETWEEN USSR AND DPRK

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[Article by V. I. Andrianov, candidate of economic sciences, and V. I. Mel'nikov, candidate of juridical sciences: "Commemorating the 35th Anniversary of the Soviet-Korean Treaty on Economic and Cultural Cooperation"]

In August 1945, the Soviet Army defeated Japanese troops in Northeast China and Korea and delivered the Korean people from Japan's forty-year-old colonial yoke. Liberation marked the beginning of a new epoch in the country's history. Having become masters of their own destiny, the people of North Korea received the opportunity to build an independent democratic state.

This proved to be an extremely difficult and complicated task, for the Japanese colonisers upon their withdrawal from Korea destroyed almost all industrial enterprises. In addition, the country had to overcome the economy's lopsided colonial nature stemming from many years of foreign domination and establish new links with the world economy. Colonial Korea had been turned into an agrarian and raw-material appendage of the metropolis, with primary development of mining, metallurgical and chemical branches of industry whose products were exported to Japan, while the development of processing industry was artificially held back.

Serious difficulties for the economy also arose from Korea's division into North and South. Having disrupted the country's traditional economic ties, the division aggravated even further the existing economic disproportions and demanded an urgent replacement of the missing economic links: the bulk of Korea's heavy industry was concentrated in the North, while the South was the haven of light industry and the country's main bread-basket. Before liberation, North Korea accounted for 92 per cent of the country's electric-power industry, 90 per cent of its metallurgical, 88 per cent of its fuel, 82 per cent of its chemical, 78 per cent of its mining, 73 per cent of its building materials industries. In South Korea were concentrated 77 per cent of textile, 63 per cent of rubber and 60 per cent of the food industries.¹

The situation in people's Korea was further compounded by an almost total lack at the time of technically qualified national personnel and institutions in which to train them, as well as by a pretty low general educational and cultural level of the population as a whole.

Obviously, under the circumstances it was quite a formidable task for the Korean people to cope with the economic, social and cultural problems that confronted it. The Soviet Union was the only country in the postwar world that was in a position and which sincerely and selflessly desired to assist the fraternal Korean people in building a new life.

It was not fortuitous then that in the course of the first, since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, official

¹ F. Shabshina, *Socialist Korea (On Forms of Manifestation in the DPRK of General Laws of Building Socialism)*, Moscow, 1963, p. 111 (in Russian).

visit to Moscow of the DPRK's government delegation, headed by Kim Il Sung (March 1949), the parties devoted their main attention in the talks to questions of further development and strengthening of economic and cultural relations, that had already been shaped and needed juridical sealing up.

As a result of the talks, on March 17, 1949, the USSR and people's Korea signed a Treaty of Economic and Cultural Cooperation.² This document's special significance lies in the fact that by signing it the DPRK entered a new type of international relationship. As it was pointed out in this connection in the DPRK, "for the first time in its history the Korean people has concluded an equal agreement".³

Evaluating the agreement, Kim Il Sung emphasised that it opened up "a new page in developing a new relationship between the DPRK and the Soviet Union after Korea's liberation", the agreement had "tremendous political and economic significance in enhancing the international authority of our young republic and furthering its limitless flourishing and development".⁴

The great vital force of the Soviet-Korean agreement on economic and cultural cooperation, its internationalist spirit became especially manifest during the 1950-1953 war, started against the North Korean people, and in the postwar rehabilitation period. "We are very grateful to the peoples of the USSR and other socialist countries for their active material assistance and material support rendered to our people during the Patriotic liberation war", said Li Jong Ok, Premier of the Administrative Council, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the end of the Korean war.⁵

The war brought havoc to the young republic. Barbaric US air raids turned cities and villages, industrial enterprises irrigation projects and other economic units into rubble. 8,700 plants and factories, 600,000 homes, over 6,000 educational and medical buildings and thousands of cultural facilities were destroyed. The total damage to the national economy was estimated at 420,000 million won.⁶

The country faced the task of restoring its productive forces on a new technical foundation, which demanded a large amount of up-to-date equipment, machines, new technologies, and a sufficient number of qualified personnel, i. e., the goal was to solve a whole set of problems simultaneously and at a high level.

Proceeding from the 1949 agreement and its instruments, and guided by the principles of proletarian internationalism and feelings of friendship towards the fraternal Korean people, the Soviet Union rendered people's Korea effective economic assistance, sent to Korea highly qualified specialists and invited a large number of Korean young people to study at Soviet colleges. Suffice it to mention that from 1954 to 1960, with the technical assistance of Soviet organisations and specialists, the DPRK restored or built anew 20 economic projects, including the Suphun hydroelectric plant, the Hunnam chemical works, the Kim Chak iron-and-steel works, the Nampho non-ferrous metal works, the Pyongyang textile mill, the Madon cement plant, a fish-canning factory in Synpho, a plywood factory in Kilju and Pyongyang's central radio station.⁷

In the 1970s and early 1980s Soviet-Korean cooperation continued

The Soviet Union's Relations with People's Korea 1945-1980. Documents and Materials, Moscow, 1981, p. 69.

² *Minjoo Chosun*, March 18, 1949.

³ *Foreign Trade of the USSR*, 1959, No. 3, p. 6.

⁴ *Rodong Sinmun*, July 28, 1983.

⁵ *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1975, No. 2.

⁶ 100 DPRK won=74.93 roubles.

⁷ *The Soviet Union's Relations with People's Korea*, p. 407.

to develop apace, taking new forms and improving old ones. By now, with Soviet technical and economic assistance the DPRK has built, reconstructed and restored 62 economic projects,⁸ with many others under construction or in the works.

At present technical assistance to the DPRK is rendered on the basis of long-term low-interest loans in accordance with the Treaty of Economic and Technical Cooperation signed on February 9, 1976 in Moscow, which also sets the guidelines for settling accounts between the two countries. The agreement envisages expansion of the converter mill and hot-rolling mill at the Kim Chak iron-and-steel works to increase output of steel and its subsequent processing into hot-rolled sheet (second stage of reconstruction), as well as assistance in the construction of the Chongjin thermal power station with a capacity of 150 MW. To expand the Kim Chak iron-and-steel works the DPRK was given a 45-million-rouble loan for a period of eight years at two-per-cent annual interest to be repaid on the product-pay-back principle by equal annual deliveries of the work's products one year after the commissioning of the corresponding mill. The loan for the construction of the Chongjin thermal power station amounts to 40 million roubles, also at 2 per cent annual interest, granted in this case for ten years. Repayment will be effected by equal annual parts beginning one year after completion of equipment deliveries in accordance with the existing Soviet-Korean trade agreement and putting the corresponding sums on the clearing account.

In addition, in keeping with this agreement, the DPRK was given a twelve-million-rouble credit at two-per-cent interest for eight years in order to complete the construction of the converter and hot and cold rolling mills of the same iron-and-steel works (first stage of reconstruction), as well as a credit of twenty million roubles at two-per-cent interest rate for ten years to be re-paid by clearing, to complete construction of a ball-bearing plant, an ammonia plant in Aoji and an aluminium factory in Pukchong.

Taking into account the large sum of repayments due on earlier loans and proceeding from principles of friendship and cooperation, the Soviet government granted the DPRK government a 400-million-rouble loan at a two-per-cent annual interest rate to cover the debts on the 1976-1980 payments, due from the Korean side, and interest on them. The repayment of the used credit sums will be done by deliveries of Korean products to the USSR for ten years by equal annual parts beginning from 1981.

Account-settling relations between our countries are also regulated by the corresponding intergovernmental protocol on the repayment of loans. The latest refinancing of the DPRK's debt to the USSR meant that the Korean side started paying back practically in the 1980s, i. e., 35 years after the beginning of Soviet-Korean cooperation, when the DPRK had become an industrially developed socialist country.

Steady progress has been achieved in trade between the two countries. In 1970 the trade turnover amounted to 329.3 million roubles. In 1980 it reached 572 million roubles, and in 1982 it grew to 681 million roubles.⁹ It should be pointed out that Soviet-Korean trade is not limited to clearing deliveries on account of annually signed protocols. In recent years a "raw-materials-in-exchange-for-finished-goods" form of trade has become commendable, whereby the DPRK receives Soviet cotton and works it into fabrics for export to the USSR. Soviet wheat has been traditionally bartered for Korean rice, and potassium fertilizers have been traded for nitric fertilizers. Although the DPRK is not a member of the

⁸ *Ekonomscheskaya gazeta*, 1983, No. 33, p. 20

⁹ *Foreign Trade of the USSR*. Statistics yearbooks for corresponding years

CMEA, the prices of the mutually delivered goods are determined on the principles of trade among the CMEA member-countries and are fixed in roubles.¹⁰

In our day and age progress for any country is impossible without the natural and social sciences being brought into play. And for countries like the DPRK, which began socialist construction after freeing itself from the shackles of colonial yoke, this question is of special importance, since the colonisers did their utmost to keep the enslaved people in ignorance. In this aspect too the Soviet Union lent a hand to the fraternal people. The history of Soviet-Korean scientific cooperation, as part of cultural exchange, is almost 40 years old now. It began in 1946, when the first group of young Korean researchers arrived in the USSR, and when in July 1948 a delegation of Soviet scientists, headed by Academician A. Oparin, visited the DPRK. In 1949, a group of thirty Soviet scientific workers was sent to the people's Korea to assist in the creation of a Korean Academy of Sciences.

The founding on December 1, 1952 of the DPRK's Academy of Sciences and the signing in October 1957 of an Agreement on Cooperation between the Academies of the USSR and the DPRK (renewed in 1969) ushered in a new stage in Soviet-Korean scientific cooperation. From 1957 to 1969 the Soviet Union played host to over 120 Korean scientists and some twenty Korean specialists took post-graduate courses in institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences. About 100 Soviet scientists visited the DPRK. Over eleven years (1951-1962) Soviet colleges graduated some 200 Korean scientific workers.¹¹

The USSR Academy of Sciences and its establishments assisted the DPRK in determining the main directions of research and in equipping four major laboratories—in physics, electronics, machine technology and experimental biology. To help the Korean side organise public and higher education the corresponding Soviet organisations handed over to the DPRK over 110 various educational programmes and instructions.¹² Through a joint effort Soviet and Korean geologists put out a fundamental work, *Geological Structure and Minerals of the Northeastern Part of the DPRK and Southern Part of the USSR Maritime Territory*, while philologists of the two countries collaborated on a two-volume *New Korean-Russian Dictionary*.¹³

In the 1970s and early 1980s scientific links between the two countries continued to be maintained through exchanges of scientific delegations, mutual invitation of scientists to work on probation, exchanges of scientific literature, invitations of outstanding scientists to give lectures and consultations. In medicine and agriculture joint research programmes are conducted. Physicists from the DPRK successfully work and cooperate with their counterparts from other socialist countries at the Joint Nuclear Research Institute at Dubna in the USSR.

A new step in the development of Soviet-Korean scientific ties was made through cooperation in the study of outer space. Of much importance for the national economies is the joint research conducted at the artificial earth satellite tracking station built near Pyongyang with the assistance of Soviet specialists.¹⁴

The plan of scientific cooperation for 1982-1983 between the Soviet and North Korean Academies, signed on May 17, 1982, envisaged con-

¹⁰ *Ekonomiceskaya gazeta*, 1983, No. 37, p. 21.

¹¹ S. G. Nam, *Formation of People's Intelligentsia in the DPRK (1945-1962)*, Moscow, 1970, pp. 60-61, 83, 84.

¹² *Soviet Eastern Affairs*, 1974, No. 1, p. 8 (in Russian).

¹³ I. Gulyazinov, *Construction of Material and Technical Basis of Socialism in the DPRK*, Moscow, 1979, pp. 222-223.

¹⁴ *Ekonomiceskaya gazeta*, 1981, No. 28, p. 20.

tinuation of cooperation in astronomy, conducted by the Astronomy Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Pyongyang Astronomical Observatory of the DPRK Academy of Sciences, exchange of reports delivered at scientific conferences, mutual trips and stays of scientists for research work, learning of each other's research results and exchange of experience, lasting up to 110 weeks, and work on probation lasting up to 48 weeks.¹⁵

Direct links have been made between leading establishments of higher education and research institutions of the two countries. For example, on September 13, 1983, an agreement on cooperation in education and science was signed between the Moscow State University and the Kim Il Sung Pyongyang State University, providing for exchanges of students and post-graduate students, as well as teachers and professors to lecture, conduct joint researches and form joint teams of authors to write textbooks.¹⁶ In November 1983, at the invitation of the Economics Institute of the DPRK Academy of Social Sciences, the country was visited by a group of Soviet economists representing the Institute of Economics, the Institute of the World Socialist System and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences.¹⁷

Cultural relations between the USSR and DPRK, beginning in 1949, have acquired a truly wide and diverse character, embracing such events as tours by artistic companies, groups of artists and individual soloists, exhibitions of paintings, applied arts and photographs, showings of feature and documentary films, exchanges of delegations of workers in various fields of culture and art, participation by Koreans in international competitions and festivals held in the USSR. In the first years of the DPRK's existence Soviet assistance played an important role in the development of culture in the republic, in conducting cultural work to mark outstanding events and memorable dates in the history of the two countries.

As to theatre, the following Soviet plays were staged in Korean theatres: *The Kremlin Chimes* by N. Pogodin, *Platon Krechet* and *The Front* by A. Korneichuk, *Happiness* by A. Pavlenko, *The Russian People* by K. Simonov and *Konstantin Zaslonov* by V. Movzon. Also staged in the DPRK were A. Chekhov's plays *Jubilee* and *Uncle Vanya*, a stage version of N. Ostrovsky's novel "How the Steel Was Tempered" and A. Meitus's opera *The Young Guard*. The students of Pyongyang conservatoire performed P. Tchaikovsky's opera *Eugene Onegin*. All of these productions played an important role in the development of theatrical art in the DPRK and helped acquaint the North Korean people with Russian and Soviet drama.

In preparing the above productions Korean art figures were consulted by their Soviet colleagues. Thus, producer A. Dmokhovsky and artist L. Kovalenko of the Pushkin Drama Theatre in Leningrad were consultants to the staging of the play *Uncle Vanya* and D. Baridze advised the singers who sang in opera *Eugene Onegin*.

In 1957, Soviet producer V. Vlasov and his Korean colleague Kim Daek In put on N. Pogodin's play *The Kremlin Chimes* at the DPRK State Drama Theatre. It was timed for the 40th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and for the first time presented the image of the great Lenin on the Korean stage.

Soviet theatre-goers had the opportunity to view the Korean play *South of the 38th Parallel*. Works of Korean composers, Korean folk and modern songs are performed by Soviet musicians.

¹⁵ *Rodong Sinmun*, May 18, 1982

¹⁶ *Izvestia*, Nov. 14, 1983

¹⁷ *Rodong Sinmun*, Nov. 1, 1983

A prominent part in Soviet-Korean cultural exchanges is played by tours of artistic companies and circus groups. Audiences in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and other cities warmly welcomed the performances of the Pyongyang song and dance ensemble, the ensemble of the Korean People's Army, the Pyongyang opera companies Phipada and Mansude. The Soviet public and spectators much appreciated the gifts and artistic mastery of Korean singers, musicians and dancers. Artistic groups from the border areas of the DPRK toured the Soviet Maritime Territory with great success.

In their turn, Korean audiences have more than once welcomed outstanding Soviet performers. Workers and employees of Pyongyang, steel-makers and dockers of Chongjin, machine-builders of Heju, fishermen and engine-makers of Wonsan, stevedores of Nampho, weavers of Sariwon, ginseng-growers of Kaesong, inhabitants of other Korean cities and villages admired the performances of such well-known Soviet artistic companies as the Beryozka Choreographic Ensemble, which in 1983 toured the DPRK for a second time, the Alexandrov Song and Dance Ensemble of the Soviet Army, the Ensemble Zhok of the Moldavian SSR, the Virsky Dance Ensemble of the Ukrainian SSR, the Pacific Navy Song and Dance Ensemble, the Song and Dance Ensemble of the Don Cossacks, the Osipov Orchestra of Folk Instruments and the Krasnoyarsk Ensemble of Siberian Dances. Tours to the DPRK were also made by the Orenburg, Urals and Northern Russian folk choirs, by the Moscow choir, the Dance Ensemble of the Byelorussian SSR, the Veryovka Ukrainian Folk Choir, and by circus artists.

Regular performances in the DPRK of artists from the Soviet union republics have become quite a tradition. At the end of 1982 and beginning of 1983 Pyongyang and Wonsan welcomed artists from Kazakhstan, who toured the DPRK in connection with the festivities marking the 60th anniversary of the USSR. As the newspaper *Rodong Sinmun* wrote in this connection, "the songs and dances performed contribute to a further deepening of the feeling of friendship between the peoples of Korea and the Soviet Union".¹⁸

Korean performers are regular participants in such major international cultural events as the Tchaikovsky International Competition in Moscow, the International Moscow Festival of Music and the International Tashkent Film Festival of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. As to the achievements of Korean performers, they are attested to by the following facts: the gifted Korean violinist Kim Son Ho won 4th prize at the 6th Tchaikovsky Competition (1978), while violinist Suh Yong Ran was awarded a special prize at the 7th Competition in 1982. The Korean film *A Song on the Battle-Field* won a prize at the 5th Tashkent Film Festival. The 1981 International Moscow Music Festival gave a hearing to the works of the Korean composer Mun Gyon Ok. The poster "That's Capitol" by artist Pak Ha Lyon was judged one of the best and awarded a prize and diploma at the international competition Posters for Peace, Security and Cooperation (1982).¹⁹

Lively interest is engendered in both countries by exhibitions of applied art, paintings, books and photographs, as well as by film showings, all of which are staged in accordance with the plan of DPRK cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union. High acclaim in the DPRK in recent years was won by the USSR National Exhibition (1977), the exhibition "The Great Patriotic War in Fine Arts" and an exhibition of Soviet books, dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the October Revolution and the 60th anniversary of the USSR. The USSR National Exhibition was

* *Rodong Sinmun*, Jan. 9, 1983
** *Izvestia*, Feb. 26, 1982

told during the month of Korean-Soviet friendship timed to the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The over 100,000 people who attended the exhibition demonstrated the Korean people's great interest in the life and achievements of the country of Lenin. A fine arts exhibition, held in Pyongyang in connection with the 40th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi troops near Moscow, displayed over 140 works of painting, sculpture and placards by such well-known masters as A. Deineka, S. Gerasimov, Y. Vuchetich and Kukryniksy. The exhibition was shown in Pyongyang for 14 days, where it was viewed by 50,000 people. Korean artist Li Sok San, after seeing the exhibition, commented that the works of Soviet artists were easily understood and much appreciated by the Koreans who had lived through difficult years of war against the US aggressors.²⁰

The book exhibition in Pyongyang in 1982 displayed over 2,000 books: works by the classics of Marxism-Leninism, materials of the 26th CPSU Congress, books devoted to science and technology, fiction, the arts, textbooks, as well as books in Korean published in the USSR. In their comments the visitors pointed out that the exhibition served to extend their knowledge about the life and achievements of the Soviet people and furthered the development of cultural exchanges between the two countries. When the exhibition ended the books were donated to the library of the People's Palace of Learning.²¹

Since the end of the Second World War, books and booklets by Korean authors, a total of 227 titles have been brought out in the Soviet Union in more than 10.5 million copies. Books of Korean poetry, prose, drama, and folklore have been published in 21 languages of the USSR. The works of the major Korean writer Li Gu Yong have been published 14 times with a total print-run of about 1.3 million copies in 10 languages of the USSR.

Ten-day festivals of Korean books are held regularly in the USSR. The last one opened on August 12, 1983, at the All-Union State Library of Foreign Literature in connection with the 38th anniversary of Korea's liberation. Soviet readers displayed interest in collections of works by modern Korean writers, as well as in the literary and historical monuments of ancient and medieval Korea, including the novel *Dream in a Nephrite Pavilion*, a major work of Korean national literature from the early 17th century. During the ten-day festivals bookshops in Moscow, Khabarovsk and Alma Ata put on sale DPRK books.²²

Soviet authors are invariably popular with Korean readers. In recent years DPRK publishers have reprinted works by N. Ostrovsky, D. Furmanov, A. Fadeyev, A. Tolstoy and A. Serafimovich, as well as a new edition of the novel *Anna Karenina*.²³ To mark the 100th birthday of V. I. Lenin in 1970, the publishers of the Workers' Party of Korea brought out a collection of his selected works, and some separate titles.

An agreement on cooperation in book-publishing, signed in October 1982 by the USSR State Publishing Committee and the DPRK Board of Publishers, will undoubtedly contribute to the further dissemination of literary creations of Soviet and Korean authors and to mutual enrichment of the two socialist literatures.

Also lively are contacts between Soviet and Korean film-makers. Those are guided by the working plans of cooperation concluded annually between the USSR State Cinematography Committee and the DPRK Ministry of Culture and Arts, between the Union of Soviet Film-Makers

²⁰ *Pravda*, Jan. 31, 1982.

²¹ *Pravda*, Oct. 16, 1982.

²² *Izvestia*, Aug. 13, 1983.

²³ *Sovetskaya kultura*, Sept. 9, 1980.

and its Korean counterpart. Under way are, among other things, mutual business visits, sharing of technical and creative experience, participation in film festivals and film fairs. Soviet and Korean films are displayed during film weeks and premieres are organised for this purpose. The latest plan of cooperation in cinematography was signed in January 1983.

The USSR and the DPRK engage in diverse and active sport exchanges on the basis of a long-term agreement, concluded in 1978 by the USSR Sports Committee and the DPRK Committee on Physical Education and Sports, and on the basis of annual plans of sport exchanges. The sides organise mutual tours of sport teams for joint training sessions and matches, participate in international competitions held in the USSR and the DPRK and exchange experience in sporting activities.

The 1980 Moscow Olympics, the third for the DPRK sportsmen, witnessed the most representative team in the history of Korean sports. Olympic titles were vied for by 57 Korean athletes, including weight-lifters, wrestlers, gymnasts, marathon-runners, judo wrestlers, marksmen, archers and boxers.

Well-known Soviet coaches and sport experts, at the request of the Korean side, have been coaching Korean athletes in such novel to them sports as ice hockey and figure skating. For this purpose specialists in Soviet hockey and figure skating celebrities, K. Loktev, A. Tarasov, I. Moskvin worked in the DPRK in 1981-1983. "Merited coach I. Moskvin," said a letter from the chairman of the DPRK Sports Committee, "has helped our trainers and assisted the promotion of figure skating a great deal. I believe that Moskvin's sincere cooperation with our athletes is a manifestation of great friendship between the sports organisations of the two countries..."²⁴

Soviet-Korean cultural cooperation embraces other spheres as well. Mutually useful contacts are maintained in a planned way in public health and medical science, in broadcasting and television. Creative links have been forged between unions of journalists and writers, artists and musicians. Agreements on cooperation were signed and are being implemented between TASS and KCNA, APN and KCNA. The newspapers *Pravda* and *Rodong Sinmun*, *Izvestia* and *Minjoo Chosun* have regularly been exchanging delegations. Traditional contacts have been maintained between trade-union, youth and other public organisations of the two countries.

In the framework of Soviet-Korean cultural relations special attention is paid to the observance of national holidays in both countries, to memorable dates in their bilateral relations. The Soviet public, for example, gloriously marked in the last decade the 30th and 35th anniversaries of Korea's liberation from the Japanese colonial yoke, the 30th and 35th anniversaries of the formation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the formation of the Workers' Party of Korea, as well as other significant dates in the history of the Korean people. Socialist Korea held mass festivities in connection with the 60th and 65th anniversaries of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Soviet Army, the 60th anniversary of the Leninist Young Communist League, the 60th anniversary of the USSR and the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday.

Jubilee festivities in both countries marked the following memorable dates in Soviet-Korean relations: the 15th and 20th anniversaries of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the DPRK, the 30th and 35th anniversaries of establishing diplomatic relations, and some others.

The Soviet-Korean Friendship Society (SKFS) and the Korean-Soviet Friendship Society (KSFS) have continued to develop and strengthen

²⁴ *Soviet sport*, Nov. 19, 1981.

their links. The SKFS, which marked its 25th anniversary in 1983, takes an active part in months of solidarity with the struggle of the Korean people for the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and a peaceful unification of the country on democratic principles held annually in the USSR. The Society acquaints Soviet people with the DPRK's achievements in socialist construction. The KSFS organises annual film showings, photo exhibitions, etc., devoted to the Soviet people's successes in building a developed socialist society.

In 1975 on occasion of its 30th anniversary the Korean-Soviet Friendship Society was awarded the Order of Peoples' Friendship. In this connection the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet noted "the successful activity of the KSFS in strengthening and developing fraternal friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the DPRK and the Soviet Union".

Summing up the results of Soviet-Korean cultural relations we can single out certain typical features. First of all, these relations are characterised by a unity of purpose and fraternal cooperation. Their other characteristics are stability, variety, comprehensiveness and great mutual benefit. The experience of Soviet-Korean cultural exchanges provides convincing proof not only of the objective necessity of and need for mutual contacts and enrichment of socialist cultures, which are socialist in essence and national in form, but also of the law-governed nature of the gradual internationalisation of cultural life of socialist countries.

Cooperation between the USSR and the DPRK proves that major achievements in the DPRK's economy and culture, the successful process of creating modern socio-economic and socio-political structure are inextricably linked with the existence of the world socialist system and with mutual assistance and influence of socialist countries. The DPRK's successes in the national economy, in public education, health and culture, in cinematography and the arts are primarily a result of the many-sided and fruitful cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries.

Of special importance in the dynamics of relations between the USSR and the DPRK are meetings of their party and state leaders. The last decade has witnessed a number of high-level contacts, such as the visit to the USSR of a WPK delegation headed by Kim Dong Gyu, member of the Political Committee of the WPK CC, Secretary of the WPK CC (1973), a visit by Pak Sung Chul, member of the Political Committee of the WPK CC, Premier of the DPRK Administrative Council (1977); the visit to the DPRK in January 1978 of a Soviet party and government delegation headed by D. A. Kunayev, member of the Politburo of the CPSU CC, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. A useful exchange of opinions on important questions of the international situation and the struggle against the hegemonic policy of aggressive imperialist and reactionary circles took place during the visit to the USSR in June 1979 of a Korean party delegation headed by Kim Yong Nam, member of the Political Committee of the WPK CC, Secretary of the WPK CC. The 6th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, which took place in the days when the Korean people celebrated the 35th anniversary of the WPK (October 1980), was attended by a CPSU delegation, headed by V. V. Grishin, Member of the CPSU Politburo, First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU. Lastly, in 1983, the celebrations of the 35th anniversary of the DPRK were attended by a Soviet party and government delegation, led by P. N. Demichev, Alternate Member of the Politburo, USSR Minister of Culture.

A milestone in Soviet-Korean relations was the exchange in early 1983 of personal messages between Yuri Andropov and Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the WPK CC, President of the DPRK, which doubtlessly

contributed to mutual understanding and cooperation between the two countries, to the development of Soviet-Korean friendly relations in the political, economic and cultural areas, as well as to further coordination of efforts in the struggle against imperialism, for the prevention of war, for peace and security of peoples.²⁵

The US military buildup in the South of the Korean peninsula, announced by R. Reagan during his visit to Seoul in November 1983, the formation of a tripartite military alliance in the Far East, comprised of the US, Japan and South Korea, call forth legitimate concern and serious anxiety among the peoples of the region. In the present complicated international situation, the Soviet Union constantly demonstrates its internationalist support of the Korean people's just struggle for the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, for a peaceful, democratic reunification of the Korean nation. In its address to the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly the Soviet delegation emphasised that the real foundation for the settlement of the Korean question is provided by the proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which envisages the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea, the creation of prerequisites for a unification of the country by peaceful means, without outside interference.

The Soviet Union is a reliable friend of the DPRK, a reliable bulwark in the confrontation with the class enemy, in defending the interests of the working people of Korea, of their revolutionary achievements against the stratagems of imperialists and their henchmen.

²⁵ *Rodong Sinmun*, Jan. 21, 1983; *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1983.

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NATIONAL REBIRTH OF KAMPUCHEA

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[Article by D. V. Mosyakov, candidate of historical sciences]

January 7, 1984 was the Fifth Anniversary of the formation of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). During these years the PRK has traversed a long and complicated path of struggle for national rebirth, better living standards, and buttressed its domestic and international conditions. The triumph of the Kampuchean people in January 1979 in the struggle against the bloody Pol Pot regime was a turning point in the modern history of Kampuchea and in the development of the revolutionary process in the country. The road towards national rebirth opened up before the long-suffering people of that country.

The Programme of Kampuchea's National Rebirth was adopted at the peak of the anti-Pol Pot struggle in December 1978, at the Constituent Congress of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation (KUFNS), a massive socio-political organisation which united representatives of all strata and social groups of Kampuchea which led the national struggle for the overthrowing of the Pol Pot regime and later guided the country's national rebirth.

The Programme of the Front in the sphere of domestic policy contained the task of holding universal elections to the National Assembly, reorganising the bodies of power at all levels, working out a new constitution guaranteeing the rights of people to genuine equality, freedom and democracy, and passing legislation of an independent and democratic state marching along the road of building socialism. The Programme emphasised the need for setting up mass organisations affiliated with the KUFNS.¹

The socio-economic section of the Programme determined the principal task of economic development, i. e., the formation of a new, planned economy having markets and meeting the people's interests and requirements of progress. A special point was made of the need for raising the standard of living of the population.²

The section of the Programme which dealt with cultural construction set forth the task of eradicating the reactionary cultural policy pursued by the clique of the national traitors; creating a new national people's culture; eliminating illiteracy; developing popular education; building schools, higher educational establishments and specialised secondary schools; and properly employing scientists, technicians, and workers of culture and art.³

A special section of the Programme formulated fundamental principles of Kampuchea's foreign policy: "To pursue a foreign policy of peace, friendship and nonalignment in relations with all countries, to settle all differences with the neighbouring countries through negotiations, and to restore relations of friendship and cooperation with all countries of Southeast Asia."⁴

This Programme met the vital interests of the Kampuchean people. It

¹ Declaration of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation, Phnom Penh, 1979, p. 6. Since June 27, 1981, the KUFNS was called the Kampuchean United Front for National Construction and Defence (KUFNCD).

² Ibid., pp. 7-8.

³ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 9-10.

served as the basis for consolidating forces which struggled for the overthrowing of the Pol Pot regime, and for the national rebirth of the country. Of special significance is that, for the first time in the history of the national liberation movement in Kampuchea, the Programme of the Front described the building of a new state as "development towards socialism". Thus, the ideas of scientific socialism for which the Kampuchean Communists fought became the foundation for the building of a new life in the country.

After the January triumph, the KUFNS Programme spelled out the socio-political development of Kampuchea. Many of its propositions, including the strategic goal of the Kampuchean state—the building of the foundations of socialism—the propositions from the socio-economic and cultural sections relating to planned economy, and to the creation of national people's culture became part and parcel of the programme for the development of the country adopted by the Fourth Congress of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (PRPK), held in May 1981. The major items of the Programme's political section were for the most part translated into reality between 1979 and 1981. Many provisions of the Programme, adopted in 1978, took much time to be carried out because of the difficult socio-economic and political position of the young republic.

The Pol Pot regime left behind a devastated national economy. The latter was on the decline, and chaos gripped the country's socio-economic and political links. A greater part of industrial enterprises, power stations and the entire infrastructure were practically non-existent. In some areas of Kampuchea, particularly in southeast (along the Mekong River and near the Vietnamese-Kampuchea border) there was hardly any population left: it had either been annihilated or expelled during the Pol Pot rule. Phnom Penh and other cities were ravaged, and their population was deported to the rural areas. The systems of health care and education, rather developed in the 1960s, were destroyed. Practically all branches of the economy lacked skilled specialists.⁵ However, as Heng Samrin, Chairman of the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea, pointed out in his interview to the Kampuchean news agency SPK, "the most monstrous crime committed by them [the Pol Pot cutthroats.—D. M.] was the killing of more than three million people, i. e., the destruction of the main productive force of the country. Those who remained alive are totally emaciated and suffer from serious diseases."⁶ The situation in the country was even more complicated because the remnants of the Pol Pot troops were still active in some areas.

By that time the food problem became critical. A greater part of rice reserves were destroyed by Pol Pot loyalists during their escape. A good many irrigation and land improvement systems were totally out of order. The pump stations did not operate, the channels which brought water to the checks were destroyed. The threat of famine loomed large.

Under such conditions, the Front carried out its Programme stage-by-stage. First, the main emphasis in the policy of the KUFNS and the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea (PRCK) set up soon after January 1979, was placed on implementing the provisions of the Programme directed at creating prerequisites for national rebirth and renovation. Among the priority tasks were the formation of a national army for the protection of the revolution, eradication of the Pol Pot bases in the central areas and in the west of the country, stabilisation of the overall military-political situation, formation of the state power bodies and the spread of their activities to all provinces, restoration of the foun-

See Interview of President Heng Samrin to the SPK News Agency on the Occasion of the Beginning of the New, 1980/81 School Year, Phnom Penh, 1980, p. 5 (ibid., p. 1).

dations of national economy, and the elimination of the threat of famine.

Although Pol Pot's main forces were crushed, up to the mid-1979 they continued to control some areas in the central, southern and western provinces of Kampuchea, opposing in every way possible the measures taken by the people's power. Under such conditions, it was imperative, within a short span of time, to form the backbone of the national army of Kampuchea which, together with the Vietnamese voluntary units, could defend the revolutionary gains, life and security of citizens from the intrigues of the enemies of the young republic.

The problems of forming a national army were discussed in April 1979 at a conference in Phnom Penh, which was attended practically by all commanders of the combat units of the People's Liberation Army of Kampuchea. The conference examined the primary tasks of military construction in the PRK, i. e., the formation of the army to defend the revolution.⁷ It was stressed at the conference that this army should consist of the three arms of the service (ground forces, air force, and navy), act in close coordination with the people, and be able to cut short any intrigues by the enemies of the revolution.

Another key problem discussed at the conference was the setting up of self-defence groups in villages and townships. The speakers emphasised that in rural areas "since the very first days after the liberation, a large-scale popular movement emerged in defence of the revolutionary gains, and against the armed Pol Pot gangs. This movement should be supported as much as possible". The conference also noted that the struggle against the Pol Pot cutthroats should be waged along several lines. Apart from the armed struggle, it is necessary to "carry out explanatory work among the soldiers of the enemy and win them over to the side of the people". The participants in the conference arrived at the conclusion that "though the enemy had not yet laid down their arms and continued hostilities in different areas of the country, the Kampuchean revolution was unswervingly consolidating its positions".⁸

The military conference in Phnom Penh was convened on the eve of a decisive offensive against the Pol Pot bases, which started in late March—early April 1979. In the course of the offensive the main bulk of the Pol Pot troops which remained since January 1979 was liquidated. From January to July 1979 about 42,000 Pol Pot officers and men were killed, wounded, and taken prisoner and over 10,000 soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the PRK authorities.⁹ Since the mid-1979 military operations on a greater part of the territory of Kampuchea practically ceased, and the remnants of the Pol Pot troops still continued their armed actions only in a rather limited area in the west of the country, near the Thai border.

THE FORMATION OF THE PRK STATE AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE

General stabilisation of the military and political situation made it possible to set up organs of state power on a large scale, over the entire territory of the Republic. "KUFNS and PRCK put forward the task, within a brief span of time, of organising in all towns and villages people's self-government committees as the lowest stage of the state and political structure of the country," wrote *Kampuchea*. "The tasks of these bodies of power consist in effectively implementing at all levels the decisions of the leading bodies of power."¹⁰

⁷ *Kampuchea*, No. 7, April 1979.

⁸ *Ibidem*

⁹ *Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star)*, Jan. 4, 1980.

¹⁰ *Kampuchea*, No. 12, June 1979.

While forming the people's self-government committees, the revolutionary power could effectively operate throughout the entire country, carry out its decisions and control the situation in different areas. The creation of bodies of state power at all levels was particularly necessary for launching the process of national rebirth and organising the people for the struggle against hunger and dislocation. In its editorial dealing with the tasks of building the foundations of state power, *Kampuchea* wrote: "It is necessary to begin bolstering state power in the People's Republic of Kampuchea from the local bodies of power since it is mainly they which bring the population the basic provisions of the political line pursued by KUFNS and PRCK. Local authorities impart organisation and discipline to the popular movement, and enlist genuine friends of the people for cooperation in implementing the revolutionary policy."¹¹ The wretched socio-economic and political situation in the country, however, did not provide conditions for holding elections to the local bodies of power simultaneously all over Kampuchea. They were held in different areas at different time as the situation stabilised there. In 1979-1980 the political and administrative structure of the country was as follows: the government—the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea, People's Revolutionary Committees in the provinces, People's Committees in the counties, and People's Self-Government Committees in villages and at the urban enterprises. The leaders of the medium and high echelon of the administrative organs were appointed from the people devoted to the revolution, veterans of the anti-imperialist and anti-Pol Pot struggle.

The Second Congress of the KUFNS held in Phnom Penh late in September 1979 was a major event in the political life of the country. It was attended by more than 500 delegates which represented all provinces.

In his speech at the Congress Heng Samrin underscored that a complete rout and liquidation of the bloody Pol Pot regime and the destruction of the Pol Pot bases in many districts of the country were the main results of the activities of KUFNS after its First Congress convened in the conditions of a national uprising late in 1978. The prestige of the KUFNS, as well as mass trade union, peasant, women, and youth public organisations affiliated with the Front has increased considerably over the time of national rebirth. These organisations made up the basis of the PRK's socio-political structure. Today the Republic is faced by the formidable problems of national rebirth. Heng Samrin mentioned among the particularly crucial tasks the further cohesion of the Kampuchean people around the KUFNS and active participation of all citizens in national rebirth.¹²

At the Congress, the Central Committee of the KUFNS was extended substantially, and the number of its members increased from 12 to 35. The principal aim of expanding the KUFNS Central Committee was to "rely on increasingly broad strata of the population, enhance the role of the Front as a chief national political organisation to be made up of representatives of all layers and social groups of Kampuchean society".

In late 1980 the entire country started preparing for the general elections to the National Assembly of the Republic. Immense significance was attached to those elections, since they were to legalise supreme bodies of state power and reflect the attitude of Kampucheans to the domestic and foreign policies pursued by the KUFNS and PRCK. The resolution of the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea on the preparations for the elections stressed, among other things: "The general elections will reaffirm the resolve of our multinational people to build an independent,

¹¹ *Ibid.* Feb. 19, 1981

¹² *The Speech of Heng Samrin, Chairman of the PRCK at the Second Congress of the KUFNS, Phnom Penh, 1979, p. 5*

peaceful, united Kampuchea marching towards socialism. They will be carried out on the basis of universal, equal, direct and secret ballot. True patriots who sincerely desire to serve the people are to be elected to the supreme body of state power."¹³

The elections to the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Kampuchea—the supreme body of state power in the country—took place on May 1, 1981. A total of 97.8 per cent of the registered voters took part in it, and 117 deputies were elected to the National Assembly, among them the leaders of the Kampuchean state, of the KUFNS, and representatives of various social groups of Kampuchean society. In an article dealing with the results of the general elections the *Kampuchea* newspaper noted that the "elections were fresh evidence of the confidence enjoyed by the people's power in the country, and were a graphic demonstration of the achievements scored by the people of Kampuchea during the two years after its liberation. They confirmed the correctness of the political line pursued by the revolutionary party and the KUFNS and showed convincingly the irreversible nature of the revolutionary changes in Kampuchea."¹⁴

The First Session of the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Kampuchea started its sittings in June 1981. The Deputies faced the task of adopting the Constitution of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, thereby legalising the political line opted for by the Republic, and the system of the bodies of state power in the country.

The discussion of the draft Constitution of the PRK lasted a long time, i. e., since the first half of 1980. Important amendments were introduced in the original text of the Constitution in the course of the nationwide discussion which received broad coverage by the Kampuchean press. They concerned practically all sections of the document and were aimed at reflecting, as profoundly as possible, the obtaining situation in the fundamental law of the country. For example, it was stated in the socio-economic section of the first draft that only one form of property—the property of all people—exists in the country.¹⁵ After amendments were introduced, the PRK Constitution proclaimed that the economic system rests on the three forms of property: state property, the property of the groups of labour mutual assistance, and family property. A provision was added to the same section that the "state supports small-scale production and craftsmen in every way possible". At the same time, the Constitution reads that the "state develops industrial and agricultural production, trade and the infrastructure".¹⁶

The political section of the PRK Constitution states: "The political line of the PRK is independence, peace and happiness of the people, and the building of genuine socialism." This reaffirms legislatively the strategic line of Kampuchea's development. It is also stressed that "all power in the PRK belongs to the people". A point is made in this section that the "party is the leading and guiding force of Kampuchean society". The Constitution notes that all citizens of Kampuchea, regardless of their nationality, have equal rights. The provision introduced in the political section of the Constitution in the course of its discussion to the effect that "citizens of the PRK must actively participate in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country, and they may submit to the state bodies their proposals on the problems concerning the policy of the state and the life of the country" is an important addition to the Constitution.

The document consolidates the fundamental provisions of the foreign policy aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with the Soviet

¹³ Resolution of the PRCK on the Preparation for the Elections. Phnom Penh, 1980.

¹⁴ Kampuchea, June 6, 1981.

¹⁵ Draft Constitution of the PRK. Phnom Penh, 1980, p. 5.

¹⁶ Constitution of the PRK. Phnom Penh, 1981, p. 4.

Union, Vietnam, Laos and other countries of the socialist community. In the international scene, the Constitution stresses, the PRK pursues a policy of nonalignment and peace with the purpose of establishing relations of stability and goodneighbourliness with all countries.

The adoption of the Constitution—the fundamental law of the PRK—was the final stage in setting up the state structure, and spelling out functions of the bodies of people's power, rights and duties of its citizens.

The party construction was developing simultaneously with the state progress. It was necessary, within a brief span of time, to vitalise a party of Kampuchean Communists, based on true Marxism-Leninism, as a leading force in society, in order to restore the country successfully, and defend its revolutionary gains. The problem was that since the early 1960s, when Pol Pot and his accomplices seized important positions in the Communist Party of Kampuchea, they steered towards physical destruction of Communist-internationalists who opposed the leftist-extremist line imposed on the party by Pol Pot and his group. In 1962 Pol Pot's minions assassinated Tus Samut, General Secretary of the Party Central Committee, and in 1972 they poisoned Son Ngok Minh, Chairman of the Party and one of its veterans. Such well-known party leaders as Keo Muny and Sien An and hundreds of other Kampuchean Communists were tortured to death in the Pol Pot dungeons. Large-scale purges were carried out in the party during the last period of the national liberation war against US imperialist and their Lon Nol puppets (1973-1975). At that time hundreds of veteran Communists were secretly murdered (their disappearance was "explained" by sending them to education courses, changing the place of work, and so on). Pol Pot and his group who by that time had seized control over the party replaced these veterans with persons who lacked serious ideological training and requisite experience in revolutionary struggle and who were under the ideological influence of Maoist precepts.

By January 1979 just a handful of party veterans remained alive. Many of them perished as a result of the Pol Pot terrorism, and in the protracted and bitter struggle for the overthrowing of the Pol Pot clique.

On January 5-8, 1979, the Third Congress of the Party was held in one of the liberated areas of the country,¹⁷ it was attended by 66 delegates. The Congress formed the Party Construction Commission which later was turned into the Central Committee. The Congress adopted the provisional Rules of the Party and set forth the task of restoring and expanding Party ranks. The participants in the Congress laid bare the reactionary essence of the Pol Pot regime, and approved the programme of struggle for its eradication and for national rebirth.¹⁸

In 1979-1980 there was no official announcement about the existence of the Party, because it was necessary to restore and consolidate it on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist positions, form the network of primary Party organisations, expand its social base and personnel from among the people devoted to the cause of the revolution. Impressive successes in the Party construction were achieved during the two years of strenuous work, which made it possible to start, early in 1981, preparations for the Fourth Party Congress which was held on May 26-29, 1981.

The Congress, attended by 162 delegates, furnished a profound analysis of the political situation in the country and determined the tasks of the national construction. The delegates approved the proposal made by the Central Committee to call the Party by its former name—the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (PRPK). The Report of the Central Committee to the Congress pointed out: "The strengthening of the

¹⁷ *Pravda*, May 28, 1981.

¹⁸ *History of Kampuchea A Concise Essay*, Moscow, 1981, p. 233 (in Russian).

party politically, ideologically, and organisationally, its unity and cohesion and stronger solidarity with the international workers' movement are among the principal tasks facing the Congress."¹⁹ The place of the party in society was defined as follows: "In Kampuchean society the PRPK carries out guidance, elaborates a political line, selection and placing of personnel, mobilises masses for translating into reality the decisions of the Party and state. The Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation plays an important part in it."

While examining the socio-economic and political development of the country, the Report stated: "The theory of Marxism-Leninism by which PRPK is guided in its practical activities is the basis of the successes achieved." The Party succeeded in giving a right assessment of the domestic and international situations, elaborating a correct political line, constantly taking into account the experience of the revolutionary struggle of the fraternal countries.

Proceeding from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, socio-economic specifics of Kampuchea and the experience of the world revolutionary movement, the PRPK put forward, at the present stage of the revolution, the task of ensuring reliable protection and consolidation of the country's independence and its gradual transition to socialism, in accordance with the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country, without any subjectivism or voluntarism.

The Congress determined strategic tasks of the socio-economic construction in Kampuchea. "It is imperative," the Report of the Central Committee stressed, "to have an ample supply of food, increase the output of consumer goods, develop exports and trade with the socialist countries, which, in the final analysis, will contribute to the further normalisation and improvement of the living standards of the working people. With these aims in view it is necessary to improve the system of state rule, ensure correct guidance of the economy, improve the quality of training personnel, and increase the number of qualified specialists in all spheres of the country's national economy."

The extended programme of building the foundations of socialism, approved by the Congress, and the documents adopted in the course of its proceedings are ample evidence that the experience of the international workers' and communist movement has been exerting increasing influence on the elaboration of the basic provisions for the foreign and domestic policies of the PRK. "From now on," the Report of the Central Committee said, "we will build a socialist society on the basis of the principles of genuine Marxism-Leninism... This is the sole way for national and social emancipation, for building a happy and prosperous life for the people, and for reliably protecting national independence."²⁰

According to Heng Samrin, General Secretary of the PRPK Central Committee, Chairman of the State Council of the PRK, the "PRPK is a truly Marxist-Leninist party and its principal tasks at the current stage of development of the Kampuchean revolution consist in defending independence and building foundations of a socialist society in Kampuchea."²¹

ECONOMIC REHABILITATION

In the economic rebirth of the country a strategic line was taken towards the priority restoration and development of agricultural production. The task was set, within a shortest period of time, to eliminate the threat of

¹⁹ *Pravda*, May 28, 1981

²⁰ *Sovetskaya Rossiya (Soviet Russia)*, July 10, 1981

²¹ *Pravda*, June 30, 1982

tanine, ensure complete self-sufficiency of Kampuchea in food, and then begin exportation of agricultural produce. Restoration of industry should be closely connected with the needs of agriculture. Such an economic development programme enabled Kampuchea to obtain a source for currency earnings which it needed, and then the means for the development of national industry.

In the 1960s the area in which rice was grown in Kampuchea amounted, on the average, to about 2.5 million hectares, while the harvest of rice was 2.2-2.5 million tons, of which 0.5 million tons were exported annually.²² In 1979 the situation in agriculture was extremely grave. The area under rice was only 0.5 million hectares, and the harvest amounted to approximately 0.8 million tons. The countryside suffered from acute need of agricultural implements, fertilizer, and draught animals. The situation was even more aggravated due to the fact that the country was deprived of seeds.

During this most difficult period, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, other socialist countries, and also a number of international organisations acting under the aegis of the UN came to the aid of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. In 1979 the USSR gave Kampuchea overall assistance worth \$134 million, including 112,000 tons of food, 130,000 tons of fuel, and 8 million metres of fabrics. Also, the first Soviet specialists arrived in Kampuchea.²³

This assistance largely helped major difficulties to be overcome during the period of national rebirth. And the domestic policies pursued by the KUFNS and the PRPK played an important part in it. Taking into consideration the exceptionally complicated situation in the countryside, the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea decided to leave to the peasants the whole amount of rice where they managed to plant it, while the other areas were supposed to be supplied from the state reserves, i. e., chiefly through international aid. In the obtaining situation this decision was of great political and economic significance. First, it strengthened the peasants' confidence in the new power, and, second, created conditions in which substantial areas of the country could provide themselves both with food and seeds.

Already in February-March 1979 the formation of peasant groups of labour mutual assistance which was called "groups of solidarity in the struggle for increasing production" was launched throughout Kampuchea. They became a major form of organisation of peasant labour. These groups were formed only on a voluntary basis.²⁴ The aim of their formation consisted in uniting scattered peasant farmsteads and organising regular mutual assistance among peasants. In 1979 each labour mutual assistance group usually consisted of 20 to 25 families. In 1980 they became smaller, with each group comprising ten to fifteen families. By that time there were more than 50,000 groups of labour mutual assistance in Kampuchea, with each of them representing the primary form of production and marketing cooperation. The Kampuchean leaders oriented the groups of labour mutual assistance towards inadmissibility of the levelling principle and stressed the need for the distribution according to labour done. However, the threat of hunger, the inability of many people to work intensely due to disease and starving made it necessary to use a differentiated system of distribution. The members of a group which worked in the field intensively obtained one-day work-day unit per shift. Those who worked incomplete working day got 0.7-0.8 work-day unit, and those who

²² G. G. Socheyko, *Present-Day Cambodia (1941-1965)*, Moscow, 1967, pp. 85-91 (in Russian).

²³ *World Marxist Review*, 1980, No. 10, p. 74 (in Russian).

²⁴ *Kampuchea*, Feb. 5, 1981.

could not work altogether received 0.5 work-day unit. The distribution of rice harvest was done at the general meetings of all members of the group. In the districts of the country where the 1979 harvest was small, levelling distribution took place. The aim of that measure was to feed as many people as possible. In the districts where the situation was more favourable, part of the harvest was distributed according to the work done, and some part on the levelling basis.

The cultivated areas were owned collectively by all members of the group, while cattle and implements were not socialised and were mainly owned by individual peasants. At the same time, each peasant family was permitted to receive a plot of land of no more than 2,500 sq m to obtain additional agricultural produce.

The year 1979 witnessed a whole series of measures aimed at developing agricultural production. Specialised agricultural services were set up in Kampuchea: distribution of seeds and implements, irrigation and propaganda services whose task was to distribute new varieties of rice and progressive agrotechnical methods. Courses for training agronomists were started in Phnom Penh.

The measures taken by the people's power, as well as the selfless labour of peasants resulted in a gradual change of the situation in the Kampuchean agriculture for the better.

The year 1980 was crucial in economic rebirth. The restoration of the country started on a large scale and embraced practically all spheres of social life. The Kampuchean press wrote: "In 1980 our people worked wholeheartedly. Thanks to that it was possible to solve many major problems in developing and restoring the national economy, enhancing the efficiency of agricultural production, raising the level of food supplies, and creating necessary reserves for 1981."²⁵

Agriculture—the principal branch of the Kampuchean economy—made a particularly big stride forward. The cultivated area more than doubled and reached 1.5 million hectares. The rice harvest also more than doubled and amounted to 1.6 million tons. The areas under additional crops (as Kampucheans call them), including maize, batat, and manioc, and technical crops also expanded. The rice crop increased considerably, first and foremost, due to the fact that the labour mutual assistance groups consolidated and obtained agricultural implements, mineral fertilizer, and the required seed.

Kampuchean industry also began to get back on its feet. Despite the lack of raw materials and considerable depreciation of a greater part of equipment, industrial enterprises were commissioned one after another. A large-scale reorganisation of production was under way: many enterprises which used imported raw materials switched over to local ones, others which produced luxuries, started putting out consumer goods for the people. In a leading article dealing with the development and reorganisation of industrial production *Kampuchea* wrote: "Our national industry should above all be closely linked with agriculture, process agricultural produce, and provide it with the necessary machines. It should use chiefly local raw materials. Under the correct guidance of the PRPK and with the assistance of the fraternal socialist countries, our engineers and workers having overcome tremendous difficulties, succeeded in restoring the base for industrial and artisan production."²⁶ By 1981 in Phnom Penh alone seven heavy industry enterprises and three power stations were in operation, 32 enterprises produced consumer industry items, and ten put out foodstuffs. There also operated nine chemical facto-

²⁵ *Kampuchea*, Feb. 26, 1981.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

ries. All in all, there were 50 factories and plants each with over 100 employees.

Apart from the capital, national industry is developing in other towns and provinces as well. Among the biggest enterprises outside Phnom Penh there are textile mills in Kampongcham, and Battambang provinces. Alongside these enterprises, there exist hundreds of artisan shops which service industrial production, agriculture and everyday needs of the people. The total of 25,000 people were employed in industry and craftsmanship.²⁷

In 1980 the national industry considerably increased its output having produced about three million metres of fabrics, 13,000 tires, 500,000 pairs of simple footwear, almost 1.5 million bottles of milk, and three million cigarettes. Also, the production of electric power went up substantially.

By early 1981 the gravest period of national restoration of Kampuchea was completed. While summing up the results of the country's development for two years, *Kampuchea* wrote in its editorial: "The economic restoration of the country is proceeding successfully; rice was planted on more than 1.5 million hectares, which is twice as much as last year and more than what was planned initially. Such important branches as fishing, wood-cutting, and rubber-bearing plants started growing again. This opens up broad vistas for a further development of the economy. Money circulation has been introduced, banks are operating, and intense commodity exchange is under way. Important enterprises which are assigned to meet the needs of the people are functioning again. Over a million children attend schools, and a campaign against illiteracy among adults has been launched. On the whole, the standard of living is rising uninterrupted."

In touching upon the state construction, the paper noted: "During the past period the state-revolutionary power at all levels was consolidated and developed. The ranks of our cadre workers extended and consolidated. They are working with greater efficiency now, and are increasingly devoted to the implementation of the political goals of our revolution. Each of our triumphs proves that we are following a correct course."²⁸

CONSOLIDATION OF THE YOUNG REPUBLIC

Between 1981 and 1983 the political and socio-economic development of the People's Republic of Kampuchea continued. As was provided for by the decisions of the Fourth Congress of the PRPK, the economic potential of the country grew considerably, and agricultural production was developing rapidly. The living standards of the population rose. During the agricultural season of 1982 the area of cultivated land in Kampuchea increased by almost 200,000 hectares, as compared with 1981, and now amounts to 1.8 million hectares in the rainy season and more than 40,000 in the dry season. The areas under other crops have also expanded considerably. For example, almost 10,000 hectares are under corn, about 40,000 hectares are under leguminous plants, and 10,000 hectares are under tobacco. Husbandry produce is growing steadily. Cattle increased by 120,000 head per year. The overall catch of fish reached 70,000 tons. It was underscored at the conference of the agricultural workers held in April 1983 that Kampuchea has come close to self-sufficiency in food. Thus, an important step has been made towards solving the tasks put forward by the Fourth Congress of the PRPK.²⁹ At the same time, the participants in the conference noted that to accelerate the development of

²⁷ *Ibidem*

²⁸ *Kampuchea*, Jan 1, 1981

²⁹ *Kampuchea*, April 7, 1983

agriculture it is imperative to solve the important task of creating a solid material and technical basis, speeding up the use of new areas of land, and intensifying work in all spheres of agricultural production.³⁰

Today high quality rubber, whose production is gradually increasing at the restored plantations, has become the chief export item of Kampuchea. The area of rubber plantations has already reached 12,000 hectares, with 10,000 people working there. The restored plant for reprocessing of latex is gathering momentum. In 1982 it produced almost 8,000 tons. The first batches of rubber have already been sent abroad.

In conformity with the decisions of the Fourth Congress of the PRPK, the Kampuchean industry in 1981-1983 placed chief emphasis on the restoration of those enterprises which could work on local raw materials and meet the urgent needs of the population. For example, at the biggest spinning factory in Phnom Penh the machines were retooled and the production premises expanded. The number of employees at that enterprise reached 700 people. The restoration and development of the enterprises connected with agricultural production and the processing of raw materials continued. Of special importance was the reconstruction of the Phnom Penh mechanical works which supplied peasant cooperatives with pumps, their spare parts and other irrigation equipment. On the whole the industrial production in the country increased 18-fold by the end of 1983, as against 1979.

However, there exists a number of still unresolved problems which drastically slow down the rates of developing the national industry. This is, primarily, the weakness of the energy basis, the lack of skilled personnel, and the need for renovation of a greater proportion of the technological equipment.

Road building is developing on a broad scale. A large-scope programme of the building and reconstruction of highways and the whole of infrastructure was adopted. In 1982, in conformity with that programme, 150 kilometres of highways, including such important ones as Phnom Penh—Kampong Saom (a port) were restored.

The People's Republic of Kampuchea scored especially tangible achievements in developing the system of health service and education. During the first year after the people's power took over, about one million children went to school, whereas in 1983-1984 school year the number of schoolchildren doubled and topped 1,840,000 boys and girls. Never were there so many schoolchildren in Kampuchea. The campaign to eliminate illiteracy among adults is still active. After the victory of the people's revolution about 600,000 Kampucheans learned how to read and write. During the current school year their number will exceed 700,000. Thus, Kampuchea is marching rapidly towards the solution of a chief task of national restoration, i. e., the achievement of complete literacy in the country. In the coming years thousands of well-trained specialists will work in the national economy.

The withdrawal of a contingent of the Vietnamese voluntary troops from Kampuchea in May 1983 was graphic proof of the further stabilisation of the domestic situation and the support by the people of the policy pursued by the PRK government. The statement issued by the Ministry of National Defence of Kampuchea noted that "the positions of the Kampuchean revolution are now strong and solid as never before. That is why the governments of the PRK and the SRV began pulling out a contingent of the Vietnamese volunteers. Of special significance is the further strengthening of the People's Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea which is scoring fresh successes in defending the revolutionary gains, and liquidating the remnants of the Pol Pot gangs, and other groupings of Khmer reac-

Ibidem

tionaries. In the course of the military operations during the dry season of 1983, the People's Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea won impressive victories driving out the Pol Pot gangs and other counterrevolutionaries, trained and armed with US weapons in Thailand, from border areas in a number of provinces."

While evaluating Kampuchea's achievements, it is necessary to bear in mind that its enemies did not lay down their arms and during the entire period of the existence of the PRK have been conducting subversive activities both inside the country and in the international arena. By means of massive ideological and political attacks and military provocations on the Kampuchean-Thai border, US imperialists and other forces of the international reaction spare no efforts to check the development of the Kampuchean revolution and bring back to the country the Pol Pot men and other Khmer counterrevolutionaries.

All these intrigues, however, are doomed to failure. The People's Republic of Kampuchea is confidently marching along the road of building a new society.

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NAKASONE'S MILITARY POLICY

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[Article by V. N. Bunin, candidate of historical sciences]

Lately Japan has noticeably sped up the expansion of its military capabilities. The process is justifiably linked with the accession on November 24, 1982, of Yasuhiro Nakasone, the bellicose chairman of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to the post of Prime Minister.

The Sixth Five-Year Programme (1983-1987) for the development of Japan's armed forces which began on April 1, 1983, provides graphic evidence of the rapid expansion of the country's "self-defence forces". The programme is an important element of the Japanese leadership's military policy, which is part and parcel of the US strategy in Asia and the Pacific.

The programme is primarily designed to complete the qualitative modernisation of Japan's armed forces, to attain the number targets for the three services set forth by the 1976 long-term plan, to develop a new military policy and to meet the Pentagon's demand that Japan appreciably build up its military capability in order to extend the range of protection by the US and Japanese navies and air forces of the two countries' ocean communications to a radius of 1,000 miles from Japan's coasts, which would tie Japan closer to the collective defence systems something that is outlawed by the country's Constitution. Japanese analysts describe the programme as a sharp turn in Japan's military policy, meaning that the country has definitively opted for becoming a military power.¹

Describing the military-political situation in the Far Eastern region, Andrei Gromyko, a Member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU CC, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the USSR Foreign Minister, said that lately Japan's leadership "has tilted toward building up the country's military potential, revived militarist trends in the country and joined the global confrontation strategy imposed by Washington. Clearly, in Japan there are still politicians who are nostalgic about the past, while it is precisely the past that repeatedly brought misfortunes to the Japanese people".²

As soon as Y. Nakasone was elected head of government, Japan's mass media immediately reported that the shares of firms in heavy industry, electronics and other branches involved in defence production jumped sharply, for the new Prime Minister was known to support the "hawks" who demand an expansion of military production. Shortly before Nakasone's taking office, the *Nihon keizai shimbun*, a mouthpiece of the country's industrial and economic circles, carried a statement in which he stressed that relations with the US on the basis of the Security Treaty must be the lynchpin of Japanese foreign policy. Nakasone said that Japan must develop its military strategy with due account for the specific features of the country, which is an island state, as well as for the latest advances in military technology and the military-tactical doctrine.³

Whereas the Japanese business quarters close to the National Defence Agency were jubilant about the new Prime Minister's accession to power,

¹ See *Mainichi Daily News*, July 24, 1982.

² A. Gromyko, "On the International Situation and the USSR Foreign Policy", *Pravda*, June 17, 1983.

³ *Nihon keizai shimbun*, Nov. 18, 1982.

the country's left-wing parties and democratic forces responded in an extremely negative way, with Nakasone's Cabinet being described by them as the most reactionary one in Japan's postwar history.

Japan's Socialist Party sounded warning about the country's future military and political course which would be shaped by a man notorious for his "reactionary and militaristic utterances". Describing the new Cabinet, M. Kaneko, Chairman of the Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat, pointed to "the inevitability of the further sharpening of contradictions between the government headed by Nakasone and the people, because the Premier is a vocal advocate of the revision of the Constitution, a close friend of right-wing figures and exponent of a reactionary ideology".⁴ Expressing concern about Nakasone's "hawkish" policies, the left-wing forces stressed that he had long been pressing for the revision of the country's fundamental law and for an arms buildup. The Nakasone Cabinet's record for 1983 fully bears out these assessments of the opposition.

According to Japanese political analysts, Y. Nakasone's militarist views took shape immediately before and during the Second World War. A graduate of Tokyo University's Law Department, in April 1941, a time when the military and the monarchist bureaucracy were in fact wielding full power in the country, he received a post at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Soon, however, he joined the Imperial Navy as a lieutenant in the supply service, in which he stayed until the end of the war. In 1945, after the capitulation of Japan, Lieutenant-Commander Nakasone left the Navy and returned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where he was eventually promoted to the post of superintendent of the Tokyo police department.

According to Japanese sources, Nakasone's postwar philosophy included the justification of the aggressive war unleashed by Japan's militarists in East Asia and the Pacific, the demand of a review of the 1947 anti-militarist Constitution, which, in Nakasone's view, had been imposed on Japan by the Allies, and the desire to restore the imperial system, introduce conscription and remove all obstacles in the way of building an independent powerful army. In December 1946, Nakasone resigned his police post and returned to his native Gunma Prefecture, where he set up an organisation called the Seium (the cohort of the blue cloud), through which he propagated reactionary ideas among young people, seeking to educate them in anti-democratic and anti-communist spirit.

In September 1955 the same year Nakasone became an MP from the ruling party, his book *The Principal Features of an Independent Constitution* was published. It contained the author's draft of revised fundamental law. Nakasone's draft of a revised constitution actually abolished the limited democratic liberties gained by the Japanese people after the rout of militarist Japan, nullified the anti-war Article 9 and restored the monarchy which had made possible the country's total militarisation before and during the Second World War. Among other things the author wrote: "I believe that in the name of the future security of our state it is necessary to adopt, with the people's consent, a new independent constitution and to include in it a provision on conscription. The new constitution should leave no place for ambiguities about the country's armament and universal conscription."⁵ The draft constitution granted the prime minister powers to declare war in the Emperor's name and to commit the country's armed forces to combat without the consent of the people and Parliament which would be suspended under the state of emergency.

⁴ *Akahata*, Nov. 25, 1982
⁵ *ibid.* Dec. 10, 1982

According to the Japanese progressive press, Nakasone's reactionary concepts put forth in the book were actually identical to those expressed in the constitutional review programme published in November 1954 by the Liberal Party's special commission for the study of the constitution under the chairmanship of former Premier Kishi, who to this day heads the Parliament's League for an Independent Constitution (Jishū kempo giin domei).⁶

Nakasone put the idea of constitutional reform into words in "Constitution's Review", a song he wrote in 1956 to the music of composer Akimoto, another dyed-in-the-wool supporter of the imperial militarist regime. This revanchist anthem has the following lines: "Patriotism will be revered by us as law in the new constitution... Our motto will be: 'March in step with the nuclear age!'".⁷

In the course of his subsequent career in the ruling party and government, this champion of renascent Japanese nationalism invariably advocated the abolition of Article 9 of the Constitution and the bolstering of the country's military might. In September 1968, when he was Minister of Transport, he made it clear in a lecture that the Japan-US "Security Treaty" called for a flexible approach that would take into account the fluid international situation, which might even warrant a review of the treaty. He added that Japan must see to it that its security should not be wholly dependent on the United States, "we must assure it by our own forces".⁸

On January 13, 1970, Nakasone was appointed Director of the National Defence Agency (NDA) and, living up to his past as an officer, set out to effect a qualitative and quantitative modernisation of the Japanese armed forces. He embodied his ideas about the rapid buildup of the country's military potential in the 4th programme for the strengthening and expansion of the "self-defence force" for 1972-1976, demanding for its implementation the astronomical sum of 5.8 trillion yen, twice the expenditure for the previous military programmes. The debate in Parliament over the funding of the new programme was unusually bitter, with the opposition parties referring to the budgetary estimate as "a portent of the revival of Japanese militarism" and strongly demanding that it be revised. Under pressure from the opposition and left-wing forces, the allocations for the procurement of war materiel were considerably reduced after Nakasone's resignation from the NDA.

While still head of the NDA, Nakasone launched the "self-reliant defence" (jishū boei) concept under which Japan was to create a military capability independent of the US, to begin production of Japanese-made weapons, to reduce to a minimum the purchases of American materiel and to extend the sphere of operations of the Japanese navy and air force far beyond Japan's territorial water and air space.⁹

Nakasone expounded his thinking on the subject in the report "Defence Over a Radius of 1,000 Miles", which provoked outcry from the opposition. Although at the time of the publication the report's provisions were declared unacceptable, the idea found many ardent supporters in Japan, who even elaborated on it, proposing to extend Japan's defences all the way to the Strait of Malacca.¹⁰ Subsequently the "self-reliant defence" concept was transformed by the radical "hawks" into the so-called "autonomous defence policy" (dokuritsu boei seisaku), which as

⁶ *Shakai shimpō*, Dec. 12, 1982.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ *Komei shinbun*, Nov. 24, 1982.

⁹ Kaoru Murakami, "Nakasone rosen to 70-nendai-no boei" ("Nakasone's Concept and Defence in the 1970s"), *Tōsō keizai*, Feb. 28, 1970, pp. 100-104.

¹⁰ See *Ima koso hibuso churitsu-o* (For Immediate Disarmament and Neutralization), Tokyo, 1980, p. 53.

even bourgeois scholars acknowledged, called for the creation of an army much larger than would be needed for defence.¹¹

For example, O. Kaihara, former General Secretary of Japan's National Defence Council (NDC) who has good connections with the military which gave every support to Nakasone's ideas, proposed in the military-political journal *Gunji kenkyu* the creation of "a special army to defend the Japanese Archipelago" and the building of "a naval self-defence force with a total displacement of 300,000 tons".¹²

As nationalistic and militarist trends grow stronger in Japan, Nakasone's "self-reliant defence" concept (referred to by certain Soviet analysts as the "autonomous defence" doctrine) gains increasing support among Japan's politicians, businessmen and scholars. "The presence and active propaganda effort," writes Soviet foreign affairs analyst V. Lukin, "of the advocates of the 'autonomous defence' doctrine on the Japanese political scene are becoming increasingly evident."¹³ The coming to power of the concept's architect, who calls for the creation of powerful armed forces capable of countering the alleged "Soviet military threat", a myth invented by Washington and used by Japan's ruling quarters to justify their military preparations, may mean that the doctrine of "defence over a radius of 1,000 miles" put forward by Nakasone in the early 1970s and presently the lynchpin of the country's military strategy, will get a new impetus under his administration. There is no doubt that O. Kaihara's hair-brained scheme about the creation of a large naval force will also be implemented: the Sixth Plan for the Strengthening and Expansion of the "self-defence forces" provides for bringing the total displacement of Japan's warships to 320,000 tons.¹⁴

Nakasone's inauguration as Prime Minister was marked by a series of bellicose statements which, according to local observers and military and political figures, signify the departure of Japan's ruling quarters from the old defence doctrine.

In his first policy-making speech, December 3, 1982 Nakasone said the following about military policy: "Our basic stance on security is to maintain the Japan-US security arrangements and to seek to achieve a high defence capability limited to that necessary for self-defence."¹⁵

Nakasone's subsequent exercises in eloquence dealt with the burning problems of Japan's military policy: Article 9 of the Constitution, the arms buildup, and ceilings on military spending. The *Wall Street Journal* wrote at the time that one of the first moves of the new Prime Minister was to criticise Japan's defence effort and call for the buildup of the armed forces.¹⁶ The author went on to note that Japan's growing military might aroused justified misgivings on the part of the Asian nations who are alarmed by the resurgence of Japanese militarism.

Japanese observers pointed out that Nakasone's bellicose rhetoric was timed to coincide with the US Congress's passing in December 1982 of an unprecedented resolution calling on Japan to speed up its military buildup to achieve, by 1990, what the US considers an adequate military might. Commenting on this coincidence, the *Asahi shimbun* wrote: "It is hardly legal to pass such a resolution which amounts to an act of interference in the internal affairs of another country, if the US really intends to maintain healthy interstate relations with Japan in the future."¹⁷ Many observers justifiably pointed out that the US Congress

¹¹ See *Report on Comprehensive National Security*, Tokyo, 1980, p. 36.

Ima koso hibuso churitsyō, p. 54.

V. Lukin, "Centres of Power": *Concepts and Reality*, Moscow, 1983, p. 115 (in Russ.).

¹² See *Asahi Evening News*, July 26, 1982

Japan Times, Dec. 4, 1982

¹³ *ibid.*, Jan. 13, 1982

¹⁴ *Asahi shimbun*, Dec. 12, 1982

took this step under the influence of Nakasone's hard-line military policy.

The Prime Minister has also remained loyal to the movement clamouring for a review of the Constitution. Although the Premier's December 3, 1982 speech contained no mention of the matter, subsequent public addresses left no doubt that he is one of the most vocal supporters of constitutional reform. Speaking at a press conference at Tokyo's foreign correspondents' club on December 10, 1982, Nakasone commented, clearly appealing to the Japanese people's national sentiment: "I would like to implement a new constitution drawn up by ourselves".¹⁸

In his December 13, 1982 speech before Parliament Nakasone said that he had long sought to amend the Constitution which outlawed war, and called on the Diet to launch a nationwide debate on the subject. Proposing to abandon the principle of not-discussing constitutional reform with a view to carrying out such a reform in future, the Premier reminded his listeners that the ruling party, whose chairman he was, had included in its programme plans to review the Constitution, and it was only too natural that the party would continue pressing for it, because the existing Constitution had been adopted under the influence of outside forces during Japan's occupation by the Allies.

When in interpellations on changes in Article 9 opposition members, for example, Socialist MP Kumao Tarada, asked the Prime Minister to expound his stand on the problem, Nakasone categorically refused to give a straightforward answer, saying that the head of government's personal opinion might be misinterpreted.¹⁹ Nevertheless, at its January 1983 regular congress the Nakasone-led LDP again included in its programme a stronger demand for constitutional reform.

Compelled to reckon with the broad popular movement against the anti-democratic constitutional reform, Japan's ruling quarters resort to manoeuvring and changes of tactics. The conservatives' strategy on constitutional reform now is to seek an agreement between the ruling and the opposition parties, and to conduct broad debates in order to shape public opinion using which the conservatives could revise the Constitution, strike out its anti-war provisions and thereby win a free hand for speeding up the full-scale rearmament of Japan.

The ceiling of not more than one per cent of the GNP placed on the country's military budget by a November 5, 1976 Cabinet decision was an important factor limiting military spending during the last decade. The limit was adhered to until 1983. However, when the 1983-1987 military buildup programme valued at 15.6-16.4 trillion yen (\$65.0-68.3 billion), which called for 6.3-8 per cent²⁰ annual increases in the military budget was adopted, fears arose that the ceiling would be overshot already in 1984.

Addressing the Lower House of the Diet on December 14, 1982, Nakasone pointed out that the implementation of the new five-year military programme means, and his government sees no other way out, that the 1 per cent ceiling has to be abandoned. That was the first statement by Japanese head of state in which he made it clear that he was prepared to abandon one of the fundamental principles of military policy respected by his predecessors. The following day Nakasone was even more explicit about his intention to review the policy of limited defence spending some time soon. The statement was strongly attacked by the democratic public and even by business quarters.

On the same day Japan's Chamber of Trade and Industry conducted

¹⁸ *Akahata*, Dec. 11, 1982.

¹⁹ See *Asahi Evening News*, Dec. 24, 1982.

²⁰ See *Ibid.*, July 23, 1982.

a poll of businessmen on the new military programme. Eighty per cent of the 740 captains of Japanese business community questioned spoke in favour of maintaining the present strength of the "self-defence force". Despite Nakasone's statement about the need to raise the defence spending ceiling, 42.6 per cent of those polled supported the existing 1 per cent ceiling and were even for reducing it, with only 37 per cent favouring an increase of the defence budget, thus meeting Nakasone's policies.²¹ The Japanese press was unanimous in noticing that two weeks after taking office Prime Minister Nakasone dramatically showed himself for the "hawk" that he was, encroaching on a key principle which prevents the country from becoming a major military power.²²

At the prodding of Nakasone who supported the demands of the country's military, under Washington's direct pressure and in defiance of the well-reasoned objections of the Treasury Department, on December 30, 1982 the government decided to increase the 1983 military budget by 6.5 per cent, a far higher rate of growth than for any other budget item. The press reported the growth of military appropriations, most impressive, would be achieved at the expense of social spending.²³ All leftwing parties strongly condemned the government's fiscal policy which favoured increased military spending. An SPJ statement, for example, said that Prime Minister Nakasone had ignored the opposition's demands and the wishes of the majority of the people in drawing up the budget, which favoured a rapid growth of military allocations at the expense of social programmes.

On January 22, 1984, again under Nakasone's pressure, the Cabinet gave the go-ahead to a 6.55 per cent hike in the 1984 NDA budget, leaving no doubt that the "political hurdle" of 1 per cent of the GNP would be cleared. The country's leadership is now searching for an acceptable formula which would not prove an obstacle to spending more on the "self-defence force" at a rate suitable to Washington, i.e., 3 per cent annually, like in NATO countries.

Highly symptomatic in this respect are the pronouncements of N. Ushiba, prominent politician and former Japanese ambassador to the USA, in a New Year interview with the *Japan Times*, a semi-official organ of Japan's Foreign Ministry. In an apologia of Nakasone's military policy Ushiba said that in his view "the 1 per cent ceiling is devoid of any meaning", since the Prime Minister has made it clear that soon military spending would inevitably top the mark. Within the framework of the "comprehensive security" concept which was, during the last few years, the groundwork of Japan's military policy and which called for a broad range of diplomatic, economic, military and other measures to help the implementation of the ruling quarters' foreign policy, Ushiba proposed that military spending be raised to 1.5 per cent of the GNP, and economic assistance to the developing countries be increased to 0.5 per cent of the GNP. Ushiba reasoned that the total of 2 per cent of the GNP would be hailed by the USA and the rest of the capitalist world as a major contribution by Japan to the "defence" of the West.

Ushiba called on the government to honour its pledge to the US to fulfill the 1983-1987 plan of military buildup and to draw up a new long-term programme for strengthening the armed forces for a period of 7 to 10 years.²⁴

Fulfilling the prediction of Japanese political analysts, 1983 saw a heated debate on national defence and busy preparations for a review of the country's military policy, a programme of which would be sub-

²¹ See *Japan Times*, Dec. 16, 1982.

²² See *Asahi shimbun*, Dec. 16, 1982.

²³ See *Akahata*, April 5, 1983.

²⁴ See *Mainichi Daily News*, Jan. 26, 1983.

mitted to the Diet in 1985. The programme will provide for the joint US-Japanese defence of the sea lanes near Japan and the blockade of international straits in emergencies, take into account the latest Pentagon military-strategic doctrine of turning Japan into a jumping-off ground for US global aggressive policies in the Far East and the country's further integration in US imperialism's policy of building military alliances the world over.

Nakasone set the tone for the defence debate in his keynote speech before Parliament on January 25, 1983. One Japanese newspaper published an article entitled "Danger Sign in PM's Speech" which said that the head of government's statement indicated that he had chosen a highly dangerous direction in his policies. For example, the article pointed out, Nakasone's excessive emphasis on the growth of "the Soviet military threat" put him in the camp of the US global anti-Soviet strategy.²⁵

According to the Japanese press, Nakasone's talks with President Reagan on January 17-21, 1983, became a "decisive" stimulus for the escalation of US-Japanese military cooperation. Trying to make up to Washington, which is displeased with Japan's sluggish military growth, and to balance trade and economic contradictions between the two countries, Nakasone prior to his US visit had his government adopt a series of military-political measures which he brought to Washington as "a present".

We have already pointed out that Nakasone insisted on increasing the 1983 military budget by 6.5 per cent as compared to 1982, thus proving Tokyo's "tireless efforts" to contribute to Washington's global war preparations.

In breach of the existing ban on the export of armaments, on January 7, 1983, the Japanese government gave the US virtually unlimited access to the latest advances of Japanese military technology, including integral circuits, fiber optics, refractory coatings, as well as microcomputer and laser technology which can be used in American missile guidance systems.²⁶

According to the bourgeois press, in taking this step, Nakasone dared to breach one of the most sacrosanct principles of Japanese policy limiting the country's defence capabilities,²⁷ thereby creating prerequisites for abandoning other fundamental principles of Japan's military policy, for launching large-scale military production and for lifting the ban on the export of Japanese-made military hardware. In short, the move was described as a dangerous tilt towards further militarisation.

On January 11-12, 1983, Nakasone made a "surprise" visit to Seoul, becoming the first Japanese head of government to visit South Korea since the Second World War. Unlike the preceding Prime Ministers Masayoshi Ohira and Zenko Suzuki, who dragged their feet over extending economic assistance to the South Korean regime, Nakasone took the resolute step of granting it a concessional loan of \$4 billion.²⁸ Although in announcing the decision he tried to argue that the loan had nothing to do with security problems, Japanese observers noted that reports from Seoul testified to Chun Doo Hwan's intention to use the money for strengthening "the triangular security get up to include Japan, the US and South Korea".²⁹

In his talks with Reagan the Japanese Prime Minister reasserted his commitment to the joint May 8, 1981 communique. Assuming a greater

²⁵ See *Ibidem*

²⁶ *Akahata*, Jan. 8, 1983

²⁷ *Mainichi Daily News*, Jan. 17, 1983

²⁸ *Akahata*, Jan. 12, 1983

²⁹ *Mainichi Daily News*, Jan. 17, 1983

responsibility than that shouldered by his predecessors for the country's "security", he assured the US Administration that in the near future it would get further proof of Japan's resolve to build up its military potential. Although Reagan seemed pleased with Nakasone's "gift package" and especially with the Japanese Prime Minister's Seoul visit, he called on Japan to intensify its defence effort and to groom its armed forces to be able to confront the Soviet Union.

In a January 20, 1983 interview with the *Washington Post* Nakasone enumerated the objectives of his military policy: to turn Japan into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" which would become a reliable barrier against the "Soviet military threat", to set up an effective "defence system" which in an emergency could block the passage of Soviet submarines and surface warships through the international straits, and to "secure" sea lanes. "For the ocean, our defence," said Nakasone in the interview, "should extend several hundred miles... our desire would be to defend sea lanes between Guam and Tokyo and between the Strait of Formosa and Osaka".³⁰

At the press conference which followed the talks Nakasone pointed out that in spite of certain differences between the two countries over trade, the talks were very fruitful. He had succeeded in establishing "close links of personal friendship with Ronald Reagan" and in removing certain "ill feeling" in US-Japanese relations. He had assured the US President that US-Japanese cooperation was "of utmost importance not only for the two countries but also for the solidarity and unity of the entire Western world".

Nakasone reaffirmed that the two countries are in an unbreakable bilateral alliance not only in the economic but also in the military sphere, because they share the destinies, ideas and objectives of the Western camp.³¹

The *Washington Post* commented that Nakasone's firmness in the military sphere and his resolute actions on bilateral economic relations were warmly welcomed by the President and other members of the administration.³² However, the Japanese Premier's bellicose pronouncements which were hailed in Washington got only a guarded reception in Tokyo. The Japanese public saw in Nakasone's military policy proof of his intention to integrate Japan into the US policy of global rigid confrontation with the Soviet Union and to turn the Japanese Archipelago into the Pentagon's nuclear missile base.

Only 25 per cent of those polled by the Japanese broadcasting corporation NHK approved of the results of Nakasone's visit, while 56 per cent expressed concern over their military aspects. More than 60 per cent of those questioned by the *Asahi* newspaper said that they were opposed to the US President's plans to turn the country into "an unsinkable aircraft carrier". Nearly 70 per cent condemned the government's decision to transfer military technology to the US, and over 60 per cent were opposed to growing military spending.³³

The Nakasone Cabinet decision to allow the flagships of the US Seventh Fleet, the aircraft carrier *Enterprise* and the modernised battleship *New Jersey* with Tomahawk cruise missiles on board, to call on Japanese ports and to give the go-ahead for the deployment of two squadrons of F-16 fighter-bombers capable of delivering nuclear strikes at the Soviet Maritime Territory and Sakhalin (a total of 50 aircraft) at the Misawa base in northeastern Honshu, amounted to a serious

³⁰ *Japan Times*, Jan. 20, 1983.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Jan. 20-21, 1983.

³² *Washington Post*, Jan. 20, 1983.

³³ See *Pravda*, May 4, 1983.

breach of the Diet's stand on nuclear policy (on November 24, 1971 the Japanese Parliament adopted a resolution on the three non-nuclear principles: not to possess, produce or import nuclear weapons).

Nakasone's protestations of firm commitment to the non-nuclear principles and assertions that the US *Enterprise*, which is known in Japan as "a floating nuclear fortress", and nuclear-missile submarines call at Japanese ports without nuclear weapons on board, cannot mislead the Japanese people: few believe this pack of lies. According to US Admiral (Ret) Gene R. Larocque, when the nuclear aircraft carrier *Enterprise* visited the Japanese port of Sasebo in March 1983 it had more than 200 nuclear warheads on board.³⁴

LDP activists are increasingly calling for a review of the three non-nuclear principles resolution. Arguing that "without calling on at Japanese ports and passing through Japanese territorial waters" the US Seventh Fleet cannot normally function in the US-Japanese security system, the NDA urges that the three principles be replaced by two-and-a-half principles, with certain "hawks" demanding the preservation of only two principles in order to legalise the presence of American nuclear weapons on Japanese territory.

The programme for building up the military potential under the Sixth Plan of strengthening and developing the "self-defence force" allots a special place to the complicated set of problems connected with Japan's protection of sea communications over an area extending to a radius of 1,000 miles from Japan's coasts. When during his talks with Reagan Nakasone reaffirmed his government's continued commitment to the defence of sea lanes and the blockade of the international straits, supplementing it by the odious statement that the "self-defence force" was assigned to escort US warships sailing to Japan with military cargo in an emergency, the Japanese mass media described the prime minister's statement as a breach of the ban on collective defence.

Nakasone's blatantly militaristic call for the joint defence by the United States and Japan of a vast area in the northwestern part of Pacific was strongly criticised by Japan's opposition parties and public at large. The issue of protecting sea lanes became acute as never before and sparked a heated debate in Parliament. To pour oil on troubled waters and to shore up the sliding popularity of the head of government (according to an opinion poll conducted by *Asahi* in February 1983, the Prime Minister was supported by only 29 per cent of those questioned, while 43 per cent opposed his "hawkish" militarist policy³⁵), on February 13, 1983, the NDA Director Kazuo Tanikawa appeared on a special television programme, "Nakasone's Cabinet and his Defence Policy". Tanikawa did his best to convince the viewers that Nakasone's utterances were a reflection of his personal views and that the Prime Minister was far from intending to depart from the framework of Japan's current defence policy, and that the "self-defence force" would perform its function of defending the sea lanes and blocking the straits strictly within the framework of "individual defence", which is not a breach of the country's fundamental law.³⁶

Trying to justify the Premier's "clumsy" pronouncements, Japanese political analysts tried hard to convince the public that his plans to turn Japan into "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" are nothing new, for already in Suzuki's time there was talk of building a defence machinery comparable to a "bristling hedgehog" defying outside aggression. They view the metaphors used by the two Premiers as identical, since both Suzuki

³⁴ *Akahata*, March 18, 1983.

³⁵ See *Asahi shimbun*, Feb 21, 1983.

³⁶ See *Asahi Evening News*, Feb 14, 1983.

and Nakasone were concerned with strengthening the land, air and sea defences in order to prevent outside aggression.³⁷

Japanese observers noted that under the pressure of public opinion Nakasone had to cool, for some time, his militarist rhetoric. Moreover, he even apologised before Parliament for causing "misunderstanding" of the people. Explaining to the correspondents that he had only used the expressions as a figure of speech, Nakasone deplored their misinterpretation. What was the motive behind this tactical manoeuvre by the Prime Minister, wondered the bourgeois *Asahi*, concluding that there were two: an internal and external one. Since the internal one was connected with the June 1983 elections to the Upper House of Parliament, Nakasone's LDP friends explained to him that a hard line in military policy and constitutional reform only played into the hands of the opposition and would mean a loss of votes for the LDP at the coming elections. The second, external, aspect had to do with the negative reaction of many countries of Southeast Asia to Japan's accelerated military buildup.

However, Nakasone's "restraint" proved to be short-lived. Already in May 1983, during separate talks with the leaders of the capitalist world's seven major powers held prior to the plenary meeting at Williamsburg, Prime Minister Nakasone again showed his militarist teeth, saying that the West, including Japan, must forge closer relations in matters of security to confront the Soviet Union. Signing the Williamsburg communique, he supported the NATO decision to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe toward the end of 1983.

The Japanese head of government's full support of the anti-Soviet nuclear strategy espoused by the US-led NATO alliance provoked a storm of indignation in Japan. All left-wing parties strongly attacked Nakasone's stand at Williamsburg, referring to the Seven's political statement as irresponsible and posing a threat for the international climate.³⁸

Former chairman of the SPJ Executive Ichiro Asukata said that Nakasone had spurned the Japanese people's negative attitude to nuclear weapons, the Williamsburg communique that he had signed being proof of the US-Japan security system's drawing closer with NATO.³⁹

The Komeito also strongly criticised Nakasone's Williamsburg record, accusing him of having betrayed the Japanese people's yearning for peace and sided with Reagan's policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union. The ruling LDP approved on the whole the results of the Williamsburg Summit as a step to the consolidation of Western unity, but certain members of this conservative party were also critical of Nakasone's stand.⁴⁰

After the LDP's victory at the June election to the House of Councilors of Parliament, Nakasone gave fuller vent to his militarist ambitions. In July 1983, he gave his full support to the NDA request for a 6.55 per cent increase in the 1984 military budget compared to 1983, with total spending planned to reach 2,934 billion yen (\$12.5 billion)⁴¹.

On August 14 the Nakasone Cabinet approved the terms for the transfer of Japanese high military technology to the US. With Nakasone's blessing, Japan and the US began to conduct on March 12, 1983 joint research into problems of defending sea communications. After discussing the basic concept and the framework of the joint study, the sides continued work at the level of the Japanese Joint Staff Council

³⁷ *Asahi Evening News*, Feb. 1, 1983

³⁸ See *Ibid.*, May 31, 1983

³⁹ *Ibidem*

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*

⁴¹ See *Daily Yomiuri*, July 13, 1983

General (JSCG) and the US Supreme Command in Japan with the aim of defining the ways and means of "joint protection" of sea communications, as well as the capability of the "self-defence force" to escort US warships bringing cargo to Japan during hostilities.

Yuri Andropov stated that other countries were being increasingly drawn into the implementation of Washington's dangerous plans and, "attempts are being made to revive Japanese militarism and to hitch it to the NATO's military-political machine".⁴²

Since Nakasone took office many fundamental principles which during the last three decades provided the framework of Japan's military strategy have been trampled underfoot. The country has begun implementation of the sixth military buildup programme calling for a substantial strengthening of the country's armed forces and the growth of military spending beyond 1 per cent of the GNP; the 1976 long-term programme for beefing up the "self-defence force", the cornerstone of the Japanese military doctrine, is slated for review; everything is being done to carry out a constitutional reform. By granting the US unlimited access to sophisticated Japanese military technology, the Nakasone Cabinet has spurned the Parliament's ban on the export of armaments. Despite the three non-nuclear principles, the Japanese leadership allowed US warships with nuclear weapons on board to enter Japanese ports.

Reagan's November 1983 visits to Tokyo and Seoul had far-reaching and sinister objectives: to spur on Japan's and South Korea's military preparations, to hitch US Asian partners in "security treaties" to America's global strategy of attaining military superiority over the Soviet Union, thus putting Japan and South Korea on a par with NATO members, and to take a step further in the work of creating in Asia a new dangerous triple alliance consisting of the US, Japan and South Korea.

Realistically thinking persons in Japan wonder who profits from these developments. The answer is that the current military psychosis helps those internal and external reactionary forces which spur on the arms race, placing the world on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe, and seek to build Japan into a major military power, this threatening to tilt the existing balance of forces in the region and seriously to complicate the military political situation there.

"If Tokyo opts for peace and goodneighbour relations," stated A. Gromyko, "the USSR is going to be Japan's reliable partner in the development of broad mutual links in political, economic and other spheres".⁴³ Only this approach can contribute to the overall improvement of the situation in the Far East and the conduct of a genuinely independent policy by the Japanese ruling circles, which will serve as a firm guarantee of the country's peace and security, as well as enhance its prestige on the international arena.

⁴² *Pravda*, Sept. 29, 1983

⁴³ *Pravda*, June 17, 1983

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PRC WORKING CLASS AS PRODUCTIVE FORCE OF SOCIETY

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[Article by A. V. Ostrovskiy, candidate of economic sciences]

China has vast manpower resources and leads the world in the numerical strength of the economically active population. The country's vast working class, employed in different sectors of the national economy, is growing in importance as the major productive force of society under condition of modern production. At present it creates the bulk of the national income of the PRC and is to play the main role in fulfilling the task formulated by the 12th CPC Congress to increase production dramatically by the year 2000. Li Xiannian, Chairman of the PRC, stressed in his speech at the 10th Congress of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions that "the general historical mission of the people as a whole and the main task of the working-class movement at the present stage is to quadruple the gross output of industry and agriculture by the end of the 20th century and build a modernised socialist state with a high level of civilisation and democracy."¹

However, the Chinese working class finds it rather difficult to accomplish the ambitious tasks set before it, for at present it fails to perform in full measure its role as the leading productive force of society. The overall numerical strength of the working class grew noticeably by the beginning of the 1980s but its occupational skills and educational standards did not improve and no contribution was made towards the strengthening of its core, namely, industrial workers.

According to the figures cited by Chinese leaders, the working class of the country numbers 110 million.² This figure, however, includes, in addition to shop floor workers and employees of retail trade, the services and other non-production areas, engineers, technicians, research personnel, educators, cultural, public health and physical education workers, all the *ganbu* (cadres) and other government employees.³ The figure cited by Chinese statisticians as the total numerical strength of the workers and employees of the public and cooperative sectors in cities and villages in 1982—112.8 million⁴—virtually coincides with the figure given above. In other words, the *ganbu*, intellectuals and office workers are included in the working class, although they can belong to the working class neither from the point of view of their role in the system of social production nor their contribution to the social organisation of labour. We believe that at the beginning of the 1980s the total strength of the working class stood at about 75 million in the public and cooperative sectors in cities and townships and at about 20 million in the country-

¹ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 19, 1983.

² See Speech by Hao Jianxiu, Alternate Member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee at the 5th Session of the Executive Committee of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, 9th convocation, *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 25, 1983.

³ *Ibid.*, July 28, 1983.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 10, 1983.

side, employed by the industries of people's communes and production teams.⁵

In analysing this problem, the author employed mainly figures reflecting the numerical strength of workers and employees rather than the working class per se because Chinese statisticians, as a rule, publish their data under the heading "workers and employees". When the author could avail himself of the figures representing "workers" as a separate category, which are sometimes supplied by Chinese statistics publications (e. g., those on employment in industry or in capital construction), he used them in his analysis. It appears that labour statistics released in the PRC reflect the dynamics and shifts in the composition of the working class by the beginning of the 1980s and give an idea of the working class as a productive force of society.

An analysis of statistics indicates that the workers and employees have grown considerably in number during the past 20-odd years. Whereas in 1957 the total numerical strength of workers and employees was 31 million, in 1978 the figure was 94.9 and in late 1982 112.8 million. The share of workers and employees in the total number of the economically active population grew accordingly from 13 per cent in 1957 to 25 per cent in 1982.⁶ As a result, the Chinese working class is gradually becoming the leading productive force of society. However, at present there are factors strongly influencing this process, such as sources of replenishment of the working class, job placement, territorial distribution, advanced occupational training and the further rise in labour productivity.

RURAL POPULATION AS A SOURCE OF REPLENISHMENT OF THE WORKING CLASS

Screening for work in locally supervised industries in the countryside, at the level of counties, people's communes and production teams, constitutes one of the main sources of replenishment of the working class.

The number of industries run by people's communes and production teams grew considerably in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. In 1981 there were 1,338,000 such industries, which employed a total of 29,696,000 persons (averaging 20 workers per enterprise).⁷ These industries employ for the most part the labour of the numerous members of people's communes working either on a temporary or on a permanent basis. Young people in those communes tried in every way to secure employment in industries outside of agriculture on a temporary basis because such employment secured a higher income level than field work in people's communes.

The communes have begun to attach more importance to the development of industry. In 1980 the share of industries in the total economic activity of the people's communes and production teams was 51.8 per cent; they accounted for 62.5 per cent of total employment and for 76.3 per cent of total profits.⁸ That is why the countryside meets most of its needs in manufactured goods required for the development of agriculture, such as farm implements, building materials and chemical fertilizers.

⁵ Calculated from the data of a selective census taken in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, on July 1, 1980, in accordance with which the share of workers in the total strength of the economically active population was 67.8 per cent, and also on the basis of employment statistics, excluding agriculture, in people's communes and production teams. See *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1981*, Peking, 1982, pp. 59-102, 189-190.

⁶ Calculated from *Zhongguo tongji zhajiao 1983*, Peking, 1983, p. 18.

⁷ See *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1981*, p. 189.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

The majority of all Chinese workers are employed by the small-size industries of people's communes and production teams and also by the industries of cities and townships run on a cooperative basis. For instance, in the early 1980s the industries of people's communes and production teams employed 19,800,000 (28.2 per cent of the total industrial workforce), the cooperative industries 14,950,000 (21.7 per cent) and the public industries 34,070,000 (49.5 per cent).⁹ (It should be borne in mind that the public industries are not necessarily large-scale factories with sizeable workforces; they are often small plants run at the level of counties, districts, or provinces).

During the early 1980s it was mostly the small-size industries at the level of counties, people's communes and production teams and also the cooperative industries in cities and townships that were being replenished with labour. As a result, the numerical strength of the working class was artificially boosted because the workers of those industries were in no way connected with large-scale industrial production but could be considered workers only from the point of view of their role in the system of the social organisation of labour.

EMPLOYMENT PROBLEM IN CITIES

Job placement for young people leaving secondary schools in cities every year constitutes a formidable problem. Between 1978 and 1982, according to the Main Statistical Board of the PRC, over 38 million people—roughly one-third of the urban workforce—were employed in the country.¹⁰ Most of the newly-employed were "educated young people awaiting jobs or waiting to be sent to rural and mountain areas". In 1981 that group accounted for 65.1 per cent of all the newly-employed. Altogether 920,000 people (11.2 per cent of the urban workforce) were sent by rural people's communes under contracts for temporary unskilled work. The share of higher school, specialised secondary school and vocational training school graduates among the newly-employed remained relatively small, a mere 13.2 per cent of the total number of those employed in 1981.¹¹ This shows that during the past few years the urban working class was replenished for the most part with young people who did not have occupational training and had not been employed for several years previously.

A large number of cooperative enterprises began to be established in the late 1970s to provide jobs for urban young people. A national conference on employment, which took place in August 1980, recommended that the problem of employment for young people be tackled through the establishment of small cooperative cottage industries taking orders from major industrial plants to produce goods which the latter find it unprofitable to manufacture in small quantities. Large numbers of unemployed young people were sent to small-size retailing, public catering and communal services enterprises. Efforts were also made to attract these young people to jobs in work service companies, doing different temporary and seasonal jobs to meet the needs of the urban population.

Between 1980 and 1981 cooperative industries and the private sector absorbed some 36 per cent of all the newly-employed.¹² In some cities the newly-employed of cooperative industries constituted the absolute majority of all new employees. According to the selective data of the Main Statistical Board of the PRC for individual provinces, in 1982 co-

⁹ Calculated from *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1981*, pp. 189-190.

¹⁰ *Zhongguo tongji zhaiyao 1983*, p. 20

¹¹ See *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1981*, p. 129.

¹² See *Ibidem*.

operative industries employed more than 60 per cent of all the jobs.¹³ All this goes to show that China is trying to resolve the problem of employment for the most part by setting up small-size cooperative industries, which require only one-fourth or one-fifth of the investment required for a job in the public enterprises.

Measures are being taken to expand capital investments in the modernisation of old industries and in the development of light industry and cooperatives. The growth of capital investments in obsolete industries has helped to increase the number of machine tools and to expand production capacities with a resultant rise in newly-created jobs. For instance, in Changzhou, Jiangsu Province, the textile industry absorbed 8,600 workers (17 per cent of all new employments) in 1978-1979.¹⁴ As a matter of fact, the textile and other light industries can create more jobs because they take less investment to create them. Statistics on 25 provinces, cities and autonomous districts (with the exception of Guangdong, Gansu, Qinghai and Tibet) indicate that in 1978 the cost of the fixed assets of production per employee (constituting the bulk of the cost of a job) was 5,000 yuan in light industry and 11,000 yuan in heavy industry.¹⁵

Cooperation is considered a major factor in the solution of the employment problems in China: on the one hand, it helps to expand production at leading industrial plants and, on the other, contributes to the growth of the number of small-size affiliated industries. All this helps to increase the number of jobs with limited capital investments. On the whole, the rise in employment at industrial plants resulted primarily from the growing number of small-size cooperative enterprises in light industry.

Despite all these measures, by the end of 1982 China still had, according to the Chinese press, "3.04 million people waiting for jobs".¹⁶ Many foreign observers believe that this figure is an understatement. The efforts to expand employment failed to ensure the rational use of labour because of excessive centralisation in employment and because of industrial plant managers' inability to regulate the influx of labour. The solution of that problem was hampered to a considerable extent by the provisional decree on the retirement of workers and employees, passed by the State Council of the PRC in 1978, under which jobs in industry were virtually inherited by children of the retiring personnel. Virtually all the workers and employees retiring on pension, including industrial workers, intellectuals and office employees, were taking advantage of that decree.

In September 1983 the State Council made a special announcement on alterations in the Provisional Decree. In accordance with it, it was permitted to employ the children of only permanent workers upon the attainment of a certain age limit by the latter (60 years for men and 50 for women) provided their uninterrupted work record was at least 10 years. Compulsory occupational examinations were introduced for the children of those workers and a probation period was fixed, while the managers were given the powers to dismiss those of them who did not comply with the terms of employment.¹⁷ However, even after that announcement local industries (e. g., the Wuhan railroad administration) bypassed that document in their employment practices.¹⁸

At the same time a new form of employment was introduced in 1982, namely, a system of work contracts, which embraced about 160,000 wor-

¹³ See *Renmin ribao*, April 10, 1983.

¹⁴ See *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 19, 1980.

¹⁵ See *Zhongguo shehui kexue*, 1980, No. 3, p. 31.

¹⁶ *Beijing Review*, 1983, No. 23, p. 5.

¹⁷ See *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 9, 1983.

¹⁸ See *Renmin ribao*, Sept. 26, 1983.

kers in 9 provinces, cities and autonomous districts.¹⁹ For the most part those contracts were concluded by young people in the 16 to 25 age bracket who had an education corresponding to first-stage secondary school (or higher) while being employed by government-owned and major cooperative enterprises.²⁰ The new form of employment envisaged a period of training, during which budding workers were entitled to scholarship and bonuses, an examination, and a probation period of six months to one year, after which a work contract was signed for 3-8 years or more with subsequent extension. A conference on work contracts in Peking in early 1983 laid emphasis on the provision that workers employed under contracts and enjoying equal conditions with permanent workers but contributing more should get higher wages than permanent workers. It was also pointed out that they have equal rights with permanent workers in joining the CPC, the Young Communist League of China, and trade unions, in attending political education classes and in advanced training.²¹ To all appearances, an attempt is now being made to substitute the system of work contracts for the system of inheritance of jobs by children of skilled workers retiring on pension and in due time eliminate social barriers between temporary and permanent workers. Nevertheless, the system of work contracts has so far been extended only to an insignificant part of the Chinese working class.

STRUCTURE OF THE WORKING CLASS BY INDUSTRIES

By the beginning of the 1980s the working class had become dominant in industry as a result of increased employment at small-size plants. Whereas in 1957 the total strength of industrial workers and employees in the public sector was 7.5 million (30.5 per cent of all the workers and employees of the public sector), in 1981 it reached 34.1 million (40.7 per cent), as Table 1 shows. However, in the late 1970s the growth rate of the working class in transport, retail trade, the public utilities and the services began to outpace that in industry and capital construction. As a result, according to the figures of the Main Statistical Board of the PRC, by the end of 1982, a total of 22.75 million industrial and office workers were employed in retail trade and other non-productive spheres, which is 28 per cent more than the figure for late 1978.²²

The proportion of workers and employees slightly grew in such heavy industry branches as power engineering, oil and steel, while the proportions of the work force in light industry perceptibly decreased in 1981 (see Table 2).

By the beginning of the 1980s the overall growth of the working class in industry was accounted for mostly by an influx of labour predominantly into heavy industry. By 1981 the proportion of industrial and office workers in engineering and the chemicals and coal-mining industries had grown substantially. For instance, whereas in 1957 engineering employed 1,403,000 people, almost as many as the textile industry (1,282,000), in 1981 engineering employed 10,151,000, while the textile industry provided work for just 3,890,000. As a consequence, the proportion of those employed in engineering as compared with all the industrial and office workers of the state public sector rose from 17.7 per cent in 1957 to 29.8 per cent in 1981 and in the textile industry dropped from 16.2 to 11.4 per cent, respectively.

This led to certain shifts in the distribution of the working class by industries. We lack statistics on the breakdown of the working class by

See *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 2, 1983.

See *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 11 and Feb. 2, 1983.

See *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 2, 1983.

Beijing Review, 1983, No. 23, p. 5.

Table 1
Employment in the PRC
Public Sector

	1957 million	Percentage	1981 million	Percentage
Industrial and office workers, total	24.5	100	83.7	100
By industries:				
Industry	7.5	30.5	34.1	40.7
Capital construction	2.7	11.1	6.7	8.0
Agriculture (state farms, irrigation, weather service)	1.1	4.6	8.1	9.7
Transport and communications	1.7	6.8	5.0	6.0
Retail trade, public catering, material and technical supply	4.8	19.9	11.4	13.7

Sources: *Zhongguo jingji nianjian 1981*, p. VI-7; *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1981*, p. 106.

industries for the PRC as a whole. However, these shifts can be traced by the figures of employment in industry and capital construction in 1981 and also by the employment of the working class by industries in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province (according to the findings of a test census in 1980). For instance, the working class in Wuxi was mainly comprised of metal workers and engineering workers (38.6 per cent of the total work force), and also textile workers (11.9 per cent of the total). Transport, warehouse and cargo-handling workers continued to comprise a considerable share in the total numbers (16 per cent).²³

One can therefore draw the conclusion that the breakdown of the working class by industries in the PRC has survived since the 1950s. Workers of the heavy and textile industries and also warehouse, transport and cargo-handling workers predominate in the Chinese working class.

TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORKING CLASS

Shifts in the territorial distribution of the Chinese working class began in the late 1970s. The numerical strength of industrial and office workers began to grow at a faster rate in coastal areas as compared with inland regions. According to the Main Statistical Board of the PRC, employment in the coastal provinces of Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong and Guangxi grew in 1982 (as compared with 1978) by more than 20 per cent as against the 17.4 per cent rise registered for the PRC inland provinces.²⁴ All in all, in the early 1980s the percentage of industrial and office workers in the coastal areas of

Table 2
Employment by Industries
in the PRC Public Sector

	1957 million	Percentage	1981 billion	Percentage
Industrial and office workers, total	7,480	100	34,070	100
By industries:				
Power	143	1.8	916	2.7
Coal	669	8.5	4,013	11.8
Oil	67	0.8	569	1.7
Steel	693	8.8	3,192	9.4
Engineering and metallurgy	1,403	17.7	10,151	29.8
Chemicals	253	3.2	3,071	9.0
Building materials	600	7.6	1,921	5.6
Woodworking	333	4.2	1,318	3.9
Textiles	1,282	16.2	3,980	11.4
Food	1,200	15.2	2,561	7.5

Sources: 1957: *Zhongguo jingji nianjian 1981*, p. VI-7; J. P. Emerson, *Nonagricultural Employment in Mainland China, 1949-1958*, Washington, 1965, p. 143; 1981: *Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1981*, pp. 109-110.

the PRC was 47.2 per cent as compared with 52.8 per cent in inland China.²⁵ However, comparing the distribution of the working class in the PRC in the late 1950s and the early 1980s, we should note that the share of the working class in the inland provinces grew but insignificantly during that entire period.

A substantial portion of China's industrial and office workers remained concentrated in the three largest cities, Peking, Shanghai and Tianjin. While in 1955 1,764,000 industrial and office workers (11.5 per cent of the total) made their homes in those cities, in 1981 10,500,000 (9.8 of the total) did so.²⁶

The share of the working class employed by industries in those cities remained high—12.4 per cent of the total strength of labour in the industrial public sector in 1981. If we add to this figure the working class employed in industry in the three economically developed provinces in the northeast of China, Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, the share of industrial workers will reach 29.2 per cent of the total number of workers employed by government-owned industry. A similar situation obtained in capital construction, in which over 25 per cent of workers employed by the public sector (25.5) were concentrated in Peking, Shanghai, Tianjin and the three northeastern provinces of the PRC.²⁷ In this way by the beginning of the 1980s most of the working class was concentrated, as before, in the three largest cities, Peking, Shanghai and Tianjin, and in the northeast of China.

OCCUPATIONAL AND INDUSTRIAL SKILLS

In the early 1980s, the occupational and industrial skills of the working class in the country as a whole remained relatively low. This was pointed out by Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, at a meeting of advanced workers in Tianjin in April 1982.²⁸ This is explained by a drop in the educational standards of the working class during the "cultural revolution". Many general educational schools were closed down and as a result most of the workers in the early 1980s did not have even elementary education. According to the findings of a study carried out in Suzhou, Jiangsu province, in 1981, as many as 72.5 per cent of the 122,000 young and middle-aged workers in industry, capital construction and transport (55.4 per cent of all the industrial and office workers in those sectors in the city) had only elementary education or had not completed the first stage of secondary school, while 1,500 people were totally illiterate.²⁹ Since at present industrial and office workers below 30 constitute over 60 per cent of the entire work force,³⁰ it is obvious that the "cultural revolution" has had a negative effect on the occupation and industrial skills of the Chinese working class.

During the 1970s, the system of vocational technical training as a whole was to a considerable extent ruined and almost all the newly-employed workers at industrial plants lacked previous vocational training. Workers were improving their occupational skills mostly through a system of apprenticeship, and virtually no tests were held to raise the skill ratings of workers. As a consequence, in the early 1980s, more than 70 per cent of the 40 million skilled workers had only the 1st to 3rd ratings.³¹

²⁵ See *Zhongguo tongji nianjian* 1981, p. 115.

²⁶ See *Tongji guangzhi* 1986, No. 23, p. 30; *Zhongguo tongji nianjian* 1981, p. 115.

²⁷ *Zhongguo tongji nianjian* 1981, pp. 27-37, 105, 117, 119, 120.

²⁸ See *Guangming ribao*, May 2, 1982.

²⁹ See *Renkou ya zhigui*, 1983, No. 1, p. 38.

³⁰ See *Renmin ribao*, June 10, 1981.

³¹ See *Ibid.*, July 24, 1983.

This situation is explained by the fact that the problem of establishing a stable network of vocational training schools and classes for workers has never been resolved, nor the organisational structure of vocational training outlined, nor integrated plans and programmes drawn up. The level of vocational training which existed prior to 1965 has never been reached, whereas at that time about 17 million industrial and office workers passed through different systems of advanced occupational training.³²

Attempts have been made in China since the late 1970s to improve the occupational and technical skills and general educational level of the working people. A national conference on occupational and technical training of industrial and office workers took place in March 1981. Yuan Baohua, Chairman of the National Committee for Occupational and Technical Training of Industrial and Office Workers, who at that time served concurrently as Chairman of the State Economic Committee, said that "the CPC Central Committee and the State Council of the PRC decided to enhance the training of industrial and office workers, gradually to develop a training system and to consider this a major undertaking in 'readjusting' the national economy."³³

The task was to eradicate within two or three years illiteracy among young and middle-aged workers and to see to it that from 60 to 80 per cent of the industrial and office workers with elementary education finish first-stage secondary school by 1985; that graduates of first-stage secondary school acquire secondary education or graduate from specialised secondary educational establishments; that some of the industrial and office workers with secondary or specialised secondary education get higher specialised education; and that engineers and technicians master scientific and technical knowledge in allied fields. Another task was to organise occupational and technical training for workers and to improve their occupational skills to bring them up to the requirements of a definite rating according to the rating list. It was pointed out that the occupational skills of young and middle-aged workers should be raised by one or two grades within five years and that the proportion of workers with high and medium-level skills should be raised.³⁴

However, it proved extremely difficult to accomplish those tasks in the country as a whole. Vigorous measures have been taken since the early 1980s to expand the network of educational centres for workers, such as technical and evening schools, TV universities and different advanced-training courses. Committees responsible for improving occupational skills have been set up in 29 provinces and autonomous regions. In March 1982, the PRC Ministry of Finance approved an interim decree on spending on the educational system for industrial and office workers and its organisation, under which since 1982 altogether 1.5 per cent of the overall wages fund of every plant should be used for the advanced training of industrial and office workers. The national conference on education for industrial and office workers, which was held in the middle of 1982, pointed out anew the need "to start work to improve the educational standards of industrial and office workers".³⁵

As a consequence, the PRC has made certain progress during the past four years in raising the general educational level of the working class, mostly through training and advanced training on a part-time basis. But by and large the experience of improving the occupational and technical standards of the working class is popularised insufficiently, labour is employed in most parts of the country before occupational

³² See *Hongqi*, 1982, No. 5, p. 18

³³ *Renmin ribao*, March 20, 1981

³⁴ See *Ibidem*

³⁵ *Guangming renmo*, May 7 and July 15, 1982

training, and the system of inheriting jobs is still surviving, all this severely shackling the growth of the occupational and technical standards of the working class of China.

THE PROBLEM OF RAISING LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY IN INDUSTRY

The low occupational and technical standards of the Chinese working class along with other factors determining its social composition inevitably has to hamper the growth of labour productivity in industry. During the past 10 years labour productivity in industry as a whole and in individual branches of industrial production has grown insignificantly, and even declined in certain industries. For instance, in capital construction it was 3,858 yuan per employee per year in 1979 and 4,257 yuan in 1980, dropping to 4,051 yuan in 1981.³⁶ The slow-down of the growth rate of labour productivity was largely due to the influx of large numbers of unskilled or low-skilled workers, whose labour was not necessitated by actual production needs. In Suzhou, Jiangsu Province, for instance, the annual average growth rate of the industrial work force between 1977 and 1981 was 8.2 per cent and that of labour productivity a mere 3.8 per cent. The gross industrial output of the city in 1981 rose by 6.1 per cent over the previous year, whereas the growth of labour productivity was a mere 0.7 per cent, and at the enterprises of the public sector labour productivity even dropped by 3.5 per cent.³⁷ In addition, the system of wages, the size of which depended for the most part on the skill rating rather than the personal contribution of workers, did not adequately stimulate the growth of labour productivity.

The existence of small-scale industries run by people's communes and production teams all over China, particularly in heavy industry, does not objectively contribute to the growth of labour productivity either. The material and technical standards of small-sized industries remain very low. Although they do get equipment discarded by large plants, it is traditional production processes and manual labour that constitute the basis of production. When all is said and done, labour productivity at plants run on a cooperative basis is far lower than that at government-owned plants. In 1981, labour productivity was 11,822 yuan per employee in the government run industries, 7,294 yuan at the cooperative industries in cities and communities, and about 3,000 yuan at the level of people's communes.⁴⁸

A comparison of these figures with labour productivity per employee in Shanghai industry, 25,293 yuan in 1981, three times the average for the country, shows how large the gap is between the technical standards of the major urban industries and the small-scale "cottage-industry" workshops in people's communes. Average labour productivity at the government-run industrial plants in Nanking, Jiangsu province, is 15,597 yuan per employee per year, seven times as much as that in the industries of people's communes of the same province (2,235 yuan), while in the interior regions of the country the gap is even wider. In Xian, Shenxi Province, the figure at the government-run industrial plants in the early 1980s was 10,305 yuan and in the people's communes 1,076 yuan (9.5 to 1), in Lanzhou, Gansu province, 12,909 as against 1,039 yuan respectively (12.4 to 1).³⁹

This difference in labour productivity levels can be explained by the large gap between the fixed assets per employee ratios at major plants

¹⁰ See *Zhongguo tongji manzhan* 1981, p. 327.

See *Renkou yu jingji*, 1983, No. 1, p. 36.

Calculated from *Zhongguo tongji nianjian* 1981, pp. 190, 265-266.

Calculated from Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1981, pp. 59-61, 63-65, 83-85, Z.

Actinopterygii mammal 180 Peking 1981 pp 8-136

managed from the centre and small-sized industries run by local authorities. The cost of fixed assets per production unit in people's communes and production teams is on average 19,000 yuan (or 1,000 yuan per employee).⁴⁰ The figure for major government-run industries is far higher and depends on the economic development level of individual provinces and cities. In Peking, for instance, it is 13,915 yuan per employee, in Tianjin 10,568 yuan per employee, in Wuhan 16,473 yuan and in Dalian 13,570 yuan.⁴¹

These differences in fixed assets per employee ratios between large- and small-sized industries depending on subordination, industrial branch and region entail large social distinctions between the workers in the educational standards, occupational skills and accordingly, wages and social insurance benefits. Most of the workers are divorced from large-scale industrial production and for this reason cannot improve their occupational skills, particularly if they are assigned to certain plants.

In conclusion, although during the 1980s the role of the Chinese working class as the major productive force of society has been gradually growing, there are a number of factors hampering this process. One of them is the need to find jobs for several million people in cities every year. To solve the employment problem, China has to set up many small-sized and quite tiny production units both in cities and in the countryside, government-owned, cooperative and private, which are, as a rule, managed by local authorities, lack modern equipment and have no need for skilled labour. This explains the predominance of the working class in those industries which, using for the most part manual labour, require a large work force, such as engineering, the textiles, and also cargo handling.

This situation does not encourage the use of the intensive factors of production growth, and the scope of using unskilled manual work without machinery and mechanisms is growing. Given the low educational standards of the bulk of the working class, these factors do not contribute to the improvement of its occupational and technical standards. As a result, the proportion of highly skilled workers (5th-8th skill grades) in the Chinese working class is still low. All this taken together pre-determines the slow growth rate of labour productivity in industry and the low efficiency of production.

Attempts are being made in the PRC to enhance the role of the working class as the leading productive force of society. Certain changes have been introduced to the employment system. More attention has begun to be paid to the system of occupational and vocational training. Small-sized industries operating at a loss have begun to be shut down in many parts of the country. However, the inadequate material and technical base of most of the industrial plants predetermines the low occupational skills of their work force. That is why, despite certain measures to improve the occupational and technical skills of the Chinese working class, the employment of surplus unskilled labour by industrial plants in cities has largely contributed to the continued predominance of workers employed by small-sized plants and removed from modern technology in the general composition of the working class. All this creates considerable difficulties for the development of the Chinese working class as the leading productive force of society.

⁴⁰ See *Zhongguo jingji nianjian* 1981, p. IV-55

⁴¹ Calculated from *Zhongguo tongji nianjian* 1982, pp. 27-29, 31-33, 43-45, 79-81.

JAPAN: UNSTABLE POLITICAL BALANCE

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[Article by Yu. D. Kuznetsov]

Early elections to the House of Representatives of the Japanese Parliament on December 18, 1983 (16th after World War II) led to notable changes in the internal political situation though the Liberal Democrats (in office since 1955 when the party was founded) retained the reins of power.

The most impressive result of the elections was significant defeat suffered by the Liberal Democrats who lost 36 seats and the majority in the House, winning only 250 seats out of 511. It was the biggest setback for the ruling party in any of the elections and this time it managed to obtain the minimal majority and the right to form a one-party cabinet only through joining hands in Parliament with the MPs elected as "independents".

In the past, particularly in the late 1970s, the same trick helped the Liberal Democrats to retain their majority in Parliament though they lost it in the elections.

A lesser number of seats won by the Liberal Democrats in the 1983 elections was not all. The share of voters for the party candidates also went down from 47.9 per cent in 1980 to 45.8 per cent in December 1983.¹

The results of the elections were very instructive in still another respect. They indicated that the trend towards a growing influence of the LDP manifest in the 1979-1980 electoral campaigns had discontinued. As was to be expected, the "revival of conservatism" talked so much of in the early 1980s proved short-lived. The Liberal Democrats failed to demonstrate that their policies, aimed, first and foremost, at pleasing the monopolies and victimising the workers, could help solve the serious economic and social problems which Japan faces today. Moreover, the policies of the Liberal Democratic cabinets have involved Japan in Washington's global military strategy which views the Far East as a potential theatre of operations in a Pentagon-incited "limited" nuclear war.

The results of the December 1983 elections to the House of Representatives came as little surprise, for the unsoundness of the LDP's policies had been obvious long before election day. The symptoms of the party's flagging influence had been manifest when it still enjoyed a stable (and seemingly an absolutely safe) majority in both chambers of Parliament. Its shrinking prestige resulted in the forced resignation of Suzuki's cabinet in the autumn of 1982 amid the country's slide into a financial crisis. The crisis only tilted the balance, however. The collapse of the cabinet should be viewed against the background of the huge anti-nuclear movement which showed that the popular masses resented the Washington-led policies of the Japanese government as regards halting the nuclear war threat, limiting the arms race and eliminating the nuclear stockpiles. It was made clear as day that a steady parliamentary majority in itself provides no stability to a cabinet that pursues an unpopular policy.

¹ *Asahi*, Dec. 19, 1983.

The progress of the first political battle in April 1983 during the nationwide elections to the local bodies of power was another worrisome symptom for the LDP. On the whole the results of the election were favourable for the ruling party. By joining hands with the centrist parties the Liberal Democrats retained the governorships in Tokyo, Osaka and other large prefectures, as well as mayorships in major cities. They were defeated, however, by the left-wing candidates in Hokkaido and the Fukuoka prefecture, losing the governorships there, which was a heavy blow to the LDP which feared that a similar trend might develop in subsequent parliamentary elections.

The election of a progressive governor in Hokkaido severely jeopardised the personal prestige of Premier Nakasone who had made a special journey to the island to campaign for the conservative candidate. The Premier's journey was extensively used to promote the government's policy of militarisation of Japan, for stronger military cooperation with the US and confrontation with the Soviet Union. The defeat of the LDP's candidate thus had a repercussion far beyond the local boundaries. It indicated that the population of the island was discontent with pro-American, militarist policies pursued by the Nakasone cabinet, and in favour of goodneighbourly relations with the Soviet Union.

No wonder that the Liberal Democrats spared no effort to avoid losses in the June elections to the Parliament's Upper House where half of the Councillors were up for reelection. To create more favourable conditions for the LDP candidates, the procedure of their nomination in the national electoral district (accounting for 40 per cent of the reelected Councillors) had been changed: personal voting for each of the candidates was replaced by the voting for slates proposed by the political parties. The new system favoured large parties, especially the LDP. Moreover, it ruled out the joining of hands by the opposition parties in individual electoral districts which had been a headache for the ruling party in the past.

The government drew useful lessons from the Hokkaido governor's election and toned down its openly militarist rhetoric during the election campaign to the Upper House, avoiding statements advocating the turning of Japan into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier", the "blocking" of international straits near Japanese coasts, the establishment of a 1,000 mile "protected" sea communication zone, etc. The stratagem was a success with certain sections of inexperienced voters.

Partly as the result of the aforementioned changes in the election procedure several small factions had been formed on the eve of elections to the Upper House which proclaimed themselves political parties. Twelve of these "mini-parties" took part in the June elections. As they were all in opposition to the LDP, it added to the fragmentation of the opposition camp as a whole and, in the final analysis, played into the hands of the ruling party.

The Liberal Democrats were not unanimous in their approach to the forthcoming elections. Tanaka's group, for example, suggested "double" elections (i. e., simultaneous elections to both chambers of the Parliament) which had ensured a notable success for the Liberal Democrats in 1980. Ex-Premier Tanaka himself was very anxious to be reelected to the House of Representatives as he never doubted that his control over electoral district would ensure success, so that he could sway the verdict expected from the Tokyo district court in the coming autumn on his Lockheed bribery case.

Premier Nakasone, however, was opposed to "double" elections, fearing (and not without reasons) that the Liberal Democrats would not repeat the 1980 successes and that in case of a failure he would be made responsible and might lose his key posts both in the LDP and the

cabinet. His posture was supported by influential forces in the ruling party and outside it. "Double" elections were likewise opposed by the leaders of large factions in the LDP, the former Premiers Fukuda, Miki and Suzuki, and the right-centrist parties: the New Liberal Club, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), Komeito and the Social Democratic Union.

Amid this, Premier Nakasone succeeded in upholding his stand despite pressure from Tanaka. The Premier's resoluteness somewhat increased the government's prestige which took a plunge after Nakasone's visit to Washington in January when he meekly accepted Reagan's adventurist policy guidelines. A public opinion poll commissioned by the *Mainichi* newspaper in early June indicated that since March the number of government supporters had risen from 34 to 40 per cent.²

As the result, the LDP won three additional seats in the Upper House on June 26 which, however, brought about no radical changes in the alignment of forces there. The Japanese press commented on this occasion that these were "elections without winners".³

The Upper House elections had not stabilised the internal political situation in the country. As the time for handing down a verdict on Tanaka's case was nearing, the movement against corruption and the monopoly-oriented policies in Japan continued to mount. These policies were directly associated with Tanaka, but it was invariably pursued by the LDP which saw a great danger for itself in demands to put an end to Tanaka's practices.

The anti-Tanaka movement was manifested in various forms—from the opposition parties' drafting of a parliamentary resolution to deprive Tanaka of his MP title, to the proclamation of slogans at mass meetings and demonstrations calling for a crackdown on corruption in the ruling party. Though the movement had no definite organisational framework it involved various strata of the population and had a great influence on public opinion. The vast scale of the protest campaign against everything that Tanaka symbolised transpired from public polls. For example, according to a *Yomiuri* poll, 73 per cent of those queried said that in case of a "guilty" verdict Tanaka should forsake his MP's mandate; 74 per cent opined that he should not stand for reelection to Parliament, and 56.9 per cent believed he should give up political activities entirely.⁴

On October 12 the Tokyo district court passed a verdict of Tanaka being guilty of bribery, sentenced him to four years in prison and fined him 500 million yen. He was immediately let out on bail and appealed to a higher court while remaining an MP.

After the court's decision the opposition parties demanded an urgent vote in Parliament on their draft resolution to deprive Tanaka of his mandate, but the government and the ruling party refused to satisfy their demand. Although after his case was brought to court Tanaka had formally dropped out of the LDP and became an "independent", his supporters in the LDP constituted the largest faction which included 118 MPs in both chambers. Seven members of Tanaka's faction were LDP leaders and members of the government holding the key posts of the LDP General Secretary, the General Secretary of the Cabinet, the Minister of Finance, etc. Tanaka's influence on Premier Nakasone was also immense, since he had played a decisive role in helping the latter come to office in November 1982, when Nakasone lacked the majority needed to be elected chairman of the ruling party.

With the government flatly refusing to force Tanaka to resign, the

Mainichi, June 9, 1983
Tokyo shinbun, June 28, 1983
· *Yomiuri*, Oct. 3, 1983

opposition parties unanimously resolved to boycott parliamentary sessions, which provoked a crisis in Parliament lasting for more than a month.

Unanimous opposition is rare in Japan's present-day political practices. The last time a similar thing happened in May 1980, when the House of Representatives passed a vote of nonconfidence on the Ohira cabinet. More often the opposition parties act in disunity, helping the LDP to retain power in most unfavourable circumstances. Such was the case, for example, in May 1983 when the centrist parties (the DSP, Komeito, as well as the bloc of the New Liberal Club and the Social-Democratic Union) refused to support the nonconfidence vote on the Nakasone cabinet tabled by the Socialist Party and backed up by the Communist Party.

The lull in Parliament's activities caused by the opposition parties' boycott created serious difficulties for the government and the ruling party, blocking the early adoption of the urgent bills, specifically concerning the "administrative reform" providing for the curtailment of the state apparatus, denationalisation of railways, etc., in the interests of monopolies. It put Nakasone's cabinet, which was shortly expecting the arrival of West German Chancellor H. Kohl, US President Reagan and Chairman of the CPC CC Hu Yaobang who were to address Parliament, in a special predicament.

In an effort to lure the opposition MPs back to parliamentary sessions, the government and the LDP agreed to make some concessions, specifically, to adopt the bills on a 1.2 trillion yen reduction of taxes, higher pay to civil servants and a number of measures to stimulate business activity. But the opposition turned down the deal, declaring that the tax reduction was inadequate, and demanded priority for the discussion of its draft resolution on depriving Tanaka of his mandate.

The ruling party also lacked consensus on "Tanaka's problem". Although the LDP had a steady majority at that time in both Houses, its leaders feared that if the resolution on Tanaka were put to a vote, many MPs would join the opposition or abstain, thus promoting the resolution.

These fears had a good leg to stand on. The *Mainichi*'s poll of MPs (Liberal Democrats) in both chambers indicated that 43 per cent of them were in favour of Tanaka's expulsion from Parliament and only 20 per cent felt "it was not necessary".⁵ The poll carried out by the Kyodo Tsushin News Agency also confirmed that 38 per cent of the leaders of local LDP divisions were of the opinion that Tanaka should be stripped of his MP's mandate.

Responsive to these sentiments, many prominent LDP leaders also opined that to save the ruling party's "face and reputation" Tanaka ought to surrender his mandate. Specifically, such opinions were voiced by ex-Premiers Miki, Fukuda and Suzuki, whose judgement had to be reckoned with by the cabinet since they still wielded sizeable influence not only in the ruling party, but also throughout the country.

Seeking a way out, Nakasone personally met with Tanaka in late October, asking for his "help" in overcoming the acute parliamentary and political crisis and for his "voluntary" withdrawal from Parliament, which the ex-Premier refused to do. Moreover, on October 25 Tanaka's faction voted to dissolve the House of Representatives and called for early elections.

The opposition parties tabled a similar proposal, hoping to capitalise on the LDP's extremely unfavourable position after Tanaka's court verdict. Particularly active was the Socialist Party, whose new

leadership headed by Chairman of the Executive Committee M. Ishibashi (elected at the 48th party congress in September) sought to take the political initiative into its hands.

Amid a sharp political struggle in the LDP some of its leaders went as far as to establish direct contacts with the opposition (for example, ex-Premier T. Miki met with SPJ, CPJ and DSP leaders). Of course, any real cooperation between a certain part of Liberal Democrats and the opposition was out of the question, but even the idea of such cooperation seriously troubled the LDP leadership.

Only the dissolution of Parliament could break the political deadlock, but the government could not act promptly as its bills and the visits of foreign summit-level guests to Japan were still overhanging.

A kind of "truce" was agreed upon between the government and most of the opposition parties for the period of the visits, with all MPs except the Communists attending the parliamentary sessions addressed by H. Kohl, R. Reagan and Hu Yaobang.

The Liberal Democrats, however, used the "truce" to consolidate their positions. A plenary meeting of the House of Representatives on November 16 attended only by LDP MPs carried a resolution to lengthen the parliamentary session by 12 days. This was a defeat in the inner-party struggle for Premier Nakasone who proposed to prolong the session for a month with a view to put off early elections till early 1984. Nikaido, the LDP General Secretary and an associate of Tanaka, however, who insisted on the session to be prolonged by 10 days took the upper hand.

Meanwhile the LDP persuaded MPs from the New Liberal Club to forego their boycott of Parliament and at a session of the House of Representatives held on November 17 pushed through almost all of its bills. Premier Nakasone declared that approval of all the bills on the agenda was a *sine qua non* for early elections.

To avoid loss of influence among their electorate, the opposition parties had to return to Parliament without any discussion of their draft resolution concerning Tanaka. On November 18 all opposition MPs took part in the plenary session of the Upper House which discussed the "administrative reform" bills. The parliamentary crisis was over. On the surface, the government had won since it defied the opposition on the Tanaka conflict, but in reality it was another defeat for the Premier, who was pressured against his will by the opposition and Tanaka's faction into dissolving Parliament and calling for early elections to the House of Representatives.

Nakasone's unwillingness to hold early elections early can be explained by his fears that they might prove a failure for the LDP and though in summer he managed to oppose the "double election", this time he had to give in.

On November 28 a vote of nonconfidence in the cabinet sponsored by the opposition parties was carried in Parliament. In response, Parliament was dissolved by Nakasone and new general elections were appointed. A short but fierce election campaign ensued, involving 848 candidates for 511 seats in the House of Representatives. The largest share of them (360) ran on the slate of the ruling LDP which, as always, had plentiful funds as a result of generous donations from big business. Among the Liberal Democrats, candidates from Tanaka's faction were most numerous (84). The faction pinned great hopes on the elections, expecting to strengthen its leading position in the LDP and to "rehabilitate" its leader's reputation.

But the court's verdict on Tanaka had seriously damaged the LDP's prestige as could be seen from public opinion polls taken before the election campaign. The Asahi paper poll showed that for the first time

in several years less than half of those polled (48 per cent) supported the ruling party. On the contrary, support to the opposition parties which for several years never exceeded 30 per cent, rose to 41 per cent. Support for the government fell to 38 per cent (according to *Mainichi* poll data).⁷

It stands to reason that the opposition parties sought in every way possible to turn the favourable situation to their advantage, joining hands in individual electoral districts. The process was started by the SPJ which offered cooperation to Komeito as far back as September. Later, negotiations at various levels, including those involving their Chairmen, led to their mutually-agreed cooperation in six electoral districts. On November 29 they signed a corresponding agreement. On the same day an agreement on cooperation in 25 districts was signed between the Komeito and the DSP leadership. There were other combinations of the opposition parties in the campaign. Five parties (save for the CPJ) cooperated in different ways in 57 out of 130 electoral districts,⁸ breaking the previous record.

In the course of the campaign a new trend of trade union support for political parties was started, breaking the long-standing tradition of the SOHYO unions supporting the Socialist Party and the Domei unions backing the DSP. This time some SOHYO trade unions supported the DSP, while some Domei member unions gave their support to SPJ candidates. It is noteworthy that this "cross-support" system was initiated by the All-Japanese Council of Private Enterprise Unions (*Zemmin rokyo*), founded in December 1982 to amalgamate both SOHYO and Domei unions. The right-reformist Council used the campaign to bolster up its claims for the long-coveted leadership of the Japanese trade union movement.

However, the cooperation of the opposition parties and the trade unions during the elections to the House of Representatives had a major drawback: it excluded the CPJ. The latter's rivals sought to isolate it, specifically the DSP which, being a right-wing opposition party, invariably declined any cooperation with the Communists. Such narrow-minded policies deprived the opposition parties of the chance to capitalise fully on their mutual cooperation, weakened their ranks and in fact aided the ruling party which had launched a fierce anti-communist campaign.

The 6th plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Japan (November 17-18) emphasised the need to vigorously resist the anti-communist campaign, but the fierce anti-communist attacks of the LDP and some other opposition parties did produce some results: the CPJ lost three seats in Parliament as against 1980; it collected 9.3 per cent of the votes as against 9.8 per cent previously.⁹

Those who gained were the SPJ, Komeito and the DSP, mostly as a result of their cooperation. The New Liberal Club lost two seats and the Social Democrats retained their former positions. Thus, the 1983 elections made it once again clear that sharper competition made it increasingly difficult for the smaller parties to retain their positions on the domestic political scene.

The election results were also affected, to a large measure, by the tactics of individual parties, specifically, their ability to concentrate their efforts and forces in most promising districts. For instance, the DSP collected 1.2 million less votes than the CPJ, but won 12 more seats than the latter in the House of Representatives. The Komeito

* *Asahi*, Dec. 5, 1983

⁷ *Mainichi*, Nov. 23, 1983

⁸ *Yomiuri*, Dec. 4, 1983

⁹ *Asahi*, Dec. 19, 1983

collected only 400,000 more votes than the CPJ and more than twice as many seats in Parliament than the latter.

The December elections were a serious defeat for the LDP though it continued to lead in the number of votes received and the seats won. Of course, the Tanaka case seriously dampened the LDP prestige, but there were also other reasons. The voters expressed their unambiguous disapproval of the Nakasone cabinet's policy of militarising Japan, extending its military strategic cooperation with Washington, and of Pentagon and Japanese "hawks" plans to turn Japan into a US "unsinkable aircraft carrier". A series of summit-level visits by foreign statesmen on the eve of the elections was of no help either, though some of the visitors, particularly President Reagan, did their utmost to bolster up the cabinet's posture and Premier Nakasone's personal prestige.

The elections changed the balance of forces in the ruling party itself. The influence of Tanaka's group grew stronger. Despite the court's verdict Tanaka never collected as many votes before. No doubt the "victory" cost a lot of money to Tanaka's supporters, spent in his electoral area, but it gave the ex-Premier a pretext for disputing the court's decision.

After the elections the LDP's major challenge was to obtain a minimal majority in the House of Representatives in order to form a one-party cabinet again. It met this challenge by inviting some ten "independents" to join its parliamentary faction. This, however, did not solve all the difficulties caused by the elections. Apart from losing many seats in Parliament, the Liberal Democrats lost its majority in a number of important House Committees concerned with the discussion of bills and, therefore, influential in the law-making process.

The major outcome of the December elections to the House of Representatives was, consequently, a return to roughly the 1976-1979 balance of forces between the ruling party and the opposition. In other words, the political balance in the lower house of Parliament is again unstable. The present situation differs somewhat from the late 1970s when similar instability was characteristic of both Houses. Today the LDP has a stable majority in the House of Councillors, but the complexity of the LDP situation should not be underrated, bearing in mind that the House of Representatives plays a crucial role in the Japanese Parliament.

It is not accidental that on learning the election results Premier Nakasone declared that he was in favour of talking to the opposition and prepared to give more heed to its opinion. A dialogue with the opposition was a forced tactics which the LDP had used in the late 1970s under the cabinets headed by Fukuda and Ohira. When it won a stable majority in both Houses in 1980, it never gave a thought to the need for a dialogue.

It is safe to assume that with the present alignment of forces in Parliament, the role of the opposition and its influence on Japan's policies may increase. Whether the opposition parties will seize the opportunity or miss it and hand over the initiative to the LDP, as was the case in the recent past, still remains to be seen.

In any case the ruling party is greatly apprehensive of the future, which is evidenced, *inter alia*, by the avoidance of an open conflict in the LDP in the struggle for key posts after the elections. Realising that such a conflict could further cripple the party's reputation, the Liberal Democrats feigned unity in reappointing Nakasone Prime Minister despite their failure in the elections, which is in stark contrast to the 1976 situation when Premier Miki had to resign after the party lost even less seats.

In 1983 Japan witnessed three large-scale election campaigns, which is an extremely rare case, and though no elections are expected in the near future the internal political strife (and not only in Parliament) will continue to be acute, as Japan is on the threshold of new class battles.

Both the LDP and Nakasone succeeded in staying in power despite their failure in the elections. Yet they did not escape unscathed. Nakasone's rivals in the LDP agreed to let him have his posts only after he had admitted in a public statement that he was fully responsible for the loss of many seats, deserved resignation as LDP Chairman and intended to put an end to any of Tanaka's political influence.

The LDP, for the first time in its history, lost its monopoly over political power. To ensure a more or less stable majority it had to ally in Parliament with the New Liberal Club ("LDP-NLC National Union") with 267 seats in the House of Representatives for the whole union. In exchange an NLC representative was made a member of the cabinet. In effect, for the first time in many years Japan has a coalition government. And though the LDP new General Secretary R. Tanaka described it as a "conservative-conservative coalition" it cannot belittle the main implication of the December elections to the House of Representatives, to wit, that it is increasingly difficult for the LDP to retain power—not only during elections, but on a nationwide level too.

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ELITE AS INTERPRETED BY CHINESE BOURGEOIS SOCIOLOGISTS

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[Article by S. R. Belousov]

In general terms the theories of the elite are socio-philosophical concepts, according to which the indispensable components of the social structure are the elite ("a qualified minority", a privileged ruling stratum performing managerial functions, "responsible" for the development of science and culture) and the bulk of the people. The primary postulate of such theories is the absolutisation of political relations, that is, political rule is viewed as a prevailing factor and a prerequisite of all social relations, with domination and subordination being most important. Hence, the class roots of the elitist theories are in the division of antagonistic society into an exploiting minority (politically dominant) and an exploited majority (politically dependent). Thus, elitism is an indispensable characteristic of society built on the private ownership of the means of production and constitutes the essence of the ruling class' mentality.¹

The theoretical foundation of elitism is philosophical idealism. The considerable spread of the ruling elite theories is explained above all by the fact that their aim is to enslave spiritually the masses and to preserve their political inertness and cultural backwardness. Like all idealist theories, they are "a *sterile flower*, undoubtedly, but a sterile flower that grows on the living tree of living, fertile, genuine ... human knowledge".²

THE ORIGINS OF THE ELITIST IDEAS. TRADITIONS AND TRENDS OF DEVELOPMENT

The history of the elitist theories goes back to ancient times. Their emergence in Europe is usually associated with the views of the ideologists of the slave-owning aristocracy, particularly Plato who argued that the masses (*demos*) should not be allowed to participate in running the state and claimed that "humankind would not be able to rid itself of evil until a generation of genuine philosophers came to power". These views were further expounded in the sociological concepts of Machiavelli and Carlyle, who attached considerable importance to the problem of the elite as a ruling group guiding society. Nevertheless it was not until the 20th century that these problems became especially topical for the bourgeoisie (in connection with the steady growth of political consciousness and activity of the masses) and truly systematic studies in this field were initiated above all in the works of modern Italian sociologists V. Pareto, G. Mosca, and R. Michels.³ In this way since time immemorial and up to now the ideologists of the ruling classes have declared not only individual "strong personalities" but an entire social stratum, to be the subject

¹ H. Aptheker, *On the Nature of Freedom. The Marxist View*, New York, 1960.
² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 363.

³ For further details about the elitist theories see G. K. Aspin: *The Myth of the Elites and "Mass Society"*, Moscow, 1966 (in Russian).

in history, describing the upper crust as a caste of "outstanding individuals", so to speak, true makers of historical and cultural progress.

The emergence of elitist ideas in China outstripped the European tradition by several centuries: the "embryonic" forms of their existence date as far back as the pre-Confucian period.¹ The political theory underlying Confucianism itself was the thesis of the "primordial" inequality of people and their division into two social strata, that of rulers and that of the ruled. According to this theory, the guiding of society was the prerogative of a special stratum of "noble officials" — *jun zi* (in this case the term means precisely those involved in management and symbolises the development of the original Confucian model of a perfect man, a "noble man"). As a rule, the term "noble administrators" meant people occupying the higher posts in the state apparatus and free to interpret moral norms or "rules" (*li*), whereas the majority had to follow the latter blindly and without fail. Characteristically enough, the essentially anti-democratic Confucian concept of the political system, which denied the masses the right to broad participation in running the state and which reduced their role to purely executive functions, included the demagogic demand "to effect government in the interests of the people rather than in those of the ruler". This thesis became established in Chinese socio-political thought and persisted throughout its evolution.

A different but just as clearly formulated elitist concept of the social organisation of society was developed by the Legist school (*fa jia*), which maintained that the people had no political right to state government. The Legists focussed their attention on the centring of the strong individual's rule; the bureaucratic stratum, however, which was taking shape at the same time was unwilling to reconcile itself to the position of a dependent political force and, as it strengthened its positions "and emerged as a ruling estate, its role also grew, especially the role of its higher echelon, in managing different state affairs".² Long before Machiavelli, the Legists evolved their own model of a despotic state and laid the foundations of the bureaucratic rule by the higher privileged stratum. In so doing they followed the Confucianists, insisting that the meaning of their entire activity was determined by their sincere concern for the interests and well-being of the people.

By the 3rd century B.C. representatives of different philosophical schools in China had evolved a single view of the place of the individual in the system of social relations, depending on the extent of his services to society, which differed only in their interpretation of the concept of "services". It was in the Han period (206 B.C.-220 A.D.) that the two formerly opposite ideologies began to be synthesised, that law became "Confucianised" (the merging of "*li*" and "*fa*"). This process culminated in the emergence of the so-called orthodox Confucianism, whose political system incorporated features belonging to both of the doctrines. To a certain extent, this "reconciliation" became possible because both the Confucianists and Legists deemed it impossible for the common people to participate in running the state. As far as representatives of the major trends of Chinese philosophical and political thought dealt with the problems of social relations in the history of the country, in the course of solving these problems a concept of hierarchical Chinese society was worked out along with the speculative thesis of the "rule by a limited minority exclusively in the interests of the majority", and the need was recognised in principle to curb to one extent or another the growing social inequality. The Confucian-Legist concept of a political system

¹ See H. G. Creel, *Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung*, Chicago, 1953, pp. 12-13.

² S. P. Peterson, *Confucianism and Legalism in Chinese Political Thought*, Worcester, 1957, p. 125 (in Russian).

which presupposed the existence of a ruling élite, survived in its general form to the 20th century.

The first decades of the 20th century saw heightened interest in Western values among Chinese intellectuals and a vigorous spread of European doctrines in China, whose influence on the country's socio-political thought of the period can hardly be overestimated. True, John Stuart Mill's *On Freedom* and Charles Montesquieu's *Spirit of Laws* were translated into Chinese by Yan Fu already in the 1880s. But at that time these works, like the few other translations, were read only as literary pieces, if at all. In the 20th century, however, the spontaneous realisation of the obvious advantages of certain aspects of Western civilisation, dissatisfaction with the country's dependent position and the resultant acute nationalistic sentiments forced the ideologists of the up-and-coming Chinese bourgeoisie to undertake a serious study of European doctrines which, they thought, could to one degree or another be used in effecting "national reconstruction" in the shortest possible time.

This contact with European thought and social institutes, the realisation of the need for reforms and a desire to "keep up with the times" convinced many representatives of the Chinese bourgeois intelligentsia of the need to resolve, along with other problems, the issue of the structure of the social political system. It should be pointed out that, like other exploiting classes, the bourgeoisie tends to scorn the masses and to give the credit for the development of civilisation to the "useful" élites—representatives of the dominant class. For this reason, the Chinese bourgeois ideologists' interpretation of the problem of state government inevitably resulted (just like in Europe) in the emergence of new versions of elitist theories. They serve to illustrate the general idea that elitism does not exist in modern bourgeois sociology as a separate trend; it is nothing else than a characteristic feature of entire bourgeois sociology. In accordance with this, theoretical studies of the élite were not systematic in China, nor can they be called theories in the generally accepted sense of the word. Nevertheless, in the 20th century the more prominent figures in the country's ideological life touched upon the problem of the "creative minority" in one way or another, within the framework of their socio-political concepts (naturally, this refers to bourgeois ideologists). Most of the theoreticians and researchers of China's political history in 1911-1949 focussed their efforts on studying the top of the socio-political pyramid—the administrative hierarchy at national and regional levels. A "view from below", that is, an analysis of "local society", local political structures and groups (including, the élites), making it possible to improve the global concepts, was rarely adopted.

The founders of Marxism-Leninism pointed to the need to put an end to the absurd prejudice that "only the so-called upper classes", only the rich, and those who have gone through the school of the rich, are capable of administering the state.⁷⁴ In this context it becomes clear that a concrete historical analysis of the evolution of the 20th-century Chinese theories of elitist rule would help us to understand better the reactionary essence of Chinese bourgeois sociology and a few of the general tendencies of its development in our time. In the course of such an analysis it is obviously necessary to differentiate between the views of downright reactionary theoreticians and those whose, on the whole, progressive programmes contained individual erroneous concepts.

The difficult external and internal situation in which China found itself by the beginning of the 20th century and the desire to lead the country out of the crisis posed by the ideologists of the national bourgeoisie a complicated alternative connected with tradition, memory, whether it

⁷⁴ V. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 409.

should be preserved or discarded. Was it possible to synthesise the old and the new, traditionalism and modernism? On the one hand, the renunciation of deeply integrated and rooted socio-political doctrines and institutes that had existed for two millennia caused serious psychological difficulties. On the other hand, the emergence of modern national statehood called for a new structure. Be as it may, in the majority of cases there existed the problem of assimilating a Western doctrine in the context of national peculiarities. The elitist concepts, which developed in China in the new historical conditions were no exception in this sense: they combined elements of European theories adapted to Chinese traditions and the traditional views of the structure of a political system, with the latter predominating more often than not. The interpretation of the problem of the elite by Chinese bourgeois sociologists was essentially a reminiscence of the local (above all, Confucian) ideas of state management.

It seems natural that the elitist theories of 20th-century China should be viewed in chronological order, which would make it possible, on the one hand, to show the extent to which each of them was ideologically or functionally connected with Chinese tradition and, on the other, to trace a certain continuity and mutual influence among these theories themselves.

ELITISM AS INTERPRETED BY LIANG QICHAO

The problem of the ruling elite was studied by the representatives of the liberal reformist wing of the Chinese bourgeoisie, among whom Liang Qichao (1873-1929) paid it most attention. Regarding the constitutional monarchy as the optimum form of government for China, Liang Qichao at the same time believed that the country's state and administrative institutes were not ready for the immediate introduction of a constitutional monarchy and in late 1905-early 1906 stopped propagandising it and passed on to the apologia of "enlightened absolutism".

The leader of the reformists thought this regime to be a "transition form" most suitable for China and the period of transition to the constitutional monarchy was, according to him, to last from 10 to 20 years. Expounding his fairly abstract concept of "enlightened absolutism", Liang Qichao wrote that his political system envisioned "absolute rule in the interests of the people".⁷ He drew on the concept of the German monarchist historian K. Bornekhak, while his arguments were reminiscent of the sociological theories of British philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who viewed the state as a convention between people. Nevertheless, despite the presence and partial utilisation of Western analogies, Liang Qichao's concept is quite obviously associated above all with the Confucian doctrine of humane, "philanthropic" monarchic rule.

The Xinhai Revolution of 1911 made Liang Qichao revise his position. In the first years of the republic, incidentally just as later on, he maintained that constitutional rule on the basis of a bipartite system was the most suitable model for China in the new period. Claiming that his sociology was scientific and lacked a partisan spirit, Liang Qichao as a bourgeois ideologist could not but draw on the dogmas and prejudices of his own class whose interests he defended. Like many elitists, he imagined the formation of the elite to be immanent in the development of the socio-political, cultural and psychological life of society and an inalienable attribute of civilisation. It seemed natural to him that under the

⁷ Liang Qichao, "On Enlightened Absolutism", *(Selected Materials on Chinese History on the Eve of the Xinhai Revolution)*, Vol. 2, Part I, Peking, 1963, pp. 160-162, 169.

constitutional system party leaders and statesmen should necessarily come from the upper strata of the social pyramid. "Human nature itself presupposes that the well-meaning peaceful majority is guided by the outstanding minority," Liang Qichao wrote. "In the course of history it was precisely the minority that was responsible for the destiny of the nation in every country."⁸ (The mentioning of "human nature" in this context is also not accidental if we call to mind the author's infatuation with social Darwinism.)

Class limitations of the leader of the reformists resulted in his belief that the relations of government inevitably took the form of the relations of political domination and subordination. Liang Qichao stated rather forthrightly that "the people were unable to govern themselves", sharing the view of the ancient Legists that the masses invariably welcomed the final positive results of rule, but could hardly be expected to show initiative in working out and implementing long-term strategic plans of state government. Like all elitists, he believed that democracy in the sense of the rule of the people was impracticable, as the people were a mob with primitive and token mentality and therefore had to be "taken care of" by highly gifted individuals from among the dominant classes. According to Liang Qichao, the people's rule and the government formed from the representatives of the people were "an historical illusion". Among the reasons for the "illusory nature" of the people's rule, he named the opportunity to profiteer on the emotional aspect of social consciousness of the masses, that is, that a political leader should be able to pass his own ambitions for the interests of a certain section of society. Even in states with "developed democratic traditions", Liang Qichao emphasised, social demagoguery was not only retained but often evolved into the gross violation of human rights. The "democratic" system of government (naturally, as the bourgeoisie interprets the concept) has the function of, on the one hand, guaranteeing the observance of these rights and, on the other, of upholding the interests of the state. According to Liang Qichao, popular forms of government, paradoxical as it may seem, can be the main obstacle to accomplishing these tasks. From his point of view, a commoner, elected, say, a deputy or appointed a minister or an official would inevitably abuse power. Trying to substantiate his opinion, he spoke of the irrationalism of the masses and their unpreparedness for governing and feigned regret for their primitive political mentality, low cultural level and ignorance. The "unenlightened people" can easily be hoodwinked and bribed because they are guided only by local and personal interests and have no use for state and public interests.⁹ In a word, ordinary Chinese can by no means be entrusted with the "civilised task" of putting into effect the parliamentary forms of state rule.

Liang Qichao did not consider the problem of creating a political system on the basis of the participation of the people's representatives in government as a serious prospect and thought the rule of the elite to be a logical alternative. According to him, the just and successful rule of society was guaranteed by the fact that the people effecting it had a high intellectual level and the necessary virtues and merits; political activities should be assigned to professional politicians who are "specially trained", "informed", and have a certain social status, prestige and influence. By force of his class affiliation he was convinced that statesmen of this type could be found only amidst the dominant class, which has access to education, science and culture and the ruling positions in po-

⁸ Liang Qichao, "The Guiding Principles of Forming the Chinese State". (In Ch. C. Tan, *Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century*). New York, 1971, p. 34.

⁹ See Liang Qichao, "On Enlightened Absolutism", pp. 192-193; Ch. C. Tan, *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

political and economic life, and by way of example cited the Chinese social category of *shenshi*, believing that in the new period the country would have enough people "worthy" of this tradition.¹⁰ Historical development has refuted these absurd declarations of Liang Qichao. Under Guomin-dang rule in China, instead of the "virtuous *shenshi*" of Liang Qichao, a new social type emerged, which was referred to as "evil *shenshi*" (*lieshen*) and in fact monopolised the local bodies of self-government. The growth of this new ruling elite was closely connected with organised violence and the loss of legality and was accompanied by the partial elimination of representatives of the old dominant class by kidnappings and assassinations.¹¹ (Symptomatically enough, even this obviously reactionary and essentially criminal stratum of the elite named the concern for the people's well-being as the foundation of its activities.)

In general Liang Qichao set forth as an objective regularity the idea that in "rational" society the educated representatives of its upper crust, "impeccably honest" and "possessing a sense of dignity", form the stratum from which political leaders are recruited. These "decent academics" are to a certain extent reminiscent of the "natural aristocrats" of British sociologist E. Burke and American sociologist Ph. Giddings, though Liang Qichao's views basically resemble above all the Confucian model of "perfect personality"—*jun zi*. His idea that the rule of the elite was not only desirable but also inevitable largely coincides with the positions maintained by V. Pareto, G. Moska and R. Michels, who adamantly claimed that political rule of the minority was inevitable ("the iron law of oligarchic tendencies"). The views of these European sociologists were somewhat cynical, whereas Liang Qichao idealised the elite, ascribing to it tremendous intellectual and moral superiority in Confucian traditions. Also in keeping with them, he tried to conceal the anti-democratic essence of his sociological ideals with the help of high-sounding declarations about the selfless "missionary" activity of the ruling elite towards those it "governs" and claimed that the intellectuals and the "knowledgeable" people should be *gurus*, leaders and "good gels" for the illiterate and the "ignorant".

Without playing down the reactionary nature of Liang Qichao's views of the social structure of the political system, I should like to point out that he did not turn a blind eye to the odious leaders within the ruling elite of the dominant class. Like E. Burke, who singled out from among the British titled nobility "flatterers, informers, parasites, pimps and actors", Liang Qichao admitted that there were quite a few bureaucratic, reactionary and downright base elements among the ruling elite in post-revolutionary China. This objective evaluation was, however, brought to naught by his own explanation of the reason for the emergence of those elements—according to him, it was caused by the spread of the revolutionary movement which was overthrowing, along with everything, the "correct" norms of social life and the moral principles reigning in China before the revolution.¹²

ELITIST ELEMENTS IN THE VIEWS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRATS

The position of Liang Qichao and other liberal reformists (Gu Sheng in particular) on the question of the political system was largely determined by the goals of their ideological and political struggle against the

¹⁰ See Liang Qichao, "On My General Political Views" (Materials on the Chinese Bourgeoisie of the Middle Road of the Chinese Bourgeoisie), Vol. 1, Peking, 1958, pp. 115-118.

¹¹ G. S. Alitto, "Rural Elites in Transition: China's Cultural Crisis and the Problem of Legitimacy". In *Papers from Research Conference on Rural-Urban Networks in Chinese Society*, Ann Arbor, 1979, p. 252.

¹² See Liang Qichao, "The Reasons for Political Progress in Europe". In *Op. cit.* Tan. Op. cit., pp. 35-36.

representatives of the revolutionary-democratic wing of the Chinese bourgeoisie (Sun Yatsen, Zhang Binglin, Wang Jingwei, Zhu Zhixin, and others). After the Tongmenghui society was founded in Tokyo in 1905 under the leadership of Sun Yatsen (1866-1925), *Min bao*, the mouthpiece of that organisation, immediately drew Liang Qichao into a protracted and fierce argument about the future state system. In the course of the discussion Liang Qichao, referring to the experience of historical development of Western countries, asserted that the political regime of any country developed from barbarity to absolutism, from absolutism to the constitutional monarchy and then to the republic, and therefore China was unable to alter that process nor did it have to "skip any stages".

Arguing with Liang Qichao, Sun Yatsen and his associates advocated the establishment of a republican democratic system and unconditionally rejected "enlightened absolutism" and the constitutional monarchy, believing that they were too firmly connected with the predominant authoritarian forms of government. For Liang Qichao any mass movement was "plunder during a fire", whereas his opponents were united precisely by their striving after the revolutionary overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. From their point of view the main goal of the revolution was to transfer political power to the Chinese people. They believed that any political system which gave the masses no chance to implement self-government did not resolve the tasks of the transition to a democratic system. To be viable, the constitution should be drawn up by the people rather than "granted by the ruler". (This was constantly stressed, for example, by Wang Jingwei in the *Min bao* monthly.)

Despite their on the whole progressive position, the representatives of the revolutionary democratic wing of the Chinese bourgeoisie were unable to overcome fully the limitations of their class in solving various theoretical problems: we know about the contradictory elements of the Sun Yatsen's programme and Lenin's dual attitude towards it.¹³ The above also refers to the problem of the political system. Besides, they were influenced by the traditional education they received along with the modern one, experiencing the influence of European stereotypes, on the one hand, and that of the Confucian dogmas deeply rooted in their minds, on the other. The sum-total of these reasons accounts for the fact that certain aspects of the theory on elite also found expression in the views of the revolutionary democrats, particularly Sun Yatsen. He maintained that the "progress of civilisation" is ensured by three groups of people—the first consisting of *xianzhi xianjiuge* (foresighters or prophets), the second of *houzhi houjiuye* (followers or propagandists, disseminators of ideas), and the third of *buzhi bujiuye* (practical workers acting unconsciously).¹⁴ It seemed natural for Sun Yatsen that only very few people could look into the future and foresee it, whereas the majority was unable to realise on their own the prospects and patterns of social development. For this reason the masses should trust their leaders and help implement their plans. Otherwise, the people may even impede the development of the revolutionary movement and "national reconstruction".

Noteworthy, in his interpretation of elitism Sun Yatsen, on the one hand, by tradition proceeded from the Confucian doctrine and, on the other, contradicted it. This contradiction essentially lay in the fact that Sun Yatsen considered the Confucian thesis "knowledge is action" (*Wang Yangming*) untenable and proposed a different thesis, "action comes easy, while knowledge is difficult to attain". This maxim explained to a certain extent Sun Yatsen's interpretation of the problem of the elite—his crediting of the "select" few with the development of civilisation.

V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, pp. 165-167; Vol. 41, pp. 282-283.

¹³ See Sun Yatsen, *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, Taipei, 1956, p. 91.

It should be mentioned that later Sun Yatsen partially revised his position and recognised the possibility for rising social mobility in Chinese society primarily by the development of education.

Liang Qichao, as a liberal reformer, and Sun Yatsen, as a revolutionary democrat, represented the two main trends in early Chinese nationalism (that is, of the first quarter of the 20th century). The process of the final evolution of the national bourgeoisie was accompanied by the development of that class' ideology and culminated in late Chinese nationalism, which emerged as a separate trend of socio-political thought after 1921.¹⁵

ELITISM AS AN IDEOLOGICAL ASPECT OF LATE BOURGEOIS NATIONALISM.

THE POSITION OF DAI JITAO

At the late stages of its development bourgeois nationalism in China was not homogeneous but included at least three varieties as represented, first, by reactionary Guomindang theorists (Dai Jitao, Chen Lifu, Chiang Kaishek and others), second, national etatists from the Young Chinese Party (Chen Qitian, Zeng Qi, Li Huang, Zuo Shunsheng) and, finally, reactionary bourgeois scholars (Zhang Junimai, Zhang Dongsun, Liang Shuming). Despite certain differences of opinion and internal theoretical and political wrangling, they shared a sharply negative attitude to Marxism-Leninism, to the spread of the communist movement and to the building of socialism in China.

One of the peculiarities of late Chinese nationalism consisted in the attempts to contrast progressive ideas, above all Marxist, with the falsified interpretation of Sun Yatsen's doctrine, enhancing his individual erroneous ideas. This was especially characteristic of Dai Jitao, who represented reactionary Guomindang nationalism.

Exploiting the Sun Yatsen concept of "foreseers, followers and workers", Dai Jitao (1891-1949) claimed that the "learned man" representing the intellectual elite and inspired by some "great idea" was called upon to bring back to life man's inherent sense of humanism and mercy, and to develop it in the dominant exploiting class. By making use of their "innate wisdom" and the knowledge acquired, the "skilled and highly educated minority" ensured a voluntary "philanthropic" policy meeting the needs of the masses who should remain passive under the circumstances, blindly accepting that policy and supporting it.

Dai Jitao's reactionary views were not only in his categorical denial of a creative potential of the Chinese people but also in his transfer of the elitist leadership pattern to the process of revolution, which he believed to be a cause for the "intellectual aristocracy", theorists and political leaders, and pictured the development of the revolutionary movement from the foreseer to the propagandist and from the latter to the practical worker. Claiming that the results of such a revolution "from above" were primarily in the interests of "irresponsible masses", Dai Jitao relegated it to the field of philanthropy, describing revolution as a "manifestation of altruism of the foreseer".¹⁶

Qu Qiubo rejected the reactionary anti-Marxist point of view of Dai Jitao, saying that the method of the elitist "revolution", which was suggested by that bourgeois ideologist, envisioned the awakening of the "philanthropic instincts" among the exploiters and denied the historical creative activity of the masses, aimed at renouncing class struggle and, essentially, led to completely emasculating the very essence of the revo-

¹⁵ See *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1974, No. 1, p. 76 (in Russian).

¹⁶ Dai Jitao, *The Philosophical Foundations of Sun Yatsenism*, Peking, 1945, pp. 51-52.

lutionary process. It seems highly improbable, Qu Qiubo wrote, that Dai Jitao himself sincerely believed that the "supra-class state" and the government of "noble activists" of Guomindang were capable of representing the "common" political interests of different classes and exercising "humane government". Historical experience graphically illustrates that precisely the bourgeoisie and other exploiters will in reality dictate their will to the government and run the state, proceeding from their selfish class interests. That is why the Chinese proletariat should not "expect humaneness and mercy from the capitalists, something utterly impossible in fact, but should resolutely fight for true democracy for the working masses, which can be translated into life... only after power is seized from the hands of the big capitalists" and their political stooges.¹⁷

ZHANG JUNMAI'S VARIATIONS

The structure of the political system was a subject of thought of all representatives of late nationalism in China without exception. Fulfilling the social order of Chinese reaction, bourgeois sociologists paid special attention to the idea of the ruling elite. This was explained above all by their desire to preserve their class positions, for which it was necessary to theoretically substantiate the political rule of the bourgeoisie and to find an "antidote" to the truly democratic Marxist theory of state rule. The growing influence of communist ideas seriously alarmed the bourgeois ideologists, while the foundation of the Communist Party of China made fourteen prominent professors of the period (Hu Shi, Ding Wenjiang, Liang Shuming, Cai Yuanpei and others) counterbalance its programme with the slogan of establishing the elitist "government of noble people" from among the bourgeois scholars and politicians, to replace the "odious figures" of the militarist government.¹⁸ Most of them subsequently also stuck to the reactionary positions in idealising the elite. In particular, the leader of the agrarian reconstruction group, the conservative philosopher of Eastern orientation Liang Shuming (b. 1893) wrote in his works of the 1930s and 1940s that the intellectuals should act as "teachers" and leaders of the masses, shaping the moral atmosphere in society and developing the fundamentals of social policy.

The "platform of the fourteen" was supported by the leaders of a research group (set up on the initiative and under the guidance of Liang Qichao). One of the more prominent members of that organisation was Zhang Junmai (1886-1968), scholar-theorist and politician who expounded nationalism of the conservative, right-wing political forces, and remained true to his ideas of the elite later on when he analysed the problem of the political system within the framework of his Sinified concept of "state socialism".¹⁹

Zhang Junmai belonged to that generation of bourgeois ideologists who propagated the ideas of synthesising traditionalism with modernism, of Chinese with Western values. He believed that "national reconstruction" should start in China in the field of human relations and create instead of the "antiquated complex of Chinese traditions" a new culture which would serve as a basis for modern political and economic systems. "Instead of worshipping ancient graves," Zhang Junmai wrote, "it is better to frankly admit the fact that our culture has to be created

¹⁷ Qu Qiubo, *Social and Political Writings of Different Years*, Moscow, 1979, p. 244 (in Russian).

¹⁸ See A. G. Krymov, "Social Thought and Ideological Struggle in China in 1917-1927" (Abstract of the Doctor's Dissertation), Moscow, 1962, p. 30.

¹⁹ For details of Zhang Junmai's views see S. R. Belousov, "A Variety of Chinese Bourgeois Nationalism", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1983, No. 3, pp. 114-125.

anew."²⁰ According to him, "to create anew" meant to adopt the positive aspects of European civilisation and to adjust them to the Chinese conditions. Subscribing to the theory of German sociologist O. Spengler, Zhang Junmai asserted that mankind owes the successes of its socio-cultural development completely to the elite and therefore the "creative borrowing" of Western values and their interpretation in the spirit of the Chinese tradition was the task of individual thinkers. The intellectuals constituted the only "writing" stratum, which was capable of shaping social consciousness and which was listened to by the majority of the people. Representatives of its upper crust were leaders evolving and proposing different reforms in all spheres of social life.²¹

Recognising in principle the possibility of vertical social mobility in China, Zhang Junmai called "good education" a "royal road" to the elite but passed in silence the fact that such education in exploiting society had class nature and in most cases was only within the reach of the members of the ruling classes. His practical activities in the field of education serve to illustrate this point. To train philosophers and theorists capable of synthesising Eastern and Western cultures, Zhang Junmai founded a number of institutes, in particular, the Xuehai in Guangzhou (1935) and the Institute of National Culture in Yunnan (1939). Those were small privileged educational establishments with students chosen with extreme care.

Zhang Junmai began as a follower and associate of Liang Qichao. Despite the modern education he received along with the traditional Chinese schooling, he belonged to the older generation of scholar-theorists. Syncretic reformism had undoubtedly largely influenced his way of thinking: his socio-political views can be traced back both to the Confucian tradition and Western thought. It is therefore only natural that Zhang Junmai not only assigned the masses an insignificant, passive role in "reconstructing national culture" but even considered them incapable of "wisely" governing society. In his opinion they were too preoccupied with everyday matters of earning their living to take an active part in political life at the state level. Therefore it was unrealistic to expect them to understand the entangled relationships and contradictions between the interests of different classes and social strata.²² Such an approach to the problem was a graphic example of class solidarity by bourgeois scholar-nationalists, in this case by Zhang Junmai, who insisted on the inevitability of the elitist rule system. In this context all his declarations in the spirit of Confucius that the main duty of the ruling elite should "exclusively be to satisfy the interests of the people" are nothing but social demagoguery. Symptomatically enough, Zhang Junmai himself exposed the class principles underpinning his sociological theories, admitting that the thinking representatives of the ruling elite limit their "great contribution to the chronicle of history" by making one "general" abstract proposal or another without "debasement" themselves by understanding concrete needs of peasants or workers. "Their proposals," he wrote, "are largely a result of a speculative analysis and imagination of little relevance to the actual practical interests of other classes."²³ In other words, the masses are opposed and governed by the elite, which is severed from them and consists of a small number of "creative minds" which, according to this Chinese sociologist, occupied such an important place in the life of the country that they in fact turned into the "tuning-fork of public

²⁰ Zhang Junmai, *The Morrow of Chinese Culture*, Shanghai, 1936, p. 132.

²¹ See C. Chang, *The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought*, Vol. 2, New York, 1957, p. 438.

²² See Zhang Junmai, *The Principles of Laying the Foundations of the State. State Socialism*, 1939, pp. 360-362.

²³ See C. Chang, *Op. cit.*, p. 438.

opinion". Furthermore, Zhang Junmai wrote about the "decisive role and power of the intellectuals in settling problems of not only national but also international policy".

He opposed any mass movement if it served as a means of ensuring the "privileged position" for some party or class (meaning, of course, above all the Communist Party and the proletariat). From his point of view, people should "help" each other in attaining "social justice", an adequate level of knowledge and moral characteristics by developing education and "caring for one's kith and kin". Only when members of society attain personal freedom (from the bourgeois point of view) and the ability to make independent judgements and conclusions, their participation in political life will be of some value. Even in this case the "successful functioning of the government" is possible only when it is formed of "able leaders" representing the upper crust of the ruling class: "the carrying out of a big task presupposes an outstanding doer".²⁴

These concepts can be contrasted with the solution of the problem by Marxism-Leninism which, of course, recognises that political activity involves people with a certain general educational level and political training. At the same time it sets itself the task of raising the cultural level and political awareness of the people so that all members of society could take part in running the state *de facto*, and not *de jure*. Lenin wrote that we "demand an immediate break with the prejudiced view that only the rich, or officials chosen from rich families, are capable of administering the state, of performing the ordinary, everyday work of administration. We demand that *training* in the work of state administration be conducted by class-conscious workers and soldiers and that this training be begun at once, i. e., that a *beginning* be made at once in training all the working people, all the poor, for this work."²⁵ After winning political power, the masses led by the proletariat create the conditions for the utmost development of people's education and their direct participation in governing the state.

Of course, such an approach to the problem evoked a sharply negative reaction on the part of bourgeois ideologists, including Zhang Junmai, a fact which explains his thesis of consolidating the rule of the "capable leaders". Incidentally, he imbued that concept with a fairly stereotype meaning. According to him, a political leader should have a highly developed intellect, impeccable moral characteristics and sound health; he should be able to "synthesise the old and the new", to act resolutely and lead all the political parties and groups to accomplish a "general final objective". It is easy to notice that Zhang Junmai is not original on this issue: his ideal of a "leader" is reminiscent not only of the Confucian model but also, in general features, of the "political leader" as pictured by the majority of the elitist theories. His understanding of "leadership" was to a certain extent original only in the sense that it bore the impact of the neo-Confucian interpretation—the "heroes" should act in complete accordance with the doctrines of the "sages", otherwise their success is highly problematic (Zhu Xi, Han Yu).

CHINESE NATIONALISTS ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF ELITISM

The theorists of elitism agree on the issue of principle, namely, that society is inevitably divided into the elite and the masses, and differ only in their evaluation of the reasons for this division. They give psychological reasons, including "striving for power" of some and "tendency to submission" of others, the presence or absence of abilities of leadership.

²⁴ Zhang Junmai, *The Principles...*, pp. 360, 370

²⁵ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 113

different levels of education and so on. But the very assumption of the "inevitability" of and the "need for" the elite, has to be substantiated, hence the characteristic resort by elitism to the method of historical analogies, and attempts to picture the singling out of the "skilled minority" as a characteristic element of the entire historical process. Chinese bourgeois sociologists are no exception in this respect—they believe that the history of civilisation allegedly demonstrates that the masses always and everywhere were far from taking part in government affairs, which were the prerogative of the upper crust of the ruling classes or one or two "strong and noble individuals". For example, Zhang Zhiminai cited the concept of "social leadership" by Zeng Guofan, claiming that "Zeng's personal example both in military and academic fields is the best confirmation of his thesis of the decisive role of the individual, as he alone in fact ushered in a new era in the history of the country".²⁶ The personality and views of Zeng Guofan "inspired" another representative of late Chinese nationalism, Zeng Qi (1892-1951), one of the leaders of the Young Chinese Party. This etatist believed that in modern circumstances the Confucian concept of government should be "supplemented" by the Legist concept and insisted on "strengthening" the moral principles by the "strict methods" of leadership. Speaking about the coexistence of the positive and the negative in human nature, Zeng Qi stressed that it was only through a combination of "sincere trust and strong authority" that the political leader would be able to coordinate the efforts of his followers and control the actions of his enemies. In his view Zeng Guofan, who knew the "skill of practical government", was one of those who fully succeeded in this.²⁷

As we see, the ideologists of the Chinese bourgeoisie, particularly national-etatists, also showed great interest in the Legist concept of the ruling elite. Apart from Zeng Qi, it was also interpreted by other leaders of the Young Chinese Party (Zuo Shunsheng). Chen Qitian (b. 1893), who was their associate and a professor at Yuchang and Nanking Universities, gave a most complete outline of his views of the problem in his *Study of the History of Legism in China* published in 1936. He spoke in it about the need to update Legism and its system of government in keeping with the "modern epoch of Fighting Kingdoms". To judge by the author's reasoning, he was attracted by the Legist ideas of strong power and resolute political "leaders".²⁸ The theorists of one of the most reactionary trends of Chinese bourgeois nationalism as represented by Zeng Qi and Chen Qitian drew on the teaching of the founder of Legism, Shang Yang, primarily because certain aspects of his teaching could be used with the aim of absolutising power of the upper crust of the ruling bureaucracy.

Similar to Western "liberal" elite theorists (K. Mannheim, G. Lasswell), some ideologists of the Chinese bourgeoisie sought to combine elitism with democracy, "ignoring" the fact that bourgeois democracy itself is democracy for the exploiters but dictatorship for the working people. "Once capital exists," Lenin wrote, "it dominates the whole of society, and no democratic republic, no franchise can change its nature."²⁹ It becomes clear in this context that Chinese bourgeois scholars, despite their proclaimed adherence to "social justice", by force of their class views emasculated the democratic concepts of everything concerning po-

²⁶ C. Chang, *Op. cit.*, p. 405. Zeng Guofan (1811-1872) was the leading figure in suppressing the Taiping uprising and the author of the essay *A Study of the Reasons Behind the Emergence of Talented People or Social Leadership*.

²⁷ See *Collected Works of Zeng Qi*, Taipei, 1954, pp. 374, 459.

²⁸ See L. S. Perelomov, *Op. cit.*, p. 214.

²⁹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 486.

litical equality among people and substantiated in this way the functioning of the elite.

Elitist and bourgeois democratic ideas coexisted in the sociological concepts of Zhang Dongsun (1886-?), who maintained close contacts with Zhang Junmai and together with him led the party of state socialism in China. He regarded democracy not only as a "system of government", but also as a moral category, a "certain stage in the development of civilisation" based on lofty moral principles. In his ideas of the problems of democracy and morality Zhang Dongsun unambiguously denied the masses' role in history and exaggerated the influence of the individual and the privileged stratum of intellectuals on the course of historical development.³⁰ The founders of Marxism-Leninism pointed out that these views were a speculative consequence of the idealistic solution of the fundamental question of philosophy, in which "a few chosen individuals as the active Spirit are counterposed to the rest of mankind, as the spiritless mass, as Matter".³¹ In accordance with this, Zhang Dongsun who himself described the origins of his views as "epistemological pluralism", transferred the idealistic and eclectic solution of the fundamental gnoseological question to the understanding of social processes in the belief that social development was determined by the mind and depended on the will of the "wise minority".

To sum up, philosophical idealism is the key factor uniting Chinese bourgeois sociologists in their interpretations of the system of political government. Idealistic theories that denied the historical mission of the people and named the "select" representatives of the ruling classes as the architects of progress were used by the ideologists of the exploiters throughout history, and this also had its precedents in China. Elitist theories are nothing but a component part of the idealist views of the role of the masses and the individual in history. The specificity of their interpretation in China lay in the considerable influence of local traditional thought "supplemented" by the ideas of Western bourgeois sociology.

The class nature of their views was another most important aspect that determined Chinese intellectuals' interest in the problem of the elite. The aim of elitism is to justify the division of society into classes and the existence in it of the "ruling" classes and the exploited. The ideologists of the Chinese national bourgeoisie developed this concept in the interests of their class, which sought to safeguard its rule and, furthermore, create favourable conditions for enterprise. Nationalism, which underpinned their views, brought about the speculative thesis of "peaceful" coexistence within the Chinese nation and the slogan of class cooperation in society. Yet despite the declaration of the "voluntary" subordination of the "irresponsible" mass of the people to the "noble and selfless" minority, Chinese bourgeois sociology in fact recognised that the creative elite, which solved some "general national" problems through abstract reasoning, ignored the specific needs of the exploited.

The true reasons for the bourgeois sociologists' negative attitude to the mass movements and the irrationalist interpretation of the activity of the masses lie in the fear of the growing activity of the people. The elitist theories became topical for the Chinese bourgeoisie not only because they justified its political rule but also because, by denying the historical activity of the people, they objectively aimed at curbing their revolutionary initiative. They appeared as a repercussion to the spread

See Zhang Dongsun, *Intellect and Democracy*, Shanghai, 1946, pp. 177-179.
K. Marx, F. Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 85.

of the Marxist-Leninist ideas and the growing emancipation movement of the working people, that is to say, they are, undoubtedly, anti-communist.

The modern expounders of elitism in China shared a sharply negative attitude to scientific socialism and communism, whose victory in China Zhang Junmai subsequently called a "tragic absurdity". Substantiating their reactionary sociological ideas, they tried to accuse the advocates of scientific socialism of being "impartial" to the elite by allegedly taking the "selfless thinking theorists" for "crafty" leaders who borrowed the ideas of the former and made them serve their utilitarian aims.³² At the same time the elitists "ignored" the fact that ideology was a class concept and therefore any conception evolved by a bourgeois theorist already contains prerequisites for being used by bourgeois politicians in their narrow class interests.

The frank hostility of the late Chinese nationalists to Marxism-Leninism became also manifest in their anti-Sovietism. One of the "arguments" against "Soviet-style communism" was the absurd thesis of the "absolute monarchy of Qin Shihuang as the historical source of Soviet totalitarianism".³³ Groundlessly accusing the Soviet Union of "lacking a democratic order", the Chinese bourgeois sociologists who, as a rule, called themselves "democrats" and "liberals" in fact made efforts to dock the political rights of the working people in their own country and to preserve the low educational level of the people.

It should be emphasised that a concrete historical analysis of the elitist concept in China in modern times gives insight into the general ideological atmosphere in society and the theories underlying political strife and touches upon the problem of the mutual influence on the Chinese intellectuals. Criticism of Chinese bourgeois sociology of the period from 1911 to 1949 graphically illustrates the controversial development of ideas in those years and helps reveal the essence of the two trends of bourgeois socio-political thought of the period, first, the obviously reactionary trend which focussed on the problem of suppressing the activity of the masses, above all their political activity directly threatening the existing social system and, second, the progressive trend, whose representatives, to quote Lenin, "subjectively" sought a revolutionary transformation in the spirit of socialism but were unable to overcome completely their class limitations.

³² Zhang Dongsun, *Knowledge and Culture*, Shanghai, 1947, pp. 83-84
³³ C. Chang, *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

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G. F. YEFIMOV'S WORKS ON THE HISTORY OF CHINA

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[Article by V. N. Nikiforov, doctor of historical sciences]

While assessing the contribution of Soviet scientists to the study of China, its politics, economy, culture and history, one should not overlook the influence that the works by Prof. Efimov had on the sinological studies in the Soviet Union in the period between the 1940s and 1970s.

Prof. Geronty Efimov, who headed sinological research at Leningrad University over 30 years,¹ had a wide range of academic interests: his pedagogical activities, his work as an organiser of sinological studies and as a prolific writer, embracing works on China, articles and books on modern and contemporary history and on the historiographical trend which he was actively trying to establish from the 1960s.

A mere acquaintance with the books written by the author (and only his books are reviewed in this article) shows that the author dealt in them specifically with the period from the second half of the 19th century up to 1949. All the books by Prof. Efimov, except for general essays on modern and contemporary history, cover "the Sun Yatsen period", i. e., mainly the modern history of China, and only his last book (1983) features the first years of the contemporary period. Thus, Prof. Efimov may be considered a scholar of the period of the imperialist rule in China, of the Chinese anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution and of "the Sun Yatsen period". There is one feature common to all of Geronty Efimov's works, no matter what subject or form—a monograph, a treatise or an essay—he is an educator, first and foremost, who tried to write in a clear and intelligible way, thus enabling his works to be used as textbooks. Indeed, while the author's essays (for example, his *Notes on the Modern and Contemporary History of China*—a big success in their time) have become outdated by now, his books, such as *The Bourgeois Revolution in China and Sun Yatsen* or *The Foreign Policy of China. 1894-1899* can be recommended as basic study materials for certain university courses.

One can observe four main themes in Prof. Efimov's publications: Sun Yatsen and the Chinese revolution, China's foreign policy in 1894-1899, the outline of China's history in the modern and contemporary time and historiography.

The theme "Sun Yatsen and the Chinese revolution", which the author had been working on for more than 45 years, beginning with his Candidate thesis is most fully and clearly developed in the book, *The Bourgeois Revolution in China and Sun Yatsen. (1911-1913). Facts and Problems*. Its contents, however, go beyond the chronological framework outlined in the title. The author starts the account of events from 1905 (almost

¹ Geronty Efimov (1908-1980), from 1941 headed the Oriental Studies Chair (from 1972 the Far Eastern Studies Chair). In the years between 1961 and 1965 he was also a professor of Leningrad State University. See also S. Mikhalev, A Bibliography of Prof. G. Efimov's Works in *Far Eastern Studies*, M., 1975, pp. 202-203; Prof. G. Efimov in *Far Eastern Studies*, 1982, no. 2, p. 122, a member of the editorial board of the journal *Far Eastern Studies*.

one-third of the book is devoted to developments that took place prior to the Wuchang uprising of 1911). The book is a summary of the author's opinion on a large variety of issues. The subtitle "Facts and Problems" underlines its resultant nature, the attempt of the author to shed new light on much of what he was writing about throughout his lifetime.

The study focuses on the role of the working masses in the revolution. In the textbooks which were put out shortly before the Great Patriotic War and which served for a good 15 years as the main sources of information for students and other readers, two approaches were formulated to the Xinhai revolution. G. Karz-Murza wrote that the revolution "ended without unfolding. It was not people's revolution, for the masses had put forward no demands, they had left no imprint on the developments of the revolution".² He therefore called the Xinhai revolution a revolution from above, a bourgeois revolution. Prof. Efimov described that revolution at the time as bourgeois-democratic.

The desire to establish and emphasize the weighty contribution of the people's movement to the first Chinese revolution is repeated in many works by Efimov of subsequent decades. The researcher had never indulged in abstract theorising and had always drawn his conclusions from concrete historical facts. In this respect Prof. Efimov, who had joined the field of historical science in the second half of the 1930s, remained all his life an exemplar of that stage of historiography whose originates from the well-known decisions of the party and the government taken in the period between 1934 and 1936 (on the teaching of history at schools, and others). Those decisions oriented the scientists to carrying out concrete research and overcoming elements of scholasticism that were still present in the research of that time.

The enormous factual material which allowed him to look more thoroughly into the nature of the revolution, which he collected over three decades, convinced him that "though revolutionary organisations finally succeeded in awakening the masses and drawing part of them into the struggle against the Qings these masses proved to be too weak for forming a broad revolutionary front that can perform the tasks of a bourgeois-democratic revolution".³ The contacts of the left, revolutionary-democratic wing of the bourgeoisie with the peasant masses and the plebeian-proletarian elements in towns were very insignificant. Contacts with secret societies were only partial means of communication with the peasantry. The work within the ranks of the New Army was also nothing else but contacts with the peasants. But the expansion of the activities of the United Alliance in the army could hardly be regarded as a consistent course in defence of the peasantry aimed at involving it in the revolutionary movement.⁴

Prof. Efimov disclaims the tendency to belittle the role of Sun Yat-sen and his party in the preparation of the 1911 revolution and put them against "more democratic organisations" such as the Huohe ("Red") Society ("Wentuanteshe"), a tendency that used to prevail in the historiography of the People's Republic of China. In his work Efimov notes that one other but the Sun Yat-sen party exerted, surely before the decisive year of 1911, "a considerable influence on the political situation in the country; the Sun Yat-sen party was 'a major organisation that gave a systematical preparing a revolutionary overthrow of the existing government'".

On the basis of the collected material Prof. Efimov came to the following

² Quoted from George Efimov, *The Chinese Revolution in Shimonov's Report (1911-1942) Facts and Problems*, v. 1974, p. 20.

³ Ibid., p. 154.

⁴ Ibid., p. 71.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., p. 42.

side with G. Kara-Murza in the sense that he felt convinced as the latter that the Xinhai revolution could not be called a revolution from above, a Young Turk revolution, but, on the other hand, there was no reason to exclude the 1911-1913 period in China with the first Russian revolution for the degree of the masses' participation.⁷ Efimov agreed with L. Bereznoy that further debate about the attempt to contrast the notions of "bourgeois" and "bourgeois-democratic revolution" was absolutely futile.⁸

While joining in this conclusion one can note at the same time that the viewpoints of Geroniy Efimov and G. Kara-Murza have come, somehow unwittingly, closer. Indeed, Kara-Murza (in the quotations cited above) wrote about the 1911 revolution as one that had no chance to unfold because "the masses failed to put forward their own demands," and "left no imprint of their own on its developments". Which of these assertions by Kara-Murza is central and the most concrete? Of course, the assertion that "the masses failed to put forward their own demands." The rest is designed to augment and fortify the given thesis whereas the concepts that the revolution "had no chance to unfold" (to what extent?) or that masses "left no imprint on it" (?) are very vague.

Meanwhile, Professor Efimov, rejecting the idea that the 1911-1913 revolution was a Young Turk revolution, a revolution from the top, or the idea that "it ended having no chance to unfold" wrote the following in 1974 on the central question mentioned above: "As concrete facts reveal, the masses failed to put forward independently their own demands, though they played a big role in the revolution, in securing the victory over the local Manchurian regime ... they failed to rise to a position where they could play an independent political role."⁹

Conclusions by Efimov (and Bereznoy) are flexible enough and are backed up by concrete material. Though these conclusions were probably more accurate in works by other historians they have definitely reflected part of the modern concept of the Xinhai revolution in Soviet historiography.¹⁰

Prof. Efimov's book *Sun Yat-sen. The Search of a Road 1914-1923* comes with the theme "Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Revolution". Efimov planned to study in detail the last years of Sun Yat-sen's life, that is, the years between 1923 and 1926, and write his full biography. But the book *Sun Yat-sen. The Search of a Road* turned out to be Efimov's last book and was published posthumously. It ought to be said at this point that the period from 1914 to 1923 is one of the most unexplored in the history of Sun Yat-sen and his party. Efimov's book therefore will long remain a valuable source of material for all in the Soviet Union who are interested in the given period of the history of the Chinese revolutionary movement.

Efimov studies confirm that the Sun Yat-sen revolutionary party really attempted to play a leading role in the movement of the Chinese people against Senator Yuan Shikai in 1915 to 1916. The graphic illustration of this was the failure of the uprising organised by this party in Shanghai province. The Sun Yat-sen party played no particular part in the May Fourth movement of 1919. It had neither an army of its own nor massive support. Only between 1923 and 1925 did it begin building links and profit between 1923 and 1925 is reported in the last chapter of Efimov's book that occupies the place of the concluding section).

But in the earlier period of 1914-1921 Sun Yat-sen's moderation of the founding of the Republic by principal social, peasant patriotic and democratic approach helped promote the idea of represen-

canism and defeat the reactionaries. Prof. Efimov shows that, despite the utopic nature of some of the theories advanced by Sun Yatsen, he was always ahead of his time. That was his strong point. Prof. Efimov thoroughly analyses works of Soviet reviewers of Sun Yatsen theories, accepting on the whole concepts advanced by S. Tikhvinsky and M. Sladkovsky. He also joins in certain propositions by A. Meliksetov while opposing other theses of that author.¹⁰

Along with the theme "Sun Yatsen and the Chinese Revolution" Efimov's debatable article on the formation of a nation in China has equal prominence.¹¹ Published in 1953, this article aroused at the time the interest of historians of the People's Republic of China and called forth a discussion of the problems of a nation in their midst. Efimov claims that the modern Han nation originated at the threshold of the 19th and 20th centuries when national capitalism in China was making its first steps. Some historians of the People's Republic of China (Zeng Wenjin) advocated a similar concept and others (Fan Wenlan) tried to find the roots of Chinese nation in old China, that is, they failed to observe the qualitative changes that occurred in the Chinese nationality with the development of capitalism. It should be noted that the lack of sufficient clarity on this matter results partially from the absence of a single approach to the translation of corresponding terminology from Chinese into Russian and vice versa, and partially from imprecise terminology (*koumin*, *mintsu*—a nation).

The problem of a contemporary nation in China was for Prof. Efimov a kind of theoretical basis for the study of the national liberation movement and the activities of Sun Yatsen. Regrettably, the author did not expound his concept of a nation (though the theme "The Bourgeois Revolution in China and Sun Yatsen" afforded him such an opportunity).

Efimov's second interest was "The Foreign Policy of China 1894-1899". But he devoted to it a considerably shorter period of time, from 15 to 20 years, and wrote only a few materials on this subject. They include, however, one essential work—a monograph written on the basis of Efimov's doctoral paper. The period under study is the same ("the Sun Yatsen period") but the subject of studies is entirely different—China's international relations, to which many research works were devoted beginning in the 1950s. Unlike other researchers who examined the subject either from Russia's angle or from 'the angle of the West' (B. Romanov and A. Erusalimsky) Efimov set for himself a different task—to study China as a subject of international relations.

The author has proved that in the conditions prevailing at the turn of the last century the Chinese government was not a mere instrument in the hands of other powers, that it pursued its own interests trying to make the most of what the situation offered. It steered at different times to alliances with Russia, Britain or Japan. The last two chapters of the monograph (5 and 6) devoted to the study of the last two years 1898 and 1899 are especially interesting. In them Prof. Efimov argues that even the Cixi government which established itself firmly following the reactionary (September) coup of 1898 was pursuing a rather flexible policy; it put up as much resistance as possible to the powers, promoted national defences and even hinted that it was not against reforms.¹² These observations by Efimov (not enough taken into consideration by subsequent

¹⁰ See Geronty Efimov, *Sun Yatsen. The Search on a Road 1911-1922*, M., 1981, pp. 144-149.

¹¹ Geronty Efimov, "About the Formation of a Chinese Nation", *Voprosy Istočnoj Azii*, 1953, No. 10 (in Russian).

¹² Geronty Efimov, *The Foreign Policy of China 1894-1899*, M., 1959, pp. 315-316, 318, 323-325, 312, 311.

works) make for a better understanding of the change that took place before the Yihetuan uprising, a change without which the very emergence of the Yihetuan movement looks unexpected.

Prof. Efimov defined more exactly the positions of the imperialist powers and showed that Britain had got hold of the lion's share during the division of China that began at that time. There was a certain confusion in the literature on the issue since the actual state of affairs did not always coincide with the juridical: other powers (France) claimed the right to some Chinese regions actually controlled by Britain. Efimov recalled that Guangdong, of course, was mainly Britain's sphere of influence and it was Britain that secured more gains in developing the region at the end of the 19th century (the opening of the Xijiang River area.)

The Foreign Policy of China: 1894-1899 is among a series of monographs which exemplified, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the desire of Soviet sinologists to switch over from short essays to long monographs (the cases in point are books by M. Sladkovsky, G. Astafyev, M. Kopitsa, S. Tikhvinsky and the economic study by V. Maslennikov).

In his book Efimov explained imperialists' refusal to completely and finally divide China by the fact that they encountered the opposition of the many million strong masses of the Chinese people.¹³ Yet, the opposition movements of the Chinese people, as the Yihetuan uprising demonstrated, were easily suppressed by the imperialists at that time. It would probably be more correct to assume that differences between powers saved China from the prospect of being finally divided and turned into a colony. Anyway, this is a point that requires further scrutiny.

In the specific conditions of the 1950s the author showed correctly the independent nature of China's foreign policy at the end of the last century and early in this century but failed to expose China's aggressiveness in some particular cases when it displayed itself especially vividly (for example, in Korea in the eighties and early nineties of the last century).

After finishing his work on the subject of China's foreign policy, Prof. Efimov planned for some time to undertake a thorough study of the period between the seventies and nineties of the last century. One of the remembrances of that plan is Efimov's report at the 25th International Congress of Experts on Oriental Studies held in Moscow in 1960. The report was headlined "The Importance of the Period Between the Seventies and the Nineties of the Last Century for China's Modern History". But in later years Efimov found himself engrossed in historiographical problems and abandoned that line of research. In the last two decades (1961-1980) he kept elaborating on his permanent theme "Sun Yatsen and the Bourgeois Revolution" and dealt simultaneously with historiography.

Typical of the third trend in Efimov's works—general essays—is his *Notes on the Modern and Contemporary History of China*. No other book by the author, as in general no other study on China in the postwar period, enjoyed such a big success when it was released, as the *Notes* did. The book provoked literally a flow of positive reviews. It was published and republished over a short period of time (1949, 1951).

The detailed analysis of this book, already well known in historiography, would be unnecessary. What can be said is that this book, issued at the time of the victory of the Chinese revolution, summarised for the Soviet reader the achievements of Soviet studies on the modern and contemporary history of China. The book was actually more of an essay than a piece of research but it contained the most complete information that the then level of knowledge of that historiographical period could allow. As the subsequent decade (1949-1959) showed, a temporary regress was

observed in the study of certain problems in China's contemporary history as a result of the influence of some concepts of Maoist historiography that penetrated some of Soviet works beginning with the second edition of the *Notes on the Modern and Contemporary History of China*. Only at the end of the 1960s did Soviet sinologists begin to revise some of the concepts. Prof. Yefimov took the most active part in that critical reassessment of some points, mainly contributing to that by his historiographical work.

The first edition of a survey dealing with sources and literature is mainly a material for reference. Some assertions of the author in it are subjective (one can hardly agree that the book by D. Yanchevsky, a correspondent of the newspaper *Novyi Krai*, represents a greater interest "from the point of view of a historian" than the 16-volume edition of documents of the General Staff).¹⁴

Historiography proper can be found in the next three editions where references to works of history alternate with general conclusions and an analysis. For example, in the second edition there is a brief introduction to the history of Soviet sinological studies pertaining to China's modern history. A survey of Soviet sinological works in the period between the 1930s and the 1950s to which the author contributed a great deal is of particular interest (it occupies 40 of the 90 pages).

"Historiography," as the author rightfully believes, "sums up all that has been achieved by historical science in the study of mankind's past and in the development of theoretical problems dealing with the development of society. Without that critically-approached summary historical science can make no headway."¹⁵

When Prof. Yefimov wrote a survey of literature, as a rule he commented on issues in question: such as the debate about the existence of the "class of feudals-landlords in China", the discussion about a nation in China, about the conflict of 1856 in the camp of taipings engaged in war with the imperial government (Yefimov believed that it would be wrong to assume that the struggle inside the taipings was not a class struggle but "the outgrowth of the struggle of factions and clans for power").¹⁶

The third edition features Western and Chinese works on the modern history of China,¹⁷ the fourth Soviet literature on the modern and, mainly, on the contemporary history of China.¹⁸

The author included in it only Soviet works that were published in the 1960s and 1970s and covered the period of the contemporary history from 1917 to 1949. In the same edition Yefimov reviewed separate works by Western authors on China and characterised certain common features of the Western sinological studies.

Included in the fourth edition was an article on the study in China of the modern history of social thought written by Yefimov's disciple I. Kuzmin. This gives the fourth edition the nature of a collection of works.

Prof. Yefimov's works mirror clearly the landmarks in the development of Soviet historical science pertaining to the study of the history of China—from general essays to their combination with monographs as the basic form of the profound historical research and up to the promotion of systematic work in the area of special academic subjects.

¹⁴ Geronty Efimov, *A Historical and Bibliographical Survey of the Soviet and Literature on China's Modern History*, Part 1, L., 1965, p. 152.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Part 2, L., 1968, pp. 49, 72-73, 75.

¹⁷ Geronty Yefimov, *A Historical and Bibliographical Survey of the Soviet and Literature on China's Modern History*, Part 3, L., 1972

¹⁸ Geronty Yefimov, *Op. cit.*, Part 4, L., 1980

JAPANESE COMINTERN FIGURE'S ACTIVITIES IN 1920'S COMMEMORATED

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[Article by A. I. Senatorov: "Sen Katayama--Internationalist and Fighter Against Imperialism"]

Since the Great October Socialist Revolution the upsurge of the national liberation movement brought about a radical recarving of the political map of the world. Today it is self-evident that the achievements scored by the peoples of the former colonies and semi-colonies in the struggle against colonialism would be inconceivable without the close ties with the revolutionary struggle of the working people in the capitalist countries for their social emancipation, and without their triumph, first, in Russia, and then in a number of other countries. The establishment of a socialist system in Russia was a powerful impetus which gave rise to a qualitatively new stage in the national liberation revolutions in the East.

This phenomenon was not fortuitous, for the roots of the two currents of the world revolutionary process and their material prerequisites lie in the entrails of the world system of imperialism. These two currents are spawned by imperialism and directed against the latter. That is why the consolidation of all anti-imperialist forces is a prerequisite for the success of the proletariat in the capitalist countries in its struggle for social emancipation and, at the same time a *sine qua non* for the success of the oppressed peoples in their struggle for national liberation.

Lenin expressed this regularity in a clear-cut thesis, stating that "the social revolution can come only in the form of an epoch in which are combined civil war by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie in the advanced countries and a *whole series* of democratic and revolutionary movements, including the national liberation movement, in the undeveloped, backward and oppressed nations".¹

The Communist International consistently translated into life the idea of a close-knit alliance of all anti-imperialist forces, being guided by Marxism-Leninism. Many prominent leaders of the Comintern persistently worked for the implementation of that important concept into the everyday practice of all communist parties. Sen Katayama, a pioneer and veteran of the Japanese trade union and socialist movement, a consistent proletarian internationalist was among them.

Katayama's firm anti-imperialist views made it easier for him (during World War I he was an emigre) to come closer to the revolutionary elements in the Socialist Party of America which adhered to the internationalist platform of the Zimmerwald left-wing group. Having acquired rich experience of direct participation in the working-class movement and having realised in practice the principle of the inadmissibility of opportunism, Katayama understood that he had nothing in common with the opportunistically-minded leaders of the Second International. He heartily welcomed the Great October Socialist Revolution and unconditionally

¹ V. I. Lenin. *Collected Works*. Vol. 23, p. 60

sided with the Bolsheviks. He regarded the triumph of the October Revolution as a turning point in the world revolutionary movement.

As soon as the Communist International was formed, Katayama and the members of the Japanese Communist group in the US, which he led, translated the Manifesto of the Communist International to the Proletarians of the Whole World into Japanese and published it in the newspaper *Heimin* (People),² put out by Katayama in New York.

While in the US, Katayama established permanent links with the Comintern, and in 1921, as a representative of the Pan-American Bureau of the Comintern, left for Mexico. His views on the burning issues of that time made themselves clear most characteristically in an article entitled "Japan and the Forthcoming Social Revolution", which he wrote there. In it Katayama upheld passionately the stand of combat solidarity with the working people of the oppressed nations, the only correct stand for the proletariat of the imperialist powers.

"Drawing proletariat into the sphere of nationalistic and chauvinistic sentiments," Katayama wrote, "the ruling classes of the contemporary capitalist and imperialist countries are seeking to implant in it the most base feelings of racial arrogance and racial prejudices so as, while pursuing their own selfish goals, to prepare it for a war"³. Katayama stressed the need for overcoming racial prejudices and struggling against the bourgeois propaganda of nationalism and chauvinism. He called for the declaration of a resolute war against any imperialism. As a Japanese he primarily opposed Japanese imperialism. "The collapse of Japanese imperialism will be to the benefit not only of the Koreans and the Chinese, but also to the Japanese proletariat. The destruction of imperialism in the British possessions is in the interests of a considerably larger number of nationalities and races. Freedom and life of the Mexicans, Negroes, the inhabitants of Cuba, Haiti, San Domingo, the Philippines and Central America depend on the disintegration of imperialism in America."⁴

Katayama regarded Japanese imperialism as a major reactionary force in the Far East. To organise a successful struggle against that force it is necessary to solve the task of the class education of the Japanese proletariat. He stressed that "imperialism in each country should be destroyed by the proletariat of that same country."⁵

Katayama believed that the proletariat can wage a successful struggle only provided it was led by the Communist parties relying on the Communist International. But such parties in the Far East, including Katayama's native land—Japan—were either non-existent or needed consolidation. That is why he heartily supported the initiative of the Comintern to convene in Soviet Russia a congress of representatives of the revolutionary organisations of the Far East with the aim to speed up the process of forming communist parties there along the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Katayama left Mexico for Moscow to take part in organising and convening the congress.

During the Congress, which opened in Moscow on January 21, 1922 and held its final sitting in Petrograd early in February, representatives of communist and national revolutionary organisations of China, Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Dutch India (now Indonesia) discussed in a free and democratic atmosphere the state, tasks of, and prospects for, the liberation struggle in their respective countries, as well as the problems of strengthening solidarity among the communist and national liberation movements of Far Eastern countries. Delegates of the Congress got acquainted with the state of affairs in the neighbouring countries, met outstan-

² See *Heimin*, No. 21, June 1919.

³ See Katayama, *Articles and Memoirs*, Moscow, 1959, p. 47 (in Russian).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

ding leaders of the Comintern marked with a broad world outlook who relied on the experience of the revolutionary battles of the entire world proletariat, particularly on the lessons of the victorious October Revolution. This provided them a good opportunity to transcend the boundaries of their own still small and fragmentated organisations, as far as revolutionary experience was concerned.

Of exceptionally great significance for the further orientation of the participants in the Congress was the meeting of their representatives with Lenin, held in his study in the Kremlin. While discussing questions specific for each country and bearing on the entire Far Eastern region Lenin emphasised the need for uniting revolutionary forces of all countries represented at the Congress. He highly appreciated the stand of Katayama whom he knew as a person who resolutely denounced Japanese imperialism and who appealed for the solidarity of the Japanese working class with the working people of the countries which became the target of Japanese expansion. Addressing Katayama, Lenin said: "You defended the united front in the Far Eastern countries".⁶

The meeting with Lenin contributed to the strengthening of the spirit of internationalism which permeated all the activities of the Congress. In the Manifesto of the Congress its participants stated: "We declare a war to the death on the Japanese, American, British, French and all other world plunderers."⁷

The political platform elaborated by the Japanese delegation under the guidance and with the direct participation of Katayama mentioned, among the key demands and tasks in the struggle of the Japanese revolutionary forces, the liberation of colonies and Japan's renunciation of its colonial spheres of influence.⁸ Proceeding from the recommendations of the Congress, the Communist Party of Japan which was set up soon afterwards (July 1922) adopted anti-imperialist slogans and demands.

As Katayama became more active in the Comintern he was increasingly engaged in solving the problems faced by the national liberation movements. At the Fourth Congress of the Comintern (November-December 1922) Katayama was elected to the commission on the Negro problem and to the special commission to examine the situation in Egypt, and reported to the Congress on the results of their work. He took part in discussing the Korean issue in another special commission and also participated in the commission on elaborating theses and resolutions of the congress on the Eastern problem at large. Besides, Katayama took part in the editorial commission on the agrarian issue, which was of particular importance in colonies and semi-colonies where peasants constituted the overwhelming majority of the population. At that Congress Katayama reported that the Japanese proletariat was waging a struggle against capitalists who mercilessly exploited Korean workers, and was siding with the anti-imperialist struggle of the Chinese proletariat.⁹

While discussing at the Fourth Congress the reorganisation of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, Katayama consistently underscored the need for a strict and well-organised guidance of the Far Eastern policy of the Comintern with the aim of "helping the revolutionary workers' and peasants' parties there".¹⁰ It is therefore only

⁶ *Reminiscences About Vladimir Ilyich Lenin*, Vol. 5, Moscow, 1979, p. 438 (in Russian).

⁷ *The First Congress of Revolutionary Organisations of the Far East*, Petrograd, 1922, p. 6 (in Russian).

⁸ See *Ibid.*, p. 152.

⁹ See *Fourth World Congress of the Communist International. Selected Reports. Speeches and Resolutions*, Moscow-Petrograd, 1923, p. 273.

¹⁰ *Bulletin of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International* No 27, Dec 6, 1922, p. 6.

natural that Katayama was satisfied with the inclusion in the theses on the Eastern issue of a provision obliging the Communist parties of the countries which had colonies to "undertake the task of organising regular ideological and material aid to the working-class and revolutionary movement in colonies."¹¹

Following the fifth anniversary of the Communist International Katayama, who immediately after the Fourth Congress was elected Member of the Presidium of the Comintern Executive, made an attempt to examine the experience of the activities carried out by the headquarters of the world revolutionary movement in the Far Eastern region. Having noted that the existence and activities of the Communist Party of China was completely determined by that time by the "direct and indirect influence of the Comintern", he expressed hope that relations between the Comintern and the CPC "will become firmer and more close-knit, with the Chinese proletarian movement gaining in strength."¹² Katayama expressed the opinion that the expansion of contacts between the Mongolian revolutionary movement which had won people's power under the leadership of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, and the liberation movement in other countries of the region would meet the interests of the revolutionary process in the Far East. Touching upon the Korean issue, Katayama stressed the need for a careful elaboration by the Comintern of its policy vis-à-vis that country so as to influence the national movement which was mounting there. He noted that in this case it would be possible to "unite the revolutionary organisations of the Korean emigrants scattered in China and Manchuria into a single front with the revolutionary movement inside Korea."¹³ The article examined the influence of the Comintern on the diverse aspects of the liberation struggle in Japan. Moreover, Katayama paid attention to the fact that the beneficial influence of the Comintern also found its reflection in the Japanese working-class movement's attitude towards the workers' movement in the Japanese colonies.

At the same time, Katayama expressed his regret that during the first five years of its existence the Comintern failed to forge sufficient ties with other countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia.

Katayama drew the following conclusion: "The Comintern should play a major part in the forthcoming revolutionary struggle of the East... The communist and the workers' movement in the Far Eastern countries are young and inexperienced, and the Comintern, the leader of the proletariat, should help them and lead them."¹⁴

Katayama emphasises the same idea concerning greater attention to the Eastern problem at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern (June-July 1924). From the rostrum of the Congress he said that, in accordance with Lenin's provisions on the nationalities question, "the exploited peoples of colonial and semi-colonial countries are close comrades of the revolutionary proletariat. The support of the revolutionary movement among these peoples is an inalienable task of the latter". Having demonstrated that such an approach to the nationalities question imparted to it a "totally new" significance, which differed from the stand of the Second International, Katayama noted with pride that the Comintern "considers all and everybody to be equal, both civilised and non-civilised, white, black and yellow."¹⁵

¹¹ *Communist International in Documents*, Moscow, 1933, p. 324.

¹² Sen Katayama, "Comintern and the Far East", *Communist International*, 1924, No. 1, pp. 205-206.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 211-212.

¹⁵ *Fifth World Congress of the Communist International Official Records*, Part I, Moscow-Leningrad, 1925, p. 618.

Katayama noted that national movement was multifarious and that it "can radically change its orientation depending on its class character." He favoured flexible tactics of Communist parties as regards bourgeois-national and petty-bourgeois national movements. According to Katayama's observations, the petty-bourgeois national movement "rather often than not displays an inclination for turning into pure nationalism". However, under favourable conditions, it "may easily forge contacts with the proletarian movement". He was absolutely sure that there was need to find a correct approach to this type of national movement. It was particularly important to elaborate "the most suitable tactics as regards the mass peasant movement in colonial and semi-colonial countries because peasants there make up a majority of the toiling masses."¹⁶

National sentiments, hatred of foreign enslavers who were most frequently represented by the white race gave ground for pan-Asiaticism with "Asia for Asians" motto. The Japanese reactionary forces pinned great hopes on that movement and encouraged it, meaning that Japan which had already demonstrated its ability to uphold independence, would manage to head the pan-Asiatic movement, and, consequently, subordinate it and use in the rivalry with other imperialist powers. That is why the words by Katayama at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern that Communists should always bear in mind Lenin's warning not to be deceived by the pan-Asiatic movement were quite to the point.¹⁷

Katayama was invariably interested in the revolutionary developments in China.

The autumn of 1924 saw a campaign supporting national liberation struggle of the Chinese people and opposing the imperialist interference in its internal affairs, which was launched in the Soviet Union. On September 22, at a meeting held in Moscow by the Hands off China Society, Katayama said that a united anti-imperialist front was being created in China, which came out against the front by means of which "British, American, Japanese and French capitalists wish to trample the Chinese people, eliminate its resistance, and plunder it without any limitations." The Japanese Communist appealed for rendering Sun Yatsen "the national revolutionary leader in the south of China, allround support, so that having started a struggle against imperialists, the Chinese working people could carry it through to the end, to their emancipation"¹⁸. The resolution passed by the meeting expressed the solidarity of the working people of the Soviet Union with the liberation struggle of the Chinese people, and also contained an appeal to the workers of Britain, America, Japan and France to break the conspiracy of silence by which imperialists surrounded the developments in China, to voice protest and force their respective governments to abandon the plunderous plans of enslaving China.¹⁹

Katayama was deeply impressed by the rout in Guangdong of the so-called mutiny of the "paper tigers" which in October 1924, as he explained, was staged to overthrow the Sun Yatsen government by "fascist detachments armed with money contributed by Anglo-American capitalists and big Canton industrialists". As is known, the decisive part in defeating that counterrevolutionary action was played by the newly-formed military units of cadets of the revolutionary military school Huangpu, and workers' detachments. Katayama regarded this as the confirmation to the fact that the Chinese proletariat, despite its relatively small number and still low level of organisation in trade unions, was "greatly important in wa-

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 618-619.

¹⁷ See *Ibid.*, p. 622.

¹⁸ *Hands off China*, Moscow, 1924, p. 24.

¹⁹ See *Ibid.*, p. 31.

ging the civil war" and was to "play an even greater part in the destinies of the Chinese Republic".²⁰

By that time the development of the revolutionary process depended on the establishment of cooperation within the framework of the Guomindang, whose creation signified an important step to implement the policy of the united national anti-imperialist front. However, the aggravation of the political situation at the Guangdong base of the revolutionary movement in China, the envigoration of different reactionary forces and stronger anti-communist sentiments among the Guomindang leaders resulted in part of the CPC leaders favouring the withdrawal of Communists from the Guomindang, discontinuation of the support to its military undertakings, and even the elimination of revolutionary power and revolutionary base in Guangdong.²¹ The left-sectarian views of a number of the CPC leaders who denied the revolutionary mood of the Chinese national bourgeoisie found their reflection also in some resolutions of the Fourth Congress of the CPC held in Shanghai in January 1925.²² Such actions ran counter to the tactical line proposed by the Comintern in relations with the Guomindang.

It was precisely at that time that Katayama went to China via Vladivostok. By February 1925, he arrived in Peking and stayed there until mid-March, acquainting himself with the situation in the country. His meetings with Li Dazhao, one of the founders of the CPC, Secretary of the North Bureau of the CPC, an eminent party theoretician and proletarian internationalist, were particularly useful. Katayama, who made acquaintance with Li Dazhao at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, met him in Peking several times and discussed problems faced by the Chinese revolution.²³

A trip to China helped Katayama uphold the line of the Comintern relating to the strategy and tactics of Chinese Communists in the mounting revolutionary process.

Having completed his stay in China, Katayama chose to come back by way of Mongolia. This choice was not fortuitous. He decided to visit that country when he met Mongolian revolutionaries who attended the First Moscow Congress of the Revolutionary Organisations of the Far East. The difficulties entailed in a long car trip over gravel roads and sleeping in the cold steppe did not make him change his mind. In mid-March 1925, Katayama left Peking and headed towards Ulan Bator, the capital of Mongolia, through Kalgan. He made a short stop-over there early in April to study different aspects of Mongolian life and specifics of the process of liberation revolution. Katayama was deeply impressed by independence of the Mongolian state and the socio-economic changes which were effected in the interests of the working people.

"Mongolia", Katayama wrote, "is the only Asian country which has succeeded in setting up an independent republic... China is still languishing under the yoke of foreign imperialism, while Mongolia is a truly independent revolutionary republic led by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. Mongolia is able to solve independently the problems of the customs policy, and it has no external debts. Its economic autonomy is not limited as is the case with China. To be sure, Mongolia enjoys much support from Soviet Russia, but, unlike the policy of imperialists in China, the influence of Soviet Russia and its backing bring immense

²⁰ Sen Katayama, "The Civil War in China and the Working Class", *The Red International of the Trade Unions*, 1924, No. 12, p. 91.

²¹ See *The Contemporary History of China 1917-1970*, Moscow, 1972, p. 84.

²² See *Ibid.*, p. 85.

²³ See *Narody Azii i Afriki (Peoples of Asia and Africa)*, 1968, No. 5, p. 145.

benefits to Mongolia, without hindering its progress and the growth of people's well-being."²⁴

The support given by the Red Army to the Mongols who stood up in arms during revolutionary battles, and later Soviet assistance in developing Mongolia's national economy were precisely of such a positive nature. Katayama could observe an example of internationalist cooperation between the two peoples when he saw a cattle- and horse-breeding centre near Ulan Bator. "I visited that place", Katayama wrote, "and got convinced that the Russian specialists in cattle-breeding were doing fruitful and interesting work."²⁵

With great interest Katayama got acquainted with the policy of the revolutionary government with respect to Lamaism. It was obvious to him that the latter was a heavy burden on the shoulders of the people, that the Lamas cultivated backwardness of the population and exploited the people in every way possible. This is why Katayama approved the measures to deprive Lamas of all their privileges, to undermine Lamaism by means of stratifying the clergy and winning over the majority of Lamas who possessed no property and were oppressed by the Lamaist upper crust to the side of the revolution.

Members of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League warmly received Katayama's speech at a meeting in Ulan Bator held in his honour. Mongolia, Katayama stated, was the first Asian country which had accomplished the revolution and had become a sovereign state. Revolutionary Mongolia and its people, in close alliance with the USSR, should help the oppressed peoples of Asia in eliminating world imperialism and delivering them from the foreign yoke. He pointed out that the solution of all problems in Mongolia should be based on Leninism which is "so omnipotent that can overcome any obstacles and any confrontation, can overcome mountains and rocks, rivers and seas, and it is destined to spread among the peoples throughout the world."²⁶

Katayama returned to Moscow convinced that Mongolia had embarked on a right track, though it had to do a great deal of work to improve the condition of the people and eliminate backwardness.

Soon after his trip to the Far East Katayama published his impressions about the Chinese working-class and national liberation movements in a progressive Japanese journal. He was of the opinion that the road to the liberation of the Chinese people lies through revolution, which would unite workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie.²⁷

Even prior to his trip to China, Katayama supported the publication of and wrote the preface to the booklet *Modern China* by I. G. Rogachevsky-Brodsky²⁸, which acquainted Soviet readers with different aspects of life in that country. After visiting China Katayama wrote and published his own book about that country.²⁹ He concentrated on analysing the economic situation in China, noting its dependence on foreign imperialists, who invented different slogans like "open doors", "equal opportunities for all powers concerned" and others to enslave the Chinese people. "Foreign capitalists," Katayama noted, "closely watched each other and each concession to one immediately, 'for the sake of equilibrium', entails new seizures."³⁰ At the same time Katayama saw the awakening of national self-

²⁴ Sen Katayama, "Travelling in Mongolia", *Life of Buryatiya*, 1925, Nos. 5-6, p. 4 (in Russian).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, April 23, 1925.

²⁷ See "Impressions from a Trip to China", *Kaizo*, Tokyo, June 1925.

²⁸ I. G. Rogachevsky-Brodsky, *Modern China (A Brief Socio-Economic Essay)*, Moscow, 1925.

²⁹ See Sen Katayama, *China (An Economic Essay)*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1926.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

consciousness as the most crucial phenomenon in China. The Chinese were increasingly realising the need for social and political changes. Moreover, they displayed the ability to exhibit their own will in solving most important domestic and international problems. This is evidenced, among other things, from the anti-Japanese movement in China, a large-scale anti-Japanese boycott, and the movement against foreign capitalism in general.

Katayama emphasised another "factor of immense significance" which one should bear in mind when studying modern China, that is, "the influence of the Russian October Revolution on China. At present it is only Soviet Russia which is 'on an equal footing' with China. Soviet Russia has eradicated the disgraceful 'extritoriality' which is so widely used in China by foreigners. Soviet Russia is the best friend of the Chinese people."³¹ This circumstance, in Katayama's opinion, was conducive to the development of revolution in China aimed against "domestic and foreign exploiters", a revolution which would require considerable effort and great sacrifice, "the only and direct road towards China's rebirth and further prospering."³²

In his speech at the Seventh Extended Plenary Meeting of the Communist International Executive Committee in November 1926 Katayama said: "The Russian revolution is awakening the oppressed classes of workers and peasants of the East and helps them in the struggle against foreign imperialism and capitalism. The Chinese revolution is an indisputable fact, but it is a national revolution... We should render assistance to the national revolution in China, inasmuch as its success would open up the road towards a socialist revolution".³³ Katayama defined the revolution in China as the one solving primarily the tasks of national liberation, and called for the unification of all revolutionary forces of the country under anti-imperialist and anti-militarist slogans. He warned that the Communist Party of China should prepare to repulse the united offensive orchestrated by the reactionaries.³⁴

Between 1925 and 1927 China's democratic forces failed to carry through to the end the anti-imperialist revolution. It was the Guomindang which broke the united national front, thereby striking a serious blow to the revolution. The Chiang Kaishek counterrevolutionary government, which echoed the interests of the big comprador bourgeoisie and Chinese landlords, was pursuing a policy of merciless terror.

While analysing the developments, in the course of which Chiang Kaishek betrayed and made short shrift of the revolutionary workers, peasants, Communists and left-wingers of the Guomindang, Katayama drew a far-sighted conclusion about the illusory nature of Chiang Kaishek's victory, pointing out that he would "probably win a dominating position within the right wing of the Guomindang but, no doubt, would lose the confidence of the broad masses in China who are the source of strength and a bulwark of the Chinese revolution".³⁵ Katayama thought that in reply to the formation of the Chiang Kaishek counterrevolutionary government it was imperative not to give up the policy of a united national front but, on the contrary to continue the persistent effort aimed at its formation on the broadest foundation possible. He also concluded that after Chiang Kaishek's betrayal and departure from the revolutionary

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 53.

³³ *Ways of the World Revolution, Seventh Extended Plenary Meeting of the Communist International Executive Committee. Official Records*, Vol. I, Moscow-Leningrad, 1927, p. 176.

³⁴ See *Ibid.*, pp. 440-441.

³⁵ Sen Katayama, "Chinese Revolution and Its Prospects", *Mirovaya Khiznistroj i Mirovaya Politika (World Economy and World Politics)*, 1927, No. 4, p. 13.

forces, he "had become quite an acceptable general for the imperialist plunderers of China".³⁶

Indeed, foreign imperialists decided to use the opportunity to step up further enslaving of China. The Japanese imperialists, for whom China with its raw-material resources, huge market for industrial goods and capital was attractive also due to geographic proximity, were especially zealous. At the same time, the Japanese powers that be feared losing China as a most suitable target for plunder and exploitation. Katayama noted in 1927 that the constantly growing influence of the Russian revolution in China, the "influence impregnating the whole of giant China causes anxiety and fear in Japan."³⁷ Aware that Japan was "too poor to wage a protracted war without foreign aid", Katayama nevertheless rightly noted that this would not stop Japanese militarists, full of resolve and harbouring ambitious imperialist plans, who possessed "human resources sufficient to serve as cannon fodder and the target for military exploitation".³⁸ It is indicative that Katayama became sure of Japan's inevitable direct attack against China at a time when Japan was still camouflaging its aggressive plans and was even trying, on the surface, to demonstrate a "goodneighbour attitude" towards China. It pursued a cautious policy when discussing customs problems and avoided joint actions with Britain in support of counter-revolutionary forces. That was quite natural for Katayama was well aware of the nature of imperialism and its readiness to wage aggressive wars, whether it was Japanese, American or any other imperialism.

From this viewpoint, of interest are Katayama's assessments of US imperialism, which are still valid today. In the 1920s, as today, US ruling quarters talked a lot about "freedom and humanism", creating a smoke-screen to cover their imperialist and predatory policy.

In analysing the activities of the US in the world scene, Katayama wrote that in reality the US was waging wars not "for the sake of freedom" but "for the sake of expanding its territory and influence". It was waging "predatory, aggressive wars" under the pretext of "settling" some "internal mutiny" on the territory of its neighbours, often provoked by Americans themselves. US presidents have long since made cynical statements that the United States "is compelled" to take upon itself the "duties of international police" "in particularly acute cases of lawlessness or impotence" in other countries. Initially the US was acting like that chiefly in Central America. "American sailors unhinderedly land in any port of the republics of Central America, quelling any liberal movement there and shooting arbitrarily the local population. In this way the sailors were clearing the way for US bankers." Katayama noted that later US imperialism spread the same methods also to the Far East when it was establishing itself, for example, in the Philippines.³⁹

Katayama's words echo with what is now being done by US imperialism in Central America and in the Middle East, where it is brandishing a nuclear club, using armadas of up-to-date warships with their powerful weaponry. International terrorism now and before, as is seen, among other things, from the piratical US aggression against Grenada, is a traditional method used by the US in a bid to establish its world domination.

Imperialism means wars and enslavement of peoples. The rallying of all forces opposing war is imperative to repulse the imperialist policy. Katayama was among those who carried out purposeful work towards

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³⁷ Sen Katayama, "Revolutionary Movement in China and Japan's Stand", *The Communist International*, 1927, No 1, p. 18.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

³⁹ See Sen Katayama, *Japan and America*, Moscow, 1925, pp. 50-55

such rallying. He was a most active participant in the Brussels Congress of Anti-Imperialist Forces, held in February 1927.

The Congress discussed the following issues: 1) imperialism and the consequences of its activity in colonial and semi-colonial countries; 2) imperialism and the danger of war; 3) cooperation of the national liberation movement with the workers' and anti-imperialist movements in imperialist powers; 4) coordination between national liberation movements and the workers' movement of all countries, both colonial and imperialist; and 5) the establishment of a standing body on a world-wide scale, uniting all forces against imperialism and colonial oppression.⁴⁰

After the Congress Katayama actively popularised its results. He attached special importance to the representative nature of the anti-imperialist forum in Brussels which was "attended by people of all colours and shades of skin, different stages of civilisation, various political and religious trends, most diverse trades". "All of them," Katayama stressed, "assembled with one aim in view—to struggle against imperialism".⁴¹ As Katayama pointed out, the Brussels Congress demonstrated the possibility for the colonial peoples "to consolidate an alliance with the revolutionary proletariat of the West in organisational forms."⁴²

Katayama's election to the leading bodies of the Anti-Imperialist League of Struggle for National Independence, set up at the Brussels Congress, was the recognition of his services in the cause of protecting the interests of the oppressed peoples. Katayama pinned great hopes on that organisation, favoured its strengthening and worked for a greater attention to it on the part of the communist parties. He regarded the Anti-Imperialist League, first and foremost, as a broad non-party organisation capable of inspiring the masses to wage a struggle against the danger of war. Katayama told the Sixth Congress of the Comintern: "Our communist forces are not sufficient, but experience has shown that the Anti-Imperialist League can mobilise masses in a movement against war."⁴³

In July 1929, Katayama went to the Second Congress of the Anti-Imperialist League held in Frankfurt am Main where he censured severely the militaristic preparations of Japanese imperialism.

Soon Japanese militarists provoked a number of "incidents" in Northeast China and in September 1931 began capturing Manchuria. Katayama called that brigandage "the first step towards the forthcoming world war".⁴⁴ The seizure of Manchuria by imperialist Japan, of course, caused irritation among other imperialist powers, the US in particular, which was against Japan bolstering positions in China. At the same time, it did nothing to thwart the aggressive designs of the Japanese militarists. What was the reason for this?

Katayama explains: "Imperialist powers actually allowed Japan to carry out dirty gangsterism in North China as preparations for a military intervention against the Soviet Union."⁴⁵

Indeed, having completed the occupation of a vast territory in Northeast China, the Japanese militarists declared it to be the new state of Manchukuo, a mere puppet in their hands, and began hastily creating a springboard and a base there not only for the expansion of their aggres-

⁴⁰ See Sen Katayama, "The Brussels Congress of the Oppressed Peoples", *The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, Vol. 7, Moscow, 1927, p. 716.

⁴¹ Sen Katayama, "The Brussels Anti-Imperialist Congress", *The Red International of Trade Unions*, 1927, No. 3, pp. 242-243.

⁴² Quoted from *Pravda*, Feb. 27, 1927.

⁴³ *Official Records of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern*, Issue 1, Moscow-Lenigrad, 1929, p. 305.

⁴⁴ Sen Katayama, "Manchuria and Japan's Colonial Policy", *Krasnaya Nov.*, 1932, No. 1, p. 90.

⁴⁵ Sen Katayama, "Japanese Imperialism and War" *The Communist International*, 1933, No. 21, p. 19.

sion in China, but also for attacking the USSR. As subsequent developments showed, Katayama quite timely stressed the danger to the Soviet Union from imperialist Japan. Minami, Japan's War Minister from 1930 to 1931, admitted at the Tokyo trial of the chief Japanese war criminals: "Manchuria was regarded as a military base in case of a war against the USSR. Both the occupation of Manchuria and the invasion of China were staged with Japan's ultimate strategic goal in view—the war against the USSR."⁴⁶

Katayama devoted his last years to the struggle against the danger of war, bending every effort to lay bare the aggressive plans of Japanese militarism. At the same time he realised the interconnection between the growth of militaristic sentiments in Japan and the spread of fascism in Europe. The Amsterdam Anti-War Congress (August 1932), with Katayama, an internationalist and zealous peace activist as one of its initiators, issued an appeal for the mobilisation of the masses to avert a new world war, to struggle against imperialist forces, and in defence of the Soviet Union. Katayama was elected to the International Committee of Struggle Against War and Fascism set up by the Congress, and, despite his age and poor health, was active in its work until his death.

Sen Katayama died on November 5, 1933. When announcing his death, the Presidium of the Comintern Executive Committee called Katayama an irreproachable and selfless fighter for proletarian internationalism. "As a proletarian, he experienced the oppression of the most barbarous Japanese capitalism armed with a semi-feudal whip, and the oppression of the most civilised American capitalism using false bourgeois democracy. Wherever he happened to be, he immediately went to the masses with propagation of deathly hatred of capital, preaching international unity of the proletarians".⁴⁷

Sen Katayama made a weighty contribution to the Comintern activities aimed at strengthening the influence of the Communist parties in different Eastern countries. He also displayed an unceasing concern for the communist movement in his native land. He could not return to Japan where an anti-communist terrorism reigned, and the Communist Party was compelled to go underground. Nonetheless Katayama exerted much influence on the Japanese communist movement. He spared no effort to educate Japanese Communists in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and solidarity with the working people of the countries which were the target of Japan's imperialist oppression and in the spirit of friendship of, and respect for, the Communist Party and the peoples of the Soviet Union.

All policy-making documents determining basic trends of activities of the Communist Party of Japan were permeated with this spirit, including the first draft programme (1923), the theses of the Comintern on the Japanese question in 1927 and 1932 in whose elaboration Katayama took part. Katayama supported and propagated in every way possible all manifestations of comradely attitude of Japanese trade unions to the needs and interests of the Korean workers in Japan, and solidarity with them in the struggle against merciless exploitation.⁴⁸ He insisted on the Japanese Communists' active cooperation with the liberation struggle of peoples in Japan's colonies—in Taiwan and Korea. As has already been mentioned, Katayama was constantly worried by Japan's aggressive policy with regard to China. He used every opportunity to call on the Communist Party of Japan to rouse the masses to struggle against oppression and plunder conducted by the Japanese imperialists in China.

⁴⁶ Quoted from *History of the USSR Foreign Policy 1917-1945*, Vol. I. Moscow, 1976, p. 277.

⁴⁷ *The Communist International*, 1933, No. 32, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁸ See, for example, Sen Katayama, "Korean Workers in Japan", *The Red International of Trade Unions* 1921, No. 6, pp. 716-721.

Finally, Katayama taught Japanese Communists to keep in mind that the Japanese ruling circles' hatred for the Soviet Union was caused by the latter's role as a powerful factor which awakened the peoples of the East to the struggle for their emancipation, and as a friend and defender of these peoples.

On the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of Soviet Power in Russia Katayama wrote: "The October Revolution left a deep imprint on the psychology of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples who saw that the numerous nationalities of the Soviet Union which earlier were under the oppression of tsarism were granted full freedom and genuine equality".⁴⁹

As a sincere friend of the Soviet people, Katayama made a great contribution to nourishing among Japanese Communists the feelings of friendship and respect for the world's first socialist state. He himself saw the building of a new society in the USSR, travelling a lot in the Soviet Union, and studying the life of Soviet people in Baku, Grozny, Kazan, Odessa, Siberia and Central Asia. While telling his friends in traveller's notes, articles and letters about the achievements of socialist construction in which the Soviet people were pioneers, he also stressed the importance of propagating those achievements by all communist parties, as a support in solving the tasks of revolutionary struggle in their own countries. Life itself has corroborated that the achievements of the existing socialism are the manifestation of the correctness and life-giving force of Marxism-Leninism.

⁴⁹ *Put MOPRA*, 1927, No. 21, p. 1 (in Russian).

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ZHAO JANUARY 1984 VISIT TO U.S. ASSESSED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, Jan-Mar 84 (signed to press 29 Feb 84) pp 131-136

[Article by I. A. Il'in and F. L. Likin: "Washington-Beijing: A New Stage in Cooperation (The Results of the U.S. Visit of Premier Zhao Ziyang of the PRC State Council)"]

[Text] This January Zhao Ziyang, premier of the PRC State Council, visited the United States. This was the first trip to the United States by a PRC head of government. Shortly before Zhao Ziyang's visit a group of leading American experts on China from the influential Atlantic Council, a non-governmental organization, prepared a report containing recommendations for the White House on questions of U.S.-PRC relations. Some of the proposals in the report provide an idea of how China and its policy are now perceived in American political circles.

The present stage of U.S.-PRC relations, in the opinion of the document's authors, differs from the past in that the sides have moved on from a state of "euphoria to the everyday work of maintaining ties with each other." At the same time, Washington and Beijing have begun to regard their mutual partnership with a "certain degree of caution." Although the PRC leadership is seeking to maintain a balanced position between the United States and the USSR, China "remains closer to Washington than to Moscow" on important questions.

The American experts adduce a number of reasons to explain certain adjustments in PRC policy. Beijing apparently believes that it has obtained maximum dividends from rapprochement with Washington (including the Taiwan issue) and can now derive greater advantage from both the United States and the USSR if it adopts a position "midway" between them. The American experts feel that it is now more important for the Chinese leaders to develop ties with the Third World than to ally themselves with the United States against the Soviet Union. It is also noteworthy, the report's authors remark, that there is some ideological opposition in China to the development of ties with the United States.

The American specialists propose that the administration regard China as a "major, undeveloped, independent and nonaligned" state. The PRC's significance as a "regional" force is stressed.

The compilers of the report acknowledge that the "Soviet factor" is the main motive force in U.S.-Chinese relations, which has led to U.S.-PRC rapprochement. Opposition to so-called "Soviet hegemonism," which, they point out, is making various kinds of cooperation between these countries possible, is declared to be the common aim of the United States and China.¹

During the visit the Reagan Administration patently sought to use it to achieve further China-U.S. rapprochement, to provide a "stable basis" for American-Chinese relations, which would prevent any wavering and reversals in Chinese policy in this regard, and to slow down the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations. Political observers pointed out that the American President was counting on Zhao Ziyang's visit and his own visit to the PRC, scheduled for April 1984, to strengthen his political prestige in the country on the eve of the presidential elections. The Beijing journal LIAOWANG wrote plainly in this regard that unless Sino-American relations are developed, this will not provide Reagan with as much election support as he would like.²

The foreign press noted that Beijing set itself goals on many levels: to state China's role in world affairs and secure U.S. recognition of this role; to present its domestic and foreign policy, particularly the Chinese stance on Taiwan, to the American public in a favorable light; to strengthen Sino-American cooperation and establish the necessary conditions for deeper and broader cooperation; to stimulate American business interests in the Chinese market and to obtain what China views as the optimum system of economic, scientific and technical ties between these countries.

The main topics of discussion during the 2 days of talks in Washington by Zhao Ziyang with R. Reagan, G. Bush, G. Shultz, C. Weinberger and other U.S. administration leaders were international problems and specific questions of U.S.-Chinese political and economic relations. One feature of the talks stands out: the fact that the participants took considerable pains to avoid exacerbating existing political disagreements (above all, the Taiwan problem) and instead focused attention on the sphere of trade, economic, scientific and technical ties.

The two sides concentrated on their so-called "common disquiet" at the USSR's foreign policy course, particularly "the intensive buildup of the Soviet Union's might in Asia." A U.S. administration spokesman stressed that this disquiet is leading to "concrete cooperation between the two countries" and to a "strategic dialogue" between them, which is a vital element of bilateral relations, and that "it is useful for the Soviet Union to know that the United States and China are cooperating in the resolution of important international questions."

Zhao Ziyang avoided open support for Reagan's idea of strategic cooperation between Beijing and Washington. "The PRC and the United States hold identical or similar views on a number of international problems, but there are disagreements on other issues," he stressed during a televised interview. "Under these conditions it is impossible to establish a comprehensive strategic partnership." The Chinese leader did not reject the idea of this cooperation, however, but effectively put forward the terms on which Beijing could agree to it. The issue of Taiwan was placed at the top of the list. Zhao Ziyang

emphasized that, given a solution of the Taiwan question "under the conditions of a united PRC," Beijing and Washington could discuss any problems. The need for the United States to consider the interests of the Third World, on whose behalf the Chinese premier attempted to speak, was mentioned as the second condition. He repeatedly referred in this context to Beijing's unfavorable attitude toward U.S. policy in the Middle East and Central America. Washington took this "criticism" calmly, however. "American officials," the FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW reported, "maintain that China's criticism of U.S. policy in the Middle East, Central America and southern Africa on problems in North-South relations has enabled Beijing to portray itself as a nonaligned state and to keep its distance from the United States. But they immediately add that China's loudest criticism has pertained to aspects of U.S. policy which are of no direct significance to Beijing.

"The United States and China hold largely parallel views on the USSR, Afghanistan and Indochina."³ It hardly needs to be said that these parallel and common approaches greatly suit U.S. foreign policy leaders. The visitor from Beijing, for example, again expounded the well-known Chinese interpretation of the events in Kampuchea and argued the need to give "support to resistance forces in order to increase the SRV's difficulties" while exerting political and moral pressure on Vietnam. The Chinese assessment of the situation surrounding Afghanistan, which tallies exactly with the American assessment, was received with satisfaction in the White House. In these specific instances, therefore, the Chinese side has taken the same stand as imperialist and reactionary forces. On the other hand, the Chinese premier said absolutely nothing about R. Reagan's declared "crusade" against world socialism and Washington's course of sharply exacerbating international tension and of siting American medium-range missiles in Europe.

Within the context of Beijing's willingness to cooperate with Washington in selective strategic avenues, Zhao Ziyang declared the "particular responsibility" of the PRC and the United States in the Pacific Ocean. He set out the principles the countries of the Pacific must observe in their relations: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual advantage, peaceful coexistence, the peaceful settlement of disputes without the use of force or threats of force, the renunciation of hegemony in the region, the cessation of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops.

Many observers have noted that these essentially correct tenets are abstract to some degree, since the main thing, namely any mention of American imperialism, which became the gendarme of the Asian people long ago, is missing. The Asian and Pacific regions are becoming an area of U.S. military and political activity second in significance only to Western Europe. Here, near the borders of China and other states of the region, the United States has more than 300 different military installations. In the Pacific Ocean there are 12 major naval bases and 12 major air bases. Around 140 warships and more than 800 warplanes are stationed there permanently.⁴ There are 1,500 short- and medium-range nuclear charges on the ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The U.S. 7th Fleet, based in Japan, the Philippines and Guam, is being re-equipped with the latest

Tomahawk and Trident missiles. A major grouping of U.S. forces is deployed in the Indian Ocean. Its foundation consists of two aircraft carrier groups numbering up to 20 warships. There are up to 190 combat planes based on the carriers, including 80 nuclear-capable deck ground-attack aircraft.

All countries on the Asian continent, including China, are in the sights of the nuclear weapons deployed at American bases in Asia and the Far East.

Washington is making an increasing effort to create a U.S.-Japanese-South Korean triple alliance. The U.S.-South Korean military maneuvers of unprecedented scales, Team Spirit-83 and Team Spirit-84, in which hundreds of thousands of American and South Korean servicemen were involved, were a manifestation of this. For the first time, high-ranking representatives of the Japanese army were present at the maneuvers as observers. The militarist Washington-Tokyo-Seoul alliance is acquiring increasingly distinct outlines.

Nor did Zhao Ziyang's speeches in the United States say anything about the danger of a revival of Japanese militarism or the plans to involve Japan in NATO. And yet, Japanese military spending has increased more than 20 times over since the early 1960's. The high rate of growth in Japanese military spending, according to estimates, will allow Japan to match or even outstrip many NATO countries in absolute terms by the early 1990's.

The American press described as "unexpected" the fact that during the American-Chinese summit talks Zhao Ziyang informed Ronald Reagan of new DPRK proposals on a peaceful settlement on the Korean peninsula, envisaging trilateral talks involving the DPRK, the United States and South Korea to discuss the replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace treaty and the withdrawal of American troops. The American President and U.S. press showed no interest in the organization of the trilateral conference proposed by the DPRK, but suggested a four-way meeting with the participation of the PRC. Zhao Ziyang stated that China "will actively support" a trilateral conference with the participation of the United States, South Korea and the DPRK, but that Beijing was not considering the possibility of its own inclusion in such a meeting.

In his public speeches during his visit to the United States, the PRC State Council premier frequently touched on certain questions of Soviet-Chinese relations. His statements contained ambiguous phrases and patent contradictions. For example, he spoke in favor of "improving and developing relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence with all states," including the Soviet Union, expanding exchanges, continuing dialogue and increasing the number of Soviet-Chinese contacts. At the same time, however, he made statements of a different kind, obviously aimed at keeping Washington from becoming unduly worried by changes for the better in Soviet-Chinese relations.

In a NEW YORK TIMES interview, the PRC State Council premier repeated the well-known Chinese preliminary conditions, which could more accurately be called demands on the Soviet Union, concerning the interests of Mongolia, Vietnam, Kampuchea and Afghanistan and these countries' relations with the USSR. "If these barriers are not removed," he observed, "there can be no

significant improvement in Chinese-Soviet relations.⁵ While he was in the United States Zhao Ziyang considered it necessary to stress the Chinese leadership's "opposition to many aspects of Soviet policy." Moreover, he expressed the hope that China and the United States "will be able to coordinate their efforts to restrain Soviet expansionism" in the region of Afghanistan and Kampuchea.

Answering a question about the Soviet-Chinese talks on a border settlement, which, as is well known, were not resumed after 1978 owing to the Chinese side's stance, the PRC State Council premier stated: "Our stance has not changed." In a NEW YORK TIMES interview he essentially made territorial claims against the USSR, accusing the "Russians," contrary to the historical facts, of "seizing Chinese territory," and cited so-called "unequal treaties" between China and Russia as evidence.⁶

The following fact is worthy of attention. During his visit to the United States Zhao Ziyang stated that China and the United States do not threaten each other and he also let it be known that China still regards the Soviet Union as a "threat" to China's security. At around this time, Huan Xiang, vice chairman of the NPC Foreign Affairs Commission, clarified some of these statements in an interview given to an AFP correspondent. Formulating his own viewpoint, he noted that the Soviet Union, which is allegedly "threatening China militarily in the most direct manner," continues to pose the main threat to China's security, but, he stated, Washington also poses a "certain threat to China's sovereignty and security." He noted, however, that the threat from the United States "is not direct" and concerns Taiwan.

When bilateral relations were discussed at the talks between the PRC premier and U.S. administration representatives, the mutual interest in "stabilizing" and further developing these relations was emphasized. While the Americans stated that difficult problems had been overcome and a period of "mutual trust" had arrived, the Chinese side was more reserved in expressing its approval of steady, ongoing cooperation "despite the persisting difficulties." At the same time, Zhao Ziyang said that Sino-American cooperation is entering a new stage.

Zhao Ziyang described the Taiwan problem, which he vigorously raised at meetings with representatives of the administration and Congress, as the "main obstacle" to the "full development of relations" with the United States, although he confined himself to hoping that Washington would fulfill the accords on Taiwan already reached with Beijing. The Chinese side declared that Beijing is unable to give a commitment that it will not use other than peaceful means of bringing about unification with Taiwan and that demands on China on this account constitute interference in its internal affairs. The American side confirmed its intention of gradually reducing supplies of weapons to Taiwan in accordance with the provisions of the joint U.S.-Chinese communiqué of 17 August 1982. At the same time, Reagan stated that the United States "will not abandon old friends."

The Chinese side's expression of concern at the "Taiwan independence movement" and its request that the Reagan Administration not support this movement were

new elements in Zhao Ziyang's description of the Taiwan problem. In the opinion of political observers, the Taiwan problem will long remain an irritant in Sino-American relations. This conclusion is also promoted by the statement by Chairman Hatfield of the U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee at the end of his visit to Taiwan this January. No matter how U.S. relations with China develop, the senator said, this will not have a detrimental effect on existing ties between the United States and Taiwan. He added that the amount of military aid to Taiwan in 1984 will be the same as in 1983--that is, between 750 and 780 million dollars.

In response to the fears displayed by the American side that the internal processes taking place in China might have an adverse effect on its cooperation with Western countries, Zhao Ziyang gave repeated assurances of Beijing's unchanged intention of continuing the "open door" policy with regard to the West.

According to journalists, the Chinese premier took every opportunity during his visit to persistently advertise the idea of the prospect of the virtually "unlimited" Chinese market for American businessmen. China "has opened its door and will never close it." Promises were made about the further improvement of the political and legal climate for American investors in China.

The premier of the PRC State Council especially welcomed Washington's measures to ease restrictions on the transfer of modern technology to China, which have had, in his words, a "very good influence on U.S.-Chinese relations." He sought a further expansion of privileges for importing U.S. technology into China and for exporting Chinese textiles to the United States. Speaking in Congress, Zhao Ziyang demanded that China no longer be subject to the ban on aid to "communist countries." Moreover, he stated that for the United States, China is a friendly, nonaligned country, and not a hostile state.

Here it ought to be said that the United States is already China's third largest trading partner. It is assumed that this year trade turnover between the two countries will grow to 5.5-6 billion dollars, as against 4.3 billion in 1983.⁷ An increase in U.S. investment in the Chinese economy and a rise in the number of joint U.S.-Chinese enterprises are planned. A number of major U.S. companies have confirmed their intention to expand trade and economic links with China on the basis of joint long-term programs lasting 10-15 years. To this we can add that last year the American side issued export licenses for the delivery of goods and equipment to China worth 800 million dollars which could potentially be used for military purposes. According to U.S. estimates, this year these deliveries could increase to 1.5 billion dollars.

On the eve of Zhao Ziyang's visit to the United States a spokesman for the IBRD, clearly following advice from Washington, announced the bank's plan to expand its financial and economic aid to the PRC. Since China's entry into the IBRD (1980), it has been granted a total of 1.068 billion dollars in loans and credit. But in the second half of the 1980's China will be allotted 2 billion a year. As the aforementioned spokesman said, the IBRD will also promote the development of "new forms" of cooperation between the capitalist countries and Beijing.

The growing financial aid being given to China by various international organizations and Western states is already generating serious concern in the developing countries, the defender of whose interests China claims so strenuously to be. In this connection, American Professor G. Harding makes the following observation: "China's obtaining access to Western capital, markets and technology may create definite problems for U.S. policy in the Third World since the developing countries are also interested in such access. China's entry into the IBRD has already generated unease among the major developing countries, which fear that the credit granted to them by the IBRD on preferential terms may be reduced. The same is true of U.S. economic aid, in which the developing countries' share may be reduced as a result of U.S. economic aid to China."⁸

During the Chinese premier's visit to the United States an agreement was signed on cooperation in industry and technology, which is aimed at stimulating the attraction of U.S. capital to the PRC economy on a wider scale. According to the agreement, the main focus will be the development of coal mining and the oil industry, transportation and telecommunications and the modernization of Chinese plants and equipment. The agreement envisages the transfer of information to Americans on industrial enterprises being constructed in China. A special industrial cooperation group is being set up within the framework of a bilateral trade commission. The 5-year agreement concluded in 1979 on cooperation in science and technology was also renewed. There are 21 protocols on specific questions currently in force within the framework of this agreement.

One of the important topics of the Washington talks is still an open question--the elaboration of an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear power. The sides made efforts to circumvent the existing disagreements connected with China's refusal to sign the international treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and to give the United States guarantees that it will not transfer U.S. nuclear technology to third countries. The premier made a number of soothing statements, in particular the one that Beijing "neither supports nor encourages" the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

This was sufficient cause for Washington to change its tone and begin talking about the presence of a "firm basis" for U.S.-PRC cooperation in this sphere, since the two sides allegedly "share certain fundamental principles of non-proliferation." It was stated that China and the United States had agreed "95-percent" on this matter as well. The agreement is expected to be signed during Ronald Reagan's visit to China.

A meeting was held between Zhao Ziyang and C. Weinberger, during which questions of more active U.S.-Chinese military cooperation were discussed. The premier confirmed China's interest in purchasing weapons of the types that Washington is prepared to sell Beijing and that the PRC is willing and able to buy. The U.S. administration, as is well known, had previously consented to deliver several dozen types of weapons and combat equipment to Beijing. At the same time, Beijing is making the proviso that the purchases are limited, since China, as an immense country, cannot rely on foreign countries to modernize its armed forces. Specific questions of cooperation in military

spheres will clearly be fully discussed during the planned visit to the United States by PRC Defense Minister Zhang Aiping.

In its editorial on the results of Zhao Ziyang's visit to the United States, RENMIN RIBAO pointed out that the Chinese leader's talks with the President and other leaders of the present White House administration were of "positive importance" and "ended successfully," that "deeper mutual understanding has been achieved" and that the talks were "frank and friendly" and "laid a good foundation" for the further development of relations between the two countries.

According to statements by U.S. officials, the Chinese premier's visit justified all the hopes that Washington had pinned on it and the goals the U.S. side hoped to attain.

Judging by all indications, U.S. ruling circles will continue to strive to expand specific spheres of strategic cooperation with Beijing on international questions, mindful of the Chinese leadership's growing interest in economic, scientific and technical ties with the West. Evidently some people in Beijing would like to exploit the U.S. leaders' anti-Soviet attitudes, primarily with a view to obtaining privileges in trade, deliveries of the latest technology and U.S. investment in the Chinese economy, and with a view to political advantages as a result of maneuvers between the systems of world imperialism and world socialism.

The responses to the U.S.-Chinese summit meeting (and, as is well known, it will be followed by Reagan's trip to China this April) show that the world public is alarmed at the dangerous game currently being played by the U.S. administration in an attempt to exploit the so-called China factor to fuel international tension, particularly in Asia and the Pacific. In the opinion of many observers, the present U.S. President, in an anticommunist fever, is trying to conduct a sort of all-out attack on the forces of socialism and progress, above all the Soviet Union, and on the national liberation movement, and it is precisely on the basis of these objectives that he is seeking "understanding" and more active support for his course from Beijing. A number of observers, including Americans, think that the Reagan Administration's approach to its China policy is adventuristic and is, to a considerable extent, built on a transitory foundation which, in their opinion, could be swept away by the future course of events both in China itself and in the international arena.

FOOTNOTES

1. "China Policy for the Next Decade," Wash., 1983.
2. LIAOWANG, 1984, No 2.
3. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 12 January 1984.
4. PRAVDA, 15 April 1983.

5. Quoted in RENMIN RIBAO, 18 January 1984.
6. NEW YORK TIMES, 20 January 1984.
7. LE MONDE, 6 January 1984.
8. "The China Factor: Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene," New Jersey, 1981.

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VIETNAM BACKED ON QUEST FOR 'NORMAL' RELATIONS WITH PRC

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[Article by D. M. Pospelov, candidate of historical sciences: "The Countries of Indochina Support the Normalization of Relations with the PRC"]

[Text] Truly historic changes have taken place in the past decade and have transformed the appearance of the three Indochinese countries. As a result of victory in the long and difficult joint struggle against imperialist aggression, the people of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have gained an opportunity for autonomous and independent development. The Vietnamese people have created a single state--the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. After carrying out a national people's democratic revolution, the Lao people have begun to lay the foundations of a socialist society. A new life is being built in the People's Republic of Kampuchea, formed as a result of the overthrow of the bloody Pol Pot regime in 1979.

The decisive role in all the victories of the Indochinese people was played by their combat solidarity and by the all-round assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The Indochinese people are making a great effort to continue developing cooperation in the defense of their independence and sovereignty and in the construction of a new life and they attach great significance to the internationalist assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist community states.

In an attempt to fuel tension around Indochina, imperialist and other reactionary propaganda crudely distorts events in the region and misrepresents the community of the three sovereign countries, which is the result of objective historical necessity and ensures the success of their struggle for freedom, independence and social progress. The Indochinese countries' ideological and political enemies are trying to convince the world public that the tension there is being created by the coordinated actions of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. Vietnam is being accused of "aggressive acts" against neighboring states. At the same time, some people are trying to discredit USSR policy in the region and to misinterpret the aims of its aid to the Indochinese people. In spite of the slanderous propaganda and subversive activity of imperialists and hegemonists, however, the special relations among the three Indochinese states and the bonds of friendship and cooperation between those countries

and the Soviet Union are growing stronger with each day. Clear new evidence of this was provided by the friendly meeting between Yu. V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and Le Duan, general secretary of the CPV Central Committee. During the meeting, Yu. V. Andropov stated that the USSR will continue to assist socialist Vietnam, acting in conjunction with Laos and Kampuchea, in its constructive efforts to transform Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, cooperation and stability. The two party leaders expressed satisfaction with the successful development of the all-round fraternal relations between the CPSU and CPV and between the Soviet Union and Vietnam and noted the great significance of the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty on friendship and cooperation, the fifth anniversary of which was marked in 1983.¹

The governments and people of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea are implementing plans for postwar economic recovery and social and cultural construction and consider the consolidation of peace in Asia and the establishment of good-neighbor relations with all states in the region to be among their main objectives. While waging a tireless struggle to transform Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability, they are making a great effort to normalize relations with their northern neighbor, the PRC, with which relations in the past 5 years have taken an extremely unfavorable turn and have injured the interests of the Vietnamese, Lao, Kampuchean and Chinese people, but through no fault of the Indochinese states. Matters have reached the point of an armed assault on Vietnam, the inciting of Khmer reactionary forces to struggle against people's Kampuchea and the creation of a military threat to Laos.

Under the complex conditions of an acute conflict, the Indochinese countries, especially the SRV, have continually shown great restraint and flexibility in the normalization of relations with the PRC. The fundamental and objective nature of Vietnam's approach was particularly apparent in its persistent efforts in spring 1979 to discuss questions of mutual interest with the PRC. In particular, one of the many SRV Foreign Ministry notes to the PRC embassy in Vietnam said: "In this expression of goodwill and the desire to preserve the traditional friendship between the Vietnamese and Chinese people, to resolve disputes in relations between the two sides, to satisfy the aspirations of the people of both countries and of the entire world and to contribute to the defense of peace and stability in Southeast Asia, the Vietnamese side reaffirms its willingness to begin talks with the Chinese side for the discussion of relations between the two countries and the adoption of the necessary measures for the maintenance of peace and stability in border regions, based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to discuss the restoration of relations between the two countries."²

After securing China's agreement to talks on an equitable basis, the SRV Government adhered to its line, couched in the spirit of a love of peace and good-neighbornliness, and expressed its willingness to examine all problems in bilateral relations constructively. At the talks the Vietnamese side invariably insisted on discussing both urgent measures to safeguard peace and stability on the border and the fundamental principles of relations between the two countries. In its proposal the Vietnamese side paid special attention to measures designed to end border incidents and normalize the situation in

border regions. In essence, the proposals stated the need for "a rapid end to all armed actions and any form of hostile activity leading to violations of the other side's sovereignty and territorial integrity and threatening its security," the "restoration of normal relations between the two countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence" and the settlement of "border and territorial problems between the two countries in accordance with the principles of respect for historical borders."³

It should be stressed in particular that all the Vietnamese proposals were in line with the norms and traditions of international law and with the practice of states in a border conflict situation.

Through no fault of the Vietnamese delegation, however, businesslike discussion did not take place. Vietnam's partners in the talks were completely unprepared for a constructive discussion of the most important issues of Vietnamese-Chinese relations. Despite the other side's outright refusals, delays and procrastination, the SRV continued to put forward new initiatives with the aim of achieving a serious and businesslike discussion of the most important aspects of Vietnamese-Chinese relations and of finding a common basis for their resolution. Its persistence led to a second round of talks. Above all, the Vietnamese side strove to find ways of safeguarding peace and calm in border regions by proposing the conclusion of an agreement containing a commitment to refrain from all actions threatening each other's security.⁴ Even this proposal, however, was rejected on the pretext that it was a "trick to deceive world public opinion."

At the talks the Vietnamese side not only put forward constructive initiatives on the normalization of bilateral relations, but also gave a principled and scientifically sound assessment of certain fundamental principles of relations between the two countries. In particular, the Vietnamese representative stated the SRV's position on opposition to hegemonism, a question often raised by the Chinese side at the talks. In the Vietnamese side's opinion, the discussion of this question should consist of the following points:

The renunciation of territorial expansion in any form and a rapid end to the practice of seizing other people's lands;

The renunciation of aggression and the use of force or threats of force to "punish" any country or "teach it a lesson";

The inadmissibility of imposing one's own ideology, views or policy line on other countries;

The renunciation of the use of any kind of leverage, including economic assistance, to compel other countries to abandon a policy of independence and sovereignty;

Noninterference in the affairs of other countries in any form, including interference by the dependent organizations or citizens of one country located in another;

The inadmissibility of an alliance with imperialism and other reactionary forces against peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.⁶

Even after China broke off the talks unilaterally at the beginning of 1980, the Vietnamese side continued its persistent attempts to prompt the PRC to continue the bilateral meetings. The SRV Government still considered the talks to be the only way of settling Vietnamese-Chinese relations and therefore expressed its willingness to discuss any problem within the framework of bilateral relations.⁷ Even though the Chinese side has refused to resume the bilateral talks to this day, Vietnam's proposals and initiatives have lost none of their significance since they meet the national interests of Vietnam, China and other countries in the region.

An important landmark in the joint struggle of the Indochinese people for the normalization of relations with the PRC was the first conference of foreign ministers of the PRK, Laos and the SRV, held in Phnom Penh in January 1980. The conference communiqué specifically stressed the tremendous significance of the three countries' solidarity and of their indissoluble link with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, which enables them to repulse attacks by all aggressors and to alter the balance of power in Southeast Asia in favor of national independence and social progress.⁸ The three countries' foreign ministers emphasized the "unfailing desire of their people for solidarity and friendship with the Chinese people and expressed confidence in the possibility of reviving the spirit of solidarity uniting these three populations with the Chinese people."⁹

The problem of normalizing relations with China occupied an important place on the agenda of the second conference of the Indochinese countries' foreign ministers (in Vientiane in July 1980). In a joint statement on the results of the conference, Laos and the PRK fully supported the fraternal Vietnamese people's just and successful struggle in defense of their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and the SRV Government's correct stance and policy of goodwill aimed at resolving existing problems between Vietnam and China by means of talks and in accordance with the aspirations and interests of the people of both countries.¹⁰

The desire to normalize relations with China was mentioned in SRV Prime Minister Pham Van Dong's report at a ceremonial session to mark the 35th anniversary of the August revolution. "We want peace and friendship with the Chinese people and we want the normalization of relations with the PRC," Pham Van Dong stated. "We want to focus all the efforts of the country and the people on the construction of a new socialist life."¹¹

While continuing the struggle to create favorable foreign policy conditions for the resolution of urgent national economic problems, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea put forward a new foreign policy initiative, which evoked widespread responses throughout the world, at the third foreign ministers' conference (in Ho Chi Minh City, January 1981). The declaration adopted at the conference noted that tension persists in Southeast Asia and that the national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea are still being threatened. In this context, it was stressed that the main

condition for the restoration of peace and stability in Southeast Asia is the pursuit of a policy by China toward the three Indochinese countries which will rule out hostility and interference in the affairs of other countries of the region. Conference participants declared their willingness to sign bilateral treaties on peaceful coexistence with the PRC in line with the principles that have become part of the practice of international relations.¹²

This proposal was commended by world public opinion as a concrete and constructive way of easing the tension in Indochina.

In June 1981 the fourth conference of foreign ministers of the SRV, Laos and the PRK again asked the Chinese Government to sign bilateral treaties on non-aggression and peaceful coexistence. "It is desirable and in the interests of the people of Indochina and of China and the interests of friendship between these people," the conference declaration said, "that China's ruling circles give a positive response to this proposal."¹³ RENMIN RIBAO called these new proposals "old and long since rejected."¹⁴

In spite of the PRC stance, in 1981 Vietnam persisted in its attempts to normalize relations with China: The SRV proposed the resumption of talks on five occasions that year. The abovementioned declaration by the third conference of foreign ministers in January said: "The SRV invites the PRC to resume, as soon as possible, the talks to settle problems in relations between the two countries.... The Vietnamese side reaffirms its willingness to discuss questions China may deem necessary to raise within the framework of these talks."¹⁵ On 14 June the SRV Foreign Ministry sent a note to China's foreign ministry, again requesting the resumption of talks. The SRV Foreign Ministry stressed that this reasonable step would help to reduce tension in Vietnamese-Chinese relations, secure peace along the border between the two countries and solve other problems of mutual concern.¹⁶ In the declaration of the fourth conference of the three countries' foreign ministers, the SRV addressed another proposal to Beijing, pointing out the need to agree on immediate measures to restore peace and stability, and especially to disengage the two countries' armed forces and establish a demilitarized zone.¹⁷ Le Duan, general secretary of the CPV Central Committee, made the following announcement in his speech at the opening of the first session of the SRV National Assembly, Seventh Convocation (25 June 1981): "In pursuit of our friendly policy toward the Chinese people, we would like to achieve normalization in relations between the two countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect for one another's independence and sovereignty and the settlement of conflicts by negotiation."¹⁸

The LPDR and PRK expressed their views on relations with China in the abovementioned foreign ministers' declaration (January 1981). Laos and Kampuchea stressed that the restoration of normal and friendly relations between the LPDR and PRK on one side and the PRC on the other would necessitate the strict observance of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and the cessation of interference in these countries' internal affairs.

The three states' principled and consistent position with regard to China was confirmed in 1982 at the fifth and sixth (February and July) conferences of Indochinese foreign ministers. Conference participants noted the continuous

reinforcement of the three countries' solidarity and unity and the productivity of their joint actions on the diplomatic front, expressed satisfaction with the steady growth of cooperation between Indochina's three countries and the Soviet Union and world socialist community and reaffirmed their persistent wish that "the Chinese side could respond in the affirmative to the 28 January 1981 proposal by Indochina's three countries regarding the signing of a treaty on peaceful coexistence with the PRC."¹⁹

The February conference communique drew special attention to the fact that the refusal to discuss Vietnam's proposals aimed at stabilizing the situation along the Vietnamese-Chinese border or the Indochinese countries' proposals aimed at the normalization of relations with China is generating dissatisfaction in the world public.²⁰ In the July conference communique the LPDR and PRK "supported the SRV proposal, imbued with goodwill, to resume the Vietnamese-Chinese talks aimed at settling relations between the two countries" and drew attention to "the importance of establishing contacts in the immediate future between the countries in preparation for the resumption of talks."²¹

The PRC paid no attention, however, to the peaceful appeals of Indochina's three countries. The Indochinese side remained silent about all the proposals that relations with these countries be normalized, focusing its attention on the so-called Kampuchean problem. In this connection, NHAN DAN, the organ of the CPV Central Committee, published an article entitled "Our Consistent Position on the Question of Relations with China" in August 1982. The article specifically stressed that the state of Vietnamese-Chinese relations is important not only from the standpoint of the immediate and long-term interests of the people of both countries; relations between them are also a decisive factor for the preservation of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese people, the article pointed out, are fully determined to protect their independence and sovereignty and to defend every square inch of their native land. At the same time, they value close Vietnamese-Chinese friendship, which has been tested by time and which is an important gain for both peoples. The newspaper cited a passage from the CPV Central Committee report to the fifth party congress, delivered by Le Duan, general secretary of the central committee: "Pursuing a policy of friendship and good-neighbor relations with the Chinese people, we advocate the resumption of normal relations between the two countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and the settlement of disputes by means of negotiation." The article drew attention to the following passage: "Vietnam has not done anything that could have led to the deterioration of relations or to confrontations between the two countries: The Vietnamese people have shown a sincere desire to settle all differences by peaceful negotiation and are doing everything to this end; Vietnam has constantly initiated the establishment of favorable conditions to organize bilateral talks and to secure their success; since the time when Beijing broke off the talks, Vietnam's Foreign Ministry has officially addressed proposals to China on 10 occasions for the start of the third round of talks."²²

The efforts by Indochina's three states to ease tension in the region and to normalize relations with China have invariably been supported by the Soviet Union. This support was expressed in 1982 during the meetings of CPSU and Soviet Government leaders with Le Duan, general secretary of the CPV Central

Committee; K. Phomvihan, general secretary of the LPRP Central Committee and Prime Minister of the LPDR; Truong Chinh, member of the CPV Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the SRV Council of State; and Heng Samrin, general secretary of the KPRP Central Committee and chairman of the PRK State Council, during their visits to the USSR. It was noted during the exchange of opinions with K. Phomvihan and Heng Samrin that the Soviet Union highly values and supports the efforts by Laos and Kampuchea to improve the situation in Southeast Asia.²³ The joint Soviet-Vietnamese communique on the results of the visit by an SRV party and governmental delegation, headed by Comrade Truong Chinh, pointed out: "Special attention was given to the situation in Southeast Asia during the talks. Both sides expressed their willingness to make an active contribution to the cause of peace and stability in that region. They ascertained that the continuing tension in the region is caused by the policy of hegemonic and imperialist forces aimed against Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea.

"The Soviet Union expresses its solidarity with the struggle by Indochina's three countries against the intrigues of these forces and fully supports the proposals by the SRV, LPDR and PRK on the conclusion of bilateral or multi-lateral treaties for peaceful coexistence between these countries and China."²⁴ Speaking at the Kremlin dinner in honor of the SRV party and governmental delegation, Truong Chinh re-emphasized Vietnam's desire for normal relations with the PRC: "We are advocating the restoration of normal relations between the SRV and the PRC on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of both countries, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for one another's legitimate interests, equality and mutual advantage, and also the resolution of disputes through negotiation.

"In this spirit we have put forward reasonable proposals which have enjoyed the approval and support of the USSR, the other fraternal countries and the peace-loving public throughout the world."²⁵

New joint initiatives and practical steps by the SRV, LPDR and PRK governments were taken in 1983 to ease tension in Indochina. A summit conference of leaders from Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam was held in Vientiane in February. After discussing the world situation and events in Indochina, its participants again expressed the definite desire of Indochina's people to strive for good-neighbor relations with all states. "The people of Indochina's three countries are linked with the Chinese people by centuries of friendship," the document said. "They have always valued these traditional friendly relations. The mutual assistance and support of the Chinese people and the people of Indochina's three countries in their revolutionary struggle comprise a historical reality which cannot be denied. The present abnormal state of relations between the LPDR, PRK and SRV and the PRC is not the fault of Indochina's three countries. These three countries, in the persistent pursuit of their policy line, will spare no efforts to restore relations with the PRC on the basis of peaceful coexistence and in the interests of the people of these countries and the Chinese people."²⁶

The Vientiane conference decisions met with the approval of the socialist countries. The Soviet Union expressed full solidarity with the constructive

efforts of the SRV, LPDR and PRK to ease tension in Southeast Asia. The USSR's solidarity with three Indochinese countries reflects, the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and USSR Council of Ministers noted in their message of greetings to the Vientiane conference, the common lofty ideals of socialism and our determination to fight together against imperialism for peace, security and social progress.²⁷

Instead of responding constructively to this initiative, the PRC leadership attempted to whitewash its stance on the normalization of relations with the three Indochinese countries in the eyes of the world public. The PRC Foreign Ministry published a statement containing a number of demands on sovereign Vietnam; only on the condition of the fulfillment of these demands would the Chinese side agree to begin talks on the normalization of relations.

The true nature of the PRC Foreign Ministry statement was revealed in a NHAN DAN editorial which drew attention to the unsoundness of the Chinese argument.²⁸

The demands set forth in the Chinese statement were quite justifiably rejected by the extraordinary conference and the regular seventh conference of prime ministers of the SRV, LPDR and PRK in April and July 1983. The conference communique noted: "Now, just as in the past, the three Indochinese countries attach great importance to the long-standing ties of solidarity and friendship with the Chinese people and are steadily seeking to restore friendly, good-neighbor relations with China on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

"The LPDR and PRK fully support the SRV's proposal to resume Vietnamese-Chinese talks on all questions of mutual interest.... The two sides must accept the proposals put forward by each for the basis of the talks. The conference expresses full support for the SRV's proposal concerning measures aimed at easing tension on the Sino-Vietnamese border."²⁹

The three Indochinese countries' new initiatives were supported by the USSR and other socialist countries. A PRAVDA commentary stressed the three fraternal countries' goodwill and exceptional restraint and their readiness for dialogue with interested states without prior conditions in a spirit of friendship and respect for the principles of peaceful coexistence and with consideration for mutual security.³⁰

The joint Soviet-Vietnamese statement on the results of the official friendly visit to the SRV by a USSR party and governmental delegation headed by G. A. Aliyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, noted: "The Soviet Union fully supports the SRV's peaceful foreign policy line and the constructive proposals of the SRV, LPDR and PRK aimed at normalizing the situation in Southeast Asia and turning it into a zone of peace, stability and cooperation, and it supports the SRV's efforts to normalize relations with the PRC on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence in the interests of the people of the two countries and of peace in Asia."³¹

In January 1984 the eighth conference of foreign ministers of the three Indochinese states was held in Vientiane. Participants expressed the

invariable desire of their people and governments to normalize relations with the PRC. The conference communique pointed out: "The people of the three Indochinese countries and the Chinese people have a common interest in preserving the peace so that they can use their resources and their energy for national restoration. It is in this spirit that the three Indochinese countries reaffirm their proposals aimed at the restoration of friendly, good-neighbor relations with the PRC on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence. The LPDR and PRK wholly and completely support the SRV in its efforts to restore peace on the Vietnamese-Chinese border and to resume the Vietnamese-Chinese talks anywhere and at any time. The two sides' proposals aimed at the normalization of relations must be the subject of bilateral consultations."³² The SRV, LPDR and PRK have therefore again demonstrated their willingness to secure all the necessary conditions for development and advances under the conditions of peace and friendship.

The governments and people of the three Indochinese states still face a hard and, to all appearances, long struggle to normalize relations with the PRC. The Indochinese countries are fully determined to build their relations with China and other neighbors on the unshakeable principles of peaceful coexistence. The people of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are on their side. We can express the certainty that the Indochinese countries' constructive initiatives, full of goodwill, will ultimately play their positive part in stabilizing the situation in the region.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 30 July 1983.
2. NHAN DAN, 5 April 1979.
3. Ibid., 19 April 1979.
4. Ibid., 29 June 1979.
5. RENMIN RIBAO, 30 June 1979.
6. NHAN DAN, 6 July 1979.
7. Ibid., 9 March 1980.
8. Ibid., 8 January 1980.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 19 July 1980.
11. Ibid., 2 September 1980.
12. Ibid., 29 January 1981.

13. Ibid., 15 June 1981.
14. RENMIN RIBAO, 17 June 1981.
15. NHAN DAN, 29 January 1981.
16. Ibid., 14 June 1981.
17. Ibid., 15 June 1981.
18. Ibid., 26 June 1981.
19. Ibid., 18 February 1982, 8 July 1982.
20. Ibid., 18 February 1982.
21. Ibid., 8 July 1982.
22. Ibid., 23 August 1982.
23. PRAVDA, 30 September 1982.
24. Ibid., 9 October 1982.
25. Ibid.
26. NHAN DAN, 24 February 1983.
27. PRAVDA, 24 February 1983.
28. NHAN DAN, 3 March 1983.
29. Ibid., 21 July 1983.
30. PRAVDA, 25 July 1983.
31. Ibid., 5 November 1983.
32. NHAN DAN, 30 January 1984.

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CHINESE STUDIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (LATE 1970'S-EARLY 1980'S)

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[Article by V. Ya. Zhuravlev]

The study of international relations and their history has been noticeably reanimated in the PRC from the end of the 1970s to the beginning of the 1980s. Currently this work is carried on by specialised research institutions within the framework of the Academy of Social Sciences, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, history faculties at universities, numerous national and regional academic history study societies.

In 1978-1982 alone, China witnessed over 40 academic conferences devoted to the study of world history. Most of them also discussed the history and present state of international relations. Among major forums deserving mention are the national conferences on the study of world history (Peking, April 1980; Leshan, Sichuan Province, August 1981) and the history of the Second World War (Harbin, July 1979; Kunming, June 1980; Peking, August 1982). The eighteen conferences held in 1980 were attended by over 1,400 people, who heard over 800 reports.¹

There has been a marked increase in the number of periodicals dealing with international relations. Besides the journal *Hongqi*, the mouth-piece of the CPC CC, the journal *Lishi yanjiu* (*Historical Research*, resumed publication in 1974), and university bulletins, articles on international relations are a regular feature in *Shijie zhishi* (*Knowledge of the World*, resumed in 1979), *Shijie lishi* (*World History*, issued since 1979), *Lishi jiaoxue* (*Teaching of History*, resumed in 1979), *Waiguo shi zhishi* (*Knowledge of the History of Foreign Countries*, published since 1981), *Shijie shi yanjiu dongtai* (*Condition of World History Studies*, published since 1979). Brought out since 1981 are specialised publications on the problems of current international relations—the quarterly journal *Guoji wenti yanjiu* (*Study of International Problems*) and the non-regular collection of articles, *Xiandai goji guanxi* (*Current International Relations*) brought out by the Institute of Contemporary International Relations. Translated works of foreign authors are published in the journal *Shiji lishi yicong* (*Collection of Translations on World History*).

A rapid rise has been registered in the number of reference books on various aspects of international relations and their history. Published since 1980 is *Chinese Encyclopaedic Yearbook*,² since 1982 *International Situation Yearbook*.³ In 1982, after a 17-year-long interruption, publication was resumed of the yearbook *Knowledge of the World*.⁴ Since 1979 *Chinese Yearbook of Historical Science* (*Zhongguo lishixue nianjian*) has appeared in print. Mention should also be made of such publications in recent years as the *Dictionary of International Events*,⁵ Reference

¹ *Zhongguo baike nianjian* 1981, Peking-Shanghai, 1981, p. 408

² *Zhongguo baike nianjian*

³ *Guoji xingshi nianjian* 1982, 1983, Shanghai, 1982 Prepared by the Shanghai Institute of International Problems

⁴ *Shijie zhishi nianjian* 1982, Peking, *Shijie zhishi chubanshe*, 1982 Contains, in particular, information on 210 countries and regions of the world, their relations with the PRC, USSR, US, Japan.

⁵ *Guoji shishi cidian*, Peking, Shang' wen yinshuguan, 1981 Deals with events up through the beginning of 1980.

Book of International Knowledge,⁶ *Dictionary of Contemporary International Figures*,⁷ the international section of the dictionary Cihai.⁸

Translated literature dealing with international relations⁹ also made appearance in large editions in China in recent years, including memoirs by H. Kissinger, E. Kardel, V. Micunovic (Yugoslavia's Ambassador to the USSR in 1956-1958). There appeared also first works on the composite problems of international relations. Standing out are the collective work *Second World War*¹⁰ and Hong Yuyi's book *A Short History of International Relations in 1931-1939*.¹¹

The two-volume *History of International Relations* was put out by Wuhan University.¹² The history of American-Chinese relations is analysed in Huang Shaoxiang's book, *A Short History of the US*;¹³ various aspects of the history of international relations are examined in a collection of articles on current world history, prepared by the Chinese Current History Society on the basis of materials of the Leshan conference in 1981.¹⁴ Reprinted was Wang Yunsheng's revised 8-volume history of Sino-Japanese relations in 1871-1913,¹⁵ new editions are prepared of a three-volume collection of China's treaties with foreign countries in 1689-1949 (earlier published in 1957-1962) and collections of documents on international relations in Europe in 1871-1898 and 1898-1914.¹⁶

In recent years international relations were not in the forefront of Chinese historical studies, and yet some work was done on this score. A general idea in this respect is provided by the report of historian Wang Shengzu at the constituent conference of the Chinese Academic Society to Study the History of International Relations.¹⁷ Thus, prior to the formation of the PRC were published *A History of European Diplomacy in New Time* (1926) by Zhou Gengsheng, *Postwar World Transformed* (1947) by Qian Duansheng, *A History of the Soviet-German War* (1947) by Yu Feihuang, *The Situation in Europe and the Far East* (1939) by Du Fangjuan, *A History of Chinese Diplomacy* (1925) by Zheng Youhao, *A History of Diplomacy of the Chinese Republic* (1936) and *China's International Relations* (1933) by Zhang Zhonglu, *Sino-Russian Relations During the Qing Dynasty* (1947) by Chen Fuguang. Also brought out were several collections of documents and *The Great Diplomatic Dictionary*.¹⁸

In the 1950s the history of imperialist aggression in China was actively studied, especially aggression by American imperialism. Published were such books as *Imperialism and China's Policy* (1953) by Hu Sheng, *A Short History of American Aggression in China* (1950) by Liu Danan, the collective work *A History of Imperialist Aggression Against China* (1958, reprinted in 1973), and the seven-volume collections *The Sino-*

⁶ Guoji zhishi shouque, Guanxi renmin chubanshe, 1981 (in two parts). Prepared by the Chair of International Relations of the 2nd Peking Institute of Foreign Languages. Deals with events up to September 1979.

⁷ Dangdai guoji renwu cidian, Shanghai, 1980.

⁸ Cihai, Shanghai, 1978.

⁹ Including the work by G. Brown (USA) "Relations of the USSR with Its Allies in Eastern Europe" (*Silüan yu qí Dong Ou mengguo di quanxi*, Peking, 1980); the work by Japanese authors "Japanese-Soviet Relations, Territorial Diplomacy and Economic Cooperation" (*Ri Su quanxi—lingtu waijiao he jingji hezuo*, Tianjin, 1981).

¹⁰ Zhu Guisheng, Wang Zhende, and others, *Di Er ci shijie daizhan*, Peking, 1982.

¹¹ Hong Yuyi, 1931-1939 guoji guanxi jianshi, Peking, 1980.

¹² Quoji guanxi shi, 1983.

¹³ Huang Shaoxiang, *Meiguo tonghi jianbian*, Peking, 1979.

¹⁴ Shijie xiandai shi lunwenji, Peking, 1982.

¹⁵ Wan Yunshen, *Liushi nian lai Zhongguo yu Riben*, Peking, 1979-1980. First seven volumes were published in 1931-1934 in Tianjin.

¹⁶ See *Sheke xin shumu*, 1982, No. 64.

¹⁷ See Wang Shengzu, "To Energetically Study the History of International Relations", *Shijie shi yanjiu dongtai* (Peking), 1981, No. 3, pp. 1-6.

¹⁸ Wang Zhaoran, Liu Daren, *Wujiu du cidian*, Kunming, 1940.

Japanese War (Shanghai, 1956) and *The Sino-French War* (Shanghai, 1955). Mention should also be made of such publications as *A Collection of Materials on Soviet-Chinese Friendship* (1953) and *A History of Sino-Soviet Friendship* (1957) by Peng Ming.

In today's China the value of studying the history of international relations in the 1950s is brought into question. A "dogmatic tendency" ascribed to social science in China of those years began to show, allegedly caused by borrowing from the Soviet Union, and subsequently there appeared "a vicious tendency of simplification, absolutisation and formalisation of certain theoretical views of Marx and Lenin".¹⁹

Since the early 1960s a nationalist approach began to prevail in the PRC in dealing with the problems of world history,²⁰ and it became dominant in the 1970s. Its fullest expression is found in the works of Shi Jun, thoroughly analysed by Soviet sinologists.²¹ Among major works of the mid-70s, touching on the problems of international relations, mention should be made of *Current World History*²² and *A Short History of the Second World War* (Shi Jiansi, 1975).

According to Wang Shengzu's data, in 1949-1966 and 1973-1980 PRC periodicals published 677 articles on the history of international relations. Out of that total 373 articles were devoted to China's relations with foreign countries (including 274 with capitalist), while 304 pieces were on international relations (including 176 on relations of European countries, the USA, Japan). Postwar events were dealt with in 126 articles, events in between the world wars in 105 articles, and those before the First World War in 446 articles.

Attempts by Chinese historians to falsify the history of international relations encountered criticism by Soviet scholars. Naturally, they focused attention on the questions of Russian-Chinese²³ and Soviet-Chinese relations. Also examined were China's relations with neighbouring countries²⁴ and, by way of reviews, the presentation of the history of international relations in Chinese sources and literature.²⁵

Sinology in socialist countries rebuffed also the attempts to distort and "reconsider" world history, as can be seen from the holding in Moscow, in March 1979, of an international conference.²⁶ The conference criticised, in particular, distortions of the history of the Second World War, the incorrect interpretation of Russia's part in the struggle of the Balkan peoples against the Ottoman yoke, the history of Poland, of the peoples of Central and Southeast Europe, and the booklet devoted to the analysis of Soviet historical science brought out in the PRC in 1977.²⁷

The study of international relations in the PRC remains "a comparatively weak branch of historiography". Nonetheless, the striving to quickly change the "situation of lagging behind", "which is not in the least

¹⁹ *Shijie shi yanjiu dongtai*, 1981, No. 3, p. 2.

²⁰ Translations of some works by Chinese authors of the first half of the 1960s were published in the supplement to the book *Historical Science in the PRC* (Moscow, 1971).

²¹ The articles were published in the journal *Hongqi*, 1972, Nos. 4, 5, 6, 11.

²² *Shijie jindaishi*, Parts 1, 2, Shanghai, 1974. Examined are events up to 1918 inclusively.

²³ See collection of articles *Documents Refute Against Falsification of History of Russian-Chinese Relations*, Moscow, 1982.

²⁴ See *China and Its Neighbours in New and Modern Time*, Edited by S. L. Tikhvin-sky, Moscow, 1982.

²⁵ See G. V. Yefimov, *Historical and Bibliographic Review of Sources and Literature on New and Modern History of China*, Part 1, Leningrad, 1965; Part 2, 1968, Part 3, 1972; Part 4, 1980; *History of China's International Relations at the End of the 19th Century in Chinese Sources and Literature*. In the book *In Memory of Academician I. Y. Krachkovsky*, Leningrad, 1958, pp. 235-250.

²⁶ See *Urgent Problems of Struggle Against Maoist Falsifications of History*, Conference materials, Moscow, 1979.

²⁷ *Sulan xiuzhengzhuyi shixue quangdian pipan*, Issue 1, Peking, 1977.

becoming of a great power with a population of one billion",²⁸ has already brought some fruit: in a growing number of research works and in the shaping of certain tendencies and methods of approach in elucidating separate problems and the history of international relations on the whole. This is why, in our opinion Marxist sinologists face the task of systematically and critically analysing Chinese concepts in the sphere of international relations.

The main tendencies of contemporary Chinese historiography on international relations are determined by the goals and purposes of foreign policy pursued by the Chinese leadership. The first issue of *Shijie lishi* (1979) instructed Chinese scholars to "analyse the development of international relations and the struggle of imperialism for world hegemony, to uncover the causes of international conflicts and wars, to expose imperialism and social imperialism". It was stressed that special attention must be paid to the study of current history "still exerting an influence on present-day international life", "and especially on the struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism, on the history of international relations of the period of imperialism, history after the Second World War".²⁹

Chinese scholars were told directly to take an independent stand in the study of international relations: "Since China is a world power, it must conduct research in all academic disciplines, to make its contribution to scholarship and create its own academic system".³⁰

To a certain extent the field of research has expanded beyond the limits of works of purely anti-Russian and anti-Soviet nature that prevailed in 1977-1978.³¹

Nevertheless, many works are keynoted by the Sinocentrist views on international relations and their history.

Sometimes Chinese scholars enter polemics with bourgeois historiography³², criticise western researchers for "replacing the whole history of international relations with the history of relations of Europe and the USA"³³. However, the views of Soviet researchers are challenged much more frequently. In fact, struggle against Soviet historical science became at the turn of the decade one of the main tendencies in Chinese historiography of international relations.

The polemics with Soviet historical science goes beyond the traditional limits of problems of tsarist Russia's foreign policy and the history of Russian-Chinese relations³⁴ and becomes, in fact, total, embracing ever new spheres; the history of Soviet-Chinese relations, assessment of USSR foreign policy on the eve and during the Second World War, assessment of historical figures (Roosevelt, Churchill), various international events (for example, the Locarno Pact of 1925, causes of France's defeat in 1940, the American lend-lease law, etc.).

A polemic of this kind is not meant to establish the historical truth

²⁸ Zhu Jiqin, "Several Opinions on the Study of the History of China's Foreign Relations", *Xinhua wenzhai*, 1982, No. 12, p. 60.

²⁹ *Shijie lishi*, 1979, No. 1, pp. 4, 5.

³⁰ *Shijie shi yanjiu dongtai*, 1981, No. 3, p. 1.

³¹ For example, in the list of articles about China's foreign relations published in 1978 in the PRC, 15 out of 25 constitute materials of anti-Russian character, while a list of 7 books on the same theme is fully made up of works of anti-Russian contents. See *Jindai shi yanjiu*, 1979, No. 2, pp. 289-290, 310.

³² See Qi Shirong, *The True Image of the Munich Crisis Is Not Easy to Distort. Criticism of Some Widespread Concepts of Historical Works of Western Bourgeoisie*", *Shijie lishi*, 1979, No. 1, pp. 34-45.

³³ *Shijie lishi*, 1981, No. 6, p. 73.

³⁴ Works of this kind continue to be brought out. See Lu Wei, Yan Jianxing, "Soviet Historical Science Defends the Aggression and Expansion of Old Tsars. On Some Questions of History of Tsarist Russia's Expansion in Central Asia", *Hongqi*, 1981, No. 21, pp. 30, 44-48.

within the framework of academic research and is aimed at distorting the motives of the Soviet Union's activity in the world scene and at belittling its part in international life. At the same time, they pursue the aim of "delivering China's historical circles" from the "negative" influence of Soviet historical science,³⁵ thus giving Chinese researchers a pretext to revise their own "biased" views and attitudes of the 1950s as not meeting the demands of Peking's current foreign policy course.

On the whole, it is characteristic of Chinese scholars on the history of international relations that they use historical events to draw parallels with the world situation today and "modernise" the past events in order to help realise the present conceptions of Peking.

Attempts to treat the history of international relations from present-day positions are graphically revealed in a number of works on the history of Sino-American relations. Thus, Wang Xi in the article "On Some Questions of History of Sino-American Relations"³⁶ attempted to portray the US as the only imperialist power that did not engage in territorial usurpation in China, assessed the "open doors" policy, declared by the US, as objectively positive, etc. Such unconcealed bias received a decisive rebuff not only from Soviet,³⁷ but also from Chinese, scholars. Criticising Wang Xi's article as a "classic example of pragmatism", Ding Mingnan and Zhang Zhenkun justly noted that such an approach was not fortuitous. Under the influence of resumption of Sino-American relations and the signing of a peace and friendship treaty with Japan, historians in the PRC began talking that, instead of "a history of aggression by imperialism against China it now behooves them to write also about a 'history of relations and about friendship'", "to look for some normal relations in history".³⁸ Nonetheless, their call not to turn history into "a servant of expediency" was not supported in practice—at best Chinese scholars began to seek a "balanced" presentation of the "history of friendship" and "history of aggression".³⁹

Significant, for example, is the following piece of "methodological advice" offered by Zhu Jieqin: "In studying the history of foreign relations, it is necessary to take into account both peaceful and wartime relations... We cannot onesidedly advertise friendly ties and cultural exchanges between two countries during peacetime and completely pass in silence hostile actions of the two sides during war. However, peaceful relations take a longer time than war relations... Therefore the main content of China's foreign relations consists of the beginning and development of friendship between China and the peoples of all countries..."⁴⁰ Let us note that this recipe by Zhu Jieqin does not apply to the history of Russian-Chinese relations.

One more typical trait of current Chinese historiography of international relations is an excessive stress on military problems, including questions of preparing and waging wars and of their political consequences. Even the significance of studying the history of international relations is seen by Chinese historians mainly in the fact that it allows an "understanding of the types, character, causes, consequences and laws

³⁵ See *Shanxi daxue xiebao*, 1981, No. 3, p. 79.

³⁶ *Shijie lishi*, 1979, No. 3, pp. 12-19.

³⁷ See V. N. Nikiforov, "Contemporary Propagandists of the 'Open Doors' Policy", *Far Eastern Affairs*, 1980, No. 2, pp. 82-89.

³⁸ Ding Mingnan, Zhang Zhenkun, *Study of History of Sino-American Relations: Moving Forward or Backward? "Regarding the Article On Some Questions of Sino-American Relations"*, *Jindai shi yanjiu* (Peking), 1979, No. 2.

³⁹ For example, He Ke in a review of Huang Shaoxiang's book "A Short History of the USA" writes that in the past, especially in the 1950s-1960s, in dealing with Sino-American relations the US was only an object of criticism... In the recent years some people, on the contrary, forget the bad deeds. Such totally positive or totally negative views are incorrect, says the reviewer, *Shijie lishi*, 1981, No. 1, p. 84.

⁴⁰ *Xinhua wenzhai*, 1982, No. 12, p. 60.

of war." And even though a heightened attention to this aspect of international relations is explained by the "noble striving" "to find ways of preventing, postponing or liquidating wars",⁴¹ in reality it is meant in the first place to support the present-day views of the Chinese leadership on the problems of war and peace, to provide a basis for drawing historical parallels. As is known, under "the four" studies were in vogue of Hitler's policy of "creating a show of force in the East and striking in the West".⁴² A parallel is drawn between the Munich deal and the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1975,⁴³ examples are used to prove the infutility of any talks on disarmament.⁴⁴

At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, as before, Chinese scholars devote main attention to the questions of history of international relations of such countries as the USSR, USA, Japan, countries of Western Europe. Countries of other regions are dealt with in this respect only episodically.

Study in 1977-1978 of the history of international relations of tsarist Russia went on in the same way as in the mid-1970s, i. e., with a stress on the "take-over" by Russia of Chinese territory and on Russia's Balkan policy.⁴⁵ There emerged, however, a new tendency: creation of works with a claim to academic solidity. Thus, besides the two first volumes of *The History of Tsarist Russia's Aggression in China* there appeared *Aggression and Expansion by Tsarist Russia*,⁴⁶ *The Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk* and others.

The geography of tsarist Russia's thrusts of expansion that caught the attention of Chinese researchers has been considerably enlarged, and it is clear that the choice of regions has been prompted by the lines of present-day Chinese propaganda, such as the allegedly "growing expansion of the USSR in the Far East and Pacific" and "the USSR strategy of heading south".

Out of the whole complex of USSR international relations and foreign policy Chinese researchers have concentrated in recent years on some questions of Soviet foreign policy in the 1930s-1940s. The interest in the foreign policy of the USSR in the 1930s-1940s has quite a definite political purpose: to prove that historical roots of "Soviet hegemonism" should be sought not only in the actions of tsarist Russia but also in a number of USSR foreign policy actions.

There has been a certain reactivation in recent years in publication of materials on the history of Soviet-Chinese relations and their present status. As a rule, these publications are meant to support the Chinese version of such problems as assessment of the appeal by the Soviet government to the people and governments of South and North China on July 25, 1919 and the appeal to the government of the Chinese Republic on September 27, 1920,⁴⁷ "the Sino-Soviet border issue"⁴⁸, the recall of Soviet specialists from China in 1960.

⁴¹ *Shijie shi yanjiu dongtai*, 1981, No. 3, p. 1.

⁴² See Tong Che, "Hitler's Policy of Creating a Show of Force in the East and Striking in the West, *Xuexi yanjiu*, (Shanghai), 1973, No. 3, pp. 75-77.

⁴³ See Liu Shengjun, *From "Munich" to "Helsinki"*, Peking, 1977, p. 83.

⁴⁴ See Feng Shidan, "People, Be Vigilant!", *Talks about the History of Talks on Disarmament in the 20th Century*, Peking, 1979.

⁴⁵ For example, in 1978 a collection of articles was published from the journal *Lishi yanjiu* for 1974-1977, entitled "World Hegemony--Invariable Goal of Tsarist Russia".

⁴⁶ See, for example, *Shahuang Eguo qinglue kuozhang*, Peking, 1978 Prepared by the historical faculty of Lanzhou University.

⁴⁷ See Fang Ming, "Two Declarations by Soviet Russia to China and the Question of Abolition of Non-Equal Russian-Chinese Treaties", *Lishi yanjiu*, 1980, No. 6, pp. 63-76.

⁴⁸ See "Sino-Soviet Border Question", *Guoji shishi cidian*, p. 85; Li Guichuan, "What Is the Essence of Difficulties at Sino-Soviet Border Talks?", *Guoji wenti yanjiu* (Tianjin), 1981, No. 1, pp. 11-20.

Rapidly increasing is the number of works on the history of US foreign policy. Most attention is drawn by such questions as assessment of the Monroe Doctrine, the US prewar policy and Roosevelt's activities, US policy towards Japan, the problem of the turn in US China policy at the final stage of the anti-Japan war⁴⁹.

In assessing US foreign policy, current Chinese historiography is characterised by a departure from the positions of the 1950s when, according to Chinese researchers, "US history was studied proceeding from the demands of struggle against American imperialism, so that the gist of research boiled down to the exposure and criticism of the nature of American imperialism"⁵⁰.

This tendency is traced in the treatment of the majority of problems. Thus, it is declared that the Monroe Doctrine played "a helpful and protective part in the cause of national liberation of the whole of Latin America in the 1820s", which cannot allegedly be denied on the ground that subsequently US expansion in Latin America took place under the doctrine's protection.⁵¹ Discussing Roosevelt's conception of "shaping the destinies of the world by the great powers", Jin Yonghua declares at the same time that "Roosevelt's neocolonialism... objectively created certain favourable conditions for restoration of the economy of a number of countries and regions after the war, for the embarking... of old colonies on the road of independence".⁵²

An urge, as if inadvertent, is manifest to whitewash US policy towards China. It is said that though in his prewar policy towards Japan "Roosevelt... was influenced by politicians favouring appeasement, on the whole he did not conduct a policy of capitulation in the manner of Chamberlain", in key questions he did not comply with selling China to Japan.⁵³ US lend-lease aid to China is alleged to have "objectively helped the Chinese war of resistance, the leaning back on the dollar was one of the reasons why Chiang Kaishek did not compromise with Japanese fascism".⁵⁴

Of course, in the general trend of this kind of research there stand out works of a more objective nature. For example, just criticism of the US neutrality law adopted August 31, 1935, is voiced in articles by Ou Ya and Wang Guizheng⁵⁵ who describe it as "an encouragement of aggression".

It should also be noted that publications on Sino-American relations are used in the PRC to demonstrate from time to time China's "principled positions" in one or another questions. An example of this kind is provided by the article "What's the Stumbling Block in Sino-American Relations?", which criticises the US for its approach to Taiwan.⁵⁶

Much attention is paid in China to research into different aspects and problems of the Second World War. The First National Academic Confe-

⁴⁹ See Wang Jianhui, "The Turn in US China Policy on the Eve of Victory in the Resistance War", *Shijie lishi*, 1982, No. 3, pp. 73-75.

⁵⁰ *Shanxi daxue xuebao*, 1981, No. 3, p. 79.

⁵¹ See Zhu Liming, "On the Essence and Role of the Monroe Doctrine", *Shijie lishi*, 1981, No. 5, pp. 49-55.

⁵² *Shijie xiandai shi lunwenji*, Peking, 1982, pp. 130, 136.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 340 (Deng Shusheng's article "American-Japanese Relations Before the War in the Pacific"). This version is not correct. See *International Relations in the Far East*, Book 2, 1917-1945, Moscow, 1973, pp. 169-173.

⁵⁴ Yang Jianzeng, "A Short Review of the Role of Lend-Lease Aid During the Second World War", *Shanxi daxue xuebao*, 1982, No. 3, pp. 110-115, 94.

⁵⁵ Ou-Ya, "On the American Neutrality Law of the 1930s", *Shijie xiandai shi lunwenji*, pp. 99-120; Wang Guizheng, "American Policy of Appeasement in the 1930s", *Jilin daxue xuebao*, 1979, No. 2, pp. 87-96.

⁵⁶ *Guoji wenti yanjiu*, 1982, No. 2, pp. 3-7. See also Zi Zhunun, "Trial by History. US Policy Towards Taiwan During the Emergence of New China", *Guoji wenti yanjiu*, 1982, No. 3, pp. 34-42.

rence on the Second World War (Harbin, 1979) heard reports on such questions as causes, essence, the beginning and its division into periods of the war; the policy of "appeasement" by Britain, France and the USA before the war; the importance and place in the war of the Chinese front and of the anti-fascist liberation war of oppressed peoples. The participants in the conference vowed to focus subsequent works on "academic historical assessment" of the major problems of the Second World War, on the analysis of the causes and historical lessons of the war.⁵⁷ Examined in more detail were the causes of France's quick defeat in 1940, the war in the Pacific, the question of decisive factors of Japan's capitulation. They make no bones in China about contemporary political bias in pursuance of this theme as a whole.⁵⁸

One of the main goals of Chinese researchers is the pushing of the idea of a greater importance of the Chinese front in the Second World War than is currently recognised in foreign historiography.

A whole number of methods are used to advance this purpose. One of them are attempts to move the date of the beginning of the war back to July 7, 1937, or even September 18, 1931, i. e., in any case to geographically move the initial point of the war to China. It must be said that even in China itself far from all researchers support this idea, which has no historical basis.

Another typical method is the denial of understanding "in the West" of the specifics of China's war of resistance to Japan as a "special form of waging war—a prolonged people's war", which explains an absence of major battles on the Chinese front, like the battle of Stalingrad.⁵⁹ Here they argue, in fact, not only with Western, but also with Soviet scholars who hold that "even on the Asian theatre the Chinese front was not of paramount importance. As a matter of fact, during the entire war Chinese troops did not conduct a single serious strategic operation".⁶⁰

The Chinese authors, on the contrary, claim that "prior to the unleashing of the Pacific war, the Chinese front had turned to the principal front of struggle against Japanese fascism; after the Pacific war started, it remained the main front of struggle against the Japanese aggressors in Asia".⁶¹

They insistently assert the idea that "without the Chinese people's heroic war of resistance Japan... would have invaded India and Australia and attacked the Soviet Union in the north".⁶² Finally, special stress is put on "proving" the decisive part of China in defeating Japan and at the same time, on belittling the importance of the Soviet Union in that.

Studies in the PRC of present-day international relations are openly biased. In fact, they do not go beyond interpretations and explanations of foreign policy conceptions of the Chinese leadership, their views on certain events and problems. It is significant that in contrast to study of the history of international relations, works on today's topics practically lack discussion and difference of opinion.

In spite of a formally wide range of investigations, their main ideas are few and limited by asserting of such propaganda slogans as growing tension in the world as a result of "the struggle for hegemonism" between the USSR and the US; the development of the world situation from "bi-polarity" to "multi-polarity"; the growing role in world affairs of China, pursuing an "independent and self-relied" foreign policy. On the

⁵⁷ See *Shijie lishi*, 1979, No. 5, p. 8.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 1980, No. 4, p. 13.

⁶⁰ *History of the Second World War. 1939-1945*, Vol. 11, Moscow, 1980, p. 461.

⁶¹ *Shijie lishi*, 1980, No. 4, p. 7.

⁶² *Di er ci shijie dazhhan*, p. 718.

whole, this line is continued in the materials published after the 12th CPC Congress as well.

A post-congress trait touches directly on China's role on the world scene. In 1981 it was declared that "China pins down the absolute majority of Soviet land forces in the Far East, and Japan and the US will continue to use this situation".⁶³ After the congress such overtly pro-imperialist formulations are no longer used in view of their clear disagreement with the Chinese claims to an "independent and self-relied" foreign policy; on the contrary, it is underscored that in relations with both the US and the USSR "China takes a principled position, that is, makes a connection between the development of state relations and the struggle against hegemonism".⁶⁴

We have touched on just some aspects of presentation of problems of international relations and their history by PRC publications in recent years. Undoubtedly, this work needs to be continued and deepened.

V. ZHURAVLYOV

63. Zhou Zhixian, "Outlook of Japanese-American Relations," XIANDAI GUOJI GUANXI (Luncong), 1981, No 1, p 21.

64. GUOJI WENTI YANJIU, 1983, No 1, p 10.

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CHINESE PERIODICALS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST 'SPIRITUAL CONTAMINATION'

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[Article by V. V. Il'in]

Lately the Chinese mass media is devoting much attention to the so-called problem of "spiritual contamination". The struggle against this phenomenon is closely connected with the task to "adjust" the Communist Party of China, set forth at the 2nd Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC of the 12th convocation held in Peking on October 11-12, 1983.

Speaking in Peking at a conference of China's democratic parties soon after the Plenary Meeting, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Peng Zhen noted the need to solve two basic tasks in the course of the Party's "adjustment"—to strengthen party ranks and to liquidate "spiritual contamination". The struggle against "spiritual contamination" is now regarded in the PRC as an important precondition for solving the task of "adjusting" the party, as a guarantee that the country's socialist modernisation will be successfully carried out.

The content of the phenomenon which is known in China as "spiritual contamination" is interpreted very broadly. The Chinese press mentions various categories of ideological errors, mistakes and even crimes that are related to "spiritual contamination". Thus, Member of the Secretariat of the CPC CC, head of the propaganda department of the CPC CC Deng Liqun while speaking with foreign correspondents mentioned four categories of "spiritual contamination": "unseemly, barbarous actions and essentially reactionary phenomena"; "vulgar tastes in works of art in which people are treated to perversion"; "pursuit of personal welfare"; "oral or published statements running counter to socialist ideals".

The CPC CC's magazine *Hongqi* cites the following categories of "spiritual contamination": "everything is measured in terms of money and an attempt is made to fully convert the product of spiritual activity into a commodity"; "a confusion of good and bad is observed in printed matter, and obscenity is holding full sway"; "there are visibly more superstitious people now in the countryside and in some towns, and sorcerers, soothsayers and the like have reappeared"; "immorality, flippancy and vice are flourishing in the world of literature and art, and such obscene things as pornographic pictures are being circulated illegally"; "somebody is vigorously introducing a motley of bourgeois ideas into philosophy and other social sciences. This has become almost a vogue among theoreticians. Such harmful ideas in the theoretical field of social sciences are a source of their contamination, and this has far-reaching consequences"!

Speaking on the causes of such phenomena in society, which necessitate a large-scale campaign of struggle against them, Deng Liqun, during the already-mentioned conversation with correspondents, noted that among them was the harmful heritage of the past. Moreover, he stated that these social diseases have become much worse lately. Deng

Liqun also noted the negative consequences of extensive ties with the capitalist world.

The present-day course of the Chinese foreign economic policy of extending ties with foreign countries, primarily with the West, which is viewed in the PRC press as one of the causes of the "spiritual contamination", has as its aim the development of the PRC's trade, economic, scientific and technical ties first of all with developed capitalist countries and the importation of advanced technology and managerial know-how from there. The PRC also is interested in attracting foreign capital, in particular in the form of mixed enterprises and so-called "special economic zones", and foreign capital is offered very attractive investment terms. But at the same time advertisement of the Western way of life filters into China and exerts a deforming influence on various sections of Chinese society, first of all on young people.

As reported by the Chinese press, public opinion polls conducted among young people in many parts of the country show that many young people desire only enrichment, are succumbing to the corrupting influence of the capitalist "consumer society" and departing from the spiritual ideals of socialism and communism.

All this gives rise in the country to serious concern, even to alarm. For the young people are society's future. *Hongqi* notes: "The 'spiritual contamination' poses a particular threat to young people. The negative impact of the cultural revolution has not yet been overcome and this problem has acquired special urgency at a time when a policy of expanding ties with abroad is being pursued. Young people who have been exposed to the poison of the ideas of bourgeois liberalisation try to shirk civic duties and take the road of the so-called emancipation of the individual and solitary fighter. Some young people, on reading philosophical works and fiction which glorify nihilism and decadent moods treat life as if it were a dream, are ideologically confused and even try to find solace in religion".² The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Young Communist League of China, Wang Zhaoguo, noted the exceptional importance of struggle against "spiritual contamination" among young people.³

Paramount importance is now being given to the search for a solution to the problem of "spiritual contamination". *Hongqi* stresses that "spiritual contamination" has already acquired a threatening and intolerable scope".⁴ This epidemic is spreading to various segments and groups of Chinese society and has not left the CPC itself unscathed.

The PRC press persistently conveys the thought that the vast majority of Communists belong to the categories of "good" and "comparatively good" people and that only very few of them defy education and should be expelled from the party. It is contended that all members of the CPC are divided into two groups: the first consists of party veterans, people who have gone through the period of revolutionary struggle and economic construction, through the crucible of domestic political events. It is said about them that they have revolutionary steeling but supposedly cannot always keep pace with the development of events. The second group consists of younger party members, mostly those who joined the CPC during the "cultural revolution" (1966-1976). This group in the CPC (and it numbers more than 17 million) is regarded as not being sufficiently steeled ideologically. It is with due account of this situation that concrete directions of ideological and educational work with party members are being planned.

² *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 20, p. 37.

³ See *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 6, 1983.

⁴ *Hongqi*, No. 20, p. 35.

According to reports in the Chinese press, the question of "spiritual contamination" in the style of work of the party apparatus at various levels is acute, this expressing itself in such phenomena as red tape, factionalism, parochialism, etc. It is admitted that this actually threatens the ideological, political and organisational unity of the party and greatly impedes the solution of many tasks of economic development in the country. In this connection the Peking *Guangming ribao* notes with alarm: "It cannot be said in any way that at present there are no people in the CPC who are engaged in sectarianism, parochialism or factionalism. These people continue to substitute factionalism for party cohesion, approach everything from the viewpoint of factionalism, give posts to those who are close to them, snub outsiders, form groupings and seriously jeopardise the party's cohesion and unity and the consistent pursuance of the party's line, course and policy".⁵

Materials about all sorts of economic offences appear quite often in the Chinese press. Thus, there are quite a few among the party cadres (*ganbu*) who use their position for personal enrichment. The so-called "back door" system has become quite widespread in the country, this referring to the use of personal connections to illegally acquire various benefits in life. This can be encountered when one tries to enroll at an establishment of higher learning, when one seeks employment or promotion, when housing is being allocated, when one wants to buy goods that are in short supply, etc. The *China Daily* notes that this system makes it possible to quickly achieve something that otherwise would appear impossible, that it undermines the prestige of the party and relations between cadres and the masses and contradicts socialism. It added that high-placed cadres are also involved in such activity.⁶

The so-called "theory of alienation under socialism" is discussed ever more frequently in Chinese newspapers and magazines. The essence of this "theory", according to the PRC press, manifests itself in works on problems of social sciences, in works of art. As is known, alienation is an objective social process inherent in a society with antagonistic classes. Under this process the activity of man and its result turn into an independent force hostile to man. The sources of this phenomenon are rooted in private ownership, in the antagonistic division of labour. Alienation manifests itself in the domination of materialised labour over living labour, in the lack of control over the conditions, means and output of labour, in the turning of the individual into an object of manipulation by the ruling classes. Alienation reflects itself in the individual's consciousness in the form of a sense of apathy and loneliness. It is a source of various vices, of the striving to dominate others, etc.

Socialism destroys the main causes of alienation—exploitation and private ownership, and in the course of its development leads to the total overcoming of alienation. But if we are to judge by reports in the Chinese press the possibility of avoiding alienation under socialism is being questioned in some circles in the PRC, especially among intellectuals dabbling in theory.⁷

The extensive spreading of this type of "spiritual contamination" is illustrated by, for instance, the fact that even the Chairman of the All-China Association of Literature and Art, Zhou Yang, was forced to engage in self-criticism and admit that his "pronouncements on alienation in socialist society have created a certain degree of ideological confusion".⁸

Also vigorously criticised in the Chinese press is the principle of so-

Guangming ribao, Nov. 8, 1983
China Daily, Aug. 4, 1983
Renmin ribao, Nov. 6, 1983

called "bourgeois humanism". It is maintained that this false principle is incompatible with the tasks of struggle against criminals and individuals harming the cause of China's socialist modernisation. At the same time some articles stress the need to distinguish "bourgeois humanism" from socialist humanism.

Speaking of "spiritual contamination" in the field of literature and art, *Hongqi* notes that "ideas of bourgeois liberalism, anarchism and nihilism have crept into works of fiction and articles dealing with theory". Some works, the magazine says, deny the existence of irreconcilable class contradictions. Other publications openly propagandise Social-Darwinism, presenting relations between people in socialist society as a struggle for existence. Also encountered are views devoid of historical materialism which interpret the shortcomings objectively inevitable for a new socialist society as it develops along untrdden paths as the process of "alienation" which is supposedly intrinsic to socialism. These distorted views, *Hongqi* points out, are in effect a propaganda of mistrust of the cause of socialism and communism in China, of the CPC's guidance.⁸

When analysing the process of "spiritual contamination" among art workers the PRC Minister of Culture Zhu Muzhi mentioned two of its main forms: first, departure from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, propaganda of "bourgeois humanism" and the theory of "alienation"; second, propaganda of moral depravity, false values, the cult of violence and ideals of the "bourgeois consumer society".⁹

Thus, as it is interpreted in the Chinese press, "spiritual contamination" in the field of literature and art is associated with the country's infiltration by ideas of bourgeois art and bourgeois ideology as a whole. In one of its issues *Renmin ribao* printed a commentary specially devoted to the struggle against negative phenomena in literature and art. The commentary mentioned that a number of creative workers were propagandising the concept of the "three nos": not to deal with complex issues; not to go into details; not to deal with persons. The paper adds that "these people are against the folk principle in art, against the national specificities of art and are engaged in a propaganda of modernism, irrationalism, etc."¹⁰

The press stresses that by wishing literature and art to serve the aims of developing socialism, the leadership of the PRC and the CPC are pursuing a known policy according to the formula "let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools compete". It is said that this course presupposes the development of art in the spirit of socialist principles, that socialism is not just "one of the hundred schools" and that such an approach is impermissible. Thus, *Hongqi* points out: "Purification from 'spiritual contamination' means a battle on the front of ideology in new historical conditions. Undeviating adherence to the course of 'let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools compete' is the main method of conducting this struggle. But with a socialist system and the guiding role of the Communist Party, Marxism is not merely one school out of a hundred because Marxism ought to occupy the leading place in the sphere of ideology. The perception of the course of 'the two hundred' as an encouragement of absolute freedom to disseminate false ideas, as impermissibility of Marxist criticism and struggle against them is either a serious delusion or a distorted understanding of the CPC's course".¹¹

⁸ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 20, p. 36

⁹ *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 2, 1983

¹⁰ *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 31, 1983

¹¹ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 20, p. 38.

Many prominent cultural figures in China are already calling for struggle against "spiritual contamination". The speech by He Luding, the rector of Shanghai Conservatory and one of the oldest performers and composers in the PRC at a meeting to celebrate the 60th anniversary since the beginning of his creative activity, was made precisely in this spirit.

The PRC's mass media reports that "spiritual contamination" has affected the field of social sciences as well. Under the pretext of working out a concept of "socialism with Chinese specifics" PRC scholars in recent years have been studying intensely works of foreign scholars, mostly bourgeois sociologists and economists. As a result, a number of Chinese sociologists have begun to gravitate towards a total negation of the general laws of socialist construction and the experience accumulated both in the PRC and in other socialist countries in the course of economic development. They declare that the experience of real socialism supposedly is unsuitable for the PRC's conditions and put the accent exclusively on the specificities of China.

In this connection the prominent Chinese economist Liu Guoguang writes: "Waverings about the fundamental ideas of Marx have arisen among Chinese economists as a result of the spreading in the PRC of the views of bourgeois scholars. A small number of comrades are of the opinion that it is altogether impossible to build socialism in the PRC, that only capitalism can be built here; they reject economic planning and say that the country's material and technical potential is insufficiently developed for a planned economy".¹² The danger of "spiritual contamination" resulting from the dissemination of Western bourgeois ideas in China was pointed out also by the President of the Academy of Social Sciences of China Ma Hong in one of his speeches devoted to issues of strategy of economic, social, scientific and technological development. Questions of the struggle against "spiritual contamination" among sociologists were also touched upon in the speech made at Nanking University by Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC CC, Rector of the Higher Party School at the CPC CC Wang Zhen. He even spoke of the need to conduct a purge among social science teachers. He said some scholars in the PRC were "engaged in anti-Marxist activity under the guise of teaching Marxism", that they were "spreading erroneous theories which run counter to Marxism-Leninism". Wang Zhen called for a "clear-cut and bold position in the struggle against bourgeois liberalisation" and for the "creation of a strong detachment of Marxist theoreticians".¹³

Now that a search is under way in China for the best methods for solving the tasks of the country's modernisation, the social sciences could play an important positive role in this search. But the penetration of "spiritual contamination" into this sphere, certain PRC scholars' infatuation with the ideas of bourgeois researchers can, of course, only bring about certain difficulties in the development of the social sciences in the country and impede the fulfilment by these sciences of the progressive function.

The Chinese press believes that "spiritual contamination" manifests itself also in the growth of the so-called economic crimes in the PRC, including smuggling, profiteering, bribe-taking, extortion and various financial machinations. In the opinion of the PRC press the soil for such crimes is created by the remnants of "leftist" ideology, the heritage of the "cultural revolution" and also by the active expansion of ties with the capitalist West. These causes are similar to those mentioned to ex-

Renmin ribao, Nov. 8, 1983.
See *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 24, 1983.

plain the origination of other types of "spiritual contamination". Members of various segments of Chinese society have been found to be involved in economic crimes. Thus, there is nothing unusual about high-placed officials using their position for personal enrichment when dealing with foreign businessmen.

Some types of economic crime, writes *Renmin ribao*, such as smuggling, are directly connected with the attraction of foreign capital to China, the creation of "special economic zones" in the PRC and the considerably intensified activity of foreign businessmen of Chinese origin. The number of channels through which contraband goods reach China increases with the expansion of economic contacts with the West. Here are examples given by the Chinese press: machinations by high-placed officials of the Shenzhen company for the import of electronics and the Shenzhen branch of the PRC Ministry of the Electronic Industry for the storing and transportation of raw materials were uncovered in Shenzhen which borders on Hong Kong and where the PRC's biggest "special economic zone" has been set up. The criminals smuggled into the PRC from Hong Kong large shipments of household electronics and sold them on the black market. Moreover, they engaged in currency machinations and committed other crimes. The loss to the state amounted to several million dollars.¹⁴ During the past three years PRC customs authorities confiscated more than 54,000 works of applied art, more than a ton of gold, more than 1.5 tons of silver and many other valuables which smugglers tried to take out of the country.¹⁵

Data published in a report of the Central Commission of the CPC for monitoring discipline gives an idea of the scope of economic crime in the country in general. More than 192,000 economic crimes were uncovered in the period from early 1982 to April 1983. Money and valuables to the sum of more than 410 million yuan were confiscated from the criminals. More than 8,500 people were expelled from the CPC for participation in economic crimes.¹⁶

While mounting a struggle against economic crimes and other types of "spiritual contamination" the PRC has not made it a goal to scale down ties with the capitalist world. *Hongqi* stresses that "to carry out the socialist modernisation China needs to attract advanced technology, experience of organising production and other useful things from capitalist countries but under no circumstances should the capitalist way of life and the corrupt and decadent ideology of capitalism be attracted to the PRC".¹⁷

Since "spiritual contamination" is interpreted in the PRC press as a phenomenon "totally incompatible with communist ideology"¹⁸ the struggle against it, against economic crimes and abuses, which complicate economic development in China, is regarded as a certain form of class struggle in new historical conditions.¹⁹

The Chinese mass media is calling for an invigoration of ideological work. In the already-mentioned conversation with foreign journalists, Member of the Secretariat of the CPC CC Deng Liqun spoke about the need of drawing a clear line between various categories of "spiritual contamination". According to him, while the application of criminal legislation was necessary to remove some of them, the other required intensified ideological work. A characteristic speech in this respect was made by Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC CC, Chief of the Main

¹⁴ See *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 23, 1982

¹⁵ See *Ibid.*, July 27, 1983.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*

¹⁷ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 20, p. 36

¹⁸ *Ibidem*

¹⁹ See *Guangming ribao*, Aug. 22, 1983

Political Administration of the People's Liberation Army of China Yu Quili. In this speech he dwelt on the ways for "adjusting" the party. He stressed that "to adjust the party it is necessary first of all to organise the study of the relevant documents".²⁰ Yu Quili was referring to documents that communists are obliged to study in accordance with the decisions of the 2nd Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC of the 12th convocation and the Central Commission that was formed under it to supervise the "adjustment" work in the party.²¹

The PRC mass media contends that the struggle against "spiritual contamination" will be carried out mostly by peaceful means and refutes the viewpoint held in the West that the struggle will develop into a large-scale campaign similar to the "cultural revolution". Judging by the PRC press reports the campaign of struggle against "spiritual contamination" in China is becoming an important element of the present stage of "adjustment" in the CPC.

²⁰ *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 4, 1983

²¹ *Renmin ribao*, Oct. 24, Nov. 9, 1983.

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FORUMS OF PRC SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PAST YEAR

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[Article by O. B. Gorodovikova, T. M. Yemel'yanova, V. N. Usov, candidate of historical sciences, and T. V. Kharitonova]

[Text] Congresses and forums of several mass social organizations in China--professional, youth and women's--were held last year. All of the forums were convened at the regular times stipulated in their charters, and this attests to efforts to revitalize the work of PRC mass organizations and to put these organizations at the service of CCP and PRC domestic and foreign policy. The revitalization of social organizations is also in the interest of the Chinese laboring people, who associate these organizations with their memories of the first half of the 1950's--a period of flourishing social activity aimed at the construction of the bases of socialism in China, which was then following the road to progress along with the countries of the world socialist system. The charter documents adopted in 1983 by PRC social organizations brought federations closer to the organizational forms of the 1950's, but they stated the aims of social organizations in the spirit of current party and governmental policy, the basic directions of which were formulated at the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee in December 1978. As we know, this plenum resolved to move the "center of gravity of all party work" to the accomplishment of the "four modernizations," simultaneously envisaging the extensive development of various forms of social activity aimed at the attainment of this objective.

The plenum ceased the previous practice of "mass movements" organized outside the framework of the party and social organizations. In the foreign policy sphere the plenum adopted a resolution to commend the "accuracy and effectiveness of the foreign policy line of the party and country," with the underlying motive of "struggle against hegemonism," a term generally used in political documents and the press to signify the policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

10th Congress of All-China Federation of Trade Unions

The 10th Congress of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) was held in Beijing from 18 to 29 October 1983. It was held 5 years after the previous,

9th ACFTU Congress.¹ The congress was attended by 2,326 people--1,998 delegates representing more than 73.3 million members of Chinese trade unions, and 328 invited guests.

These delegates were 1,014 union workers, 236 union activists, 394 outstanding workers, 301 representatives of the intelligentsia and 54 others.² Around 31.4 percent of the congress delegates were not party members, 588 were women, 244 represented non-Han ethnic groups, 13 represented Taiwan, 20 represented the huaqiao and 4 represented mixed enterprises. The Chinese press gave the ACFTU congress broad coverage and noted that 660 of the delegates were under the age of 35, and the average age of all delegates was 41.1. Besides this, it pointed out the fact that 550 delegates had a higher and secondary specialized education.

Congress guests, according to the Chinese press, were veterans of the labor and union movements in China, workers and employees from Hong Kong and Macao and self-employed craftsmen.

The composition of the congress delegates reflected several features characteristic of the present state of the union movement in the country. Congress delegates were elected "as a result of repeated discussions and consultations"; congress delegates represented 29 union organizations in provinces, autonomous regions and cities of central jurisdiction, and only 2 sectorial unions (railroad and civil aviation workers); the individual sector was represented for the first time in ACFTU history.

The agenda included the following items: 1) the discussion of the accountability report of the 9th ACFTU Executive Committee; 2) the discussion and adoption of the charter of Chinese trade unions; 3) a report on the financial activity of trade unions; 4) the election of new members to the ACFTU Executive Committee and Auditing Commission.

The opening ceremonies were attended by PRC party and government leaders. Foreign journalists accredited in Beijing were invited to the ceremonies. The congress was greeted on behalf of the CCP Central Committee and PRC State Council by PRC Chairman Li Xiannian, member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Central Committee Politburo. The delegates heard the accountability report of the 9th ACFTU Executive Committee (the speaker was ACFTU Chairman Ni Zhifu), reports on the financial activity of Chinese trade unions (Jiang Yi, speaker) and on ACFTU international contacts (Qian Dadong, speaker) and others. In addition to union activists, other speakers were Chairman Zhang Jinfu of the State Economic Committee, member of the PRC State Council; Vice President Zhao Dongfan of the PRC Academy of Sciences; PRC Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian Qichen; First Secretary of the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) Central Committee Wang Zhaoguo; Deputy Chairman of the WFPRC Zhang Guoying; Deputy Chief of the PLA Main Political Administration Huang Yukun; Deputy Chief Lin Jianqing of the Political Studies Department of the CCP Central Committee Secretariat; and others.

The congress had the job of summarizing the experience of the labor movement and all trade-union activity since the 9th ACFTU Congress (October 1978) and

of defining the policy line and aims of the labor and union movement during the "new stage of development." The congress, according to Li Xiannian, was supposed to play "an important stimulating role" in the unification of Chinese workers and employees for the accomplishment of socialist modernization and the fulfillment of the 12th CCP Congress objective of quadrupling the gross product of industry and agriculture by the end of this century.

The top trade-union leadership was almost completely renewed at the 10th congress. A new executive committee of 241 members and 83 alternate members and a ACFTU auditing commission of 42 members were elected. At the first plenum of the 10th ACFTU Executive Committee on 29 October 1983, Ni Zhifu (member of the CCP Central Committee and member of the 12th CCP Central Committee Politburo) was elected chairman, and Gu Dachun, Wei Jianxing (alternate member of the CCP Central Committee), Luo Gan (alternate member of the CCP Central Committee), Wang Chonglun (member of the CCP Central Committee), Zhang Ruiying (a woman), Wang Jiachong and Jiang Yi were elected deputy chairmen. The members of the secretariat will be Ni Zhifu (first secretary), Wei Jianxing, Luo Gan, Wang Chonglun, Zhang Ruiying, Zhang Bingquan, Liu Shi, Wang Shenxiang, Wang Xiun, Zhang Fuyou and Liu Xuebao (a woman). The plenum also elected 34 members of the executive committee presidium and leadership of the ACFTU Auditing Commission (chairman--Huang Minwei, member of the CCP Central Committee Central Commission for the Verification of Discipline; deputy chairmen--Mu Qibin, Wang Yongcheng and seven members of the standing committee).⁴

The decisions of the 10th ACFTU Congress reflected the attempts of the CCP leadership to change the emphasis in trade-union policy.

The congress requested the working class and trade unions of China to reinforce ideological and political work. The need for more extensive ideological and political work among workers and employees is now regarded as a means of ideologically consolidating working class ranks and is associated directly with the need for economic reforms and, consequently, for the "modernization" of the country.

In his speech at the congress, Li Xiannian said that the "noxious influence of the Cultural Revolution" is still present in the minds of workers and employees and that their thinking is subject to the decaying effects of bourgeois ideology. Li Xiannian laid special stress on the fact that ideological and political work among the broad masses of workers and employees, particularly the younger generation of workers, should be closely related to the need for "a struggle against spiritual contamination" and "a struggle against bourgeois ideological infiltration."⁵

When Ni Zhifu discussed the "negative influence of anarchism and extremism" on part of the working class, he said that it would be necessary to "elevate the class consciousness" of workers and employees by teaching the working class to accept its "historic place" and "historic responsibility" for the accomplishment of the "four modernizations." In his words, working class "awareness" should take the form of "self-sacrifice" to the cause of the "four modernizations."

In the accountability report of the ACFTU Executive Committee and the speeches presented by First Secretary Wang Zhaoguo of the CCYL, Deputy Chief Huang Yukun of the PLA Main Political Administration and Deputy Chief Lin Jianqing of the Political Studies Department of the CCP Central Committee Secretariat, the importance of stronger ideological and political work among the broad masses of workers and employees on the basis of the CCP Central Committee's "Theses of Ideological and Political Work Among Workers and Employees of State Enterprises (for experimental use)" (June 1983) was stressed.

The 10th ACFTU Congress adopted a new charter and a number of statutes. The new charter is expanded to 8 chapters and 36 articles. It examines general provisions and the specific matters of union membership, organizational structure, central and local agencies, primary organizations and union funds. A special chapter on "Union Activists and Cadres," consisting of five articles defining the requirements made on union activists and cadres and union responsibilities in the creation of a system for the education and training of activists and cadres was included in the charter for the first time.⁶

Some of the earlier phrases and slogans from the 1978 charter were dropped ("policy is the commanding force," "the continuation of revolution under dictatorship by the proletariat" and others). At the same time, there was no change in the statement that Chinese trade unions must educate the broad laboring masses, "arming the masses of workers and employees with Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong,...strengthening the internal unity of the working class and actively resisting the decaying influence of the bourgeois ideology and all other ideologies having nothing in common with the proletarian ideology." What is more, the new charter adopted by the congress lists "work for the ideological and political education of workers and employees" first among the principal functions of the primary committees of trade-union organizations on all levels.

The accomplishment of the "four modernizations" occupied a special place on the congress agenda. The charter said that in the work of Chinese trade unions "the central place...is occupied by the program for the four modernizations" and that trade unions should base their work "on this policy line."

In the accountability report and the speeches of Zhang Jinfu and congress delegates, much was said about the need to improve product quality, augment production efficiency and improve enterprise operations. In a discussion of the work of trade unions in the production sphere, Ni Zhifu noted the active participation of trade-union organizations on all levels in the economic reform, the organization of labor socialist competition, the movement for efficiency, etc. Between 1980 and 1982, for example, workers and employees in the country submitted 4.33 million efficiency proposals and solved 16,000 technical problems.⁷

The main emphasis in Chinese trade-union activity during the period between the congress, Ni Zhifu pointed out, was placed on the organization of worker and employee representative assemblies (WERA) at enterprises and establishments. These are regarded as a "reinforcement of the democratic system" in the country. By the end of 1982, 200,000 enterprises had WERA's.⁸ It was noted

at the congress that the principal aims of the WERA's were the development of production, the improvement of labor and housing conditions for workers and employees, the improvement of wages, the organization of labor competition, etc.⁹ The charter obligated primary committees of union organizations on all levels "to organize democratic participation by workers and employees in the management of enterprises and establishments." It must be said that the new WERA's, in contrast to the assemblies of the late 1950's, have again (just as at the 9th congress) been divested of all control functions. Whereas the 1957 charter said that the assemblies were a "form...of control over the enterprise administration" (Article 30),¹⁰ the latest charter virtually repeated the wording of the 9th ACFTU Congress: "The trade union will assume responsibility for the functions of a working body of the general enterprise WERA" (Article 26).¹¹

Union organization was the most important aspect of ACFTU activity between the congresses. As Ni Zhifu admitted, "the distinctive feature of the trade union as a mass organization has been seriously underestimated, and this has been reflected in the inability to organize the correct relations between trade-union and party organizations and between government and economic agencies, the inability to base work on the actual level of awareness of workers and employees and their wishes, and the failure to comprehend the need for the very existence of trade unions and their defense of worker and employee interests."¹² Ni Zhifu had to admit that "ultra-leftist errors" with regard to trade unions, taking the form of the denial of "the natural need for union work in the socialist society," committed during the "Cultural Revolution" and prior to it, "inflicted colossal damage."

By the time of the 10th congress, the ACFTU had achieved a certain measure of success in union organization. The number of members of Chinese trade unions is 42 percent higher than in 1979¹³ and is, as mentioned above, over 73.3 million. There are 433,600 trade-union organizations and 5,479,000 labor groups in the country, employing 256,000 cadres and 9.3 million activists.¹⁴ Nevertheless, Chinese trade unions do not encompass all strata of the working class. Around 39.37 million of China's 112.92 million workers and employees (or 34.81 percent) do not belong to unions. The greatest difficulties in the formation of trade unions are encountered at small state, cooperative (or collectively owned) and private enterprises.

Now that national economic sectors and a system of sectorial management have taken shape in China, sectorial unions constitute a matter of special importance. As mentioned above, only two sectorial unions--of railway and civil aviation workers--were represented at the congress. Although the need for sectorial trade associations is not being denied, the objectives of the 9th congress are still in force. The 1983 charter kept the sectorial trade unions under the jurisdiction of the union councils of provinces, cities of central jurisdiction and autonomous regions, and this is a violation of the principles of union organization. The practice of union affairs in the socialist countries testifies that all of the work of trade unions in the organization of socialist competition, the guarantee of safety on the job and the improvement of the material and cultural aspects of worker and employee life should be based on the distinctive features of each sector and be organized according to the sectorial system.

The accountability report of the ACFTU Executive Committee contains a special section on the need for "The Maximum Reinforcement of Union Organization," mainly through "stronger union contact with the masses." Congress speakers said that "deep awareness of the distinctive features of the trade union as an organization" is necessary. The charter adopted by the congress describes trade unions as mass organizations of the working class, overseen by the CCP, organizations representing the working class and displaying concern for it. Nevertheless (and this is extremely important with regard to trade-union work in general), it was stressed that although unions must acknowledge the party leadership, "they should perform their work with energy and initiative, with no fear of independence and responsibility," but with an effort to coordinate the desires and wishes of workers and employees with party policy and "link responsibility to the party with responsibility to the masses."¹⁵ The new charter says much about the reorganization and reinforcement of trade-union organizations on the lowest levels.

For the first time since the 8th ACFTU Congress, activists from among the masses were asked to support trade-union work. The promotion of activists and the training of cadres for work in trade unions constitute a particularly urgent matter in the present-day Chinese labor movement. Congress speakers said that in addition to the ACFTU cadre schools, there are 26 schools for the training of union cadres on the provincial level and 23 of municipal jurisdiction. Besides this, more than 40,000 low-level union organizations have organized short training courses. Between 1979 and 1982 the ACFTU cadre schools trained 4,900 cadres, and provincial and city schools trained 72,000.¹⁶ Concern for the training of union cadres was also expressed in the special section of the charter on "Union Activists and Cadres."

It was noted that some advances had been made during the period between congresses in the organization of social insurance and the resumption of the work to satisfy the cultural demands of the broad laboring masses and improve the working and housing conditions of workers and employees. Prior to the "Cultural Revolution" union funds for socioconsumer purposes came from labor insurance funds. Now these are allocated annually by the Ministry of Finance. Between 1979 and 1982, it was announced at the congress, the ACFTU was allocated 143.54 million yuan for this work.¹⁷ By the end of 1982 union funds had been used for the construction or enlargement of 1,486 clubs and cultural centers, 115 schools for part-time workers and employees, 43 people's universities, 16 sports facilities for workers, 12 scientific engineering stations and 2 international seamen's clubs. During the 4 years, 126 sanatoriums and vacation centers with accommodations for 27,000 were renovated for workers and employees. During this period, more than 600,000 shock workers and production leaders vacationed there. The training of part-time workers and employees was a matter of great concern. Over the 4 years, 4.49 million workers and employees graduated from various schools organized by union organizations on all levels. Around 2.77 million people participated in the exchange of technical experience.¹⁸

The ACFTU has been more active in mass cultural and sports undertakings, but the scales of its activity in this field are obviously inadequate for the more than 70 million Chinese union members. There are several reasons for this,

and financing is one of the main ones. When Jiang Yi addressed the congress, he said that the ACFTU had not had an opportunity to manage its finances independently for 12 years.¹⁹

It was pointed out at the congress that the serious shortcomings still exist with regard to labor safety in several sectors and at several enterprises. In connection with this, it was stressed that "ensuring the safety of production and labor is one of the important ways of protecting the interests of workers and employees."²⁰

The decisions of the 10th ACFTU Congress therefore testify to some changes in the work of Chinese unions. In addition to positive features (the organizational structure of labor organizations, the increase in their membership, the more active work in the sphere of labor safety, the improvement of socioconsumer conditions for the broad laboring masses, etc.), there are also negative developments in the activity of trade unions.

Fifth Congress of Women's Federation of the PRC

The latest, fifth congress of the Women's Federation of the PRC (WFPRC) was held in Beijing from 2 to 12 September 1983.²¹ The congress was convened, in accordance with the WFPRC charter, 5 years after the fourth congress, in September 1978.

The congress was attended by more than 2,000 delegates representing 56 ethnic groups in China. Congress delegates included exemplary workers, outstanding workers, representatives of "model families" and the best workers in various sectors and occupations.

The congress agenda included the following items: 1) the accountability report of the Fourth WFPRC Executive Committee; 2) the adoption of the new WFPRC charter; 3) elections for the Fifth WFPRC Executive Committee; 4) the conferment of awards to outstanding collectives and individuals winning the "March 8th Red Banner" and families earning the "model family" title.

The opening ceremonies were attended by PRC party and government officials. Congress participants were greeted on behalf of the CCP Central Committee by Deng Yingchao, member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo and widow of former Premier of the PRC State Council Zhou Enlai. In her speech, Deng Yingchao said that the CCP Central Committee was constantly concerned about the women of the country, had great hopes for them and wanted them to participate as actively as possible in socialist construction. She asked the women of the country to fight against hegemonism. In China, "hegemonism" is the term now used specifically in reference to many foreign policy moves of the USSR and other socialist countries.

The central matter of concern at the congress was the accountability report of WFPRC Chairman Kang Keqing, "Fighting an Intense and Active Struggle for the Creation of a New Atmosphere in the Women's Movement." The speaker summed up the results of the development of the women's movement in the country after the Fourth WFPRC Congress and noted the great significance of the decisions of the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee and of the role of Chinese women

in the implementation of the "line, course and policy" of the plenum. The speaker also declared that the "decade of troubles" (referring to the "Cultural Revolution"--Author) had seriously hurt the women's movement in the country, but that it was now developing on a "healthy basis." The speaker said that after the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum the number of women workers and employees at enterprises of public and collective ownership rose from 31.28 million in 1978 to 40.93 million in 1982, representing 36.2 percent of the total number of Chinese workers and employees as compared to 32.9 percent in 1978. In the textile industry and trade, women constituted over 80 percent of all the workers. The speaker also mentioned the much more important role of working women in agriculture. As for participation by women in national politics, in 1982 around 20 percent of all the delegates of people's representative assemblies on various levels were women.²²

The accountability report criticized the views of those who believe that women should only keep house and should not work in production. From the congress rostrum, Kang Keqing repeated that the Fourth WFPRC Congress policy line of active involvement by women in the program for the "four modernizations" is "absolutely correct."

Attention was directed to the continuing overt and covert discrimination against women, particularly in employment and education, to the absence of labor safety precautions for working women and to difficulties in the promotion and augmentation of women cadres. Special emphasis was laid on the fact that the overwhelming majority of illiterate people in the country--70 percent of the total 200 million--are women.

Speakers said that some of the feudal customs and beliefs, leading to the view of women as a "lower species," had been "revived after their disappearance following the creation of the PRC." The purchase of brides for money, the sale of women, the beating of women who give birth to daughters, the murder of female infants and other crimes against women and children have become common. These phenomena were called "intolerable in a socialist country such as China."

The issue of cadres was raised at the congress. As we know, many of the women officials who rose to prominence during the "Cultural Revolution" were subjected to purges, and the present Chinese leadership is extremely interested in training new women administrators from among the "best representatives of the middle and younger generations meeting the necessary business and professional requirements." Federations were charged with the task of "revolutionizing cadres, lowering their age and raising their educational and professional levels." The establishment of various schools and courses was proposed for the "regular and systematic training" of cadres for women's federations.

The transformation of the WFPRC into a "truly mass organization, enjoying prestige and capable of defending the rights and interests of women and children," was discussed.²³ Speakers advised the intensification of activity by women's organizations, particularly on the lowest level, and active cooperation with government agencies in the protection of the legal rights and interests of women and children.

Whereas women's organizations within the country have not been working effectively enough, the international activity of the WFPNC has been intensified perceptibly in recent years. As speakers noted at the congress, China took part in undertakings connected with the International Year of the Child, in UN activity connected with the Decade of Women (1975-1985) and in conferences of several international women's organizations. The accountability report noted that the WFPNC had established contact with 226 organizations working with women and children in 123 countries.

A new WFPNC charter was adopted.²⁴ "The WFPNC," the charter said, "is a CCP-guided mass organization of women workers, employees, peasants and intellectuals and other working women of all nationalities, women patriots who support socialism and support the unification of the motherland, and represents the drive belt connecting the party to the female masses." (The charter adopted at the fourth congress did not contain the phrase about "women patriots who support socialism and support the unification of the motherland.")

Just as in the past, the main objective set for the WFPNC in the new charter is the ideological and political education of women, from the study of Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong to the study of love, marriage, the family and the protection of the rights of women and children.

As for the foreign policy objectives of the WFPNC, the ones recorded in the charter still contain anti-Soviet elements.

New WFPNC administrative bodies were elected at the congress. The new charter abolishes the title of honorary chairman of the WFPNC, which was conferred by a decision of the Fourth All-China Women's Congress on the three oldest members of the Chinese women's movement: Song Qingling (who died in May 1981), Cai Chang and Deng Yingchao. Now that Cai Chang and Deng Yingchao have resigned from their WFPNC offices, they were thanked at the congress for "making a great contribution to the cause of women's liberation."

Kang Keqing, member of the 12th CCP Central Committee, was re-elected chairman of the WFPNC.²⁵ Some 13 women, 3 of whom are members of the 12th CCP Central Committee, were elected to serve as her deputies. Five deputy chairmen were elected to WFPNC administrative bodies for the first time. It is known that some of them are members of the middle generation of cadres and are CCP members. The chairman and her 13 deputies, one of whom is also the first secretary of the WFPNC Secretariat, formed the WFPNC administrative group. Some 42 people were elected to the standing committee. More than half of the new members of this committee (over 60 percent) were elected for the first time. The secretariat, the working body overseeing daily WFPNC work, also has new members. Five of the eight secretaries, including First Secretary Zhang Guoying, were elected for the first time. They are members of the middle and younger generations of cadres, from 39 to 55 years of age, members of the CCP--four joined the party between 1949 and 1961, and one joined in 1980--and have a higher or specialized education.²⁶

In all, 294 people were elected to the Fifth WFPNC Executive Committee--250 members and 44 alternate members. Only a few (around 16 percent) were

members of the fourth executive committee, which numbered 300--245 members and 55 alternates. The rest (around 84 percent) were elected for the first time.

The changes in the composition of the WFFRC Executive Committee attest primarily to the desire of the Chinese leaders to strengthen the party substratum and to give administrative offices in the WFFRC to new people who are more capable, in their view, of promoting Beijing's current policy line within the country and in international affairs among women's organizations and the female masses.

Defining WFFRC objectives for the next 5 years, the congress advised the federation to be guided by the CCP Central Committee Secretariat instruction²⁷ regarding "the unconditional defense of the legal rights and interests of women and children, the guarantee of the healthy growth of the younger generation and the offer of opportunities for women to play a more important role in the construction of a socialist material and spiritual culture." The congress asked the women of the country to elevate their ideological and political consciousness, raise their cultural and scientific level, perfect their professional skills, make use of the rights granted to women by the Constitution of the PRC and by state laws and fight against discrimination.

An analysis of fifth congress documents reveals all of the complexity of the problems connected with the status of women in the PRC. The congress proved that job placement services for women, marriage, childbirth, crimes against women and other issues are extremely urgent matters in present-day China.

An examination of the women's movement in China points up the disparity between women's significant role in the production sphere, which has grown increasingly important in the years of the PRC's existence, and their obviously inadequate role in sociopolitical life.

Sixth Session of the All-China Youth Federation

The Fifth Session of the All-China Youth Federation (ACYF)²⁸ was held 4 years ago, in May 1979, in Beijing. At that time the organization was officially reinstated after its dissolution during the "Cultural Revolution." After the reinstatement of the ACYF, the formation of its administrative organs and the adoption of its charter, activity was launched to restore local organizations on the level of provinces, cities of central jurisdiction and autonomous regions, and then on the lower level.

By April 1981 the ACYF had more than 170 million members. In 1980 the ACYF began to establish closer contact with foreign youth organizations in order to emerge from the isolation to which Chinese youth had been condemned by the "Cultural Revolution" and in order to play a more active role in the international youth movement. Furthermore, contacts with young people in capitalist countries were emphasized. Contacts with some U.S. youth organizations were established first. According to the Chinese press, by spring 1981 the ACYF had relations with 220 youth and student organizations in more than 90 countries.

At a meeting of the ACYF Standing Committee in April 1981, the need to broaden and strengthen federation ties with foreign youth was reaffirmed. Contacts

with overseas organizations were subsequently intensified. Between 1980 and 1983 Chinese youth delegations visited several countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America.

In August 1981, at the second meeting of the Fifth ACYF, changes were made in the federation leadership: Six new deputy chairmen were elected (their predecessors were probably dismissed from office).

The Sixth ACYF Session was held in Beijing from 17 to 24 August 1983 in accordance with the schedule stipulated in the organization's charter. Session meetings were attended by General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee Hu Yaobang, member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo and Premier of the State Council Zhao Ziyang, member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo and Chairman of the PRC Li Xiannian, member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo Peng Zhen, member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee Yu Qiuli, member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo and Chairman of the ACFTU Ni Zhifu, member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Central Commission of Advisers Xiao Ke, member of the CCP Central Committee and PLA representative Liao Hansheng, member of the CCP Central Committee and Chief of the Central Committee Agitation and Propaganda Department Wang Renzhong and others. The list of leaders who attended the ACYF session testifies to the significance that is now being attached to young people and their role in the development of Chinese society.

A report from the CCP Central Committee was presented at the session, just as in 1979, by Deputy Chairman of the PRC Ulanhu, member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo, who asked Chinese youth to "devote every bit of strength to the prosperity and might of the motherland and develop the spirit of patriotism." First Secretary of the CCYL Central Committee Wang Zhaoguo conveyed the greetings of various social organizations and the CCYL Central Committee.

As speakers noted, the session took place in an atmosphere of a continuing search in the country for ways of attaining the ideological, economic, organizational and foreign policy objectives of the 12th CCP Congress of September 1982 and the implementation of its motto of "building socialism with distinctive Chinese features."

The session was officially called to order by former Deputy Chairman of the ACYF Yang Le. Another deputy chairman, Kayum Baodong, presented a progress report on behalf of the ACYF leadership. He summed up ACYF activity in the past 4 years optimistically, stressing that the ACYF was guided in its work by the line of the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee (1978) and that "problems" in the ideological sphere had been overcome during that period. Kayum Baodong remarked that the federation "aided in the creation of a united front of Chinese youth in the new era." His report, entitled "Let Us Unite Young People of Various Nationalities and Various Circles and Devote Our Youth to the Unification, Prosperity and Might of the Motherland," called for the broadest possible united front of "young socialist workers who love their motherland," of "youth supporting socialism and loving the motherland," of "youth supporting the unity of the motherland," including young people in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, and of young representatives of overseas Chinese

emigres. He said that "the banner of patriotism should be raised higher, feelings of passionate love for the motherland should be cultivated in youth, closer contact should be established with young people of various circles and nationalities, and there should be more contact with the youth of various foreign countries." Explaining what he meant by "patriotism" and "love for the motherland," Kayum Baodong mentioned the "need to intensify socialist modernization, fight for the unification of the motherland, including Taiwan, and oppose hegemonism." The report requested all ACYF members to publicize party ethnic policy in detail and "oppose great-Han nationalism." The latter statement seems to indicate that relations between the Hans and the members of other ethnic groups in the country are still strained, and that "great-Han nationalism" is apparently making its presence known in all spheres of national life, and even under the mask of "patriotism." Young people in China constantly encounter a multitude of problems connected with education, employment, housing, leisure, the low standard of living, family life, occupational specialties, bourgeois influence and many others that have not been resolved to this day. The speaker mentioned the need to continue working on these problems.

Speakers at the session noted that the ACYF now has 523 members representing the young people of 56 organizations. The number of committee members belonging to the party and Komsomol has decreased slightly, and there has been a simultaneous increase in the number of young intellectuals, young people from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and patriotic Chinese emigres, attesting to an obvious emphasis on the policy of a "united patriotic front."

A new organization charter was adopted on 23 August 1983. It is slightly longer than the previous one and consists of 5 sections and 21 paragraphs (the previous charter had 4 sections and 16 paragraphs). The preamble, stating the name of the organization and its functions, says that the ACYF "is a patriotic organization of a united front of broad strata of the youth of different nationalities and different circles in our country." The need to "raise the banner of patriotism even higher" has been added to the paragraph on the main functions of the organization. The statement about the need for "struggle against imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism" was left in the new charter, with the addition of the word "racism." Furthermore, "hegemonism" was moved from third place to second. This section has been supplemented with a paragraph which says: "All federation activity will be based on the provisions of the PRC Constitution." The charter stipulates that a session of the federation will be convened once every 5 years (every 4 years in the previous charter). The rights of the ACYF Standing Committee constitute a separate paragraph of three points in the new charter.

For the first time the charter specifically states that one secretary and several deputies will be nominated by the ACYF chairman and approved by the ACYF Standing Committee.

A new section on local ACYF organizations has been added.

This charter, just as the previous one, says that the ACYF should "urge youth to study Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong" (in the previous charter, the "earnest study of Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong"

was one of the principal duties of ACYF members, but now this phrase has been removed from the duty section of the preamble), but the phrase in the previous charter about the need to "raise the great banner of the Thought of Mao Zedong higher" has been left out of the new charter.

New federation leaders were elected at the Sixth ACYF Session. Some 53 people were elected to the standing committee, the number of women members rose to 20 percent of the total (previously 17 percent), and 8 people represent ethnic minorities. The number of deputy ACYF chairmen on the standing committee has been reduced to 11. Three of the former deputy chairmen were re-elected: Li Haifeng, who was also a member of the organizational committee for the 10th CCYL Congress, a member of the 10th CCYL Central Committee and a secretary of the Daqing Oilfield Komsomol Committee, Yang Le and Liu Houming were the only ones who were ACYF deputy chairmen in 1965--that is, before the "Cultural Revolution." Only 11 earlier members of the standing committee remain. In other words, 80 percent of its members are new. Hu Jintao was elected ACYF chairman and he is also a CCYL Central Committee secretary. Kayum Baodong, who is also the ACYF deputy chairman and secretary of the CCYL Central Committee, became a member of the CCYL Central Committee Secretariat at the Third Central Committee Plenum in 1981 and has now been appointed ACYF secretary.

The professional makeup of the deputy chairmen of the Sixth ACYF was reported in the Chinese press. Liu Houming is a writer, Yang Le is a mathematician, Li Furong is a table tennis coach, Wu Yingfu is a docent, Qi Liuyun is a former world swimming champion and Sun Jiachang is a scientific worker. The information about the new ACYF leadership stressed that 60.4 percent of all the members of the standing committee have a specialized and higher education. The average age of committee members is 38.

Foreign correspondents were invited to the ACYF session for the first time in 30 years.

20th Congress of All-China Student Federation

The 20th Congress of the All-China Student Federation (ACSF)²⁹ was held from 18 to 24 August 1983, at the same time as the ACYF session.

The 20th ACSF Congress was attended by 665 delegates and 18 people with conciliation voting rights. They represented 50 million VUZ and tekhnikum students in China.

The congress agenda included a report on the work of administrative bodies, the adoption of a new charter and the election of federation leaders.

The motto of the congress was "Let us raise the banner of patriotism even higher, cultivate the spirit of unity in youth and take the lead in the struggle for Chinese national development."

Leaders of the CCP and social organizations, including Song Renqiong, Wu Xiuyuan, Han Sanchu and others, were invited to the congress.

The opening speech was presented by Deputy Chairman Yuan Chunqing of the ACSF Standing Committee. Congress delegates were greeted by First Secretary of the CCYL Central Committee Wang Zhaoguo and Deputy Chairman of the Chinese Scientific and Technical Society Wang Shuntong. The final speech was presented by Chairman Hu Jintao of the ACYF.

The accountability report was presented by Chairman Lin Yanzhi of the ACSF Standing Committee. He summed up the results of federation work during the past 4 years and defined future objectives. The main objective, according to him, is still the accomplishment of China's "four modernizations." Lin Yanzhi asked young people to earnestly study and master science, technology and other fields of knowledge and to cultivate high ideals. All of this, he said, should be based on "patriotism." The concept of "patriotism" was interpreted as the "correct" use of the efforts and knowledge of student youth for the "rapid eradication of underdevelopment" and the accomplishment of the "modernized construction" of China.

In particular, the students were asked to apply their efforts and knowledge in the most remote parts of the country and to "not be afraid of difficulties," which presupposes, the speaker said, work "in any place where construction of the motherland is going on." This request was designed to overcome the reluctance of educated young people to work in the remote mountainous zones and underdeveloped rural regions of the PRC.

The report asked students to heighten their scientific, technical and general educational knowledge, to develop ingenuity in student activity, to cultivate talent and to popularize the "new morality" in society. It was no coincidence that these matters were raised at the congress: China is experiencing an acute shortage of literate specialists in various industries and agriculture, many young people have no ideals and are studying merely for the purpose of personal financial gain, and violations of law and discipline are commonplace.

Lin Yanzhi asked students to be guided by the party line in education and to adhere firmly to the line of the "three goods" (good development in the moral, physical and mental respects).

In general, the aims of the ACSF are the same as those of the ACYF--namely, unification and the use of knowledge to accomplish the "four modernizations."

A new charter was adopted at the congress. It is only slightly longer than the previous one. It consists of 4 chapters and 15 articles (there were 4 chapters and 12 articles in the 1979 charter). The new charter is based on the previous one.

The statement that students must "raise the banner of Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Zedong higher" has been excluded from the preamble, and the charter therefore says nothing about the ideological basis of the federation. The first article says that the ACSF "is an organization of the student youth of higher and secondary academic institutions, guided by the CCP." According to the old charter, only VUZ students could be members of the federation. This means that secondary school students are again, just

as during the "Cultural Revolution," being allowed to join the federation. Apparently, the reason for the change was the desire to add secondary students to the membership for the purpose of increasing the membership of the student alliance (there are slightly over a million VUZ students in the PRC), otherwise it could not have the same impact as an alliance of 50 million members.

One of the main duties of ACSF members, according to the new charter, is "to publicize and cultivate patriotism and communism." This was not stipulated in the previous charter. The new charter places more emphasis on party guidance. The principal aims and objectives of the federation are stated more precisely and in greater detail. The organizational structure of the federation is clarified.

According to the charter, the ACSF has a system of collective membership. Its supreme organ is the ACSF congress, with its authority spanning 5 years instead of the previous 4. During the period between congresses the work of the federation is managed by a committee which, according to the new charter, will hold a minimum of three plenums during its term in power. This statement was not part of the 1979 charter. In turn, the committee elects a collective member as chairman and several collective members as deputy chairmen. The elected collective members are represented in the committee presidium, which manages the work of the federation between plenums. The implementation of ACSF committee decisions and all daily work are the functions of the secretariat.

In essence, the entire organizational structure of the student federation is now subordinated, just as that of the ACYF, to the basic aim of "turning China into a modernized socialist state."

The 20th ACSF Committee, consisting of 182 collective members, was elected at the congress. Beijing University was elected chairman. The committee membership was completely renewed. Liu Nenyuan was elected chairman of the 20th ACSF Committee. Another 18 students were elected to serve as his deputies.

A joint meeting of the Sixth ACYF Committee and the 20th ACSF Congress delegates was held on 24 August 1983. A report was presented by Deputy Chairman of the PRC and member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo Ulanhu. He summed up the results of the work of these two forums, elucidated the concept of "patriotism" in detail and asked the young people to devote all of their energy to the attainment of the "three objectives" put forth by Deng Xiaoping: the socialist modernization of the country, the unification of the motherland and the struggle against hegemonism in defense of peace throughout the world.

In conclusion, it must be said that the supreme forums of the main PRC mass social organizations in 1983, just as the Chinese Komsomol Congress in December 1982,³⁰ testify to the stabilization of the organizational forms of the political structure with a view to the experience of the 1950's, but on the basis of new political objectives grouped around the policy of "four modernizations" and "Chinese patriotism."

FOOTNOTES

1. The ACFTU was created in May 1925 at the Second All-China Trade-Union Congress. The last ACFTU congress prior to its dissolution during the "Cultural Revolution" was held in December 1957. It was reinstated in 1978.
2. RENMIN RIBAO, 13 October 1983.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 30 October 1983.
5. Ibid., 19 October 1983.
6. Ibid., 24 October 1983.
7. Ibid., 27 October 1983.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. "Eighth All-China Trade-Union Congress. Materials and Documents," Moscow, 1958, p 338.
11. RENMIN RIBAO, 24 October 1983. The 1978 charter said that trade unions should "perform the functions of working organs of worker and employee representative assemblies"--RENMIN RIBAO, 22 October 1978.
12. RENMIN RIBAO, 27 October 1983.
13. Data on the quantitative makeup of the ACFTU at the time of the 9th congress are not available.
14. RENMIN RIBAO, 27 October 1983.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. GONGREN RIBAO, 24 October 1983.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. RENMIN RIBAO, 27 October 1983.
21. The Women's Federation of the PRC, which was originally called the Democratic Women's Federation of the PRC (DWFPRC), was created prior to the

declaration of the PRC, at the All-China Women's Congress in Beijing from 24 March to 3 April 1949. In 1957 the DWFPRC was renamed the WFPRC at the Third All-China Women's Congress.

22. The same percentage of female participation in local assemblies of people's representatives was characteristic of the mid-1950's, which was discussed at the Third All-China Women's Congress in 1957--DRUZHBA, 11 September 1957.
23. Prior to the "Cultural Revolution" the WFPRC was the largest of all social organizations in the country and united around 100 million women. The present number of its members is unknown and it has less contact with the female masses. In particular, the "problems in the coordinated activity of women's federations on the level of the entire country, provinces, autonomous regions and cities of central jurisdiction" were discussed at a session of the standing committee of the WFPRC Executive Committee--ZHONGGUO FONGYU, 1982, No 6, p 6.
24. RENMIN RIBAO, 13 September 1983.
25. Kang Keqing (born in 1912), the widow of famous Chinese military commander Zhu De, was once quite active in politics. During the "Cultural Revolution" Zhu De was criticized by the Red Guards. Kang Keqing was not elected to the CCP Central Committee at the 9th and 10th CCP congresses. After the removal of the "gang of four," she became a member of the 11th central committee and is the deputy chairman of the Sixth CPPCC and the chairman of the All-China National Committee for the Protection of Children.
26. RENMIN RIBAO, 12 September 1983.
27. The secretariat instruction on the work of the WFPRC was drafted in April 1983 and was discussed at the seventh extended meeting of the Fourth WFPRC Standing Committee--RENMIN RIBAO, 27 April 1983.
28. The ACYF was founded in May 1949 as a mass organization of the united front of Chinese youth. It was based on the principle of collective membership. Its members were the Chinese Communist Youth League, the All-China Student Federation, the Patriotic Association of Tibetan Youth, the Young People's Christian League, the Young Women's Christian League, the All-Union Federation of Young Women and the Federation of the Youth of Provinces, Cities and Autonomous Regions. The federation's functions are the cultivation of the spirit of patriotism and internationalism in Chinese youth, the mobilization of young men and women for participation in socialist construction and the expansion and reinforcement of friendly ties with the youth of socialist countries and other states.
29. The ACSF was established in 1919 and re-established in 1949. After the "Cultural Revolution" the federation resumed its work in 1979. The 19th ACSF Congress was held in May of that same year.
30. For a report on the 11th congress, see PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1983, No 2, pp 183-185.

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CHINA'S UNITED FRONT

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 84 pp 150-160

[Article by G. A. Stepanova, candidate of historical sciences]

The People's Democratic United Front was formed on the eve of the proclamation of the PRC, and the 1st session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) played the role of a constituent assembly, which on October 1, 1949, proclaimed the formation of the People's Republic of China.

Unlike trade union, youth and women's organisations, the CPPCC was not formally dissolved during the period of the "cultural revolution". The hongweibings did not persist in their demands for the disbandment of the parties of the Chinese bourgeoisie. At an information conference of the CPC CC on questions of political work held in October 1966, Mao Zedong declared: "I believe that the democratic parties and groupings are better than Peng, Luo, Lu and Yang [he was referring to Peng Dehuai, Luo Ruiqing, Lu Dingyi and Yang Shangkun.—G. S]. The democratic parties and groupings are still needed. Likewise, the People's Political Consultative Conference is also still needed. This must be explained to the hongweibings."

Though not being crushed, the CPPCC and the democratic parties were inactive for all practical purposes since the commencement of the "cultural revolution".

Occasional reports on the participation of various democratic party functionaries in all sorts of protocol activities began to appear in the Chinese press from the early 1970s. Starting with the visit to China by US President Nixon in 1972 all opportunities were used to demonstrate the "activity" of representatives of various circles, usually members of democratic parties, although no mention of the parties themselves was made.

A new wording of the United Front appeared in the 1975 Constitution of the PRC. Instead of the former "People's Democratic Front" it became the "Revolutionary United Front". The same wording was repeated in the 1978 Constitution as well. Many guidelines concerning the United Front dating back to the 1950s were revived soon after the death of Mao Zedong and the removal of the "Four". Mao's article "On the Ten Most Important Mutual Relationships", dated 1956, was published in December 1976. It said in particular that "...as we now see, it appears better to have several parties. The same can be said not only about the past but also about the future, and this means lengthy coexistence and mutual control. ...We deliberately preserved the democratic parties".¹ This publication meant in practice a return to the CPC's policy of coexistence with non-communist parties for a lengthy period of time. In an article commemorating the New Year, 1977, the need was stated of "further expanding the revolutionary united front".² The report to the 11th CPC Congress in August 1977 repeated these points.³

The label of "conducting a capitulatory, revisionist line" was remo-

¹ Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, Vol. 5, Peking, 1977, pp. 354-355 (in Chinese)

² *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 1, 1977.

³ See 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents), Peking, 1977 p. 124 (in Chinese).

ved on the CPC CC's instruction in the spring of 1979 from the working bodies of the United Front dealing with matters of nationalities and religion, and measures were taken to rectify a situation in which "for more than ten years everything was turned upside down". A number of privileges were granted to representatives of the former national bourgeoisie early in 1979: bank deposits, securities and valuables and houses confiscated from them during the "cultural revolution" were to be returned, losses and outstanding payments were to be compensated.⁴ Special stipulations were made concerning their employment at enterprises without any infringement whatsoever of their rights in matters of paid sick leave, medical services, etc. Possibilities were offered for young people from these circles to join the Young Communist League of China and the Communist Party, to get an education and jobs, something that was denied them in the past.⁵ A circular adopted by two departments of the CPC CC—the organisational and of the United Front—instructed party committees to deal with the issue of providing jobs for the former industrialists and merchants, 20 per cent of whom, according to official statistics, were still capable of working.⁶

As it is now contended, work relating to the United Front was resumed after the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC of the 11th convocation held in December 1978. The actions taken in respect to the United Front and its representatives during the past 20-odd years are now described as "leftist" errors committed since the second half of 1957 as a result of the conduct of an "erroneous political struggle" in the United Front Department of the CPC CC in 1962-1964, and as a result of the activities of the "counterrevolutionary faction of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing" during the period of the "cultural revolution".⁷

As different from past years, at the present stage the United Front is called a "United Front in the New Period". A campaign has recently been launched in China to study the *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* during which his speech "The United Front in the New Period and the Tasks of the CPPCC"⁸ is a topic of discussion and comment. According to Deng's formulation, "the United Front... has already become a broad alliance of socialist working people and patriots, who support socialism. It is guided by the working class and rests on the foundation of the alliance of the working class and the peasantry".⁹ This description was made in 1979. A year later, we find changes in Deng's wording: "Our country's Revolutionary Patriotic United Front has an exceptionally broad nature, and has still further consolidated and developed on the basis of socialism and patriotism. We must further intensify the extensive cohesion of the socialist working people, patriots supporting socialism, and patriots supporting the unification of the homeland..."¹⁰

As it is recorded in the Charter of the CPPCC, adopted in 1982, the United Front in China today is a "broadest patriotic united front guided by the Communist Party of China, in which democratic parties take part, as well as non-party democratic individuals, people's organisations, individuals from among the national minorities and patriotic people from various circles, formed from among socialist working people and patriots

⁴ Payment of a fixed interest of 5 per cent annually on the capital owned by the national bourgeoisie by the time of the branch-by-branch transformation of industry and trade in 1956. See V. I. Vanin, *State Capitalism in the PRC*, Moscow, 1974, pp. 196-212 (in Russian).

⁵ See *Renmin ribao*, Jan. 26, 1979.

⁶ See *Ibid.*, Jan. 17, 1981.

⁷ *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 7; *Renmin ribao*, Aug. 19, 1983.

⁸ See *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 20.

⁹ Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works*, Peking, 1983, p. 173 (in Chinese).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 383.

supporting socialism, and patriots supporting the unification of the homeland, including fellow countrymen in Taiwan, Hongkong, Macao and the overseas Chinese".¹¹ As one can see, in the latest definitions of the United Front it is emphasised that it is a broadest front and also that it includes not only "socialist working people", but also patriots of two types: those who "support socialism" and those who "support the unification of the homeland". It is pointed out specially that support of socialism cannot be demanded of the fellow countrymen from Taiwan, Hongkong, Macao and also of the overseas Chinese. The only qualification is that they should "ardently love the homeland, support the unification of the homeland, and even if they do not approve of the socialist system, there must be cohesion with them too".¹²

If we are to speak of the composition of the United Front, then according to the instructions of the General Secretary of the CPC CC Hu Yaobang, it consists of the following ten elements: 1) democratic parties; 2) prominent non-party personalities; 3) non-party cadres from among intellectuals; 4) former Guomindang officers and officials who went over to the side of China; 5) former industrialists and merchants; 6) representatives of the upper strata from among the national minorities; 7) patriotic senior religious leaders; 8) families of those who have left for Taiwan; 9) fellow countrymen in Taiwan, Hongkong and Macao; 10) Chinese who returned to the homeland and Chinese living abroad.¹³ These ten objects of the United Front's work were mentioned in the press also in 1982.¹⁴ In 1983, private industrialists and merchants were added to this list.¹⁵

Numerical evaluations of representatives of the above-mentioned categories of the population belonging to the United Front have appeared lately. They number about 100 million.¹⁶ It is noted that this contingent of 100 million people with representatives virtually in all sections of society in the country and in the foreign Chinese communities, possess "invaluable merits and qualities". As a rule, these are people with a wealth of experience, knowledge and skills in management, and extensive ties both inside the country and abroad. Some of them own capital and are prepared to invest it in China. It is argued that the elevation of their political weight in the country, the granting of various benefits to them, the stirring up of their patriotic sentiments might make them more interested in taking a more active part in society's life. It is recorded in the Charter of the CPPCC that "...at the new historical stage the United Patriotic Front ... continues to be an important miracle-working means in the struggle for rallying the Chinese people, developing the homeland and uniting the homeland...".¹⁷ In China it is believed that with the help of the United Front it is necessary to unite all the forces that can be united, to put into play all positive factors, to turn all passive factors into active ones with the aim of making "a new contribution to the cause of socialist construction, completing the unification of the homeland and defending peace in the whole world".¹⁸

The attention given to the activity of the United Front is illustrated by the CPC CC's holding of a number of national conferences and meetings on this subject. The first national conference after the "cultural revolution" was convened in the summer of 1979. It determined the nature,

¹¹ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 12, 1982

¹² *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 20

¹³ See *Ibid.*, 1983, No. 7

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1982, No. 9

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1983, No. 7

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1982, No. 9

¹⁷ *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 12, 1982

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, June 5, 1983, *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 7, 20

course and tasks of the United Front in the "new period". At another national conference, convened late in 1981 and early in 1982, Hu Yaobang, Ni Zhongxun, Ulanfu and other leaders spoke about the importance and long-term nature of the United Front in the new period and called on the entire Party to create a new situation in the work related to the United Front. A nation-wide discussion on the United Front began late in 1982, and the head of the Department of the United Front of the CPC CC, Yang Jingren, gave a report. In the spring of 1983 the same department organised a discussion of questions of the theory of the United Front that was attended by representatives of ten Chinese provinces and cities. It is noted in the press that in the course of the past three years Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping, Xi Zhongxun and other CPC leaders have voiced many important views on the work of the United Front and that they have also made more than 30 practical remarks concerning the policy of the United Front, in particular in respect to representatives of the former bourgeois intelligentsia, democratic parties, former Guomindangers and religious circles. The press reported that during a discussion in the summer of 1983 Hu Yaobang had issued important instructions concerning the work of the United Front.¹⁹

Such measures were carried out in recent years in respect to representatives of the United Front as a recurrent check and rehabilitation of "unfair, false and erroneous cases", improvement of the living conditions and employment of persons who in the past had been mistakenly referred to as "right-wing elements", rational employment of persons with much managerial experience, deployment and promotion to guiding posts in various fields of intellectuals and non-party personalities, etc.²⁰

The practice of organising discussions and meetings of CPC CC leaders with personalities of the United Front has been resumed. Such a practice had existed before the "cultural revolution". At such consultative meetings the Party and state leaders speak about draft decisions and important documents, about candidates to leading posts on the eve of elections, etc. Such was the case, for instance, on the eve of the 5th and 6th Plenary Meetings of the CPC CC of the 11th convocation (in February 1980 and June 1981) at which important CPC decisions were adopted. Such also was the case with the draft Constitution of the PRC in 1982; a similar conference was held on the eve of the sessions of the National People's Congress and the CPPCC of the 6th convocation in May 1983, and a similar meeting was arranged after the 2nd Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC of the 12th convocation in October 1983.

The resumption of the regular statutory activity of the CPPCC, which is the organisational form of the United Front, is another piece of evidence that the United Front has stepped up its activities in the country. The first session of the CPPCC of the 5th convocation after the "cultural revolution" was held early in 1978. Issues relating to the convening and holding of the session, and also concerning the candidatures to the Standing Committee of the CPPCC were studied at the 2nd Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC of the 11th convocation in February 1978.

Sessions have been held annually after the holding of the 1st session of the CPPCC of the 5th convocation. The latest, 5th session of the 5th convocation was held late in 1982. It adopted the new, currently effective Charter of the CPPCC. The decision to introduce substantial changes in the Charter was adopted at the 3rd session of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC in September 1980. A representative commission consisting of 91 members and headed by the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC Deng Xiaoping was set up for the purpose. In the

¹⁹ See *Renmin zhengzhibao*, Aug. 17, 1983.

²⁰ See *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 7.

report on changes in the Charter, that was made at the session "on the construction of the Chairman of the Commission Deng Xiaoping" by Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC Lin Lantao, the need of introducing changes in the 1978 Charter was explained by the fact that "the activities of the CPPCC have developed extensively and the work to strengthen the United Front and the CPPCC has entered a new historical stage of its development after the rout of the counterrevolutionary grouping of Jiang Qing and especially since the time of the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the CPC CC of the 11th convocation following the tremendous changes in the country in the sphere of politics, economics and culture. The new situation and the new tasks demand that they be reflected in the Charter of the CPPCC". The report stated that an unprecedented amount of effort had been expended to glean opinion on changes in the Charter.²¹

The new Charter of the CPPCC was adopted on December 11, 1982. It states that the CPPCC is an "organisation of the patriotic United Front of the people of China", "an important form of the manifestation of socialist democracy in political life" and that the CPC, pursuing the course of "lengthy coexistence and mutual control" with various democratic parties and non-party personalities, holds consultations on the political course of the state and the life of the people and raises the role of these parties in intensifying democratic control over the activity of the state apparatus by way of making proposals and critical remarks. As it is stated in the General Programme of the Charter, the CPPCC will further develop its role in accelerating socialist modernisation, in unifying the homeland, including Taiwan, in the struggle against "hegemonism", for peace in the whole world. The CPPCC, the new Charter says, must, on the basis of patriotism and support for the CPC leadership and the cause of socialism, exert every effort to ensure the further strengthening and development of the patriotic United Front. It is noted in the General Programme of the new Charter that cardinal changes have taken place in the social and class situation, that the overwhelming majority of people who previously belonged to the exploiter class have already become working people living off the fruit of their own labour.

The new Charter also says that members of the CPPCC study on a voluntary basis Marxism-Leninism and the "thought of Mao Zedong".

The new Charter spells out in greater detail the functions and tasks of the national and local committees of the CPPCC, their mutual relationships, principles of the organisation of local committees of the CPPCC, the organisation of a special assembly under the Standing Committee of the CPPCC for the conduct of current affairs, etc.

On the whole the new Charter of the CPPCC was amended in accordance with the changes in China after the death of Mao Zedong and the toppling of the "Four": "leftist" directives and slogans connected with the Mao cult and the "cultural revolution" were removed. But as it has been already noted, "struggle against hegemonism", a reference to the foreign policy course of the USSR and other socialist countries, is invariably mentioned among the main tasks of the CPPCC. The United Front is oriented at the building of a powerful modern state and the return of Taiwan.

The CPPCC has a standing body—the National Committee formed from among representatives of the CPC, democratic parties, non-party personalities, people's organisations, Taiwan fellow countrymen, representatives of national minorities, fellow countrymen from Hongkong and Macau, and also specially invited personalities. Local CPPCC committees are formed likewise. All parties and organisations that approve of the

²¹ See *Renmin Ribao*, Nov. 25, 1982.

Charter and obtain the consent of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC have the right to join the CPPCC. Individuals also have the right to join the CPPCC with the consent and on the invitation of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC. The tenure of the CPPCC is five years. Sessions of the CPPCC are held once a year. To conduct its affairs the CPPCC forms a Standing Committee consisting of a Chairman, Deputy-Chairmen, Head of the Secretariat and Members of the Standing Committee. Candidates for membership in the CPPCC Standing Committee are nominated by way of consultations with democratic parties and organisations belonging to the CPPCC, and are elected at sessions of the CPPCC.

The 1st session of the CPPCC of the 6th convocation was held in June 1983. Prior to that, late in April 1983, the CPC CC announced its decision to reduce the representation of CPC members in the CPPCC from 60 to 40 per cent.²²

The opening of the session was attended by 1,794 members of the CPPCC, among them leaders of the CPC and the State Council—Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Peng Zhen, Wan Li, Xi Zhongxun, Wang Zhen, Wei Guoqing, Ulanfu, etc. Heads of diplomatic missions in China and journalists accredited in Peking were invited to attend the opening and closing sessions. The report to the session characterised the composition of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC of the 6th convocation and described the activity of the CPPCC of the 5th convocation. The resolution specially emphasised the importance of Deng Xiaoping's speech at the 2nd session of the CPPCC of the 5th convocation in June 1979 in which he "made a scientific analysis of the cardinal changes in the social and class situation in the country, and singled out the nature, tasks, course and policy of the United Front in the new period". The speech set forth the slogan: "To develop and strengthen the great cohesion and the great unity of the Chinese nation." Special attention was devoted to such aspects of the activity of the United Front as work with democratic parties, representatives of the intelligentsia and national minorities, in the field of religion and the peaceful unification of the homeland.

The resolution made special mention of the unusually representative nature of this session. It said: "The great cohesion and the great unity of the Chinese nation are a reliable guarantee of the development and flourishing of our cause."²³ It noted also that the slogan "Not to forget about the struggle for cohesion, to devote all energy to the cause of the Chinese nation's development", set forth by Hu Yaobang during the democratic consultative conference with representatives of various circles on the eve of the session, is the main, guiding course for the CPPCC's further work. Deng Yingchao's opening speech at the session was described as an important document for the development and consolidation of the patriotic United Front in the new conditions.

The resolution stated that in the present complex international situation the CPPCC must vigorously and purposefully mount its foreign policy activities making full use of the extensive ties and influence of the democratic parties, people's organisations and prominent personalities from various circles in the international arena. The resolution includes the wording of struggle against "hegemonism".

Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC CC Deng Yingchao was elected Chairman of the CPPCC, replacing Deng Xiaoping in this post. She took part in the work of the CPPCC of the first convocation as a member of its Standing Committee. In recent years she held the posts of Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC and Se-

See Renmin ribao, April 26, 1983

Renmin ribao, June 23, 1983

cond Secretary of the Central Commission of the CPC CC for monitoring discipline. Twenty-nine deputies of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC were also elected.

In all, 297 people were elected to the Standing Committee of the CPPCC. This is the most representative guiding body as compared to previous convocations. As it was noted by Deng Yingchao in her concluding speech, the proportion of representatives of democratic parties and patriotic personalities of various circles in the CPPCC Standing Committee has risen to 64 per cent, while the proportion of representatives of the intelligentsia in the cultural field has exceeded one-third, and there also has been an increase in the number of representatives of national minorities, fellow countrymen from Taiwan, Hongkong and Macao, as well as overseas Chinese. Eleven foreigners who have become Chinese citizens were put on the Standing Committee. These are individuals working in the press, public education and medicine who, as it was noted in the press, "devote all their energies to the cause of the revolution and China's construction".²⁴ Among the 29 Deputy Chairmen of the CPPCC Standing Committee there are no representatives of such mass public organisations of the country as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Chinese YCL and the All-China Youth Federation. At the same time the guiding body of the CPPCC includes five senior officers although the army is not an organisational unit of the CPPCC, and three Deputy Chairmen represent one of the smallest democratic parties—the Revolutionary Committee of the Guomindang.

The number of All-China PPCC members, as was noted in the speech by Den Yingchao, is 2,039. The number of organisational units taking part in the work of the CPPCC was increased to 31. Included in the All-China PPCC were 18 members of the All-China Association of Friendship with Taiwanese Countrymen and 44 "countrymen from Hongkong and Macao".²⁵ The representation of the CPC, the democratic parties and the All-China Association of Industrialists and Merchants has not changed, not counting the slight increase in the number of places held by representatives of the Zhigongdang party (from 8 to 12). The representation of youth organisations has not changed much (from the YCL—12 instead of 13), while the All-China Youth Federation increased its representation from 10 to 14. There has been a substantial increase in the representation of "non-party democratic personalities" (from 25 to 50), or re-emigres (from 21 to 31), the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (from 49 to 80), national minorities (from 56 to 88), the All-China Federation of Women (from 42 to 74), and religious figures (from 16 to 44). There was several-fold increase in the number of intellectuals working in the field of culture, art, education, medicine, public health, press, social sciences, agriculture and forestry.

Three commissions (on education, on study of materials of culture and history and on the CPPCC's proposals) have been set up within the All-China Committee of the PPCC as well as 15 working groups (on the unification of the homeland, on economic development, agriculture, science and technology, education, medicine and public health, sports, foreign affairs, legislation, on affairs related to women, nationalities, religion, Chinese emigres, and on the study of international questions). Specialists and all sorts of individuals who are not members of the CPPCC are invited to take part in the work of these groups. In the five years the Standing Committee of the CPPCC of the fifth convocation

²⁴ *Renmin ribao*, June 23, 1983

²⁵ The All-China Association of Friendship with Taiwanese Countrymen was set up late in 1981. Its task is to establish contacts with the Taiwanese, helping them in every way, etc. *Renmin ribao*, Dec. 23 and 28, 1981

has been in existence the working groups formulated and sent numerous proposals on most diverse matters to the CPC CC and the State Council. During the work of the 1st session of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC of the 6th convocation its participants also made more than a thousand proposals.

As was noted at the latest session, the CPPCC controls a rather ramified network of local organisations. At the end of 1982 there were more than 1,800 of them with more than 200,000 members.

Measures to step up the activities of the United Front in the country include also the decision of the Secretariat of the CPC CC to begin publication in April 1983 of a CPPCC newspaper *Renmin zhengxiebao*. This publication reports on the activity of the United Front's organisations and promotes the CPC CC's political course and guidelines in respect to the United Front.

The United Front consists of eight democratic parties and also the All-China Association of Industrialists and Merchants. It was stated at congresses of these parties held after the proclamation of the PRC that they recognised the CPC's leadership and would give it assistance in the building of socialism. As their political programme they accepted the General Programme of the first session of the CPPCC in 1949. On its part, in accordance with the decisions of the 8th CPC Congress (1956) the CPC pursued a course of lengthy coexistence with the democratic parties and used the United Front for purposes of "educating and re-educating the bourgeoisie so that it would use its knowledge to promote the cause of socialist construction".²⁶ The activities of the democratic parties, just as of the CPPCC, were greatly hampered by the struggle against "right-wingers" conducted in the country beginning in 1957 and then in the years of the "cultural revolution".

National congresses of all parties were held in 1979 for the first time after the "cultural revolution". They formulated the new tasks, introduced amendments in their charters and elected their guiding bodies. The envirorionment of all members in order to fulfil the programme of "four modernisations" and the reunification with Taiwan was declared the main goal of the activities of the parties and of the United Front as a whole.

National congresses of the democratic parties were again held late in 1983, some of them being convened ahead of schedule, for instance the congress of the "September 3" Society. The agenda included reports on the work done, changes in charters, adoption of new charters and election of new guiding bodies. In the messages of greetings to the congresses from the CPC CC it was stated that the current adjustment in the CPC was an inner-party matter and that democratic parties were not required to adjust their style and organisations.²⁷ Representatives of the former national bourgeoisie, the small urban bourgeoisie and other non-proletarian segments of society provided the social basis for the creation of these parties. According to the present-day interpretation, "the class of capitalists has ceased to exist as a class in the new historical period" and the United Front, which "initially included representatives of the national bourgeoisie" has become an alliance of "socialist working people and patriots supporting socialism, and patriots supporting the unity of the homeland". "The social foundation of the democratic parties is continuously changing and developing", as it is contended in the press, and each of them, proceeding from their main composition, are now "an alliance uniting and representing a part of the socialist working people and patriots supporting socialism".²⁸ The head of the United Front De-

Materials of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China, Moscow, 1956
pp. 195, 50, 147 (in Russian).

See *Renmin ribao*, Nov. 9 and 10, 1983
Hongqi 1983 No. 7; *Renmin ribao* Dec. 12, 1983.

partment of the CPC CC, Yang Jingren, characterised the democratic parties as "friendly parties in the service of socialism, closely cooperating with the CPC" and having three advantages: 1) they mainly consist of representatives of the intelligentsia, many of whom are scientists and specialists; 2) they have extensive ties with Hongkong, Macao, Taiwan and foreign countries; 3) they are full of desire to apply their energies to the development of the country.²⁹

The existence in the country of non-communist parties in addition to the CPC is used as a pretext for statements by Chinese leaders and materials in the press to the effect that "multi-party cooperation" is "an advantage and specificity" of the political system in China.³⁰ At the same time it is said that relations between the Communist and democratic parties are not ordinary relations between the ruling and opposition parties, but are relations of cooperation between friendly parties in which the CPC plays the guiding role.³¹

Late in 1983 these parties had more than 120,000 members in their ranks. Their membership has grown considerably as a result of the measures taken in recent years. In fact, some of them have now more members than ever. This is true, for instance, of the Association for the Promotion of Democracy, the "September 3 Society" and the League of the Democratic Autonomy of Taiwan.

The democratic parties also have local organisations: in 1983 there were 800 local and more than 5,000 grass-roots organisations.

Despite the small size of these parties, they have a substantial representation in the leadership of the National People's Congress and the CPPCC both in the centre and in the provinces. Representatives of democratic parties accounted for more than 18 per cent of the deputies of the National People's Congress of the 6th convocation. There are members of democratic parties among the deputies of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, deputies of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress at the provincial level, among deputy governors of provinces and mayors of cities. The democratic parties and non-party individuals comprise the bulk of the CPPCC. They hold almost one-sixth of all seats in the All-China PPCC and simultaneously more than three-fifths of all seats in the Standing Committee of the CPPCC. Among the 29 Deputy Chairmen of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC eleven represent the leadership of six democratic parties and the All-China Association of Industrialists and Merchants. The members of these parties hold a large number of top posts in the administrative apparatus and also at many big enterprises. Members of democratic parties account for almost half of the members of the General Assembly of the Academy of Sciences of China.

Special attention was paid to these parties during the 12th CPC Congress. Top-ranking members of democratic parties were invited to take part in it on a non-voting basis. In their speeches to the 12th CPC Congress Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang noted the role of democratic parties in the life of the country and assured that the CPC would further cooperate on a long-term basis with them.

The following parties belong to the United Front:

The Revolutionary Committee of the Guomindang. This party was formed in 1948 from among patriotic elements in the Guomindang. At present it consists of former Guomindang military and civil servants. Measures are being taken to recruit new members and to reduce the average age of the party membership.

²⁹ *Jiaowang*, 1983, No. 4.

³⁰ See *Duadem, Renmin ribao*, June 5, 1983, *Beijing review*, Nov. 7, 1983.

³¹ See *Hongqi*, 1983, No. 7.

Presently it has 18,000 members. Assistance to the cause of the reunification of Taiwan with China is the main direction of the Party's activities. Jointly with other parties, members of the Revolutionary Committee of the Guomindang take part in activities in the field of education and the advancement of knowledge, set up service and cottage industry enterprises, etc.

The RCG has its own newspaper—the *Tuanjie bao*. The Chairman of the RCG CC Wan Kunlun and his two Deputies Qian Changzhao and Qu Wu are Deputy Chairmen of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC of the 6th convocation.

The Democratic League of China is the biggest of the democratic parties. Formed in 1941, it consists mostly of intellectuals, some two-thirds of them teachers. Active work has been carried out in recent years to swell the party's ranks. More than 14,000 people, 70 per cent of them younger than 55, joined the League since 1980.³² Education and culture are the principal spheres of work for the League member. Reports say that members of the Democratic League of China have set up more than 100 schools with an enrollment of 80,000. In addition, members of the League are used in promoting the cause of the reunification of Taiwan with China because they have historically formed ties with corresponding circles in Taiwan and have influence on them.

The Association for the Promotion of Democracy was formed in 1945. Most of its members are from the cultural and educational field. The Chairman of the Association's Central Committee Zhou Jianren and his Deputy Ye Shengtao are concurrently Deputy Chairmen of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC. It has 15,000 members.

The Association for the Democratic National Development of China was formed in 1945. It consists mostly of representatives of the trade and industrial circles and to a lesser extent of the intelligentsia. The Association concentrates on "promoting the acceleration of socialist modernised construction". It is indicative that it is carrying out its activities jointly with the All-China Association of Industrialists and Merchants. According to press reports, these organisations have set up several thousands collective enterprises that have provided jobs to tens of thousands of young people. Consultative bodies on questions of the economic course and policy, on work in trade, job placement, and vocational training of young people have been set up in 68 administrative centres of the country. Also functioning are several hundred special courses and vocational schools.³³

The China Democratic Party of Peasants and Workers initially going by the name of the Provisional Action Committee of the Guomindang of China was formed in 1930. It was given its present name in 1947. Most of its members are medical and public health workers. A proposal on the development of Chinese pharmaceuticals made by members of this party jointly with the Association of Democratic National Development and the All-China Association of Industrialists and Merchants resulted in the creation in Peking of a consultative centre on Chinese folk medicine, and advanced training for pharmacists was begun in 15 Chinese provinces and towns.³⁴ The party has a membership of 13,700.

The Chairman of the party's Central Committee Ji Fang is a Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC of the 6th Convocation.

The Zhongguo Zhigongdang Party ("A Quest for Justice"). Most of its members are Chinese emigres and members of their families who had

See *Beijing Review*, Nov. 7, 1983

See *Renmin ribao*, July 21, 1982, *Beijing Review*, Nov. 7, 1983

See *Liaowang*, 1983, No. 10

returned to their homeland. The main direction of activity is the establishment of ties and cooperation with countrymen in Hongkong, Macao and Taiwan and with overseas Chinese, and assistance to state bodies dealing with emigres. Despite the small size of the party (2,200 members at present) it has 14 administrative units at the provincial level and one-fifth of its members are deputies of the National People's Congress and the People's Congress at the provincial level, and also of the CPPCC at the national or local levels.

The September 3 Society was initially known as the Democratic Scientific Society. In September 1945 the present name was adopted in honour of the victory over Japan. The bulk of the Society's members are representatives of the top and middle layers of the intelligentsia working in the field of science and technology, education and culture. The party has grown considerably in the past several years: from some 4,500 in 1978 to more than 11,000 by the time of the convocation of its 6th National Congress. The following figures illustrate the weight carried by this party in the country's public and academic life: every eighth member of the party is a deputy of the People's Congress at various levels and a member of the CPPCC, one-fourth of the members of the Academy of Sciences of China are members of the September 3 Society, in 1982, 55 members of the society received state awards for successes in the field of natural sciences, for various inventions and discoveries.

The League of the Democratic Autonomy of Taiwan was established in 1947 and consists mostly of people who were born in Taiwan. It concentrates on promoting the reunification of Taiwan with China.

The All-China Association of Industrialists and Merchants came into being in 1953. It unites mostly representatives of industrial and trade circles. Jointly with the Association of the Democratic National Construction of China it works actively for the "acceleration of socialist modernised construction" and also for the "completion of the cause of the unification of the homeland". Members of the Association are employed in the administrative apparatus.

In conclusion, it can be said that there is an obvious tendency in recent years towards intensifying in every way the activity of the United Front of China, this finding its expression in most diverse forms: from conferences on the theory of the United Front to the active drawing of members of the democratic parties and the CPPCC to participate in concrete work. The following can be named as reasons for the growing attention displayed in questions of the United Front:

—as a supplement to state bodies and the party apparatus this political alliance is a convenient form of liaison with most diverse sections of the population, an instrument of vigorous propaganda and of pursuing the political course;

—this alliance is used for maintaining contacts and organising co-operation with Taiwan with the aim of its reunification with China;

—it is also extremely convenient for developing cooperation with the overseas Chinese who, as is known, number about 20 million and are lately the target of a concentrated campaign of patriotic slogans and calls for the cohesion of the Chinese nation as a whole. One of the aims of this is to attract their capital.

In the future ever more active use is likely to be made of the democratic parties, public organisations and non-party personalities in expanding cooperation and ties with foreign countries, especially "Third World" countries.³

³ See *Renmin ribao*, June 23, 1983

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BOOK ON CHINESE EASTERN RR DURING RUSSIAN REVOLUTION REVIEWED

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[Review by B. N. Gorbachev, candidate of historical sciences, of book "Revolyutsionnoye dvizheniye na KVZhD v 1917-1922 gg." [The Revolutionary Movement on the Chinese Eastern Railroad in 1917-1922] by G. I. Andreyev, Izdatel'stvo Nauka, Siberian Branch, Novosibirsk, 1983, 141 pages]

In the history of the Russian working people's heroic struggle in support of the Soviet government in the Far East against the White Guards and foreign interventionists there are many striking chapters connected with the Chinese Far Eastern Railway (CFER) proletariat's revolutionary activities.

The revolutionary movement at the CFER in 1917-1922 is a unique phenomenon in the history of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Its peculiarity lies in the fact that a comparatively large proportion of the Russian railway proletariat (in 1917 more than 50,000 Russian workers and soldiers were employed at the CFER) fought for the Soviet government outside Russia. An important feature of the revolutionary struggle at the CFER was the participation in it of Chinese railway workers (they made up half of its total workforce).

Individual aspects of the Russian railwaymen's actions at the CFER assisted by the Chinese workers and directed against the Entente interventionists, who occupied practically all the railway, and the White Guard's violence there have already been dealt with in literature but, however, this important subject is not adequately elucidated yet. This is why G. Andreyev's book, which was published by the Siberian Department of Nauka Publishers deserves consideration.

The monograph examines the development of the Russian railway proletariat's struggle for the Soviet government in the right of way of the CFER, analyses the relations between the Russian and Chinese workers in

the course of the revolutionary actions, shows the community of class goals and interests of the working people of Russia and China, their international solidarity and the role played by the working class of the CFER in normalising Sino-Soviet relations in the early 1920s.

The merit of this book lies in the fact that it approaches the revolutionary actions of the CFER proletariat not as isolated actions but as actions closely connected with the general struggle for the Soviet government in the Far East.

The study is based on a large body of Party and state archival documents and materials, including the periodicals of Harbin, Vladivostok and Japan which enabled the author to conduct a perfectly substantiated and comprehensive analysis of the questions concerned.

The CFER workers undertook first genuine actions during the period of the first Russian revolution. On November 26, 1905 they joined the strike of the railway employees and workers of Russia. In 1908 the Harbin workers organised the first May-day rallies at the CFER (pp. 24-25).

Analysing the revolutionary movement at the CFER in 1917 up to the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, G. Andreyev divides it into two stages: the first stage, from March to June, and the second stage, from July to November.

There were no organised Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (B) cells at the CFER at the first stage, which adversely affected the activities of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and various public organisations formed there after the February Revolution.

The Bolshevik organisations of the RSDLP began to take shape at the second stage of the revolutionary movement at the CFER. At the end of July 1917 the Bolshevik Party committee of five was formed in the course of an acute struggle between the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries on basic issues of the activities of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. From then on the RSDLP(B) organisations began to be formed in the right of way under the guidance of the Harbin Party committee. The Harbin Bolsheviks established ties with Party organisations of the Far East (p. 37).

The vanguard of workers and soldiers of CFER received the news about the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution as their vital cause and was prepared to defend it. That was openly announced by the Harbin Bolsheviks in the October 30, 1917, appeal, To All Residents of Manchuria, on the occasion of the October Revolution in Russia. On November 7 the Harbin general meeting of workers of the Central Mechanical Workshops and revolutionary-minded armed detachments passed a resolution recognising

the Soviet government in Russia (p. 42).

The struggle for the Soviet government at the CFER, however, was hampered by the imperialist powers' gross interference in the internal affairs of the Russian population of the right of way and, in fact, in the internal affairs of Soviet Russia.

The assistance in suppressing the revolutionary movement offered to General Khorvat, manager of the CFER, by the US, British and Japanese representatives in China was aimed at backing their self-seeking interests, i.e., to seize or to establish their control over the CFER. In November 1917 the CFER became the bone of contention between the imperialist powers. At the same time, it served as a stronghold for the Russian counterrevolution, a springboard for armed attacks on the young Soviet State.

V. I. Lenin's direct instructions largely determined the subsequent development of the struggle for the Soviet government at the CFER. In his telegram of November 21,

1917 to the Harbin Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Manchuria Purchase Board it was specified that authority in the right of way should belong to the Soviets (p. 46).

The proclaiming of the Soviet government at the CFER neither violated the sovereignty of China nor threatened the security of the Chinese and foreign citizens there. The Chinese authorities feared another thing. The capitalists and landlords of China just as the bourgeoisie of all other capitalist countries, wanted, according to V. I. Lenin, "to prevent the sparks of our fire from falling on their roofs".¹

Under the pressure of the imperialist powers, which turned China into a semi-colony, the Chinese military-feudal government refused to recognise Soviet Russia. In addition, on December 13, 1917 China brought troops into Harbin and, supported by the White Guards, disarmed the revolutionary detachments and abolished the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

As a result of the anti-Soviet action by the Chinese military, the White Guards seized power in the right of way and Harbin. The Peking government was among the first to declare an economic blockade of the Soviet State. On January 6, 1918 Chinese customs officers were given orders to halt all goods bound for the Soviet Russia.

G. Andreyev puts forward several reasons for the Soviet government's fall at the CFER. Soviet power was proclaimed there earlier than in Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and China and, therefore, the CFER workers and soldiers could rely only upon themselves and the Chinese workers' support.

By December 1917 the majority of workers were still under the influence of the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, whose treacherous policy bolstered the positions of the local counterrevolution which appealed for support to the imperialist powers. The situation was aggravated by the hesitation and sluggishness of the Harbin Bolsheviks, which gave the counterrevolution the advantage in time.

The main reason, however, for the Soviet government's fall at the CFER was the armed intervention into the Russian population's affairs of the imperialist powers which used for this end the Chinese military.

The CFER proletariat, however, which after the collapse of the Soviet government found itself in an extremely difficult situation, continued the struggle. The CFER wor-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26
p. 413.

king people guided by the underground Bolshevik organisations fought against the White Guards and foreign interventionists in defence of Soviet power in Russia. Being unable to conduct an armed struggle, the CFER railwaymen resorted to a strike, which was a tried form of class battle. In 1918-1919 the CFER workers organised two general strikes which were a painful blow to the counterrevolution and interventionists in Siberia and the Far East: in September 1918 the railway was shut down for 12 days and in July and August 1919 it remained idle for 30 days. In addition, between 1918 and 1920 the workers organised several one- to three-day strikes (p. 118).

The strikes were brutally repressed by the railway administration. In September 1918, the interventionist troops' headquarters decided to bust up the action of the Russian workers with the American soldiers' hands. Sixty locomotive and guard crews were formed to replace the strikers (pp. 77-78).

The book gives much attention to the Bolsheviks' efforts at strengthening the internationalist ties with the Chinese railway workers. It was essential to win over the Chinese workers' support in the struggle against the White Guards and interventionists, who were the common enemy of the working people.

The Harbin Bolsheviks launched an active propaganda campaign, both verbal and written, among the Chinese workers. In 1918, on the eve of the May 1 festivities, the first revolutionary appeals and posters in the Chinese language appeared (p. 70).

The White Guard executioners would not dare to outrage the May-Day demonstration which had in its ranks a column of the Chinese workers wearing national clothes and accompanied by a band.

The June 22, 1919 resolution of the Far Eastern Committee of the RCP(B) "On the Communists' Tactics in the Far East" alongside instructions to destroy the transport, the war industry and the entire state machinery of Kolchak put forward as a major task the "agitation among the foreign troops and Eastern peoples" (p. 81).

In conformity with those instructions the Harbin Bolsheviks in July 1919 managed to secure the Chinese workers' active cooperation in the strike and to arouse the sympathy of the Chinese population and the majority of the Chinese soldiers stationed at the CFER towards it.

One of the strike committee leaflets addressed to the Chinese workers ran: "Let us forget our national distinctions and act unanimously and firmly, in genuine unity and solidarity for our common cause, for our common interests" (pp. 83-84).

In their subsequent actions the CFER workers also sought to win over the Chinese proletariat's support. Thus in March 1920, the Joint Conference of the Trade Union, Political and Public Organisations—the official government body representing the interests of the entire right of way Russian population—appealed to the railwaymen to go on strike to overthrow the White Guard administration of the CFER. That document also addressed the Chinese working people: "Chinese workers! Your Russian comrades are appealing to you! You know that our needs and demands are just and timely. We call you to back us in our struggle. Working hand in hand with the Russian railwaymen you have showed yourselves to be reliable comrades which makes us confident that none of you will betray the Russian workers' cause. We will continue to strike until our demands are completely satisfied, without any concessions" (p. 98-99).

The joint actions of the Russian and Chinese workers were a practical manifestation of the proletarian solidarity of the working people of different nationalities in the struggle against the exploiters who were their common enemy.

In the period following the rout of the White Guards and foreign interventionists in Siberia and the Far East and the formation of the Far Eastern Republic, the CFER workers guided by the Bolsheviks made a large contribution to the process of normalising relations between the RSFSR and the FER, on the one hand, and China, on the other. The CFER workers strongly opposed the imperialist states' attempts to establish their control over the railway. The right of way working people made a significant contribution to the favourable solution in 1924, both for the Soviet Russia and China, of the CFER dispute.

G. Andreyev's book on the revolutionary movement at the CFER in 1917-1922 introduces the reader to new chapters in the history of the heroic struggle for the Soviet government in the Far East, which is a unique confirmation of the universal nature of V. I. Lenin's theory of the socialist revolution and a vivid practical manifestation of proletarian internationalism.

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BOOKS ON SOVIET WARTIME, POSTWAR AID TO CHINA REVIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 84 pp 164-167

[Review by A. G. Yakovlev, doctor of historical sciences, of books "V nebe Kitaya. 1937-1940. Vospominaniya sovetskikh letchikov-dobrovol'tsev" [Wings Over China. 1937-1940. Reminiscences of Soviet Volunteer Pilots], Moscow, 1980, 380 pages; "Missiya v Kitaye. Zapiski voyennogo sovetskogo" [Mission to China. Notes of a Military Adviser] by V. I. Chuykov, Moscow, 1983, 270 pages; "Tam techet Yantszy. Vospominaniya" [Where the Yangzi Flows. Memoirs] by I. Strazheva, Moscow, 1983, 143 pages]

"Don't forget the past, it is the teacher of the future", a Chinese proverb says. The past, however, is manifold. When it helps assess the former experience correctly and in conformity with the trends of historical development it is a genuine teacher of the future, otherwise it can only lead to regression and reactionary dreams which have never brought good to the people.

Historical development, including that of international relations, is complex, contradictory and at times even whimsical. Throughout the ages human progress, which is a result of objective laws of development, has been marked by ebbs and flows. This, unfortunately, applies also to Sino-Soviet relations, even when these were relations of countries of the same socio-economic system.

The years of broad friendly cooperation between the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were followed, as is known, by tensions in their relations. The harm done by this situation to the interests of socialism, however, is being gradually felt in Peking as well. This is attested to both by the certain positive changes which have begun to take root in the Sino-Soviet relations and by statements made by Chinese leaders. Thus Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary of the CPC CC, said in an interview: "The normalisation of relations between China and the Soviet Union serves the vital interests of the Chinese and the Soviet peoples, the vital interests of all humanity... I do not believe that the former enmity between China and the Soviet Union is very deep and cannot be soon overcome."¹

Alongside other considerations, this statement is also interesting for its attitude towards the problem of what is really important about the past and could be genuinely useful for the future, what historical heritage should be furthered, and what renounced. The current growing understanding between the PRC and the USSR about the importance of improving the relations between the two countries gives hopes. We should mention in this respect the kind words about the combat fraternity of the two peoples in the struggle against imperialism, about their cooperation in the revolution and socialist construction, which begin to reappear in the Chinese press after a long break.

"To make history serve the present" is still a very popular slogan in China. In practice, however, it is at variance with the actual course which is being followed by Chinese society. The negative nature of the above phenomenon is most tangible in the sphere of the PRC's foreign affairs, where it gravely impedes the normalisation and development of its relations with the socialist countries and, primarily, with the USSR.

The Soviet Union, in its turn, is deeply concerned about the present and future of

¹ *Renmin ribao*, Feb. 21, 1983

the relations between the two peoples and states, has always conducted a consistent policy, an integral part of which is the upholding and protecting of all that is progressive and positive in the history of these relations and which still serves the interests of struggle for the socialist and communist ideals.

The CPSU and the Soviet government firmly pursued a course aimed at reestablishing goodneighbourly relations with the PRC and continued to spend much time and effort educating the Soviet people in the spirit of high internationalist solidarity with the Chinese people even in the period when the relations between the two sides were on the cool side. The 26th Congress of the CPSU emphasised that "our feelings of friendship and respect for the Chinese people have not changed."²

A series of memoirs by Soviet participants in the Chinese Revolution and the construction of a new China is a significant contribution to these efforts. Three other books were recently published in this series.³

The collection *Wings Over China* is a joint effort by fifteen Soviet veterans of the Chinese People's Resistance War to the Japanese Aggression (1937-1945). It is prefaced by an introductory article outlining the situation in China during the first three years of the war and showing the role and significance of the USSR's policy towards it, in particular, the importance of the Soviet military might to the Chinese people in foiling the quick victory plan of the Japanese. That large-scale and allround assistance was of extreme importance for China, especially since practically no other country rendered it assistance in the beginning of the anti-Japanese war.

The deliveries of Soviet combat aircraft and the engagement of Soviet volunteer pilots in aerial warfare were a particularly significant aspect of military assistance to China. In the beginning of the 1937-1945 war, China lost practically all its combat aircraft. The Japanese air pirates ruled Chinese air space with impunity. Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel-General F. P. Polynin (retired) recalls: "The bombing did the most damage to big towns. The incendiary bombs caused numerous fires in which people died by the thousand. The population and troops were literally demoralised by the Japanese."

² The 26th Congress of the CPSU. Documents and Resolutions. Moscow, 1981, p. 16.

³ The book under review as well as some other works of the series are published with the active assistance of Y. V. Chudovdeyev, Cand. Sc. (Hist.), who has given many years to organise the publication of the memoirs relating to the modern times' history of China.

air force. The Soviet Union lent a helping hand to its Far Eastern neighbour. The Soviet volunteer pilots, who came to China in late 1937 helped change the situation radically. The Chinese people got both the reliable shield and the striking sword in the air" (p. 29).

The Soviet Union sent to China its most experienced commanders and first-line military pilots. Outstanding Soviet military leaders, such as P. N. Anisimov, P. F. Zhigarev, F. P. Polynin, A. G. Rytov, P. V. Rychagov, G. I. Tikhon, T. T. Khryukin and others, assisted in organising operations of the Chinese aviation.

Many of them had vast experience in air combat. Thus Brigadier P. V. Rychagov had shot down twenty fascist aircraft when fighting in Spain; for heroism displayed in performing the internationalist duty he was honoured with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Prominent Soviet pilots such as A. S. Blagoveshchensky, A. A. Gubenko, G. N. Zakharov, K. K. Kokkinaki, G. P. Kravchenko, G. A. Kulishenko, S. P. Suprun and others fought against the Japanese air pirates over China. Hundreds of volunteer pilots who displayed courage and selflessness in air combats were awarded the Chinese and Soviet orders, and fourteen pilots became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

By 1940 Japan lost about one thousand aircraft in China. Nothing remained of Japan's initial dominance over China in the air. That was largely due to the selflessness of Soviet volunteer pilots who made up the basic and the most active contingent of combat aviation in the first years of the anti-Japanese war. More than two hundred Soviet pilots died defending China. The memory of the heroes who died performing their internationalist duty still lives both in their motherland and in China, people still bring flowers to their graves to worship the fond memory of the dead.

The majority of memoirs included in *Wings Over China* are published for the first time. Each author writes about his personal experience in China, in particular, about the war life and heroism of the Soviet and Chinese comrades-in-arms, about their relations with the local population and the Guomindang Headquarters. The idea of the indissoluble unity between the interests of the first socialist state and the peoples fighting against imperialism for independence is emphasised in the memoirs.

That is why the Soviet volunteer pilots made their best effort in China, just as they did later, defending their Motherland in the years of the fascist invasion. Brought up in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, they could not act differently.

The high morale and combat spirit of the Soviet pilots contrasted with that of the Western volunteers. As for their "activities" L. P. Prokofyev, for instance, recalls: "A small group of volunteers from England, the US and some other capitalist countries came to China in the hope of making a fortune. Those 'defenders' were not eager to fight, they preferred not to get into the air at all, but sat snug at rear airfields diverting themselves, collecting souvenirs and conducting business" (p. 203).

A. P. Prokofyev also notes that some of the Chinese pilots, demoralised by fantastic losses in the first air fights against the Japanese, put their airplanes out of action, unwilling to risk their own lives (p. 203).

Having dispersed the Japanese dog-fighters' halo of invincibility, the Soviet pilots greatly contributed to the strengthening of the Chinese flight personnel's fighting ability. The Chinese pilots trained by the Soviet instructors proved themselves well in joint air operations with the Soviet volunteers and formed the backbone of the Chinese Air Force after the Soviet pilots went home in 1941.

Whereas the memoirs of the Soviet pilots, veterans of the Chinese people's anti-Japanese war, give a vivid representation of the two countries' combat cooperation at the tactical level, so to speak, the memoirs of Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal V. I. Chuikov, pertain to the strategic level.

In late 1940, Army Commander V. I. Chuikov was appointed military attaché to China and, subsequently, Chief Military Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Army. It was his third mission to China. Back in 1926 V. I. Chuikov, then student of the Eastern Department of the Frunze Military Academy, was sent to China to pick up experience. At the same time he acted as a diplomatic messenger. In the autumn of 1927 together with a group of graduates he was sent to work as a military adviser to the Chinese Army which was under the influence of the Communist Party of China. The Marshal recalls: "My duties obliged me to do a lot of travelling around the country. I visited the vicinity of Peking, Tianjin, the Sichuan Province and practically the entire Northern and Southern China and learned to speak Chinese fluently" (p. 28). His professional training as a sinologist helped Chuikov in carrying out his versatile and complex duties of the Chief Military Advisor to China.

Marshal V. I. Chuikov's memoirs give a profound and detailed analysis of the military and political situation in China, describe a complex and contradictory web of interests of the opposing forces both inside

the country and around it. The everyday work of Chief Military Adviser V. I. Chuikov in China illustrates how the Soviet State tried to counteract the expansion of the anti-Communist pact countries' aggression during the complicated international situation at the junction of the thirties and forties and how that changing world situation influenced the development of war in China and made it more difficult to give help to the fighting Chinese people. V. I. Chuikov writes: "It was a particularly difficult task to keep together the united anti-Japanese front of the Guomindang Party and Army (Chiang Kaishek) and the Communist Party of China (Mao Zedong), between which fighting broke out in the early 1940s, incited by Chiang Kaishek and his counterrevolutionary generals..." (p. 5). The problem of how that task was being solved is discussed at the most interesting pages of the memoirs.

V. I. Chuikov's book provides a detailed analysis of the united front situation in China and comprehensively explains why this vast country failed to become the insuperable obstacle to Japanese aggression, while in the late 1930s and in the early 1940s the Chinese armed forces, despite all their weaknesses, were capable of carrying out active military actions relying upon the broad and versatile assistance of the USSR, including that of highly experienced military advisers. The latter played a prominent role in the successful defensive and unfortunately accidental offensive operations of the Chinese troops in 1938-1941. V. I. Chuikov writes: "Thanks to the help of our advisers the Chinese troops repelled the Japanese offensive on all fronts in 1941" (p. 261).

Mission to China is the work of a man who was not only a prominent army leader with a broad military and political outlook but also a gifted writer. This makes it interesting for both the specialists in the history of the Far Eastern policy and the reader at large.

I. Strazheva's work, the last of the three books under review, differs somewhat from the voluminous body of the Soviet memoir literature on China or, to be more accurate, on the Sino-Soviet cooperation. Thousands of Soviet people spent years working in China. Much of what they saw and experienced there is still fresh in their memory.

I. Strazheva's memoirs is a vivid account of cooperation between Soviet experts and their Chinese colleagues—scholars and lecturers at a number of aviation institutes,

of their meetings with the engineers and workers of the PRC's aircraft industry, which touches the reader by its sincerity and inexhaustible confidence in the historical logic of cooperation and good-neighbourly relations between the two great nations. The book furnishes a lively description of the atmosphere of friendship and trust in the Sino-Soviet relations in the first years of the PRC's formation.

This book of modest length by I. Strazheva contains much interesting data, including picturesque observations about the Chinese past, its contemporary life, the problems and aspirations of the Chinese working people, whether in Peking, Shenyang, Xian or on the Yangzi.

During her one year stay in China I. Strazheva witnessed everywhere the atmosphere of national creative and labour upsurge which was brought about by the reshaping of life of the great people on new socialist lines. That process was inseparable from the vivifying Sino-Soviet friendship which the working masses of democratic China associated with the emerging and flourishing socialist reality.

It is only natural for the people who have been inspired with socialist and communist ideals to walk hand-in-hand and cooperate towards a common goal, which makes it more rapid, reliable and stable. Time has convincingly proved the paramount importance of the world socialist forces' unity both for combating their class adversary and for building a new society. At present, China recognises the fact that the first Five Year Plan—a period when socialism was being built in China in close cooperation with the fraternal countries—was the time of the most successful and sound development of the PRC in its thirty-odd-year history.

I. Strazheva introduces the reader to a China of the mid-50s, to a China which has already advanced a long way along the path of social progress, to a China looking into the socialist future, which for the first time in its history most comprehensively experienced and appreciated the fruitful friendship

with the fraternal socialist countries and primarily with the Soviet Union.

The author does not recall this friendship as something irretrievable. The whole book is permeated with the idea that the Sino-Soviet relations in the 1950s are the unforgettable page of the past and the only genuine course for the future.

All three of the books under review have already found and will undoubtedly find new interested readers among the most broad circles of the Soviet public. They cannot fail to attract the attention of those who want to expand their knowledge about China, about the important periods in the history of relations between the two countries in the contemporary epoch, as experienced and perceived by the Soviet people, who took part in the Chinese people's liberation struggle and in the construction of the foundation of socialism on the Chinese soil.

The past and the future in these books go hand-in-hand which contributes to a more profound comprehension of both phenomena.

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BOOK ON CHINESE WORKERS MOVEMENT 1927-1937 REVIEWED

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[Review by V. I. Glunin, doctor of historical sciences, of book "Rabocheye dvizheniye v gomin'danovskom Kitaye. 1927-1937 gg." [The Labor Movement in Guomindang China. 1927-1937] by T. N. Akatova, Moscow, Nauka, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1983, 272 pages]

history of the working-class movement in China. The monographs by V. G. Gelbras, S. A. Gorbunova, A. I. Kartunova, and V. I. Khorkov came off the press, as well as several collections of documents. At the same time Soviet historiography lacks generalising works on the history of the Chinese workers' movement during the period of the democratic revolution of the 1920s-1940s. The detailed work by T. N. Akatova, Dr. Sc. (Hist.), which is the first comprehensive monographic study in Soviet and world Sino-logy of all major aspects of the working class movement during the so-called "Nanking Decade" (1927-1937) stands out in bold relief.

The author's focus on the aforementioned decade is especially topical because it was precisely at that time that the main forces of the Communist Party of China moved from town to village. At that time it was becoming increasingly alienated from the working class while the national bourgeois workers' policy of Guomindang was scoring its most impressive successes. It is also of importance that the analysis of problems of

¹ See L. A. Kuvshinnikova, *The Workers' Movement in China, 1917-1949. The index of sources and bibliography in Russian, Chinese and West European languages published in 1917-1978*, Moscow, 1982.

the workers' movement proper was carried out by the author in close connection with the general problems of the Chinese revolution and of the entire historical development of China in the new epoch. The author's systematic approach to concrete-historical research has enabled her to arrive at conclusions whose significance goes far beyond the framework of the topic and the period of time. This is also due to the fact that the writing of the monograph in question was preceded by many years of work by the author on the problems of the Chinese workers' movement in the 1920s. That is why, though the monograph is formally limited by the chronological framework of the "Nanking Decade" it has actually accumulated the results of the thirty years of the author's independent research in the field of the Chinese workers' movement in the 1920s and the 1930s. This gives ground to consider T. N. Akatova's study to be also the first summing-up work on the history of the Chinese workers' movement in general.

Akatova's book rests on a solid basis of sources. The author has thoroughly studied numerous Chinese sources, the majority of which were put into academic use for the first time (in particular, the materials from the Nanking Archives) and also practically the entire available literature in Chinese, English and Russian which directly or indirectly bears on the topic of the study. Similarly, the author has used, analysed and compared the sources of the confronting political forces — the CPC and the Guomindang — which, as a rule, contained diametrically opposite appraisals of the processes that occurred in the workers' movement. The comparison and verification of the contradictory sources enabled the author to avoid lopsidedness which still can be found in the studies of this kind and provided a well-analysed and scientifically objective picture of the events in question.

The notion that the countryside was the main arena of the revolutionary and liberation struggle in China in that period has firmly established itself in Soviet and particularly in foreign historiography, and that the main reasons for the alienation of the CPC from the working class was the sharp drop in the socio-political activity of the proletariat, and profound stump and complete disorganisation of the workers' movement. At the same time, while dealing with the workers' policy of Guomindang Sovnarkom

literature usually placed the main emphasis on the repressive aspects of that policy.

T. N. Akatova's book introduces rather important corrections in the existing concepts of the course of the socio-political struggle during the "Nanking Decade" and especially in those of the role of the working class in that struggle. Among the main problems examined in the monograph is the correlation of national and social aspects of the workers' and general revolutionary movement in China. The author comes to the conclusion that both in the 1920s and in the 1930s the growth of national awareness of the Chinese proletariat was far ahead of that of its class awareness, and that in all major political actions of the working class national motives prevailed, while the class struggle proper did not, as a rule, transcend the boundaries of limited economic demands. Without challenging that conclusion in essence, I would like to note in passing that in reality the proletariat's national and class awareness was rather undifferentiated, while its class consciousness developed and identified itself mostly through the national liberation struggle. Such supposition is fully in accord with the characteristic of the working class of pre-revolutionary China given in the monograph. It is described as a social conglomerate having an extremely intricate inner structure, and characterised by an absolute predominance of workers connected with the embryonic and primitive forms of capitalist production and with pre-capitalist traditional handicrafts. The inadequately expressed class differentiation of the main bulk of the Chinese proletariat is also confirmed by the data from the latest studies of the social structure in pre-revolutionary China obtained by a number of other Soviet Sinologists (V. G. Gelbras, A. V. Moseleyov, A. S. Magazin and others).

The book is replete with examples showing the mutual disconnection of the working class and the social heterogeneity of the proletariat (a battle between rickshaws and steam car workers, clashes between trade unions, friction between permanent and part-time miners in coal pits, and so on), the weak points of the Chinese society which provided the Guomindang with an opportunity to play the role of a national liberator, and another factor — a break in the nation's traditions.

In view of the foregoing, of special importance is the author's conclusion that the Ch

nese working class, despite the fact that the conditions of its struggle sharply deteriorated, in some cases succeeded, even in the 1930s, to act as the vanguard force of the national liberation movement. At the same time T. Akatova's monograph refutes resolutely the well-known assertions that the Chinese town and the working class lost their revolutionary potentialities after the 1925-1927 revolution. The monograph shows that the Chinese workers' movement in the 1930s remained a rather significant factor in the national liberation and class struggle in China, and diverted considerable forces of the Guomindang state and party machinery, thereby rendering real assistance to the armed struggle waged by the Communists in the Soviet regions of China, and contributing to the formation of a united anti-Japanese front which played a historic role in shaping out the country's future.

The monograph devotes much attention to the working-class policy of the CPC and the Guomindang. The author reveals not only the clearly counter-revolutionary, but also the obviously national-reformist character of the Guomindang labour policy, its complex nature and flexibility, and the combination in it of open repressions against Communists and the revolutionary working-class activists with the large-scale social demagogic, nationalistic propaganda and a number of quite tangible concessions to the working class. The author arrives at a basically new and important conclusion that there were objective prerequisites for the spread of the national-reformist ideology in the Chinese worker's movement.

Examining the working-class policy of the CPC and its activities in towns, the author comes to the conclusion that the almost total alienation of the Communist Party from the working class, and the fact that by the end of the 1930s it was ousted from the workers' movement were a result not only of harsh Guomindang repressions, but also of grave "leftist" sectarian mistakes of Communists, which brought to naught all their heroic efforts to lead the proletarian masses, as well as of their failing to assess properly the depth of national reformism's influence on the working people. Especially pernicious influence on the activities of the CPC in towns was exerted by the doctrine of Li Lisan, which was a concentrated expression, in the most odious form, of the sentiments of "leftist" extremism and nationalism which existed in the party. The au-

thor is right when she links the emergence of Li Lisan's concepts and other manifestations of "leftism" in the CPC both with the unfavourable social composition of the party, weakness of its proletarian basis, small size of its Marxist-Leninist nucleus, the impact of dogmatism, as well as with broader causes, including the general level of the socio-economic development of China and the ensuing weak differentiation of the society's class structure. At the same time the stable nature of the extreme left-wing trends in the CPC throughout its entire history warrants further study. In particular, many leftist exaggerations in the theory and practice of the CPC remind us of the real contradiction between the urge of the revolutionary vanguard in a number of the present-day developing countries for the speediest and "simplest" solution to the complicated socio-economic problems and the absence of the adequate economic, social, cultural and psychological prerequisites.

Also of importance is the conclusion that many leaders of the CPC identified the notion "town" and "proletariat" stemming from the underestimation of the national liberation stimulus in the working-class movement and a sectarian approach to the definition of the socio-political role of the proletariat (p. 115). The author finds the manifestations of such a distorted approach in the decisions of the Sixth Congress of the CPC and other party documents of the 1930s. However, identical trends could be observed in the CPC party documents and party press during the 1925-1927 revolution. Thus, the aforementioned conclusion exceeds the framework of the period in question and acquires a more general significance as a most stable feature of the theory and practice of the CPC. However, it should be pointed out that in the late 1940s, on the eve of the victory of the national-democratic revolution, the interpretation of the notion "town", traditional for the CPC, underwent substantial changes. At the same time one should admit that there were certain objective reasons for identifying the notions "town" and "proletariat". It is common knowledge that the upsurges of the workers' movement during the 1925-1927 revolution, in the mid-1930s and at the end of the 1940s completely coincided chronologically with the peaks of general patriotic and democratic movements of the widest sections of the urban population (students, petty and medium bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, and so on) and were part and par-

cel of those movements. The monograph under review provides abundant confirmations of this regularity.

In conformity with the exceptionally "urban" topic of the studies, the author repeatedly stresses that the Guomindang reaction delivered its "most crushing blow" in 1927 and later against the revolutionary activists of the working class and the CPC members in the industrial centres of the country. This assertion is true but is not quite accurate since in 1927 the CPC suffered a no less crushing defeat in the countryside as well, when the activists of the peasant movement were exterminated. Moreover, after a relatively brief period of development, early in the 1930s, of the CPC's rural bases they were almost completely destroyed by the Guomindang in 1934-1937, and what remained of the CPC armed forces had to move to the remote border area in the northwest. The subsequent resurgence and development of the rural bases took place under a fundamentally new situation of the Japanese-Chinese war and was linked with the direct influence exerted by the USSR on the Guomindang leaders who needed Soviet military assistance. Thus, in the second half of the 1930s, the CPC suffered the second major setback not only in town, but also in the countryside.

The author was right when she put down the year 1931 as crucial in the development of the Chinese workers' movement within the framework of the period studied. "The seizure of Manchuria and the intensification of the Japanese aggression in 1931-1937," the monograph says, "determined the main direction of the workers' movement in those years—the rebuff to the invaders" (p. 228). As the materials of the monograph show and as the author has stressed many times, the guidance of the workers' movement was completely in the hands of the Guomindang's legal trade unions. At the same time, the author makes a point of underscoring the "capitulationist" character of the Guomindang foreign policy of "appeasement" of the Japanese aggressor. Here we come across an obvious contradiction stemming from the use of standard terminology which fails to reflect the extreme complexity of Guomindang's foreign policy during the difficult period of the escalation of the Japanese aggression in 1931-1937. The materials of the Guomindang archives on the workers' movement used in the book, reveal the complex and contradictory nature of the poli-

cy pursued by the government vis-à-vis the anti-Japanese struggle of the workers, which was a serious factor in the resistance to the aggressor. Proceeding from the documents, which testify that the government took secret measures to organise and support materially the anti-Japanese workers' strikes, the author arrives at the following conclusion: in a number of cases the Guomindang kept a low profile while rendering support to the patriotic workers' actions in order to have a chance to refer to the arbitrary nature and unruliness of the national sentiments of the workers and to avoid an aggravation of relations with Japan, which it still hoped to "appease". This secret diplomacy certainly should be taken into account in defining the true role of the Guomindang. Moreover, there is no doubt that the Guomindang took all measures up to and including repres-sions (vast materials about them can also be found in the archives) to limit the anti-Japanese struggle of the proletariat. This circumstance, alongside the uncertain mood of the government in organising an armed rebuff to the aggressor, sparked off the protest movement of legal workers' organisations, which at times assumed a clearly anti-governmental colouring. This "leftist leaning" in the legal trade union movement, which forced the government to lift the ban on the establishment of large-scale regional and industrial trade union associations, the upswing of the anti-Japanese struggle of the proletariat, which went far beyond the framework by which the Guomindang sought to limit it, and the envirorment of the day-to-day economic struggle is evaluated by the author as evidence of the "cri-sis" of the Guomindang working-class poli-cy. Such an assessment seems too cate-gorical.

T. Akatova's monograph makes an impor-tant contribution to Soviet Sinology and to studying the history of the workers' and communist movement. This is the first attempt in Soviet historiography of a comprehensive research into the situation and struggle of the Chinese proletariat over a long historical period, which provides an im-portant starting point for further research with an eye to producing a generalising monograph about the workers' movement in China in 1919-1949.

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1982 ASIAN SECURITY YEARBOOK REVIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 84 pp 171-173

[Review by K. Ye. Cherevko, candidate of philological sciences, of book "Asian Security, 1982," Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, 1982, 183 pages]

Under review is the fourth Yearbook of the Research Institute for Peace and Security set up in 1978 and headed by former chief of Japan's Defence Academy, Prof. Masamichi Inoki, a specialist in Soviet studies, who received his doctorate degree in the US. The Institute is staffed by twenty scholars who took part in compiling the fourth Yearbook edited by Prof. Masataka Kosaka, an expert in international affairs. Among other editors were Lt-General Katsumi Tsukamoto, Vice-Admiral Naotoshi Sakonjo and US Brigadier-General Kenneth Hunt.

The book contains the Japanese leaders' evaluations of the positions taken by the USSR, US, West European and Asian countries (Japan included) on the problem of ensuring peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region, primarily confidence building there.

The authors recognise the importance of the Soviet government's proposals on confidence building in the Far East and maintain at the same time that before these proposals are effected, a number of problems should be settled. Among these they name above all "the Soviet military build-up in the Far East" which, allegedly, takes place unilaterally, be silent about the armed forces of the US, Japan and other states confronting the USSR. They affirm that this seriously threatens many Asian countries and doubt the sincere nature of the Soviet Union's proposals.

Another invented obstacle in the way of the Soviet confidence-building proposals, set forth in the Yearbook, is the inadequate information about the strength of the Soviet Union's armed forces (p. 171).

The authors of the Yearbook do not reject the idea of confidence building in the region but suggest that some Asian countries and the US should "coordinate" their efforts to create a united front against the Soviet Union. This refers, in particular, to the countries and regimes which, like the US, China, Japan and South Korea, have an "extremely

complicated geopolitical relationships with the Soviet Union" (p. 172).

While speaking about the significance of Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear arms limitation the authors admit that this problem is of much concern to Japan and other Asian nations. But they reduce all the complex issues related to security in Asia to one — the alleged redeployment of the Soviet SS-20 missiles from Europe to Asia (pp. 29-30). The authors assert that as long as no agreement on the reduction of medium-range nuclear missiles is reached, Western countries must hold their nuclear missiles in readiness as a means of deterrence in Northeast Asia. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union, while specifying its position on the withdrawal of Soviet medium-range missiles from the European part of the USSR in case Washington refuses to deploy US missiles in Western Europe, suggested that Soviet missiles be destroyed to the last. The Soviet proposal deprived of any sense the assertions widespread in the NATO countries that in reality the Soviet Union intends to preserve the SS-20 missiles subject to reduction by redeploying them to the East. It also rendered groundless the concern voiced by China and Japan over such a possibility.

It is pointed out in the Yearbook that in 1982 the US started the deployment in the Far East of more than 3,000 cruise missiles which can be launched from aircraft, warships or submarines (pp. 29-30). China is also going to flex its nuclear muscle. Only Japan, which is protected by the US "nuclear umbrella", still adheres to a "nuclear-free" policy (pp. 77, 78, 173).

The authors contend that arms controls are chiefly needed on the Korean Peninsula but note that representatives of the North and the South are not ready to start negotiations on this issue.

They also point to the fact that the US, on the one hand, and its Western allies and Japan, on the other, do not pursue a common policy with respect to the Soviet Union, particularly in the issue of "the USSR's military build-up". Washington contends that the Soviet Union strives to use its military might for the aims of expansion and is going to achieve these aims before the US and its allies are ready to put up proper resistance. In other words, contrary to the peaceful course pursued by the Soviet Union, the US sees in it, above all, a war challenge which allegedly requires retaliatory measures

on the part of the United States and its allies (p. 7).

Japan and West European countries, for their part, accept the Soviet military potential as a reality and see a direct threat to them in the Soviet Union's growing political influence backed by its armed forces. Hence their interest in the West elaborating a common political strategy without which there can be no effective military policy. What is more, the opinion prevails in these countries that many local problems, in particular in such a vital region as the Middle East, are not rooted in the East-West tension in general, but stem from intra-regional causes and are to be settled on a regional level.

The authors of the Yearbook maintain that large-scale military preparations are but one and not the only, as Washington puts it, element in Western strategy, with political, diplomatic and economic measures of coercion retaining their significance. Japanese political scholars justly believe that detente is not a thing of the past, it must deepen with the spread to the military sphere. It is pointed out in the Yearbook that economic and political measures can make a significant contribution to promoting stability, in particular in the "Third World". However, Washington insists on a so-called all-embracing policy of ensuring security for Tokyo, with the latter's military component being greater than at present. This gives rise to negative sentiments among the Japanese public, since should Japan succumb to US will, it will find itself even more dependent on Washington's course of aggression.

The Yearbook argues that the Reagan administration's stand vis-à-vis the USSR, in particular in the sphere of arms control, is too tough, and its easing would have facilitated understanding between Japan and the US on this question. In reality, the Japanese ruling elite only seeks to reduce Japan's share in military expenditures at the expense of its senior partner.

The creation of the anti-Soviet "security system" embracing Japan, the US, Western Europe, Northeast Asia (South Korea, ANZUS), China and ASEAN should be considered, the authors say, a global strategy of President Reagan, rather than an "original concept" of Prime Minister Nakasone who is but an efficient "vehicle" of this strategy. Such a policy cannot promote peace and stability in Asia. On the contrary, it will cause greater tension in those countries'

relations with the Soviet Union, which may lead to the growth of Soviet military potential in the Far East at the expense of other regions. The authors maintain that such a turn of affairs will not be in the interests of Japan and the ASEAN countries, even though it is in line with Reagan's strategy (pp. 48, 49).

To justify Japan's almost hostile course towards the USSR Tokyo often employs a flimsy device by referring to the biased polls of public opinion which for many years has been intensely moulded in the course of all kinds of anti-Soviet ideological campaigns. Such polls are conducted not by progressive organisations but by the Cabinet of Ministers Office.

The real reason why Japan and other imperialist countries have toughened their line with respect to the USSR is a sharp turn to the right in their policies resulting from their weakened position in the world scene and the successes scored by the national liberation movement. Nevertheless, official Tokyo "explains" its course by the events in Afghanistan in 1979 and in the Polish People's Republic in 1980, as well as by the Soviet Union's undeviating line as regards Japan's territorial claims.

Measures to promote the security of the Soviet Far East in face of the mounting military build-up of the US, Japan and China are presented by the authors of the Yearbook as the unceasing manifestation of the Soviet military muscle "for punishing Japan" and are unjustifiably assessed as a pretext for scaling down economic contacts between Japan and the USSR.

The false thesis that the lawless nature of the policy of "retaliation" allegedly pursued by the USSR vis-à-vis Japan leads to the false conclusion that the Soviet Union is erroneous in its counting on Japan to enter talks on the expansion of trade and economic ties.

As for the arms reduction and confidence building in the Asian-Pacific region, the authors hold an evasive and even negative stand following in the wake of Washington. The reason for this is the mounting US pressure on Tokyo with the aim of sharply enhancing its significance both in relations with Japan's allies in the Asian-Pacific region and at a global level.

Washington's pressure became particularly firm with Reagan's administration turning from "multipolar diplomacy" of the preceding period when emphasis was put on

attempts to provoke conflicts between different socialist and capitalist countries, to "bipolar diplomacy" aimed at ideological and military-strategic confrontation between the world's two systems on a global level.¹

When analysing the problems of security in the Asian-Pacific region, the authors concentrate on the "growing military potential of the USSR" in that region and thus create a false impression that the Soviet Union allegedly strives for military superiority rather than equitable security.

This falsehood was more than once exposed in the speeches by Soviet leaders. Also, many sober-minded politicians in the West admit the untenability of such assertions. At the same time, as Yuri Andropov said in September 1983, "the US resorts to invented pretexts to expand its military presence in regions thousands of kilometres away from its territory... To put these dangerous plans into life Washington, other NATO countries are being increasingly provoked into carrying out these dangerous plans of Washington. Moreover, attempts are being made to revive Japanese militarism and adjust it to a military-political mechanism of that bloc".²

The creation of the US-Japan-Western Europe military structure is a real threat to the security of peoples of Asia and the whole world, and the attempts of the authors of the Yearbook to prove the reverse are futile.

¹ For details see V. P. Lukin, "The Asia-Pacific Strategy. Reagan's Version", *USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology*, 1983, No. 9, pp. 7-11 (in Russian).

² *Pravda*, Sept. 29, 1983.

1982 INSTITUTE YEARBOOK ON JAPAN REVIEWED

Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS in English No 2, Apr-Jun 84 pp 173-175

[Review by Yu. Ye. Bugayev of book "Yaponiya 1982. Yezhegodnik" [Japan 1982. A Yearbook], Moscow, Nauka, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 1983, 336 pages + illustrations]

In the Soviet Union much attention is paid to the study of Japan and to the polarisation of knowledge about that country. Quite a few research works on various problems of modern Japan have been put out in the USSR in the postwar years. Among them are dozens of publications dealing with the struggle waged by the democratic forces, the workers' movement, the domestic political situation, the policy pursued by the ruling elite, Japan's international relations, its economy, culture, etc. The yearbook *Japan* makes a major and—what is important—constant contribution to the noble cause of acquainting the Soviet people with their rather unusual neighbour in the Far East. *Japan* is published jointly by the Institute of Oriental Studies, the Institute of the Far East and the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations—all of them under the USSR Academy of Sciences. The volume under review contains materials mostly relevant to the year 1981.

What was the Japan of 1981 like, and how did the eleventh issue of the book present it?

During the 1981-1982 fiscal year Japan's GNP grew a mere 2.7 per cent, the lowest gain in the last 7 years. If one compares Japan with other industrialised capitalist countries [where the situation is even more lamentable.—Y. B.] this figure seems to be not so bad. It should be recalled, however, that in the not too distant past the growth rates for industrial production in Japan came to two-digit figures. Therefore, the Japanese government and business circles are looking for ways to stimulate economic growth.

It is quite clear today that after the oil crisis of 1973, a drastic reorientation of production was launched in Japan which is still continuing, with industries requiring much raw materials and energy being replaced by those known as labour-intensive. The technology of making large quantities of various products is being replaced by high-quality technology with use of science and high precision work, done by designers and performers. The structural remaking of the economy goes side by side with implementing a large-scale programme of conserving resources, "mainly in order to ensure high profits by reducing energy, raw

materials and other costs, including those of wages (in most cases by freezing them or by lockouts), as well as by reducing the interest on loan capital" (pp. 5-6).

A. Kravtsevich, the author of the economic survey, justly points to the negative effect these main trends in the development of Japanese industry exert on its growth rates. Besides, a "sharp deterioration of the general conditions of reproduction, resulting from the dramatic rise in oil prices in 1979-early 1980, known in Japan as 'the second oil shock', stimulated these trends still more, putting a brake on economic growth in 1981" (p. 6).

Extreme dependence on foreign demand was the most characteristic feature of Japan's economy both in 1980 and 1981; three quarters of the GNP was accounted for by exports. In his review A. Kravtsevich explains this [and quite correctly, in our opinion.—Y. B.] by the slackening of consumer demand, usually the main factor of any economy's stagnation. The weak demand stemmed, first, from the monopolies' encroachment "on the working people's standard of living... In the 1980/81 fiscal year a direct offensive was launched against them: the real wages were cut for the first time in the postwar years" (p. 13). The managerial-financial reform carried out in order to give the economy a boost (for details see pp. 24-25, 30-32), presupposing a reduction of state property and enterprise among other things, may ultimately turn out to be an "'additional tax' imposed on the working people, to the benefit of capitalists" (p. 25).

It is indicative that ten of the seventeen contributors to the eleventh edition of the *Yearbook* dealt with economics; among them are A. Kravtsevich, Y. Kuznetsov, V. Ramzes, V. Popov, A. Bogyaturov, A. Sokolov, I. Lebedeva, Y. Chegodar, Y. Stolyarov and V. Prokhorov. This very fact bespeaks the role and place of economic problems in Japan today. Credit should be given to those who compiled the present *Yearbook* and paid due attention to discussing economic issues.

The questions of the struggle for a peaceful future, against the country's speeded militarisation carried out right now, are crucial for the Japanese people, who have experienced an atomic nightmare. These questions have become especially urgent of late, with the coming to power of Y. Nakasone on whom the staunch advocates of

reviving militarism in Japan pin their hopes. The bellicose pronouncements and actions of the Japanese Prime Minister mirror the frame of mind and plans of the reactionaries who in recent times literally bend over backwards to cement their alliance with Washington and jointly with the US take part in confronting the Soviet Union. The so-called defensive policy of Japan is becoming increasingly offensive.

The escalation of militarism and the falsity of all kinds of "defensive" theories put out by the Japanese brass hats are convincingly disclosed by V. Bunin in his article, "The Concept of a 'Complex' Way of Ensuring National Security", also presented in the *Yearbook*.

Mention should be made of the fact that "in the 1957-1976 period Japan implemented four five-year programmes of consolidating and developing the 'self-defence forces', despite the Constitution's prohibition against this. As a result, a modern army was formed which can be compared in terms of military might to the armies of the leading imperialist powers" [ranking 6th in the world.—Y. B.] (p. 68).

All this was carried out behind the smokescreen of various "defense concepts", such as "limited defensive armament", "independent defense", "self-reliance" and, ultimately, the theory of a "national security ensured in a complex way", which is dealt with in the *Yearbook*. The Japanese people resolutely oppose the militaristic course pursued by the ruling circles. There is a mounting struggle in the country for halting the threat of a nuclear war, against the building up of the military potential and the Pentagon's plans to deploy cruise missiles in the Far East region. Members of the Communist Party of Japan, the 60th anniversary of which the progressive Japanese public celebrated in July 1982, are marching in the first ranks of the peace champions, who are fighting to achieve a democratic rebirth and a new state policy.

I. Kovalenko contributed an article, "The Communist Party of Japan: 60 Years of Struggle for Peace and Socialism", written to mark the occasion. The article is a concise review of sorts of the history of the CPJ, tracing in detail the main stages of the party's activity over the 60 years, beginning with its Constituent Congress of July 15, 1922 and up to the present.

The present author did not set himself the task of reviewing all the materials of

the *Yearbook*. By way of summing up, however, I would like to make special mention of the article "Japanese Literature in the USSR" by L. Gromkovskaya and A. Dolin. Much effort was spent in the USSR to present Japanese poetry and prose to the Soviet reader, and the article tells namely about these efforts. The authors make a special reservation that "the present review is by no means exhaustive" (p. 225), its contains the most detailed data about translations of Japanese literature in the USSR, collected in one work, which is very useful both for the students of Japan and all those interested in Japanese culture.

By the way, the *Yearbook* under review can serve as a reference book of sorts, both for the numerous Japan scholars and those who want to know as much as possible about Japan and its people. The *Yearbook* contains a vast amount of reference material, an addenda of documents, chronology, bibliography, statistics—all of which are in addition to the articles of a general nature and those on special problems. This is one of the main merits of the *Japan Yearbook* series, the set of which is a consecutive collection of valuable material on today's Japan and its problems.

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BOOK ON HISTORY OF FRENCH-PRC RELATIONS REVIEWED

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, Jan-Mar 84 (signed to press 29 Feb 84) pp 190-192

[Review by Ye. D. Stepanov, candidate of historical sciences, of book "Kitay i Frantsiya (1949-1981)" by T. I. Sulitskaya, Moscow, 1983, 184 pages]

[Text] The 12th CCP Congress and the First Session of the Sixth NPC again demonstrated the invariable desire of the PRC Government to play an increasingly active role in world affairs. Although the emphasis is on relations with developing countries and on the belief that "stronger unity and cooperation with other Third World countries is the main point of departure in our country's foreign policy,"¹ the countries of Western Europe, including France, have been assigned an important place in PRC foreign policy strategy. For a long time, however, this aspect of China's Europe policy was not studied by Soviet researchers, while PRC relations with other West European states, particularly the FRG and Great Britain, were the subject of thorough historical analyses by Soviet writers.²

The publication of T. I. Sulitskaya's study "Kitay i Frantsiya (1949-1981)" [China and France (1949-1981)] will fill this gap. It is also noteworthy that this work is the first comprehensive study of the full range and chronology of PRC relations with France in Soviet and foreign literature. The work is based on a broad range of sources and historical analyses, and many of the sources and studies used by the author are being made available to the scientific community for the first time. The bilateral relations are examined within the broad international context so that their place in international relations in general and in the foreign policy of the PRC and France in particular is clearly demonstrated, the common interests of the two states are revealed, the limits of their political cooperation are defined, etc.

The triumph of the people's revolution in 1949 and its support by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries gave China a chance to establish broad international contacts on a new basis, including ties with the capitalist countries of Europe. Obviously, the European countries had an interest in establishing the kind of relationship with China's new rulers that would allow them to maintain close economic ties with this country. This, however, was prevented by the policy of the United States, which was hostile toward the people's government from the beginning and tried to talk its allies in Europe into joint action against China. France was more dependent on U.S. policy than, for example, Great Britain, which recognized the new Chinese Government de jure on 6 January 1950.

Nevertheless, Paris tried to maintain channels for contact and the exchange of information with the PRC. The author stresses that despite the failure of the French Government to recognize the PRC, despite the absence of diplomatic relations and despite even the fact that France was far from friendly toward the PRC during the first years of its existence, the two sides maintained relations on an unofficial level. It is quite possible that the objective interest of both sides in the establishment of official relations might have led to their normalization by the summer of 1950 if the American intervention in Korea, as the author correctly points out, had not exacerbated the entire group of Far Eastern problems (pp 20-21).

China's participation in the 1954 Geneva conference became an important stage in Franco-Chinese relations. In general, the conference was an important milestone in the history of PRC international relations because it was the first time this country was represented at an international conference where all of the great powers were also represented. "For the People's Republic of China," T. I. Sulitskaya writes, "participation in a representative international conference provided an opportunity for direct political dialogue with representatives of leading powers in the capitalist world--England and France" (p 36). Much has already been written about China's participation in the Geneva conference, but T. I. Sulitskaya was nevertheless able to find new materials to shed additional light on this extremely important event. And it was important not only for China and Sino-French relations, but also for the fate of the people of Indochina.

The discussion of Indochina's problems at the Geneva conference began soon after the Vietnamese people's historic victory in Dienbienphu, which put France's colonial domination of this region on the verge of total collapse. The Chinese Government had its own view of regional developments, however, and made plans to take advantage of this situation primarily in its own interest. After making a show of support for the people of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the Chinese representative in Geneva consented to make serious concessions to French officials during confidential meetings with them. It was during these meetings that the Chinese side announced its willingness to recognize the existence of two administrations in Vietnam, thereby considerably reducing the jurisdiction of the DRV, to recognize the royal governments of Laos and Cambodia and to suggest the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Laos and Cambodia, including Vietnamese volunteers (p 37).

In the fear of possible U.S. intervention in the events in Indochina, which would pose a more serious threat to China itself, and in the hope of creating a "buffer zone" on its southern borders by means of the partition of Vietnam and the neutralization of Laos and Cambodia, the Chinese Government exerted pressure on the DRV leadership, urging it to make concessions to France and not hold up the conclusion of an agreement. It is significant that the head of the Chinese delegation addressed the leadership of the DRV and VWP directly, bypassing the Vietnamese delegation in Geneva (pp 37-38).

On the whole, the results of the Chinese delegation's activity at the Geneva conference must be assessed as a Franco-Chinese political compromise. Furthermore, this compromise was reached at the expense of a third party--against the

interests of the people of Indochina. Even at this time, however, official relations were not established between the two countries, primarily due to France's still considerable political dependence on the United States. Nevertheless, despite some unfriendly tendencies in French foreign policy toward the PRC, it is quite likely that the experience of their productive cooperation in Geneva, the Chinese side's strong interest in broader contact with the West and France's interest in the Chinese market constituted the basis for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. This question and its resolution--both in form and in content--warrants special consideration.

On the whole, the Chinese Government's approach to the establishment of diplomatic relations with other countries was clearly formulated when the creation of the PRC was announced in 1949. Article 56 of the general CPPCC program stipulated that China could establish relations with countries "which sever relations with the Guomindang reactionaries and take a friendly position toward the PRC."³ For several years the PRC Government adhered to the principles set forth in this article, insisting that countries wishing to establish relations with the PRC sever all ties with the Guomindang administration of Taiwan.

As we know, important fundamental changes were made in China's foreign policy line at the beginning of the 1960's. These changes coincided, according to T. I. Sulitskaya, "with the substantial redistribution of power in the capitalist world, one result of which was the attempt of West European countries to rid themselves of American guardianship" (p 55), and it was precisely France that began to reflect these tendencies in Western Europe. This gave China a stronger incentive to establish official relations with France.

An entire series of important events, analyzed in detail by the author, stimulated the positive resolution of the problem of diplomatic relations, and the stimulus was so strong that the PRC Government actually ignored the existence of French diplomatic relations with the Taiwan Guomindang regime. Furthermore, the Chinese side agreed to a definition of these diplomatic relations which did not contain French recognition of the PRC's sovereign rights to Taiwan. In our opinion, the author's detailed account of the diplomatic prehistory of Franco-Chinese relations (pp 78-84) is a great success.

Chinese diplomacy actively used the "French bridgehead" to broaden PRC foreign policy relations. Furthermore, it enjoyed the aid, support and even mediation of French officials in these efforts. It was in Paris that the talks on the establishment of PRC diplomatic relations with several countries took place, including relations with Italy and Chile. French diplomats played a part in the compilation of the compromise known as the "Canada formula" that served as the basis for the establishment of diplomatic relations with a number of capitalist countries which refused to officially recognize Taiwan as an integral part of the PRC but which were regarded by China as extremely desirable partners (pp 105, 167).

Another important result of Franco-Chinese rapprochement did not escape the author's attention either--France's role in the establishment and development of direct contact between China and America, which ultimately normalized

their relations and led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. France was the middleman during the preparations for H. Kissinger's confidential trips to Beijing and during the later China visit of the U.S. President.

France's dual reaction to the results of R. Nixon's visit to the PRC is noteworthy. On the one hand, the French were pleased with the results of the personal meetings between the leaders of these two states, but on the other hand, their judgments were somewhat reserved. This was due to the French Government's realization that France would gradually lose its privileged contacts with China as American-Chinese relations grew stronger and broader (p 110).

Although the normalization of American-Chinese relations and the subsequent establishment of PRC diplomatic relations with Japan and a number of other capitalist states did make Franco-Chinese relations less "privileged," several factors have sustained the interest of both sides in the maintenance of a fairly high level of political cooperation. There is no question that the most important of these is the common or similar view of both countries on many international issues (pp 110-115). Although in many areas of world politics the two sides have sympathized with one another's positions, there is at least one area in which the Chinese Government has pointedly criticized the French approach and has expressed dissatisfaction with it: Paris' relations with the SRV and Kampuchea.

Unfortunately, the author presents an extremely brief description of France's relations with the countries of Indochina, the reasons for Paris' interest in maintaining contact with them and its general position on problems connected with Indochina (pp 152-153).

It seems that the work could only be improved by a brief account of the salient features of Sino-French relations prior to the creation of the people's republic in China.

In the 1950's, China acted in concert with the socialist countries and took vigorous action within the framework of their common policy line. At that time, the world public was impressed by these actions, which were aimed at preventing the danger of armed conflicts, at stopping imperialist intervention in the affairs of other countries and at a universal and total ban on nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, this aspect of PRC Government activity in the world arena in the 1950's has not been discussed adequately in the work.

These shortcomings, however, do not detract in the slightest from the merits of T. I. Sulitskaya's study. We feel quite justified in saying that it will contribute to Soviet historical studies of the foreign policy of the PRC and of France.

FOOTNOTES

1. RENMIN RIBAO, 23 June 1983.

2. "Kitay i kapitalisticheskiye strany Yevropy" [China and the European Capitalist Countries], Moscow, 1976; M. I. Sladkovskiy, "Kitay i Angliya" [China and England], Moscow, 1980; A. I. Stepanov, "FRG i Kitay (k istorii otnosheniy. 1949-1974 gg.)" [The FRG and China (Notes for a History of Their Relations Between 1949 and 1974)], Moscow, 1974.
3. "Collected PRC Foreign Policy Documents," vol 1, Beijing, 1957, p 1 (in Chinese).

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ALL-UNION SINOLOGISTS ASSOCIATION FORMED JUNE 1983

'Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, Jan-Mar 84 (signed to press 29 Feb 84) pp 193-195

[Report on constituent conference of All-Union Sinologists Association on 22 June 1983 in Moscow]

[Text] On 22 June 1983 the constituent conference of the All-Union Sinologists Association was held in Moscow in the Center for Friendship with Foreign Countries. Around 250 delegates attended the conference, representing all of the main Sinology centers in the RSFSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirghizia and the cities of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Alma-Ata, Tashkent, Dushanbe, Frunze, Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Chita, Ulan-Ude and others. More than 60 scientific and other organizations in Moscow were represented at the conference. It was attended by virtually all of the leading Sinologists in our country.

In his introductory speech, Academician P. N. Fedoseyev, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, remarked that the conference was being held immediately after the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which called for a higher level of ideological and political work in the social sciences. The main purpose of the association is not only the intensification of applied science projects in Sinology, but also the reinforcement of organizational contacts and cooperation between Sinologists and social scientists throughout the country, the unification of their efforts and the coordination of their work. An indissoluble connection with the present day, research findings and a principled approach to the study of China from the position of proletarian internationalism have won prestige for Soviet Sinology in the world scientific community. Academician P. N. Fedoseyev stressed that our efforts are always focused on friendship with the Chinese people and that they have been consistent and invariable. The association charter envisages the promotion of the Soviet State's Leninist foreign policy toward China and the development of friendship and mutual understanding between the Soviet and Chinese populations.

A report on the creation of the All-Union Sinologists Association was presented by Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. I. Sladkovskiy, director of the academy Institute of the Far East (IDV). The speaker discussed the role and significance of the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the objectives of Soviet Sinology in line with its decisions. M. I. Sladkovskiy

remarked that contemporary Soviet Sinology has inherited the best traditions of the Sinology of the 1920's and 1930's and of Russian prerevolutionary Sinology.

In a discussion of the current complicated processes in China, the speaker stressed that during the difficult period of the "two lost decades," as it is described by the Chinese public, Soviet Sinology performed its internationalist duty to the Chinese people and expressed the belief that the creation of the association would promote continued and even more productive activity by Soviet Sinologists.

In his speech, O. B. Rakhmanin, first deputy chief of a CPSU Central Committee department, expressed the certainty that the creation of the All-Union Sinologists Association would intensify the in-depth study of various aspects of PRC policy and China's economy, philosophy, law, culture, traditions and language, would represent a new step in the popularization of the achievements of Soviet and Russian democratic Sinology and would aid in the further reinforcement of international contacts between our Sinologists, including Chinese scholars, and the PRC public. O. B. Rakhmanin remarked that genuine internationalism and scientific objectivity in the approach to the study of China had won Soviet Sinology great prestige in foreign countries, including the PRC. He stressed that the line of the Soviet Union and our party in relations with the PRC is clear, principled and consistent. It is not subject to temporary fluctuations and it considers the interests of the Soviet people and the interests of peace and progress. This line is certainly not contrary to the fundamental interests of the Chinese people, the interests of the Chinese revolution and the interests of the socialist cause in the PRC. The policy line in relations with China was elaborated at CPSU congresses and was reaffirmed at the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. When the general secretary of our party, Yu. V. Andropov, spoke at this plenum, he announced the sincere interest of our party and country in the development and improvement of relations with all socialist states, including the PRC. He also noted that the willingness to normalize relations should not be connected with demands for any kind of preliminary concessions from the Soviet Union. O. B. Rakhmanin stressed that the association and its actions should generate many interesting ideas, proposals and initiatives with regard to the extensive study of China and the popularization of the achievements of Soviet Sinology and should promote mutual understanding, friendship and good-neighbor relations between the people of the Soviet Union and China.

Academician S. L. Tikhvinskiy said in his report that Soviet Sinologists fully support the CPSU efforts to normalize relations with China and form a friendship with the Chinese people, and he said that the creation of this association attests to the desire of our people and our country to live in peace and friendship with their neighbor China.

During the years since the declaration of the PRC, S. L. Tikhvinskiy noted, Soviet Sinology has been quite successful in the study of China and in the familiarization of the Soviet public with the culture, art and history of this country. Our Sinologists are justifiably proud of their bold defense of the socialist cause in China during the years of the excesses of the "Cultural Revolution," which are now being condemned officially in the PRC.

Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences N. T. Fedorenko recalled that even prerevolutionary Russian Sinologists considered the need to unite their forces. They also wanted to perform their functions jointly. Now our Sinology has acquired new ranks and an immense scientific community has taken shape. Sinology itself has become a multifaceted and multileveled comprehensive science. Its functions demand the concentration of the energy of Sinologists, and it is the job of the association to promote this.

When Soviet Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the PRC I. S. Shcherbakov addressed the conference, he wished the All-Union Sinologists Association success in its work on behalf of the USSR embassy in the PRC. I. S. Shcherbakov said that Soviet Sinology had made an impressive contribution to the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations and expressed the certainty that the decisions of the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum would be implemented successfully in the field of Sinology.

I. A. Rogachev, head of a department and member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presented a report in which he expressed the belief that the creation of the association is a timely and pertinent matter and one wholly consistent with the line of our party's central committee. I. A. Rogachev shed light on some aspects of the present state of Soviet-Chinese relations.

Corresponding Member of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences R. B. Suleymenov commended the creation of the association on behalf of Kazakhstan's Sinologists. He said that Kazakh Sinology had taken shape in the lap of Russian democratic Sinology, but that its development had been particularly successful in the Soviet era. R. B. Suleymenov mentioned the great assistance rendered to Kazakh Sinological scientific establishments by the USSR Academy of Sciences IDV and Oriental Studies Institute and expressed his belief that the creation of a coordinating scientific organization such as the All-Union Sinologists Association had been both timely and necessary.

Professor V. M. Solntsev, deputy director of the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, said that this kind of association should have been created long ago. Soviet Sinology represents a multisectorial field of scientific knowledge, and the work of our Sinologists covers a broad range--from ancient times right up to the present day, to the study of the most pressing problems in present-day China. One of the association's important functions will be the coordination of the efforts of Sinologists working in different spheres. The creation of the association will lend organizational strength to our Sinology and will heighten the social significance of our work.

Col Gen Avn N. P. Dagayev, deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans, welcomed and congratulated conference participants on behalf of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans, uniting around 7 million veterans of the Civil War and Great Patriotic War. N. P. Dagayev noted that many Soviet veterans participated directly in aiding the Chinese people in military undertakings against the Japanese militarists and in the consolidation of the PRC armed forces and they remember the gratitude and sincere friendship of the

Chinese laboring public. Recalling these events and retaining their desire for friendly relations with the Chinese people, the Soviet veterans applaud the establishment of the All-Union Sinologists Association.

Conference participants were welcomed by Doctor of Historical Sciences M. Ya. Sushanlo, chief of the Oriental Studies Department of the Kirghiz SSR Academy of Sciences; A. A. Khamatova, dean of the School of Oriental Studies of the Far Eastern State University; Doctor of Historical Sciences R. F. Its, director of the Leningrad Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences Ethnography Institute; Professor G. V. Astaf'yev, doctor of historical sciences (IDV, USSR Academy of Sciences); and Candidate of Economic Sciences V. N. Remyga, chairman of the Young Scientists Council of the IDV, USSR Academy of Sciences.

The resolution on the establishment of the All-Union Sinologists Association was adopted unanimously at the conference. The association charter was also discussed at the conference. A report on this matter was presented by Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu. M. Galenovich, deputy director of the IDV, USSR Academy of Sciences. He said that the work on this charter had been going on for several months and had involved extensive discussion, including discussion at a session of the Scientific Council on Overseas Far Eastern Affairs in February 1983. The association, under the jurisdiction of the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium's Section on the Social Sciences, will engage in the regular exchange of information and close cooperation with other associations and scientific councils of the USSR Academy of Sciences and with scientific research and academic institutions in the country, including the Soviet Association of Political Science, the All-Union Orientalists Association, the Soviet Association of International Law, the USSR Philosophical Society and the National Committee of Historians of the Soviet Union. The association will use various forms of collaboration to accomplish a broader group of functions in the intensive and purposeful management of activity reflecting the interests of Soviet Sinologists.

The charter which was adopted unanimously at the constituent conference said that the goals and objectives of the association are the promotion of research, based on Marxist-Leninist methodology, into the domestic and foreign policy, economy, history, social thought, languages, literature and art of China; the promotion of the Soviet State's Leninist foreign policy in relations with China; support for the development of friendship and mutual understanding between the Soviet and Chinese populations; assistance in the popularization of knowledge about China.

The charter also underscores such association functions as the familiarization of the Soviet and foreign public with Soviet studies of current problems in Sinology and the consolidation of mutual understanding and international cooperation by scientists specializing in the field of Sinology.

The ratification of the charter was followed by elections to the board and auditing commission, the members of which were approved unanimously.

A meeting of the board was held the same day. Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. I. Sladkovskiy, director of the IDV, USSR Academy of

Sciences, was unanimously elected chairman of the All-Union Sinologists Association. The deputy chairmen will be (in alphabetical order): Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu. M. Galenovich, deputy director of the IDV, USSR Academy of Sciences; Academician of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences B. I. Iskandarov, director of the Institute imeni A. Donish; Doctor of Historical Sciences M. S. Kapitsa, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs; Doctor of Historical Sciences V. A. Krivtsov, deputy director of the IDV, USSR Academy of Sciences; Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. I. Krushanov, deputy chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences Far Eastern Scientific Center and director of the Institute of Far Eastern History, Archaeology and Ethnography; public spokesman and Doctor of Historical Sciences O. B. Rakhmanin; Doctor of Philological Sciences V. M. Solntsev, deputy director of the Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences; Corresponding Member of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences R. V. Suleymanov (Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography imeni Ch. Ch. Valikhanov); Academician S. L. Tikhvinskiy, secretary of the History Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences and rector of the Diplomatic Academy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Elections for the association board presidium and association secretariat were held at the same meeting.

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INSTITUTE HOLDS CONFERENCE ON AMERICAN SINOLOGY DECEMBER 1983

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[Report by P. Yu. Maslov on scientific theory conference on 14 December 1983 in Institute of the Far East, USSR Academy of Sciences: "American Sinology at the Present Time"]

[Text] On 14 December 1983 a scientific theory conference was held in the Institute of the Far East (IDV), USSR Academy of Sciences, on "American Sinology at the Present Time." When Deputy Director V. A. Krivtsov of the IDV, USSR Academy of Sciences, called the conference to order, he stressed that it would sum up some of the results of IDV studies of American bourgeois Sinology. The speeches and reports presented at the conference would indicate the main trends in American Sinology at the present time and lay the foundations for its scientific analysis and criticism. This is all the more important in view of the fact that bourgeois Sinology quite clearly and consistently reflects the official Washington policy line.

I. N. Korkunov presented a report on "American Sinologists on PRC Socioeconomic Affairs (1970's and 1980's)." The report contained some statements and conclusions about American Sinologists' theories about the current socioeconomic problems of the PRC. American Sinologists divide these problems into two groups--immediate concerns (inflation, employment, the improvement of the system of economic management, etc.) and fundamental problems (agricultural development, the limitation of population growth, etc.)--and maintain, as I. N. Korkunov pointed out, that even if the PRC is able to solve the first group of problems, the fundamental problems cannot be solved within the near future. In general, American Sinologists take a skeptical view of the possibility of successful economic reform in urban and rural China. Pointing out the complexity of these problems and the contradictory economic situation in the PRC, they try to "suggest" to China that pushing the economy into capitalist channels will solve these problems (they make references to the theory of comparative production costs and the study of the experience of Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan and the experiment in "vertical integration" in U.S. agriculture).

Works by American Sinologists on PRC foreign policy were analyzed and criticized in some reports and speeches. M. V. Koval' said in her report on

"American Researchers on Some Aspects of Chinese Policy in the Developing Countries in the 1980's" that U.S. researchers had displayed great interest in Chinese policy in the zone of the developing countries at the turn of the decade. They had the important job of determining the place of the "Third World" in Chinese global strategy in the 1980's and elaborating the appropriate recommendations for U.S. foreign policy agencies. In a report on "Contemporary American Researchers on Some Problems in Soviet-Chinese Relations," R. B. Svetlichnyy demonstrated through an analysis of the works of A. D. Barnett, R. Thornton, R. Scalapino and D. Zagoria of 1982-1983 that American researchers are seriously disturbed by the prospect of what they regard as the possible normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations. The speaker concluded that American bourgeois Sinology would prefer the preservation of tension in Soviet-Chinese relations. A. Ye. Blok analyzed the views of famous American Sinologist A. D. Barnett on the PRC's role in Southeast Asia, revealing the professional-utilitarian reasons for the appearance of remarks about the "nonaggressiveness" of PRC policy in Southeast Asia in his works of 1977-1982--that is, the period of the rapid development of Sino-American relations. M. N. Yumin reported on American historical studies of Soviet-Mongolian and Sino-Mongolian relations; N. S. Kuleshov presented a report on "Tibet. Foreign Policy Interpretation in American Historical Studies." K. P. Pleshakov (Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences) presented a report on "Contemporary American Historical Studies of the U.S. Image in China."

V. N. Nikiforov reported on two anniversary publications commemorating the 80th birthday of the renowned author of the concept of "Oriental despotism," Karl August Wittfogel (New York). V. N. Nikiforov discussed Wittfogel's scientific career in detail, outlining the basic stages in the development of his theory. The speaker cogently demonstrated the failure of Wittfogel's theory to explain the actual course of history in China and other Oriental countries. It is of a clearly anti-Marxist nature and is actively used in the United States by anticommunist and reactionary forces.

Ye. V. Yakimova presented a report on "Social Psychology in U.S. Sinology." She stressed that the social psychology school in the United States came into being in the mid-1960's and has grown considerably since then. Objective trends in the development of the PRC are "overlooked" in works by American social psychologists, and this robs the ideological criticism of "Sinified Marxism" of all meaning. This is also the reason for the anti-Marxist thrust of the social psychology school in American Sinology.

A. N. Zhelokhovtsev said in his report on "The Dual Approach to Contemporary Chinese Literature in American Sinology in the Early 1980's" that the development of Chinese-American relations had forced U.S. Sinologists to give up their previous wholly negative attitude toward contemporary Chinese literature and culture. At the same time, influential U.S. forces began to give all-round support to developments in Chinese life which have evoked the harshest criticism from the Chinese leadership. In particular, a group of Americans began to study "opposition" elements within the Chinese society. Therefore, American Sinology has simultaneously presented "two faces"--friendly and hostile--to the PRC, A. N. Zhelokhovtsev stressed.

Several reports and speeches dealt with some problems in Chinese history in works by American Sinologists. In his report on "The Theory of the Chinese Revolution in Works by American Researcher M. Meisner," F. B. Belelyubskiy examined some aspects of Meisner's interpretation of ideological problems in the history of the Chinese revolution. In the speaker's opinion, Meisner's discussion of populist elements in the outlook of the Chinese revolutionaries of the first half of the 20th century represents a step forward in comparison to the empirical and eclectic works of many of his colleagues. The existence of revolutionary-democratic elements in the theory and practice of the Chinese revolution is indisputable, but M. Meisner, according to F. B. Belelyubskiy, erroneously ignores the role of the social activity of the patriarchal type of peasantry that had not entered the system of commodity and money relations as yet.

I. A. Yakovlev said in his report on "American Historical Studies of the Competition Between Wang Jingwei and Hu Hanmin in the 1930's" that Sun Yatsen's former supporters Wang Jingwei and Hu Hanmin disagreed after his death in their interpretations of his ideas about the future political development of China. American authors generally adhere undiscerningly to Chiang Kai-shek's historical analyses in discussions of this topic.

In a report on "R. Thornton on the United Anti-Japanese Front in China in the 1930's," N. I. Novak analyzed several works by the American Sinologist and criticized his attempts to base his own interpretation of the events of the 1930's in China on an anti-Soviet, anticommunist foundation. V. N. Usov ("American Historical Studies of the Period of 'Regulation' in PRC History") discussed works by American Sinologists who had tried to analyze the period preceding the notorious "Cultural Revolution" with the aid of extensive documented information.

Conference participants noted that American Sinology is actively serving Washington's line of broader relations with the PRC. Furthermore, in some cases American bourgeois Sinologists have tried to influence the situation in China directly by guiding it into channels acceptable to official Washington. The conclusions of American Sinologists with regard to Chinese history and various aspects of Chinese domestic, economic and cultural affairs are widely used for attacks on Marxist-Leninist theory.

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75TH BIRTHDAY OF CHINA HISTORIAN ASTAF'YEV NOTED

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[Text] It has been 50 years since the beginning of the scientific-pedagogical career and 75 years since the birth of Professor Gennadiy Vasil'yevich Astaf'yev, doctor of historical sciences, prominent Orientalist and honored scientist of the RSFSR.

Throughout his life, G. V. Astaf'yev, wherever he may have been--in his position in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade, in the ranks of the Soviet Army or within the walls of the scientific research institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences--has worked long and productively on the resolution of complex and pressing scientific problems.

It would be impossible not to mention the breadth of the scientific erudition of G. V. Astaf'yev, who speaks in his works as a geographer, historian, economist and expert on international relations. His monographs include "The Economic Geography of Xinjiang" (1938), "American Expansion in China" (1949), "China's Economic Problems" (1950), "American Imperialism and Chinese Foreign Trade" (1955), "U.S. Intervention in China and Its Defeat" (1958) and "The Economy of the Developing Countries" (in the book "Mirovaya ekonomika" [The World Economy], 1966, 1969). G. V. Astaf'yev is also one of the main authors of the books "Vneshnyaya politika KNR" [PRC Foreign Policy] (1971), "Ot antiimperializma k antisotsializmu" [From Anti-Imperialism to Antisocialism] (1974), "Vneshnyaya politika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya KNR" [PRC Foreign Policy and International Relations], vols 1-2 (1974), "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya na Dal'nem Vostoke" [International Relations in the Far East], vols 1-2 (1978) and several others. For the past few years G. V. Astaf'yev has worked as an author and editor on major monographic studies compiled in the Institute of the Far East, USSR Academy of Sciences.

In addition to conducting intensive research, for many years G. V. Astaf'yev also worked as a scientific organizer (sector head and deputy director of the Institute of the Far East, USSR Academy of Sciences).

G. V. Astaf'yev has also been actively involved in scientific education. Hundreds of Soviet Orientalists remember the meaningful lectures Professor Astaf'yev presented in the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, the Moscow

State University imeni M. V. Lomonosov and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. More than 20 of G. V. Astaf'yev's post-graduate students have defended candidates' and doctoral dissertations. At the present time, four post-graduate students are working successfully under his guidance.

G. V. Astaf'yev is a permanent member of the editorial board of PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA.

Professor G. V. Astaf'yev, doctor of historical sciences and honored scientist of the RSFSR, is celebrating his birthday with tireless, active and creative work. All of G. V. Astaf'yev's many students, friends and colleagues wish him good health, a long and fruitful career and success in all of his scientific plans.

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